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ABSTRACT
This thesis is an examination of the failure of the European Community 
and subsequently of the European Union to develop a full common air­
transport policy. The main issues on which the present study focuses are the 
reciprocal influences, interactions and confrontations of national and EC air­
transport policy interests. It is demonstrated that they obstructed the process 
of the air-transport market liberalization and inhibited the development of an 
integrated EC air-transport policy. The years covered by the doctorate are 
1987 to 1993.
The thesis explains how the interests of member-states and major 
corporations in a period of major structural adjustment blocked the creation of 
a common air-transport policy; instead EC institutions were subordinated to 
the powerful national air-transport interests of the member-states and of their 
champion carriers.
The thesis is based on an extensive examination of primary sources 
and interview materials. This not only comprises new empirical information 
about the specific characteristics and nature of EC air-transport politics and 
policy, but also takes into account the broader politico-economic 
characteristics of the member-states air-transport policies and systems.
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INTRODUCTION
" In every region of the world, countries large and small depend on their aviation 
industry to fuel their economic growth and their financial strength" IATA 1992
Air transport is an international economic activity of considerable 
magnitude and prime importance. Viewed from a worldwide perspective it 
benefits technological progress by manufacturing aircraft, engines and other 
related equipment; it promotes trade by mobilizing freight and imported goods, 
but most importantly it operates services for travel and tourism - at a total 
value of output of $ 250 trillion it is the world's largest single industry after 
petroleum. In 1989 air transport provided more than twenty-one million jobs for 
the world's workforce and US $ 700 billion in annual gross output. The number 
of passengers approximated the one fifth of the world's population, and almost 
a quarter (by value) of world international trade in manufactured goods was 
transported by air. The total yearly value of all scheduled and non-scheduled 
airlines' revenues approached $200 billion - equivalent to about 1.5 per cent of 
world Gross National Product (GNP). The international air-transport's 
revenues amounted to $100 billion, close to one half of the total value of 
international tourist receipts or about 7 per cent of world export in 
manufactured goods1. The Table below compares the proportional 
percentages of the world's population with their proportional percentages in 
the world's total international scheduled air services. It is evident that there is a 
disproportional development of population and scheduled air services in 
different parts of the world.
Despite its international character, air transport is largely associated 
with national identity: national airlines are often seen as a national virility
11nternational Air-Transport Association (IATA) Report, 1992; International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Bulletin, 
1989; International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) Report, 1992: 9-10; Lipman, 1990; Zylicz, 1991: xv-xvi.
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Parts of the world Proportion in % of Proportion in % of
world population_______ world air services
North America 5.2 21.5
Europe
Asia and the Pacific 55.7
15.2
29.0
35.5
Africa, the Middle East, 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 23.9 14.0
Sources: ICAO Bulletin 1989; Zylich, 1991: xvi
symbol facilitating political influence on other countries - as flag carriers. 
Moreover, governments have traditionally recognized civil aviation as critical to 
their defense in association with their military aviation strategy and their 
foreign policy2.
Compared to the other modes of transport, air transport is a most vital 
aspect of the public policy serving national, economic and social goals. Air 
transport as a direct and indirect earner of foreign exchange, is a major 
contributor to a country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP): as a direct earner it 
provides foreign exchange by operating in foreign countries; indirectly, tourism 
as a major source of foreign exchange in part depends on it. In addition, air 
transport is a provider of employment at very high skill levels (e.g. pilots and 
flight engineers), as well as of air-traffic controllers, personnel in airport 
infrastructures and security. Finally, it also helps to keep communications 
open to a country's remoter parts.
In 1989 the total value of output of the European Community (EC) air­
transport industry was ECU 42 billion or one per cent of the Aggregate Gross 
Domestic Product (AGDP) of the EC. In 1984 the sector was employing 
320,000 personnel, excluding another 200,000 employed at airports such as
2 Corbet, 1965; Davies, 1964; Dempsey, 1987; Dobson, 1991; Gidwitz, 1980; Lissilzyn, 1942; Mendes, 1991; Sampson, 
1984; Sochor, 1991; Thayer, 1965; Thornton, 1970; Zylicz, 1992: 3-57.
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air-traffic controllers, Civil Aviation Administrations/Authorities (CAA) 
employees, ground handling and other services outside the over one hundred 
and sixty EC airlines themselves.3
As a result, the desire of governments to protect their own airlines as 
instruments serving their politico-economic interests has been and continues 
to be of paramount influence, while the demise of national airlines, or their 
acquisition and control by a foreign-owned carrier, remains anathema. Given 
these circumstances, ever since its inception, air transport has been the one 
of the most thoroughly regulated industry in the world4. In this context, the 
ineffectiveness, in the last three decades, in the implementation of the EC 
competition rules for air transport has been no coincidence.
In 1987, the EC was obliged to liberalize its air transport, mainly 
because of radical reforms within the international air-transport arena. 
However, although unavoidable, the liberalization process was not in the best 
interests of most of the EC member-states and their national airlines. Since 
the EC was unable to draw up a transitional policy except by relying wholly on 
the co-operation of its member-states, it is not so very surprising that the 
process of air-transport liberalization failed to become a common EC air­
transport policy.
Purpose of the thesis.
The complete absence of any detailed and comprehensive analysis 
explaining the failure of the EC liberalization strategy to become a common 
EC air-transport policy was the major motivation for the present thesis. An 
analysis of this kind can now be undertaken given that before 1993 it was too 
early to draw conclusions about success or failure concerning liberalization as
3 Association of European Airlines (AEA), 1989; Commission of the EC. 15 Mar. 1984: 57; Financial Times. 1 August 
1991.
4 Caves, 1962; Davies, 1964; Doganis, 1985, 1986, 1991; Murias, 1989; Pryke, 1987; Raben, 1984; Richmond, 1961; 
Zylich, 1991.
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a common public policy in the EC air-transport industry. The fact that until 
1986 air transport remained a dormant service-subsector of the EC policy and 
decision-making process does not, however, justify the lack until today of any 
serious academic comparative analysis of the twelve national air-transport 
policies.
There are hundreds of publications on airline-industry regulation and 
deregulation, which focus on the USA and to a lesser extent on Canada and 
Australia, but no quantitatively equivalent literature for Europe, still less for the 
EC. (The effect of the deliberations by experts on US-airline regulation and 
deregulation policies between the late 1960's and the early 1990's is 
discussed in chapter I). Although there is ample evidence in the literature on 
the general EC policy-making and decision-making processes, very little is 
available on the policy for transport generally5 and still less on air transport in 
particular. Moreover, most of the EC literature on air transport undertaken 
before or during the liberalization process of the EC air-transport market 
largely took the form of policy advocacy or a preoccupation concerned with 
legal, economic or overall European dimensions.6
This thesis explore failures in the common implementation of 
liberalization policy in the EC air-transport sector. It has to be judged primarily 
by its empirical investigations and its politico-economic interpretation of the 
reasons why liberalization has failed to become a common EC air-transport 
policy. Two main arguments sustain the above major premise of this thesis. 
One suggests that within the EC institutional structures and functions only 
national, and especially strong, air-transport interests for and against the 
liberalization of the EC air-transport policy instead of common EC ones; and 
the second shows the effect of existing corporatist interests within the
6 Banister and Button, 1991; Bayfiss, 1979; Bromhead, 1974, 1979; Button and Pitfield, 1991; Clinton, 1988; Despicht, 
1964; also 1969 and 1972; Erdmerger, 1983; Greaves, 1991; Munby, 1962; Whitelegg, 1988; Wistrich, 1983.
6 Abbott and Thompson, 1989; Barrett, 1987; Button and Swann, 1989, 1991; Doganis, 1985, 1989, 1991, 1994; 
Dempsey, 1988; Haanappel, 1990; McGowan and Trengove, 1986; McGowan and Seabright, 1989; Peikmans, 1986, 
1991; Pryke, 1988; Raben, 1984; Sawers, 1987; Slot and Dagtoglou, 1989; Tretheway, 1991; Wheateroft, 1956; 
Wheatcroft and Lipman, 1986,1990.
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member-states which precluded and prevented liberalization from becoming a 
successful common EC air-transport policy. Thus it has been my objective to 
examine how the above organized vested interests have employed various 
policy networks and strategies to obstruct the liberalization process of the EC 
air-transport industry to become a common EC air-transport policy.
Methods employed
A large part of my research consisted of approximately eighty 
unstructured interviews, which have provided a great deal of interesting 
evidence. The information obtained came from both formal interviews and 
informal discussions, conducted face-to-face, taped, and transfered to 
transcripts. Certain parts of these interviews or discussions with anonymous 
sources are kept in a private file.
I originally intended to use EC files and archives, but it was impossible 
to obtain even general statements about specific attempts at mergers or other 
proposals, because such information is commercially very sensitive and EC 
officials are extremely strict and discrete7. It was my personal impression that 
they were strongly advised and even obliged to treat outsiders, and particularly 
researchers, with great circumspection especially when questioned about their 
personal relationships with their colleagues, the Commissioners and/or intra- 
Community activities.
Despite these difficulties I was able to interview many prominent EC 
officials from the European Commission and the Council of Ministers, 
responsible for various EC air-transport policy proposals from their draft stage 
until their adoption. In addition I interviewed member-states officials residing 
permanently in Brussels such as transport attaches and counsellors, as well as
7 The office of Mrs. Vasso Papandreou, Commissioner of Directorate General V for EC Social Affairs, sent me a letter 
specifying to me: "Your access to the archives of the EC is difficult - we would say impossible- because they have a 
confidential character" Brussels, 29 June 1990 - D/90/463 A/90/6649).
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officials from major organizations representing airlines, trade unions and 
consumers within the EC. Therefore part of my thesis is both attitudinal and 
behavioural because it is based on responses to questions posed by me to 
interviewees, and it provides a collection of reactions and overt actions of 
witnesses to the predominant characteristics of the air- transport interests’ 
processes from a variety of different perspectives.
Thus I consider interviewees as supportive of my argument which is 
both inductive and deductive in that it is partly abstracted from the EC air­
transport policy communities' behaviour and attitudes and partly deduced from 
the overall EC air-transport policy-making procedures.
Bibliography
I have consulted the primary and secondary material listed in the 
bibliography. For a detailed chronological examination of specific air-transport 
policy issues and events during the period of research (1986-1993), I made 
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journals such as Air Transport World. Airline Business. Institute of Air 
Transport (ITA). Journal of Air Law and Commerce. Common Market Law 
Review. Transportation Journal. Journal of Transport Economics and Policy 
etc. To familiarize myself with the major concerns and issues of the air­
transport trade unions I studied the International Transport Workers' 
Federation's (ITF) monthly ITF News for the same period of time. I also read 
through annual statistical reports and bulletins of major international, regional 
and leading air-transport organizations such as the International Air-transport 
Association (IATA), International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the 
European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC), and the Association of European 
Airlines (AEA). The bibliography lists all works consulted in the process of 
writing this thesis.
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The outline of the thesis
The present thesis is divided into nine chapters.
Chapter I presents a brief historical account of the period when it was 
mainly US and UK air-transport politics and policies which regulated 
international air-transport. The chapter explains why US airline deregulation 
has been, and remains, a deeply controversial public-policy issue in 
international air transport.
Chapter II deals exclusively with the overall historical and policy 
development of EC primary and secondary air-transport legislation until 1986. 
Its main contribution is a detailed analysis of the twelve member-states' 
national air-transport regulatory arrangements as they existed before EC 
secondary air-transport competition policy began to affect them. The chapter 
provides a brief description of the formal institutional structure of the EC air­
transport policy and decision-making process.
Chapter III outlines the EC's secondary air-transport legislation, and 
explains the pressures for reform between 1979 and 1993. It also briefly 
examines the impact of implementing the policy on competition within the 
overall EC air-transport policy. Finally, it introduces the EC actors and their 
structures.
Chapter IV provides a detailed understanding of EC air-transport 
politics. It focuses (i) on the power struggles between Commissioners and 
Eurocrats, as well as their efforts on behalf of their respective national 
concerns in the EC's air-transport policy; and (ii) the member countries' 
intricate manoeuvering to accommodate their strictly national interests in the 
overall EC air-transport policy. It shows to what extent they acted individually 
or co-jointly, and identifies their air-transport policy and decision-making 
networks in the air-transport sector.
Chapter V concentrates on four cases presenting significant empirical
evidence of what has been said in ch.IV. It outlines the controversial role of
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specific Commissioners and Eurocrats in air transport, and their acrimonious 
controversies in the pursuit of national air-transport objectives.
Chapters VI and VII focus on responses from both employers/ airlines 
and employees to the EC liberalization process, and to what extent these have 
influenced the EC's air-transport policy. Chapter VI looks at the 
interrelationships of leading EC airline associations and the central and 
controversial role of the AEA's champion airlines and the strategies used by 
them and the smaller EC national airlines during the EC air-transport 
liberalization process. Chapter VII provides a rational and systematic exegesis 
of the twelve EC members' labour-union attitudes and their reactions to a 
process that ran directly counter their interests.
Chapter VIII discusses the interesting micro-corporatist alliance 
between the AEA and the ITF. Their common EC front and the creation of the 
Joint Committee of Civil Aviation (JCCA) are explained as part of a plan to 
slow down the liberalization process after the Gulf War crisis.
Chapter IX is a final summary. A systematic comparison of pre-1987 
and post-1993 air-transport regimes is used as the basis for an assessment of 
why, by the end of 1993, the EC air-transport liberalization policy had not 
succeeded in becoming a common EC air-transport policy.
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CHAPTER I
INTERNATIONAL AND US AIR-TRANSPORT POLITICS AND POLICY IN
RETROSPECT
" The drastic deregulation in the USA has been the beginning of a worldwide 
movement towards diminished government control and increased competition...
This movement may be reluctant, it may not be as drastic as in the USA, but it 
is there. The effects are noticeable around the world" Karel Van Miert, 19911
This introductory chapter provides an historical background to the 
regulatory development of the international air-transport industry. It 
emphasizes the constant US and UK interactions and conflicts that have 
determined the character and nature of the international aviation system for 
passenger transport, and maps out the experiences of the US domestic-airline 
deregulation policy2 and its spillover effects in the international air-transport 
industry.
1. International Air-Transport Policy 1919-1978
It was the USA and the UK, the two major air-transport world leaders, 
that initiated and have been shaping the regulatory development of 
international and EC air-transport policies until today. There is a long history of 
both disputes and agreements over access to the North Atlantic Region, still a 
major bone of contention between European and US airlines, and therefore of 
European and US politics.3 This region has always dominated international air­
transport traffic, and in 1985 accounted for just under one-third (28 per cent) 
of international air-passenger kilometers as illustrated in Figure 1.1. A correct 
understanding of the American and British roles in the EC air-transport policy 
and decision-making process depends, therefore, on appreciating their historic 
politico-economic interests in the international arena.4
1ITF Report, 1992:19.
2Deregulation is the abolition of direct governmental intervention in the economic affairs of the airline industry. It can 
involve the termination of a specific method of control, or the removal of restrictions, or both. Golich, 1990:157.
3Salacuse, 1980; Sampson, 1984: 54.
Tor a thorough analysis of the US-UK politics and diplomacy in international aviation see Dobson, 1991.
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Figure 1.1: Major International Passenger Traffic Flows, 1985 (% of Total International Pax-Km in Circles are International Flows Within the Region).
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International aviation history has gone through three different phases. 
The first was the inter-war period from 1919 to 1939. In 1919 the Paris 
International Convention based its international air-transport policy on the 
principle of a state's unrestricted sovereign control over its airspace. This was 
reaffirmed by the Havana Convention in 1928. Between the wars it was the 
USA and the UK who dominated international air-transport and, since they had 
no irreconcilable differences, their negotiations led to a consensus regime. 
Broadly speaking, in the aftermath of World War I all states believed the 
primary objectives of international airlines to be political5 and military6 rather 
than commercial and social.7
In 1929 the Warsaw Convention set up the rules for private 
(commercial) international air-transport legislation. The Warsaw system, in 
which 123 states participated, was universally accepted as the basic treaty 
document uniformly regulating conditions for international air-transport in 
respect of documentation as well as rights and obligations affecting the 
airlines and individual passengers. The Warsaw Convention results were 
further developed and/or amended by the Hague Protocol of 1955, the 
Guadalajara Convention of 1961, the Montreal Interim Agreement of 1966, the 
Guatemala City Protocol of 1971, and the four Montreal Protocols of 1975.8
The second phase was the period after World War II (1945-1978), and 
was covered by the Chicago-Bermuda I and Bermuda II agreements. In 1944, 
fifty-two governments got together in Chicago to discuss the future of 
international aviation and laid down the ground rules for public international 
air-transport legislation. This was based on bilateral agreements concerning
5State and corporate airlines were and still are closely linked with international politics. They have, therefore, been used 
as competitive weapons in international negotiations, often in ways totally unrelated to the airline industry. For example, 
an air right may be conceded in bargaining for some coveted point in an agricultural agreement.
®The importance of military aviation during the two World Wars resulted in the development of civil aviation. Bockstiegel, 
1985.
7Gidwitz, 1980:135-58; Doganis, 1991: 46-48; Jonsson, 1987: 6-8, 27-31, 45; Murias, 1989:17-43; Kasper, 1988: 45-47, 
70-71; Lissilzyn, 1942: 38-93; Strange, 1988: 152; Thornton, 1970: 70, 1971: 192-97; Weisman, 1990: 12; Wheatcroft, 
1964: 46-57.
8Zylich, 1991: 89-104.
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primarily air-transport privileges, i.e. the seven traffic rights9 which are listed in 
Appendix 1.1. They also cover (i) the exchange of commercial or "hard" rights 
(e.g. frequencies, capacities, and access to air routes); (ii) substantive 
economic rights (e.g. air fares, currency conversion, and profit repatriation); 
(iii) certain technical safety and security issues (e.g. recognition of licenses); 
and (iv) ancillary services or "soft" rights deemed essential to both serving 
passengers and airport traffic, such as maintenance, ground handling, and so 
forth). On the other hand the Chicago Convention failed in the matter of basic 
multilateral agreements covering legal and economic issues affecting the 
operation of civil aircraft in international air transport (e.g. over flight rights, 
nationality of aircraft, technical and facilitation matters, trade association 
activities and pricing agreements).10
As a consequence of the Chicago Conference two regulatory bodies 
were established for international aviation: the International Air-Transport 
Association (IATA),11 a non-governmental organization for the promotion of 
economic air transport and co-operation between airlines;12 and the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), assisting the development 
and maintenance of operational, technical, and safety standards and 
practices.13
During that period the USA, as the dominant air transport power, was 
pressing for a liberalized aviation policy worldwide. It regarded European air­
transport regulation14 as cartelism.15 Unlike Britain with its global empire, the
gTraffic rights were subsumed under the notion of "freedoms of the air".
10Haanappel, 1984: 9-33; Jonsson, 1987: 33-4, 45; Kasper, 1988: 45-72; Naveau, 91-104, 128-31; Thornton, 1970: 70; 
Weisman, 1990:12-14; Zylich, 1991:47-81,135-54.
11ln Havana, Cuba, in April 1945.
12ln allowing IATA to be the forum for negotiating air fares, governments avoided domestic criticism for fore increases.
13 Barett, 1987: 8-9; Brancker, 1977; Eggers, 1991: 113; Golich, 1990: 160, 173; Haanappel, 61-77, 89-116, 167-76, 
183-88; Kotaite, 1991: 89-99; Kasper, 1988: 49; Murias, 1989: 44-51; Naveau, 1989: 25-35, 51-66, 126-28; Strange, 
1988:153; Wheatcroft and Lipman, 1986: 36-38; Zylich, 1991: 82-88,155-67.
14Regulation is a process of governmental intervention consisting primarily of intentional economic restrictions. For a 
detailed analysis for the philosophy behind such regulation see Reagan, 1987.
15Cartelism (or trust) in air transport refers a collusive association of usually state-owned airlines formed to monopolize 
the production and distribution of air services.
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USA had lacked routes and landing rights at bases located strategically along 
trunk routes. On the other hand the UK, apprehensive of the emergence of an 
American monopoly against which it could not profitably compete, was arguing 
for controlled development rather than unlimited competition. In consequence 
the UK emerged as the countervailing power to US air-transport domination - 
a result which, it has been argued, was actually a political defeat.16
More specifically, international operations were too vital to British and 
European airlines to be left in the hands of the US, especially since most 
European air traffic was international rather than domestic. Hence, Britain and 
the European countries saw IATA as a means for restraining what they feared 
as the unbridled ambition of the USA to overrun the North Atlantic with 
increased airline capacity and lower fares. The UK and other European 
countries, inevitably felt a certain animus against the USA, both because they 
had to turn to US manufacturers to obtain turbo-jet aircraft, and because the 
US airlines were able to finance and could obtain aircraft before their 
European competitors.17
The growth of US airline manufacture had three important 
consequences. The first was commercial: the US aircraft industry was the only 
market where foreign airlines could buy aircraft. Secondly, the fact that the 
other countries had no alternative supplier was used by Washington as a 
means for politico-economic pressure in all kinds of negotiations. Finally, the 
US government realized the importance of airline manufacture for its national 
defense and military operations.18 C. C. Cundiff, special negotiator for 
transportation affairs of the US Department of State said in 1992
18Jonsson, 1987:48,101,117; Sampson, 1984:179-90; Strange, 1988:153; Taneja, 1980:11; Thornton, 1970: 26,117.
17Haanapel, 1984: 78-86; Jonsson, 1987:4-9; Murias, 1989:115.
1sThe US Civil Reserve Air Fleet (USCRAF) was set up in the 1950s and has been in existence with varying degrees of 
participation ever since. It is an arrangement whereby participating airlines agree to modify their fleets to make them 
available to the US military for use in the event of national mobilization. A recent example was the transport of US troops 
to Kuwait during the Gulf War.
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" There are national security concerns that must be satisfied before any large 
scale opening to foreign investors is permitted. The US Civil Reserve Air 
Fleets (CRAF) program played a vital role in Desert Shield/Storm 
operations"19
The widespread apprehension in the UK and other countries was, 
therefore, based on the recognition that the US persistent preaching of 
laissez-faire, which squared so well with America's self-interests, really meant 
laissez-nous faire. In air transport laissez-faire is the doctrine of unrestricted 
freedom to operate air services. Not surprisingly the USA has been repeatedly 
accused of aero-imperialism, chiefly because of its lack of enthusiasm for 
deregulating others of its industries where it was competitively weaker, such 
as shipping.20
The clash between the divergent US and UK air-transport interests 
resulted in acrimonious bargaining and negotiations processes (horse trading), 
over landing rights, gateways21 and freedoms. In 1946, they reached the 
Bermuda I Agreement, which was essentially, a US-UK compromise. It 
enabled these two states to impose their air-transport bargaining power22 on 
third countries, notwithstanding their own fundamental disagreement over the 
underlying international air policy.23
However, American pressure for the creation of a competitive 
international air-transport market kept increasing, and reached its climax in the 
early 1970s. In spite of US pressures for international competition, the UK 
Labour government thirty years later, on the 22 June 1976, denounced the 
Bermuda I agreement, alleging that it benefited US air carriers much more 
than those of the UK. After protracted and heated discussions the two states 
eventually reached another agreement, on 23 July 1977, known as Bermuda
19ITF Report, 1992: 9.
20Jonsson, 1987: 53,147; Murias, 1989:19-43; Strange, 1988:154,157; Taneja, 1980:11.
21 Gateway is a means, and in air-transport an airport, of entry or access to a domestic or a foreign air transport market.
22Power here is the ability of any country to influence and even enforce its air transport will on other states.
^Doganis, 1991: 57-58; Golich, 1990:160-61; Haanappel, 1984: 27-39; Jonsson, 1987: 99,114-15; Murias, 1989: 52-72, 
106; Naveau, 1989: 36-50; Salacuse, 1980; Thornton, 1970: 26,117; Weisman, 1990:12.
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II.24 The above UK-US dispute ushered in the third period, which ran from 
1978 until 1993, and brought the gradual deregulation of air transport 
internationally.
Not surprisingly, after Britain's change in air-transport policy, America's 
persistent and continuous pressure for a liberalized global regime took a new 
dynamic turn, arising out of two very important US considerations in the 
international air-transport arena. First, in June 1978, the US view, that IATA 
should concern itself with technical matters, such as navigation and safety and 
should have no jurisdiction over economic issues, led the USA to propose the 
so called Show Cause Order (SCO) as shown in Appendix I.2.25 This required 
IATA and other interested parties to show the reasons for supporting an anti­
competitive trust that decided international airline prices. The USA suspended 
all operating and commercial rights granted to international airlines within the 
USA, and prohibited membership and participation in IATA activities to all US 
airlines. By doing so, Washington expressed its politico-economic dismissal of 
and threat to the air-transport policies followed by the UK and the rest of the 
world. However, this attempt to question the legitimacy of the most important 
international air-transport organization failed. The USA was not able to divide 
the international community, and obtained no support from other countries. 
Instead it found itself faced with a worldwide coalition of opponents. In 
consequence, the USA had to withdraw its Show Cause Order.26
The second US action, following hard on the heels of the SCO fiasco, 
was the deregulation of its domestic airline industry in October 1978. This had 
marked repercussions and created a great deal of controversy in the political 
economy of international and particularly EC air-transport policy-making.27
24Doganis, 1985: 56-60; Gallacher, 1990; Golich, 1990:161; Haanappel, 1984: 40-41; Murias, 1989: 141-146; McGowan 
andTrengove, 1986:149; Naveau, 1989:134-38; Weisman, 1990: 26.
“ Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) Order 78-6-78.
“ Fort, 1991:102; Haanappel, 1984:157-64; Jonsson, 1987: 37-8,127-51; Naveau, 1989:152-54.
27Wassenberg, 1988: 3-8.
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Observers have pointed out that the US airline deregulation had an 
important effect on the relationship between regulation and deregulation. They 
noted that regulation reforms had usually called for greater regulatory or 
incremental28 policy, or at least for a flexible regulatory or decremental29 policy, 
so as to allow the airline industry to respond to market forces. In other words, 
reformers usually focus on means. The new US deregulation movement, on 
the other hand, focused largely on ends, that is, on the political process of a 
statutory termination of the regulatory airline policy. Unlike previous reform 
efforts, therefore, US airline industry deregulation was considered as a radical 
policy alternative that contradicted conventional wisdom about the dynamics of 
regulatory politics. The academics concluded that, although regulatory reform 
and deregulation were not the same thing, the political move in favor of the 
former probably served as a catalyst for the creation of the latter, but did not 
result in its major transformation. Given that this directs attention to several 
features of the politico-economic process, behaviour and conditions 
associated with developing such a radical policy change, it is necessary to 
examine the evolution of the politico-economic process in the US that led to 
deregulation, and which eventually brought about a new and radically different 
air-transport policy all over the world.30
2. The Development of Airline Deregulation in the USA
In 1938 the US Congress passed the country's first airline industry 
regulatory legislation, the Civil Aeronautics Act (CAA)31, in response to 
pressures from the larger airlines that were hit by the recession of 1937.32
28Incrementalism prescribes increased and expanded procedural and organizational solutions for remedying regulatory 
problems.
Decremerrtalism moves in the direction of deregulation by introducing non-regulatory forms of intervention, but does not 
terminate regulation.
30Brown, A., 1987: xii; Dempsey, 1992: 13. For a thorough analysis of the theoretical and empirical premises of the 
international and US aviation regime changes see Jonsson, 1987 and Brown, A., 1987. For a general analysis of the role 
of interest groups in the regulatory and deregulatory processes see Noll and Owen, 1983.
31Publ. L. No. 706, 52 Stat. 973,1938.
32 Economic regulation was initiated by the Kelly Act in 1925.
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They were convinced that the hitherto unregulated air-transport market was
vulnerable to destructive competition. The CAA established the Civil 
Aeronautics Board (CAB), to regulate and administer the US airline sector. Its 
powers were augmented by the Federal Aviation Act (FAA), of 1958.33 
Thereafter US air transport remained heavily regulated until the US 
government deregulated it in 1978. The abolition of extensive economic 
regulation in large US transport industries was prompted by a political and 
academic consensus that had gradually grown up over the years.34
In the late 1960s and early 1970s the change in US politico-economic 
attitudes was chiefly due to the influence of academic think-tanks, especially 
the Chicago School of Economics, which embraced the tenets of New Right 
neo-liberalism35 and social conservatism. They advocated a political economy 
that sought a minimum of governmental intervention, deunionization, and 
deregulation, as a way of reducing social costs, a move which in their view 
would benefit the consumers. In other words, they basically rejected two 
doctrines which were frequently invoked to explain government involvement in 
certain industries: public utility regulation and oligopoly/monopoly doctrines.36 
It has been noted that
" The changes in the international position of the USA that had exhausted its 
capacity to act as a benevolent hegemon had gradually given rise in the 1970s 
to a domestic move away from the New Deal compromise to a political 
economy that sought competitiveness through deregulation, deunionization and 
abandoned the social-democratic principle that wages and social conditions 
were to be taken out of competition" (Streeck and Schmitter, 1991: 145).
33Publ. L. No. 85-625, 72 Stat. 568,1958. For a thorough study of early US aviation history see Lewis and Trimble 1988. 
^Altshuler and Teal, 1979; Button and Morisson, 1988: 37-40; Dempsey and Goetz, 1992:159-77; Golich, 1990:159-60; 
Haanappel, 1984: 50-56; Hawk, 1989: 255; Murias, 1989: 242; Naveau, 1989: 142-47; Reynolds-Feighan, 1992: 1-5;
Sawers, 1987:16; Weisman, 1990: 18. For a recent and detailed study of the historical and political background, the 
politico-economic developments and the end results of US airline-deregulation policy, see Dempsey and Goetz, 1992 and 
Williams, 1993.
35 The New Right philosophy is based on the traditions of Western liberal and conservative philosophy whose adherents 
added novelty and rigour by mounting a developed social science-based critique of pluralism which recognizes the 
existence of diversity in social, institutional and ideological values and practices. Liberals share a free market philosophy 
with Conservatives, although their justifications for the market approach are somewhat different. Liberals put heavy 
emphasis on individual autonomy while Conservatives believe that individuals are lost without the stable authority 
structure in society which is provided by the state, the church, the family, and so forth.
^ h e y  fought"interest-group liberalism* which in their view, deprived the government of legitimacy, turning the state into 
a vehicle for the expression of private interests. Brown, 1987: 32; Dempsey and Goetz, 1992: 179-92; Dunleavy and 
O'Leary, 1987:4-8,13-135; Dunleavy, 1991: 4-7; Levine, 1981,1987; Linowes, 81-87; Steiner, 1986: 27-33; Streeck and 
Schmitter, 1991:145; Wessberge, 1984: 24; Williams, 1993:11; Wilson, 1982: 219-36.
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Ever since US airline deregulation was first proposed it has been the 
cause of controversy among economists. New-Right economists argued that 
economic regulation had created airline monopolies that kept air fares and 
costs artificially high, produced excessive capacity, and prevented new airlines 
from entering the market. They persuaded the public that the CAB was 
deriving sectional gains at its expense - a procedure known as^capture theory, 
postulating that a regulatory agency acts as the protector of the interests of 
the regulated parties (i.e. is captured by vested interests) rather than serving 
the public interest. They therefore drew public attention to the contestability of 
the US airline industry through free market forces mechanisms. According to 
the contestability theory, there were always potential competitors capable of 
entering the air-transport markets that must satisfy certain conditions, such as 
no barriers to entry, no sunk costs (no barriers to exit)37 and prevent any 
possibility of hit and run entry.38 Their doing so (i) would prevent prices from
exceeding the cost of services and lower all fixed costs, (especially labour
I
costs); (ii) would generate more business by attracting more travelers; (iii)
L
would increase load factors;39 (iv) would safeguard any possible concentration 
and collusive behavior; and (v) would prevent predatory practices (e.g. selling 
fares below costs and abuse of dominant position).40
There were howls of protest however, from opponents of airline 
deregulation, with dire predictions of chaos and disaster, and warnings against 
the risks inherent in a competitive air-transport market as experienced in the 
pre-1938 period.41 Notwithstanding the controversial nature of the issue,
37Sunk costs consist partly of marketing expenditure, scheduling barriers, congestion problems, and uncertainty.
“ it is also called 'fly by night" or 'free rider" competition where operators move onto a route to take a quick profit and 
depart.
38Load factor is the percentage of capacity, measured either in seat-miles or ton-miles (freight), sold by airlines.
^Bailey, 1979; Bailey and Panzar, 1981,1984; Barber, 1962; Baumol etal., 1982; Boyer, 1986: 317-18, 338-40; Call and 
Keeler, 1985; Cooper and Maynard, 1972; Douglas and Miller, 1974; Douglas, 1971; Eads, 1975; Friedman, 1976; 
Fruhan, 1972; Hector, 1960; Herman, 1976; Jordan, 1970, 1972; 1978; Joskow, 1988: 110; Kahn, 1970, 1971, 1976, 
1978; Keeler, 1971a, 1971b, 1972, 1978, 1991: 132-34; Levine, 1965, 1975, 1981:191, 1987: 444; Lloyd-Jones, 1975; 
McGowan andTrengove, 1986:111-13; Martin and Schwartz, 1977; Phillips, 1975; Stigler, 1971; Taneja, 1968,1976. For
a detailed analysis on US airline industry economics prior to deregulation see Stratford, 1973.
41 Brenner, 1975; Callison, 1975; Caves, 1977; Kaus, 1979; Loving, 1977.
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proponents of US airline deregulation succeeded in making it politically 
prominent. The view that air-transport regulatory politics were based on 
special (private) economic interests and only symbolically on the public 
interest (symbolic politics), resulted in some rather cynical conclusions not only 
concerning regulatory policy-making, but also the overall role of the US 
government.42
The Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Practices and 
Procedures,43 chaired by Edward Kennedy, initiated deregulatory reform in 
hearings conducted during 1974-75. At that time the US economy was 
suffering from considerable inflation, being hit by the worst recession since the 
late 1930s. After President Nixon's resignation, his successors Ford and 
Carter embraced deregulation in their presidential campaigns. While in office 
Carter strongly adopted the deregulation of airlines, of trucking and of 
railroads as his main transport priorities. He signed the Air Cargo Deregulation 
Act of 1977, the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA), of October 1978, and the 
International Air-Transportation Competition Act of 1979. The new law 
stipulated the elimination of all entry, frequency, capacity, and fare control and 
regulations. The Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) under the chairmanship of 
Alfred Kahn, the father of US deregulation, not only supported but actively 
prompted deregulation and prepared CAB's own abolition in 1985.44 The 
remaining responsibilities were transferred to the US Department of 
Transportation (DOT), until 1989 when the US Department of Justice (DOJ), 
took over the anti-trust after public criticism of the DOT’s approval of massive 
mergers.45
42For more details on Symbolic Politics see Dunleavy, 1990:49.
43Report on the US Civil Aeronautics Board Practices and Procedures. 94th Congress, 1st Session 189,1975.
^ h e  US Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset Act of 1984, PL 98-443, 98 Stat. 1703,4 October 1984.
45 Breyer, 1986: 4; Brown, 1987: 125-126; Button and Morrison, 1988: 39-41; Dempsey and Goetz, 1992: 179-215; 
Derthick and Quirk, 1985: 36-37,162-64; Dobson, 1991: 270; Feldman, 1989; Hawk, 1989: 257-62; Harrigan and Kasper, 
1978; Hall, 1968; Jennings, 1990; Rule, 1990. For a thorough analysis of US airline and general deregulation politics see 
Derthick and Quirk, 1985 and Brown, 1987.
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3. The Results of US Airline Deregulation
Ever since the early 1980s when US airline deregulation was first 
implemented, theorists have been debating the ensuing adverse politico- 
economic results. They, and the press as well as regional and international 
and organizations, have argued that, generally speaking, US airline 
deregulation initially resulted in fierce competition. It then entered a 
consolidating phase, during which a large number of old airlines were 
swallowed up in mergers and buy-outs.46 The final globalization phase 
ultimately produced the mega-carriers.47
Some recent studies view US airline deregulation as a success,48 while 
others regard it as a failure;49 still others are more cautious, but restrainedly 
optimistic about its end results.50 The chief argument concerning US airline 
deregulation has been whether it inhibited greater concentration in the pre­
deregulation period for certain airlines, or just rearranged a greater market 
concentration for them in the post-deregulation period, focusing on an 
evidently dramatic concentration of their power on their hub-airports.51
The more recent studies and press reports have shown that US airlines, 
which are responsible for nearly half of the world's air transport output, have 
achieved a dramatic concentration of their market shares: the share of top five 
airlines has grown from 63.5 in 1978 to 71.7 per cent in 1987 and the eight 
largest airlines accounted for 95 per cent of the domestic passenger market in 
1992.52
4SChicago School economists, unlike those of the Harvard School, insist that concentrated market power is necessary, 
and mergers that may create monopolies are allowable for protecting the profits of innovators, despite the high price costs
to the consumers. Burke et al, 1991:63, 67-68.
47AEA, 1989: 84-85; Biederman, 1982; Bonneau, 1990: 729; Dempsey and Goetz, 1992: 281-95; Haannapel, 1985: 93- 
97; ICAO, 1988: 38-53; IATA, 1984: 21-24; Flint, 1990: 30-37, 129-32; Gialloreto, 1988a; 1988b: 9-18 and 1989: 68-9; 
Graham and Kaplan, 1982; Jemiolo and Oster, 1987; Keeler, and Abrahams, 1981; Meyer et al, 1981; Meyer and Oster, 
1984, 1987; Morrison and Winston, 1986. Lipman, 1985: 3-5; Marshall,1988:19-20; Molloy, 1985; Organization of 
Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), 1988: 22; Whitaker, 1989: 32.
48Button, 1991; Keeler 1991.
49Dempsey, 1989,1990; Dempsey and Goetz, 1992.
“ Keeler, 1991:155-57; Williams, 1993.
51 Hub airport is the central base airport for an airline.
52Golich, 1990: 161; Financial Times of 17 Jul 1989: 21, and of 1 Feb 1991: 14; Dempsey and Goetz, 1992: 13, 355; 
Joskow, 1988:119-25; Williams G., 1993: 2.
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As shown in Table 1.1 on market shares of domestic US airlines, 
Northwest Airlines, for example, increased its share more than 250 per cent 
(from 2.6 to 9.4 per cent) between 1978 and 1991; Continental Airlines during 
the same time span grew more than 100 per cent; and American and Delta 
Airlines expanded by 44 percent, (from 13.5 to 19.3 percent, and 12.0 to 17.2 
per cent respectively). By contrast, United Airlines lost 20 per cent of its 
market share, and TWA almost forty per cent. Finally six airlines, which had 
accounted for 50 per cent of the first twelve airlines before deregulation, were 
no longer among the leading twelve airlines in the post-deregulation period.
The given data on concentration leave considerable scope for argument 
as to whether a small increase in concentration percentages really proves 
claims and arguments for a dramatic post-deregulation concentration in 
comparison to the pre-deregulation one. A close examination of Table 1.1 
shows that in fact there has been no major increase in concentration in the US 
airline industry. The top three airlines increased their shares by only 15 per 
cent, and the top four, six and twelve airlines by roughly 11 per cent each. The 
fact that these were the results of having no economic restraints, seems to 
indicate that the predictions for a dramatic increase in the overall pattern of 
airline concentration in the US were exaggerated. What the above figures 
show is that there has certainly been a dramatic shake-up of pretty well all 
carriers during the post-deregulation period, some having improved their 
standing while other have gone out of business.
Table 1.2 shows a comparison of domestic airlines at US airports 
before and after deregulation. So between 1989 and 1991, American Airlines 
controlled 65 per cent of slots at Dallas; United Airlines 68 per cent at 
Washington DC., and 48 per cent at Chicago; and Delta Airlines 70 per cent at 
Atlanta. Currently there are major hub airports where one airline holds an 
effective monopoly of slots, as Table 1.2 demonstrates. Those hubs account
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Table 1.1: Comparison of US Airlines Market Shares in 1978 and 1991 
(in Percentages of Domestic Air-Traffic)
1 9 9  1 1978 +/-
(position in1978 in brackets)
American (2) 19.3 13.5 43
United (1) 17.3 21.1 -20
Delta (3) 17.2 12.0 44
U.S. Air* 10.1 - -
Northwest (10) 9.4 2.6 360
Continental (7) 9.3 4.5 103
TWA (5) 5.6 9.4 -37
American West* 3.9 - -
South West* 3.5 - -
Pan Am* 1.7 - -
Alaska* 1.5 - -
Aloha* 0.2 - -
Leading three 53.8 46.6 15
Leading four 63.9 57.7 11
Leading six 82.6 72.1 11.5
Leading twelve 99.0 90.8 10.9
* Not included in the leading 12 US airlines in 1978. The following companies figured in the top twelve in 1978 were 
Eastern (4) with 11.1 per cent, Western (6) with 5.0, Braniff (8) with 3.8, National (9) with 3.6, Allegheny (11) with 2.2, and 
Frontier (12) with 2.0 per cent
Source: Williams, G., 1993: 61.
Table 1.2: Comparative Percentages of US Airline Concentration at Major 
Airports-Pre and Post Deregulation
Airline Airport 1977 1990
American Dallas 19 63
Delta Atlanta 35 57
Cincinnati 35 88
United Denver 32 49
Continental Houston 37 80
TWA St. Lewis 39 79
Northwest Minneapolis 46 80
Detroit 13 73
U.S.Air Pittsburgh 46 87
Philadelphia 22 46
Sources: Dempsey and Goetz, 1992: 229; Williams, G., 1993: 24-26.
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for 70 per cent of domestic air services in the USA.53 Before deregulation, not 
a single US airport was dominated by any one airline.54
The considerable shake-up in US airlines and their dramatic airport 
concentration were due to the proliferation of effective control through 
marketing tactics and mechanisms such as Computer Reservation Systems 
(CRS),55 and Code Sharing,56 Yield-Management strategy,57 and Frequent 
Flyers arrangements rewards.58 As airline-industry experts have pointed out, 
the major US airlines have invested heavily in huge CRS, using them as one 
of the most critical weapons in competition.59 Chairman B. Attali, of Air France, 
mentioned in his speech at the IATA symposium in Paris on 3 September 
1992
"Certain competitor CRS systems are used like war machines."60
As a matter of fact it has been argued that the US transatlantic airline 
marketing agreements were politically more appealing and much easier to 
implement than transnational mergers. The former did not alter the nationality 
or share holding of either carrier in the partnership as the latter could possibly 
do.61
Negative social results have been pointed out as well by the most 
authoritative recent studies. They assessed that, on the whole, deregulation as 
a public policy has indeed failed to benefit either the public or the industry as a
53The "Structuralist School", the modem offspring of the "Harvard School", argued that large oligopolistic firms use so- 
called exclusionary practices, the most important of these being the ability to erect high entry barriers. See Burke et al., 
1991: 63.
54Abbey, 1989; Doganis and Dennis, 1989; ITF Report, 1992: 26; Kanafani and Ghobrial, 1984; Kanafani and Hansen, 
1985; Kanafani, 1981,1985; Phillips, 1985,1987.
“ CRS are used for a wide range of internal airline functions, such as scheduled planning, crew rostering, price listing, 
statistics, and aircraft inventories and maintenance records, but most importantly link airlines with travel agents.
56This has been an effective strategy for smaller airlines to survive US deregulation. It involves joint marketing 
agreements between US and foreign airline/s or between US ones in which both airlines share equal "billing” on CRSs, 
continue to inter-line baggage, and provide other joint services for the traveller.
S7This is a sophisticated marketing strategy manipulating the number of seats for which restricted discount fares are 
offered in order to fill them with passengers paying the maximum possible fare. See Desgranges, 1988.
“ These are free mileage bonuses offered by airlines to frequent customers. For a detailed analysis of all marketing 
strategies see Dempsey and Goetz, 1992:315-16; Golich, 1990:168,176; Keeler, 1991:153; Williams, 1993:18-39.
“ ITF Report, 1992, 27, 35-38; Hawk, 1989: 263-265; Joskow, 1988:114-15; Katz, 1988: 87-101; Keeler, 1991: 151-52; 
Lyle, 1988.
ITF Report, 1992: 36.
61 Golich, 1990:168.
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whole. They argue that it is highly misleading to say consumers are better off, 
where prices are well below costs on many routes (predatory prices), since 
obviously such unrealistic prices can not be sustained and are at best 
temporary. They emphasize that while most travellers fly discounted tickets, 
the full fare has risen sharply, more than double the rate of inflation.62
Moreover, since deregulation the entire US air-transport system has 
become more susceptible to delays from air-traffic63 and airport congestion, 
and by the airlines' emphasizing their so-called hub-and-spoke operations64 
which, however, have actually decreased air services to small communities.65 
Figure 1.2 demonstrates the leverage of US hub connections and compares 
the number of city pairs served, and Figure 1.3 depicts hub and networks 
routes and its overall routes connections. Essentially, both Figures 
demonstrate that deregulation by means of hub and spoke operations, in order 
to serve as many air-routes as possible at the least cost, attempted to ensure 
economies of scale on each spoke, as well as economies of scope between 
the spokes. Economies of scale are economies of high utilization because 
they both reduce costs per seat/mile by offering more efficient utilization of 
their aircraft size and personnel and achieve higher average passenger load 
factors.66 The possibility of economies of scope arises in combining economies 
of density on individual routes and their stage length.67 Don Carty, Executive 
vice-president of American Airlines said in 1992
“ Boyer, 1986: 330-33; Keeler, 1991:150; Malin, 1990; Moore, 1986:1-13;
63Air-traffic congestion may cause near misses or even collisions, when two aircraft approach each other in violation of 
the proper separation distance and/or separation time.
°*Hub and spoke is a pattern of air services that link outlying communities to a central hub-airport. Hub-and-spoke flights 
are arranged to match the collection/distribution of passengers from a number of spoke airports (small airports located 
between a connection and a hub) so that connections to cities beyond the hub are facilitated. See Ellison, 1982; Flint, 
1990a, 1990b; Ghobrial and Kanafani, 1985; Levine, June/July 1986: 3-8; OECD, 1988: 65; Pavaux, Mar/April 1989: 7-8; 
Reynolds, 1992:18-19; Toh and Higgins, 1985.
“ Keeler, 1991:135-41,152-55.
66Higher load factors means lower-per-passenger costs since the fixed costs of a flight can be spread over more 
passengers.
Economies of scope are achieved when the output growth is within a network of fixed size. See Caves et al, 1984; 
Ellison, 1982; Viton, 1986.
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" F ou rteen  yea rs  o f d e re g u la tio n  have  dnven  ho m e  the im p o rta n ce  o f s trong  
ne tw o rks  and e c o n o m ie s  o f sca le "66
Figure  1.2: Demonstration of Leverage of Hub and of City Pairs Served Connections
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Figure 1.3: Hub and Spoke Networks and Routes Connections
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In addition, the continuous disputes between airline management and 
employees have worsened labour-management relations. In particular, the 
post-deregulation period has seen changing work rules and lower labour 
costs, achieved by a reduction in the amount of work required and 
wages/salaries paid. Many US airlines have reduced their labour costs by 
negotiating two-tier agreements with the unions (less pay for newly hired 
employees), by taking on more part-time and temporary employees, by more 
flexible work rules, by introducing a cross-utilization of staff, multi-skilling, 
multiple-tasking, and by contracting out a number of air services.69 The major 
casualty in all this has been job security, because of job reductions and lay­
offs. According to Frank Borman, former Eastern Airlines' Chairman of the 
Board, deregulation has been the greatest anti-labour act ever passed by the 
US Congress.70 As has been remarked
" After the final defeat of the Labour Law Reform Act in 1978, ...causing a further, 
probably irreversible, decline in union organization ...the destruction of 
American trade unions paid off handsomely in that it gave the USA the "flexible" 
markets and the "confidence" of financial investors required to underwrite an 
expansionist fiscal policy that has been ironically characterized as 
"Keynesianism in one country" (Streeck and Schmitter, 1991: 145).
Moreover, the continuing deterioration of the airlines' financial 
performance dramatically reduced profits, and therefore did not advance the 
equity goals of deregulation. As a matter of fact, in 1991 the US bankruptcy 
legislation (Chapter 11) artificially protected from bankruptcy 30 per cent of the 
domestic airlines. The above mentioned results obliged US airlines to fly the 
oldest and most repainted aircraft to save costs on maintenance and 
personnel,71 and this inevitably affected their safety margin and safety risk.72
6*The airlines divested themselves of non-airline businesses to core airlines, concentrating strictly on commercial aviation 
operations. A whole range of private sub-contractors bid against each other to gain contracts for services in areas such 
as maintenance, cleaning of airports and aircraft, loading and baggage handling, catering supplies, and airport security.
70Boyer, 1986: 333-37; Capelli, 1985; Donoghue, 1987; Gallacher, 1989,1991; Gil, 1990; ITF Report, 1992: 39-46, 55, 
67; Martindale, 1989; Moore, 1986: 22-27; Peoples, 1987.
71 Boyer, 1986: 333; Michel and Skaked, 1984; Moore, 1987:13-22.
72The term safety margin refers to the difference between sticking strictly to minimum legal safety standards and the 
application of every reasonable safety check; safety risk is the danger level of accidents to which air passengers are 
exposed. Button and Morrisson, 1988:47*48; Cavarra et al, 1981; Cohan, 1990; Crum, 1987; Dempsey and Goetz, 1992: 
xiv; ITF Report, 1992: 47-50; Feldman, 1990; Flint, 1989; Gomez et al, 1983; Golich, 1990: 164; Pavaux, 1989; Reed, 
4/1992: 54, 56; Thayer, 1982; Woolsey, 1988.
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The overall adverse effects of deregulation for safety have been 
debated amongst academics at length. Some have argued that although 
fatality statistics have not reflected it, deregulation has inevitably decreased 
the safety margin because it has lowered safety standards and increased the 
safety-risk factor.73 Captain Y. Enderle, president of Belgian airlines cockpit 
crew association (ABPNL) has pointed
" Airline deregulation has definitely reduced the safety margins and this has been 
recognized by all airline management" (interview 7 Dec. 1990).
Others have argued that, on the contrary, safety standards have 
actually improved both because airlines do not want to damage their 
reputation, but most importantly because their employees who fly the aircraft 
had incentives to ensure a high safety factor for their lives.74
Table 1.3 depicts the number of fatal accidents and passenger deaths 
in the pre-deregulation (1971-1978) and post-deregulation (1979-1986) 
periods. The data do not indicate any upsurge in passenger deaths, but rather 
a decrease over the two periods, which does seem to suggest that there has 
been no increase in the safety risk.
However, since the safety-risk factor is a matter of prevention rather 
than of accident and death figures, it has been argued that accidents are not 
the proper parameters for assessing and evaluating whether deregulation has 
brought a change in this respect. In other words, there can be an increase in 
safety-risk even without accidents.75 President J. P. Meheust, international 
affairs adviser, O. Jullien, and safety advisor G. Gomez of the National 
Syndicate of Commercial Air-Transport Personnel (SNPNC), are agreed that it 
is unacceptable to assess the level (decrease/increase) of passenger safety-
73Adams, 1989; Alamaniotis, 1988: 7; Bailey and Kirstein, 1989:153; Golich, 1990: 164; ITF Report, 1992: 47-50; Main, 
1986; Nance, 1986,1989.
74Button and Morrison, 1988:43-44; Carlzon, 1987; Joskow, 1988:113; Jordan, 1986; Kanafani and Keeler, 1989; Keeler, 
1991:135; Moore, 1989; Moses and Savage, 1989: 308-15; OECD, 1988: 65-67; Oster and Zorn, 1989: 151-52; Panzar 
and Savage, 1989; Sawers, 1987: 27-29.
75Adams, 1985; Douglas, 1986; Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982: 1-15; Fischhoff, 1983; Hadden and Hazelton, 1980; 
Panzar and Savage, 1989:40; Perrow,1984: 304-52; Wilson, 1991.
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Table 1.3: Accidents on Scheduled US Services in Numbers of Fatal Accidents and 
Fatalities (1974-1986)
Number
accidents 
in which 
there 
were 
fatalities
7 (460)
5(160) ■5 (351)
5(15)
4(4)
4(78)4 _ 4 (233) 14(97)
3 _ 3 (38)
2 —
2 (122)
•2 (4)
1 — 2(3)
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Pre-Deregulation Period 71-78 Post-Deregulation Period 79-86
* Disaggregated figures only available from 1974
Note: numbers in brackets = actual casualties from accidents
Sources: Sawers, 1987: 28; US National Transportation Safety Board 1987-1988
risk exposure in terms of accidents and fatalities, rather than in measures 
taken to avoid them. They stated
” Consumers should know that cheaper fares means cheaper safety" (interview 
23 Nov. 1990)
The conclusion seems to be that although air safety is not incompatible 
with competition between airlines, it can not be left to free-market mechanisms 
or proved by fatality and accident statistics which in any case are a negation of 
the very definition of safety.
What remains to be examined is why US airline deregulation has not
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been successful as a public policy. Air-transport theorists and analysts have 
argued that the overall deregulation outcome was adversely affected by the 
failure of the contestability theory, and by the lack of anti-trust laws. The main 
argument of the contestability theory - that price competition becomes 
significant only when there are five or more airlines- never applied to the US 
air-transport market. Academics argued that the greater the choice and the 
tougher the competition, the greater the industry's losses, and that the 
absence of regulation had a more negative effect than its shortcomings and 
drawbacks. The conclusion was that US airline deregulation instead of 
terminating a regulated oligopoly, created a deregulated oligopoly76 or rather a 
polypoly.77 In other words, deregulation meant the elimination of competition, 
and so the negation of itself - which, as some academics argued was the chief 
aim of deregulation in general economic terms.78
John Kenneth Galbraith (as cited by Wheatcroft 1964: 55) pointed out 
in his book American Capitalism that oligopoly, and not competition, was of 
crucial importance in all Western economies. Similarly G. Kolko (as cited by 
Levine 1981: 184) said that in fact capitalists find competition unprofitable and 
consumer sovereignty unattractive, and attempt to find ways and mechanisms 
supposedly to satisfy popular demand, but in fact to eliminate the market 
forces, that are operating to reduce their profits, and to preserve monopoly 
positions. This applies equally to international air transport. Indeed, it has 
been said that the US airline deregulation's primary promotion of US airline 
interests was proof of producerism rather than consumerism.79 As was 
suggested
76Oligopoly defines a very small number of suppliers.
77Polypoly defines a great number of suppliers.
78Baileyand Panzar, 1981,1984; Beane, 1980; Burke etal, 1991: 50-62; Hammarskjold, 1987: 75; Haanappel,1985: 92; 
Golich, 1990: 170-71; Keeler, 1991: 150-51; Kahn, 1988: 316-22; Levine, 1991: 7-8, 15; McLachlan and Swann, 1967; 
Ordoverand Saloner, 1989; Pavaux, 1986:17; Rule, 1990: 99-126; Shepherd, 1982 1984; Sochor, 1991: 201-07; Villiers, 
1989: 5-23; Zylich, 1992: 29, 32-33.
7gConsumerism, which here may seen as the collective interests of air-transport consumers, was another force with a 
widespread influence on governmental attitudes towards aviation regulation. Wassenberg, 1988: 47; Williams, G., 1993: 
124. As we shall see in later chapters, the same was true also for EC airlines.
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" ...whenever an airline starts a new route the incumbent will say it welcomes 
competition'. No one is expected to believe this: it is one of the proverbial great 
lies. It is like a piece of medieval theology, trotted out because everyone 
expects it, but which has no meaning beyond the ritual. The truth is very 
different. The main purpose of successful business strategy is to avoid 
competition" (T. Bass, 1991:21).
Since the early 1980s the results of US airline deregulation have 
brought numerous calls for a partial re-regulation.80 Yet notwithstanding the 
controversy and the unfortunate results, many studies still insist that 
competition, for all its imperfections,81 is still superior to regulation as a means 
of serving the public interest.82 As has been argued
" The deregulation movement earned a special place in history. Not since the 
Bolshevik Revolution has the discipline of economics embraced an ideology 
with such a passion" (Dempsey and Goetz, 1992: xv).
Recent studies have questioned the very reason for implementing 
airline deregulation in the US air transport. They pointed out that in terms of 
passenger satisfaction the US airline industry had had for years, one of the 
highest ratings among all major US industries, so that there was no reason 
why US bureaucrats and economists arrogated to themselves the task of 
consumer protection.83 Why then such persistence in the implementation of 
US air-transport deregulation? The answer is that historically, in terms of 
overall US policy and the pursuit of its interests within international air 
transport, it is evident that the motivation behind the persistent and powerful 
US support for domestic airline deregulation was largely the global expansion 
of US air-transport interests.
4. International Repercussions
It was a fixed ambition of the USA to impose airline deregulation on air 
transport all over the globe. Behind the wish in 1978 to see worldwide
“ Brummer, 1989: 19; Cohan, 1990: 8; Donoghue, 1990: 2; French, 1990: 18, 62-66; Feldman, 1989: 34-42; Flint, 1988: 
34-37; Gialloreto, 1989: 15-20; Jennings, Sept/1992: 129; Labich, 1989; Leonard, 1983; Pavaux, 1986a 1986b: 15-20;
Pickrell, 1991:17; Pilling, 1991; Premo, 1987:10-11; Rolfe, 1990:18-22; Wijk, 1991: 38.
81 Imperfect competition may lead to oligopoly or monopoly.
“ Donoghue, 1990: 6; Hawk, 1989: 274-77; Golich, 1990: 156; Kahn, 1983, 1988a, 1988b; Kahn and Thome 1982;
Keeler, 1984; Levine, 1981,1986a: 9-14,1986b, 1987,1988: 3-7; Sawers, 1987: 74; Wilkins, 1984.
“ Dempsey and Goetz, 1992: 357; Williams G., 1993:59.
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competition in air transport lay another major concern: the once dominant US 
position was being eroded, especially in the North Atlantic Region between the 
USA and Europe. US airlines had to become more powerful and expansive to 
compete on the international air routes, in response to both the regulatory 
international aviation and the Bermuda II agreement with Britain.84 As has 
been noted
" The USA may have opened Pandora’s box when it began liberalizing 
international air transport. ..several US airlines have targeted successful 
international expansion as critical to providing the passenger feed they need to 
survive" (V. Golich, 1990: 168).
As a result the USA began to put pressure on the international 
community to open up foreign markets for exploitation by US airlines. Those 
pressures manifested themselves in two ways: One was direct diplomatic 
leverage, the other employed the carrot-and-stick. Small countries with non­
economic air-transport industries opposed to air deregulation were threatened 
with a diversion of US traffic to their neighbors. At the same time the USA 
pursued access to large, economically profitable countries, which were 
attracted by the prospect of associating with a large lucrative air transport 
industry and advanced their interest in air transport deregulation.85 As has 
been commented
" The use of such carrot and stick tactics to wean an industry away from a 
comfortable regulatory pattern was to provoke incentives which will counter 
balance the cost of leaving the dirigiste market for a competitive market" (D. 
Kasper, 1988: 89).
However US airline deregulation went beyond the simple wish to 
promote competition. It was hoped to promote and export to other countries 
politico-economic models or systems already in use at home or representing 
basic features of institutional polity functions. In other words, the USA was
84Ash, 1987; Derthick and Quirk, 1985: 39; Doganis, 1991: 53; Fort, 1991: 103; Golich, 1990:162; Hammarskjold, 1987; 
IATA, 1984; Murias, 1989:176-93,197.
“ Kasper, 1988:41-42; Pelkmans, 1986: 357; Sampson, 1984:144.
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trading its policies in order to intervene in other countries' politico-economic 
systems. This kind of progressive promotion has been dubbed "the calculus of 
concern", which refers to weighting the different considerations that have to be 
accommodated in any negotiating position.86 Bernard Attali, chairman of Air 
France declared at the IATA symposium in Paris on 3 Sept. 1992
" ...seen from this side of the Atlantic, open skies are rather like an American 
vision of Pax Americana."87
As it turned out, most countries supported increased liberalization88 
(gradual relaxation of regulatory control of, for example, air fares, capacity, 
and access to market), not necessarily because they believed in its virtues, but 
because they viewed liberalization as essential to the viability of their own 
airlines in a globally increasingly competitive situation. The USA, therefore, 
succeeded in re-negotiating bilaterally with other countries. Gradually, airline 
deregulation spread to Chile, Thailand, New Zealand (1983), Canada (1987),89 
Australia (1990),90 Argentina (1990),91 and the People's Republic of China, 
with results similar to those in the USA or worse.92 For all that, the US 
diplomatic capitalization of the pressures created by airline deregulation as a 
key element for building a competitive international air-transport industry, were 
something of a testing ground for similar developments regarding the EC air 
transport in the mid 1980s.93 As has been declared
n US airline deregulation was just the beginning of what promised to be truly 
ruthless fight for a global market share" (D. Kasper, 1988: 142).
“ Aviation Daily. 23 Sept. 1983:125; Haanappel, 1984: 57-60; Murias, 1989:189; Pelkmans, 1980: 337,1986: 57; Shane, 
1990: 2; Weisman, 1990: 25.
87ITF Report, 1992: 22; International Transport Workers' Federation News (ITF News). Oct. 1992:10.
“ The chief aim of liberalization is opening up of an industry to competitive pressures via the removal of government 
regulations. Golich, 1990:157; Preben, 1986: 7; Swaw, 1993:166-67.
“ For a thorough analysis of Canada's airline industry deregulation see Barone, 1986; Button, 1989; Heaver, 1991; Gillen 
et al, 1985; Gillen et al, 1988; ITF News of Sept. 1992:14, and of Oct. 1992:11; Lazar, 1984; Malglaive, 1985; Oum et al, 
1991; Roman, 1989; Stevenson, 1987.
“ For detailed works on Australian airline deregulation see Docwra, 1991; Findlay, 1985; Forsyth, 1987, 1991; Kirby, 
1981.
91 ITF News. Sept. 1992:13.
“ Ash, 1987; Williams, 1993: 93-103.
“ Aviation Daily of 26 June 1985: 219, of 16 Jan. 1985: 85, of 19 Feb. 1986: 271, and of 3 July 1986: 22; Button and
Swan, 1991:112-18; Hanapel, 139-56,189-90; Kasper, 1988:1, 75-81.
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As a matter of fact, in the late 1980s the USA approached the General 
Agreement for Trade and Tariffs (GATT), Uruguay Round, from its position of 
power in international air transport. The GATT round was an obvious means 
for the USA to reach some type of multilateral agreement, although applying 
key GATT principles - such as unconditional Most-Favoured-Nation rules 
(MFN)94, and National Treatment (NT)95 - was certain to present problems. 
Such principles would affect the extent to which the USA could single- 
mindedly pursue the interests of the powerful US airlines. When disputes 
required resolving, US bargaining would be vulnerable to manipulation by 
protectionist governments, and might require sacrificing certain US-airlines 
interests, so diminishing their strength (and at the same time US 
attractiveness as a "carrot") by making it possible to balance concessions on 
economic rights and restraints in some other areas. Besides US airlines would 
be obliged to compete with foreign airlines over direct access to the US air 
transport, especially with EC airlines that wished to negotiate air services 
across the North Atlantic Region. Ironically, it was the USA, the erstwhile 
driving force in worldwide air-transport deregulation, that proved in the end to 
be a strong opponent of air-transport negotiations within GATT - in contrast to 
the EC, which was a strong advocate of their inclusion. Nevertheless as a first 
step to the above negotiations in the end of 1992 an agreement was signed 
between the EC and the USA concerning the application of the GATT 
agreement on trade in civil aircraft.96
As a result of the above negotiations and agreement USA succeeded in 
establishing air-agreements between it and EC member-countries in the front 
line of the bitter competitive struggles being waged in the process of airline
84Unconditional MFN generalizes air-transport concessions without requiring beneficiaries to aceept liberalizing 
conditions. Conditional MFN requires countries to adhere to conditions designed to ensure liberalized air services.
96National Treatment for air services would require that foreign airlines receive the same treatment as comparable 
domestic airlines.
“ A 1017 (01), Official Journal of the EC (OJ) L 301,17 Oct 1992: 32. See Bulmer, 1986:147-49; Creedy, 1990; GATT, 
1990; Gofich, 1990:169; Kasper, 1988: 93-112; Lipman, 1990.
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industry globalization which threatened air-transport labourers' jobs and 
therefore were strongly opposed by them. For example, in 1992 the Irish 
national Shannon airport’ workers started to defend the airport’s designated 
status as Ireland's international getaway to the USA and Canada, the so 
called " Shannon Stopover". In other words all transatlantic flights in and out of 
Ireland had to call at Shannon under a US-lreland agreement dating back to 
the 1960's. The airport was considered as part of a regional development in an 
impoverished part of Ireland which organized many of the workers not only in 
the airport, but in the surrounding manufacturing plants. Any attempts to 
overfly Shannon would wipe out half a century of work and investment and it 
was claimed, 100,000 jobs. Therefore the Services, Industrial, Professional, 
and Technical Union of Ireland (SIPTU) had organized repeated rallies in 
defense of the airport's stopover rights. Against a German-US air-agreement 
were also all German air-transport workers who had constantly held meetings 
with the German government in order to press for the scrapping of the 
German-American air-traffic treaty, but in vain. In 1993 Germany (preceded by 
the Netherlands in Sept. 1992) signed a new Air-Treaty with the US while 
Ireland and UK were still negotiating. EC officials perceived the American 
strategy, understandably, as one of ‘divide and rule’.97
The battle for open skies agreement between the USA and the rest of 
the countries of the world, and in particular with EC member-states, continued 
with a report issued in January 1994 by the US Department of Transportation 
promoting a strong and competitive international aviation industry. The Clinton 
Administration's initiative pledged itself to head a ‘’global coalition of free 
market oriented nations” in a concerted campaign to tear up the 1944 Chicago 
convention and to replace it with global ‘’open skies” . The report suggested (i) 
the pursuit of multilateral agreements; (ii) pressures to other countries to 
liberalize existing rigid bilateral agreements; (iii) a global coalition to dismantle
97Financial Times of 22 Oct. 1992: 3: ITF News of Aug. 1992:10, and of Oct. 1992:10.
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the above agreements; and (iv) the liberalization of the rules on the foreign 
ownership of US airlines.98
5. Conclusion
The conflicts and interactions of US and UK air-transport interests in the 
pursuit of international air power shaped the political economy of international 
air-transport during the pre-deregulation period (1919-1978). Two main 
features characterized the two countries' international air-transport politics. 
First, until the Bermuda II agreement was signed, both states’ policies, 
consisted of specific actions based on certain and constant elements, which 
divided them into two opposite camps: the USA was attempting to liberalize 
the international airline industry, and the UK was trying to counterbalance US 
air-transport power and protect its North Atlantic and European air-transport 
interests. Second, the domination of US air-transport policy made the USA 
more willing to show a conciliatory attitude towards the international air­
transport arena. In this the USA had to balance two objectives: satisfying its 
own national air-transport interests, and remaining in the game as the 
indisputable global air-transport power.
In the post-deregulation era (1978-1993) it became evident that US 
airline-deregulation policy had two main objectives: to keep its domestic 
airlines competitive, and to liberalize international air transport by 
manoeuvering its own carriers, through bilateral pressures, into other 
countries.
The advocates of political and economical deregulation of the domestic 
US air transport rested their argument on the fact that regulation was costly 
and ineffective. Meanwhile strong politico-economic forces coupled with US 
air-transport politics, obliged foreign governments, to accept deregulation as
^ ITF News. Jan./Feb. 1994:16.
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essential to the viability of their own airlines in an increasingly competitive 
global arena. GATT negotiations made it quite clear that the international air­
transport policy of the USA was solely to the satisfaction of its own air­
transport interests.
The gradual worldwide spread of the US policy of airline deregulation 
inevitably had a profound impact on the policy-making of EC airline industry. It 
forced the liberalization of EC air transport through pressures that were both 
international and more specifically British. As a member-state of the EC and a 
worldwide leading air power, the UK played a decisive role in EC air transport 
by promoting US deregulation measures. This meant that the US airline- 
deregulation policy had considerable ramifications for air transport in the EC. 
How and to what extent it influenced EC air-transport policy towards 
liberalization will be discussed in Chapter III.
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CHAPTER II 
NATIONAL AND EC AIR-TRANSPORT POLICIES AND STRUCTURES 
PRIOR TO 1987
" State-owned airlines are subject to considerable economic handicaps..that 
range from having to serve destinations for political instead of commercial 
reasons to obligations in performing essential air services or cross subsidising 
money-losing markets"
Uli Baur, Vice President of SH&E 1992.1
This chapter will make a thorough examination of the main public 
policies and regulatory structures of the EC members' national air-transports 
as they existed before the liberalization of EC air transport in 1987. It will then 
present a brief historical and legislative review of transport and air-transport 
policy in the EC until 1979, when the pressures for reforms increased. The 
institutional structure of the policy and decision-making process will also be 
described.
To begin with, in attempting to elucidate the channels and strategies 
that brought the liberalization of the EC countries’ air transports it is crucial to 
examine the member-states' air-transport policy-formulation and regulatory 
structures.
1. Overall Corporatist Arrangements and Structures
It has been argued that within the EC, at that time, the individual 
member-states' overall public policy took the form of corporatist structures.2 
Corporatism implies that the EC member-states incorporated into their policy 
formulation a social partnership that took all organized producer interests into 
account through mediated and concerted action. So it basically implies a great 
degree of economic bargaining and political stability. Corporatism can be 
divided into macro, meso and micro, and corporatist arrangements into strong,
1SH&E is a consultancy company which advises governments on airline privatization. ITF Report, 1992:11.
2Fulbright, 1989: 20.
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medium and weak. Macro, meso and micro corporatism imply transectoral,3
sectoral,4 and sub-sectoral5 tripartite bargaining respectively, although it is 
arguable whether the last of these represents true corporatism. Strong 
corporatist arrangements imply that organized interest groups - labour unions6 
and employers associations, otherwise called social corporations - are strongly 
centralized and also monopolize governmental corporatist politics (social 
corporatism). Weak corporatism is also known as state corporatism. Medium 
corporatism is a residual phase which may combine the above two elements 
to some degree or another. In their broader sense all three forms constitute 
what is known as neo-corporatism or liberal corporatism.7
The overall neo-corporatist arrangements between the twelve EC 
member-states have varied. Although scaling countries according to their 
degree of neo-corporatism has been criticized for producing somewhat 
contradictory results, I shall attempt to do just that.8 Table 2.1 depicts the 
variations between the two basic components (monopoly and centralization) of 
interest-group organizations in their national policy. In the Netherlands and 
Belgium the neo-corporatism was medium to strong;9 in Denmark,10 
Germany,11 and Luxembourg medium;12 in Britain weak to medium;13 and in 
France,14 Italy,15 Ireland,16 Greece,17 Spain and Portugal18 weak.
“Where the focus is on the overall national level.
^A/here individual industries interact collectively with government.
“Where the focus is on an individual industry such as the air-transport.
6Offe 1981: 153-4 argued that trade unions gain a political status and enhance the working class’s power in their 
involvement in policy-making.
7Berger, 1981: 13; Bonnet, 1985: 100-04; Cawson, 1982: 38; 1985: 2-18, 221-223; Crouch and Dore, 1990: 2-3; 
Dunleavy, 1982: 189; Dunleavy and O' Leary, 1987: 193-97; 201-02; Gobeyn, 1993: 3-4; Grant, 1985: 7-14, 21; 
Lehmbruch, 1977: 94, 1979a: 147-84, 1979b, 53-62, 1982: 1-28; Panitch, 1977; Schoiten, 1987: 1-38; Schmidt, 1982: 
237-58; Schmitter, 1974: 93-96, 1977: 9, 1979: 6-52, 63-94; 1982: 259-79, 1985: 32-62; Steiner, 1986: 219-21; 
Wassenberg, 1982: 85-108; Wilson, L., 1983:105-23; Wilson, G., 1990:1-38,109-133.
“Lehmbruch, 1982:17-23; Peters, 1991:173; Schmidt, 1982: 245; Steiner, 1986: 225; Wilson, G„ 1990:112.
9 While organized interest associations monopolized these countries'corporatist politics, during the period under review, 
the centralization of organizations (and particularly of trade unions) was not strong and their powers weakened (especially 
in Belgium) by ideological divergences. Nevertheless their participation in governmental committes and business 
meetings was widespread and important. Especially in Belgium there was a compromise between the different cultural 
traditions and the method of policy-making was counterbalanced. See Keating, 1993:19,110,112; Schoiten, 1987:120- 
52; Siedentopf and Ziller, 1988: 66-67; Van den Brande, 1987: 95-119.
10There was a reciprocal support and good relationshipbetween interest groups and governmental politico-administrative 
culture in policy formulation. The weak centralization of Danish associations derived primarily from the organizational 
pluralism of its traditional craft unionism. See Johansen and Kristensen, 1982:189-218; Siedentopf and Ziller, 1988: 41- 
42; Wilson, 1990:19,112.
11 West Germany's organized interests had no statutory claim to being consulted, and centralization of organizations was 
unevenly developed and fragmented. However industrial relations were integrated and highly regulated by law and 
practice. Policy-making and negotiations were characterized above all by consensus rather than confrontation. Their
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Table 2.1: General Pattern of Interest Intermidiation of the Twelve EC Member-States in 
1986-Graded from 1 (Maximum) to 15 (Minimum)
Monopoly of 
associations
Centralization of 
organizations
Degree of 
neo-corporatism
Netherlands 2 9 medium to strong
Belgium 3 9 medium to strong
Denmark 8 1.5 medium
W. Germany 9 6 medium
Luxembourg 4 10* medium
UK 13 12 weak to medium
France 10 14 weak
Italy 13 14 weak
Ireland 13 12** weak
Greece 13 14 *** weak
Spain 13 14 *** weak
Portugal 14 15*** weak
* No figures available, but guessed on the basis of the other two Benelux member-states, the
Netherlands and Belgium.
** Not available, guessed in relation to the UK figure.
*** Not available, guessed according to other member-states* weak corporatism.
Sources: Lehmbruch, 1982: 17-23; Peters, 1991: 173; Schmidt, 1982: 245; Steiner, 1986: 225.
basic formulae were based on the social market, which combined commitment to a market economy with an extensive 
social welfare system. This meant a dominant pattern of highly concentrated industrial unionism, and participation and co­
determination (Mitbestimmung) in governmental committes and business meetings was widespread and important. It has 
been argued that the German co-determination leads workers and unions to identify too closely with their employers, and 
confuses the roles of co-operation and independent bargaining, so that firms can obtain concessions on working 
conditions, fringe benefits and so forth. For instance, strikes required the ballot support of 75 per cent of union members 
and were relatively rare. When they did occur, however, they were bitter and protracted. See Keating, 1993: 23, 296-300; 
Offe, 1981:123-58; Siedentopf and Ziller, 1988:3-4, 66-7; Streeck, 1982: 29-81; Wilson, 1990:19,110.
^Luxembourg's capitalist government used public labour-market politics backed by strong expansion of pubiic-sector 
employment, reduction of working hours, and early retirements schemes in order to maintain low rates of employment. 
See Schmidt, 1982: 245-55.
13 Despite the strong linkages of the British trade unions with the Labour Party, there were no real corporatist 
arrangements, chiefly because of the lack of centralization in the unions' organizational structure, which blocked effective 
co-operation and concentration at leadership level. In the 1980's the Thatcher government explicitly rejected neo- 
corporatism in favour of privatization, (a shift from publicly to privately-owned goods and services via the sale of more 
than 50 per cent of public enterprises - in contrast to denationalization, which requires a less than 50 per cent sale), 
deregulation, and reliance on market forces and business leadership. Mrs. Thatcher reduced drastically the standing of 
both the Trades Union Congress and the Confederation of British industry, in policy-making. See Bonnet, 1985: 85-105; 
Boston, 1985: 65-84, Keating, 23, 101-06; Panitch, 1979: 140-41; Vickerstaff 1985: 45-64; Vickerstaff and Sheldrake, 
1989; Wilson, G., 1990:19, 36, 77-108,110.
14Corporatist arrangements have traditionally been important in French political thinking. In general consultation between 
the government and organized interests never resulted in consensus on crucial controversial issues. The failure was due, 
above all, to ideological intransigence on the part of the labour unions and the attempts of French governments to 
safeguard their interdependence from interest groups by playing them against each other. Moreover the degree of 
centralization and monopoly of associations was low, and union leaders had only limited authority over their rank and file 
and therefore little real bargaining power. See Goetchy, 1987:177-94; Keating, 1993: 23, 170-75; Siedentopf and Ziller, 
1988: 41, 65; Wilson, G„ 1990:19,125-26,130.
^Italy's labour confederations were divided by ideological cleavages and played a mostly passive, non-dominant role. 
They usually confined themselves to demanding a larger share of the benefits produced by public administration of 
private interests (since the late 1970s) and by capital accumulation. See Keating, 1993:23, 233-39; Regini, 1982:109-32, 
1987:195-215; Wilson, G., 1990:19.
10Hardiman, 1987:153-76.
17The role of Greek labour unions has been much undermined by the ideological diversity of their leaderships. Moreover, 
the representatives of private capital have been able to exert strong influence on successive governments.
18 Historically, both Spain and Portugal had undemocratic and authoritarian corporatist arrangements which, however did 
not include the network of organized interests within the state apparatus. This presented a very interesting feature of their 
socialist parties, particularly the Spanish one, which accounted for their liberalist ambitions through association with the 
dictatorial government. As a result they behaved differently from the socialist parties of Western Europe. See Keating, 
1993: 23, 315-337-42; Perez-Diaz, 1987: 216-46; Roca 1987: 247-68.
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Syndicalism too varied greatly among the twelve EC member-states, as 
becomes obvious from Table 2.2 below. It indicates two important features of the 
EC countries' respective corporatist arrangements. The first is that comparing the 
percentages of syndicalism with the twelve member-states' overall degree of 
neo-corporatism (Table 2.1) shows that the two were in no way related. The 
second is that, generally speaking, during the latter half of the 1980s syndicalism 
decreased.
Table 2.2: EC Member-States’ Overall Rate of Trade Unionization in the 1970s 
and 1980s (Approximate Percentages)
Decade of 1970 Decade of 1980
Denmark 70 75
Belgium 70 (late) 55
Ireland * 54
Luxembourg * 50
UK 30(eariy)-44.8(late) 50.7 (early)-41.5 (late)
Italy 36.3(early)-49.8(late) 49.3 (early)-39.6 (late)
W.Germany 33 37 (early)-33.8 (late)
France 22.3 19 (early)-12 (late)
Greece 33 25
Netherlands * 27
Portugal * 30
Spain * 22 (early)-16 (late)
Not available
Sources: Keating, 1993: 23, 170, 236, 297; OECD, 1988
With respect to the EC member-states' air-transport policies it has been 
argued that they not only applied corporatist arrangements, but were among the 
most persistently separatist branches in their respective economies.19 This was 
so because, in contrast to the variations in corporatism and syndicalism among
19Van Der Esch, 1989: 32.
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the twelve countries, their air-transport sectors presented identical corporatist 
arrangements and the highest union membership, approaching sometimes the 
99 per cent. The crucial determinants therefore, in identifying the twelve 
countries' corporatist arrangements and structures in air transport, is how locked 
into each other the actors were, and how interdependent and with what degree 
of institutionalization.
2. Overall Air-Transport Policy Formulation
Before 1987 EC member-states formulated their air-transport policies 
individually, pursuing, specific policy aims. Since all scheduled airlines were 
state-owned (with one national carrier per state-except for UK which in early 
1970s had two) the role of the employer and the role of the state were 
identical.
This rather contradicted the conventional wisdom of corporatism, 
because it combined strong corporatist arrangements (true corporatism) with 
micro-corporatist structures (false corporatism). Nevertheless, this is quite 
characteristic of public utility monopolies and of the professionalized nature of 
the air transport sector in particular. In other words, the EC member-states air­
transport structures were monopolistic, combining the contradictory elements 
of strong corporatist arrangements and micro corporatism.
Eventually all airline and airport workers and employees (trade unions20 
and flight crew associations21) came to monopolize the collective bargaining 
process, and wielded enormous and excessive politico-economic power vis-a- 
vis other service industries. They traditionally shared a number of 
characteristics such as high status, good job security, a large proportion of
^Often called "capsule outsiders”, those unions represent all ground staff and employees necessary both to prepare the 
aircraft and assist air passengers.
21 Often called "capsule insiders", and comprising the crews in the cockpit (pilots and flight engineers) and the cabins 
crew (flying attendants) necessary for in-flight operation of the aircraft.
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skilled personnel (often involved in handling innovative technology), and a 
significant number of occupational categories (such as pilots, aircraft and flight 
engineers, and air traffic controllers) who required high and exacting 
standards of training.22
Benefits granted to air transport personnel had become statutory and 
were considered fundamental entitlements. Negotiations concerning pay and 
working conditions operated through a centralized and legalized wage-fixing 
system overseen by the respective governments. Any radical counteraction, 
cutting of labour costs and/or changing of work rules, under the threat of 
strikes, were virtually impossible, because strikes were a very painful 
procedure for national and airline commerce. As a result, the average salary of 
an EC-members' airline employee was almost double the average salary of a 
regular EC worker, and an airline's labour bill sometimes accounted to as 
much as one-third of its overall operating costs. This was one of the main 
reasons why European air fares were the highest in the world.23 Table 2.3 
below depicts an overall typical structure of average airline operating costs 
before 1987, with labour costs alone accounting to 26 per cent. In addition, 
and as a result of the above entitlements, some member-state airlines were 
overstaffed and plagued by labour disputes, low productivity, financial 
deterioration and organizational problems. State-owned airlines such as 
Greece's Olympic Airways, Italy's Alitalia, Portugal's TAP, and Spain's Iberia, 
were the worst examples.24
On the other hand, various governments indirectly exploited the 
privileged conditions enjoyed by their air-transport personnel and used the 
state-owned airlines for political patronage. It was a matter of common 
knowledge that in Greece the national carrier Olympic Airways (OA) was
“ Barrett, 1987: 54,1991: 242; Corke, 1986: 73,101,127-29; ITF Report, 1992:70; Sawers, 1986:49, 69.
23 Barett, 1991: 242; Bass, 1991: 218-19; EC Commission. 1981; French, 1990: 35; Kark, 1989: 384; McGowan and 
Trengove, 1986: 60-69; Pelkmans, 1986: 355; Shaw, 1993: 172-74; Sorensen, 1984, 1988; Wheatcroft and Lipman, 
1986: 33-35.
24Doganis, 1989: 5/1-9/11.
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Table 2.3: Structure of Typical Average Airline Operating Costs
Functions % o f
total
Pay Fuel Sales
commis­
sion
Landing
charges
etc.
Depre­
ciation
Mate­
rials
Commun
ications
Other
Flight operations 2 7 4 13 8 2
Maintenence 
and overhaul
12 5 5 2
Depreciation / 
amortization
8 8
Station costs 17 5 12
Passenger
services
10 6 1 3
Ticketing, sales, 
reservations, 
promotion
18 2 9 3 4
General and 
administration
8 4 1 3
Total
. _ _
10 2 6 13 9 8 8 6 4 26
Source: Wheatcroft S, and Lipman G, EIU European Liberalization and Word Air Transport, 
Special Report No 2015, May 1990.
heavily over-staffed. This was the result of employees being hired in response
to pressure from politicians, who by these acts of patronage were buying their
constituents' votes.
The air-transport personnel in all EC member-states were organized in
separate unions and/or in transport federations, some excluding and some
including flight and cabin crews. But no one country had the same trade-union
structure as any other, and none had a single, national union to represent all
its air-transport and service-related personnel. In consequence there was
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some overlapping with other unions, even though formally membership was 
restricted to one union only.25
S. Howard, head of the civil-aviation section of the International 
Transport Workers' Federation (ITF) and ex-researcher of civil air-transport of 
the Transport and Genaral Workers' Union in UK, told the author in interviews 
(3 June 1991, and 4 April 1993), that even for ITF it was very hard to get a 
complete list of unions representing air-transport personnel. This was so 
primarily because of their structural and ideological differences. In particular, 
(i) not a few unions in some categories of aviation had only a small number of 
members; there was no sector-by-sector list in any specific union representing 
civil-aviation membership, only the main trade union federations or 
associations; and (ii), neither the large nor the small unions were all ITF 
members. For example in Britain, one of the most multi-unionized EC 
member-states, there were a number of airline and airport unions that either 
belonged to the Transport General and Workers’ Union (TGWU), to the British 
Airports Authority (BAA), or to specific airlines (such as British Airways). 
Furthermore, the large Amalgamated Engineers Union (AEU), organized 
among others, also aircraft engineers; and members of the General Municipal 
Workers' Union (GMWU), included workers and employees from a large 
number of local airport authorities and airlines. None of these unions were ITF 
members. Neither - for obvious ideological reasons - was the French 
Communist General Confederation of Labour (CGT) ever an ITF member.
Flight crews particularly were often organized in separate associations 
which in name and character were not like traditional trade unions. In some 
cases flight crews did belong to separate associations which were trade 
unions in the normal sense, and others were organized in general unions. 
Some flight engineers were grouped together with pilots, and some were
“ information from author's interviews with D. Cockroft (19 June 1991); C. Deslandes (21 Nov. 1990); S. Howard (3 June 
1991); P. Laprevote (21 Nov. 1990); G. Ryde (5 June 1991); R. Valladon (22 Nov. 1990).
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separate. Cockpit crews in all countries of the world were licence holders, but
cabin crews operated under non-uniform qualifications. Some worked without 
a licence, while others needed a licence issued on a safety standard basis.26
The internal structures of the majority of unions depended on their 
ideological orientation. Furthermore, most unions in the EC countries were 
communist,27 socialist,28 christian-democrat,29 or liberal,30 in consequence of 
which they, and especially their leadership, were affected by party politics. 
Initally union leadership consisted of a national or general secretary, a 
treasurer etc. or, like that of the flight crews, a president, vice president(s), 
secretary, treasurers and so forth.31
Compared to airlines or trade unions which had direct vested interests 
in the pre-1987 period, most national consumers/users32 played a limited role 
in their country’s air-transport policy formulation, despite the importance of air 
passengers for air transport per se. Consumer/user organizations lacked the 
two most fundamental means of influence: formal membership and financial 
resources.33
Notwithstanding this lack of influence, Britain and France established 
and financed air-transport consumer structures that presented two important
“ For example licences for cabin crews were required for the cabin crews only in Denmark, France, Greece and Italy. 
Information from author's interviews with cpt. Y. Enderle (7 Dec.1990); H. Finstfein (5 June 1991); G. Koutsogiannos (18 
Jan. 1991); J. P. Meheust, D. Jullien, and G. Gomez (23 Nov. 1990); T. Middleton (13 June 1991); J. Rokofilos (17 July 
1990).
27The communist philosophy of course advocates a classless society where private ownership is abolished and the 
means of production belong to the people as a whole.
28 The socialist philosophy is an economic theory in which the means of production, distribution, and exchange are owned 
by the people collectivity, usually both through direct state nationalization or indirect state redistribution of income. It is not 
in principle against competition, on condition that economic growth is fairly distributed to all levels of society. In Marxist 
theory socialism is a transitional stage in social development from capitalism to communism, and characterized by the 
distribution of income according to work rather than need. See Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987: 201-70; Steiner, 1986: 25- 
27.
^ h e  christian-democratic ethos is conservative and strongly supports the church. In Belgium Germany, Italy, and 
Netherlands the conservatives are called Christian Democrats. Not all christian-democratic parties have a conservative 
orientation, however. For example in Belgium and the Netherlands the christian-democrats pursue centrist rather than 
conservative policies. See Steiner, 1986: 30.
traditionally liberals wished freedom from the state, demanding that some individual freedoms, or rights should be 
protected both from the state and from majority decisions. See Dunleavy and O’Leary, 1987:4-6.
Information from author’s interviews with D. Cockroft (19 June 1991); C. Deslandes (21 Nov. 1990); P. Laprevote (21 
Nov. 1990); G. Ryde (5 June 1991); R. Valladon (22 Nov. 1990).
32 The difference between user and consumer is twofold: in legal terms the user is the consumer of the public service; in 
functional terms the dissatisfied consumer denounces a specific airline or changes to another, while the user fights from 
within the system in order to improve it. There are statutory user bodies (govemmentally and legally established) and 
voluntary ones. See Shaw, 1993:199-203, 207-09.
“ information from author’s interviews with S. Crampfon (28 May 1991); P. Jeandrain (27 Nov. 1990); L. Mosca 7 
Dec.1990); J. Parr (4 June 1991); D. Prentice (31 May 1991); J. Sabourin and C. Grenier (23 Nov. 1990).
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cases of different but typical consumer organizations in their respective 
national structures.
In 1973 the UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) set up the Air-Transport 
Users Committee (ATUC), as a an autonomous body with the privilege of 
criticizing the CAA on behalf of British air-transport users. However, the 
chairman of the UK CAA was also the chairman of the twenty ATUC member 
committee and its Secretariat.34
Moreover, a body called Consumers in the EC Group of the UK (CECG) 
was set up in Britain in 1978, funded by the Department of Trade and Industry 
to give evidence to select committees of both the House of Commons and the 
House of Lords on behalf of all kinds of consumerism in the EC. The CECG is 
a British umbrella group for 29 consumer unions totalling seven million 
members, including the Consumers' Association Ltd, the National, Scottish 
and Welsh Consumer Council, and the National Federation of Consumer 
Groups. The CECG chairman was a member of the EC Commission's 
Consultative Consumer Council (CCC).35
The Consumers' Association Ltd, an independent consumer 
organization with no state funding, was the largest consumer organization in 
the UK, with over one million members. It had direct access to the 
International Organization for Consumer Unions (IOCU), and to most UN 
agencies including of course those dealing with air transport such as ICAO, 
IATA and European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC).36
In France, finally, the French Air-Transport Users' Association (AFUTA), 
founded in 1983, is part of the National Commercial Aviation Superior Council 
(NCASC), a member of the country’s Regional Transport Committee, and
34Interview with J. Parr (4 June 1991). See also Shaw, 1993: 204-06.
“ interview with S. Crampton (28 May 1991). See also National Consumer Council (NCC), 1983 and 1986: 226-33, 242- 
SI.
“ interview with D. Prentice (31 May 1991).
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closely co-operates with the ministers of Finance and Transport. It is entitled 
to approach consumers/users concerning claims, so as to give the information 
to the press for publication, and closely co-operates with the Commission. 
AFUTA belongs to the EC umbrella group of the Federation of User 
Representatives in the EC (FATUREC) which was created jointly by AFUTA 
and ATUC. In fact, in 1990 the AFUTA chairman was also the chairman of 
FATUREC.37
3. Overall Air-Transport Regulatory Structures
The national air-transport systems of EC member-states were regulated 
and controlled by their Ministry of Transport and/or Communications, Public 
Works or Public Services, their Divisions or Directorates General of Civil 
Aviation (DsGCA), and/or Civil Aviation Administrations or Authorities (CAAs). 
The DsGCAs or CAAs, frequently joined with the Ministries of Defence, were 
usually multi-purpose public service enterprises, and regulatory and 
consultative bodies with a wide range of responsibility for national air 
transport.38 They were organized either centrally (entrusted with ail regulatory 
tasks), dualistically (with separated responsibilities for technical and economic 
matters), or in a more complex way that was a combination of the two.39
Figures 2.1a and 2.1b illustrate the structure of the Greek and West 
German CAAs respectively, and Figures 2.2a and 2.2b that of the Italian and 
Portuguese DsGCAs. Comparing the Figures bejlow shows that although the 
four were somewhat differently organized, the functions were similar in all
37lnterviews with J. Sabourin and C. Grenier (23 Nov. 1990).
“ in all member-states the DsGCAs and CAAs competencies were specified as follows: co-operation with international 
organizations; agreements; aircraft accident-investigations; permission for entry, exit, and transit of aircraft; certification 
and supervision of airports, aircraft management, operating agencies, and flight operations; airworthiness certification of 
aircraft and other components; Supervision of aircraft maintenance; general planning, approval and licensing of air 
navigation facilities; licensing and control of aeronautical personnel; airspace regulation, navigation and air-traffic services 
and procedures supervision; approval and supervision of aeronautical training establishments; aeronautical information 
and telecommunications services; and authority of appeal in matters of civil aviation.
“ Naveau, 1989: 81-3.
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Figure 2.1.a: Structure of the Greek Civil Aviation Authority
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Figure 2.1.b: Structure of the West German Civil Aviation Authority
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Figure 2.2.a: Directorate Generai of Italy’s Civil Aviation
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Figure 2 2 b' Directorate General of Portugal’s Civil Aviation
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cases, whether the technical, economical, and regulatory responsibilities were 
assigned to divisions, departments or directorates. The West German CAA 
and the Italian and Portuguese DsGCAs appear to have been more centrally 
organized (as civil servants they were answerable to their Ministries of 
Transport, not to the Ministers), and were headed by Director Generals. The 
Greek CAA was a body administratively autonomous from the Ministry, and 
had a politically appointed Governor and Deputy Governor, accountable only 
to the Minister and not to the Ministry’s civil-service bureaucrats - as were the 
other three above.
The key to the structure of the EC states' scheduled air transport, as for 
that of the international one, was the Chicago Convention of 1944 and its 
bilateral inter-governmental air services agreements (BASAs) based on the 
principle of reciprocity. BASAs were a uniform system of stringent clauses 
covering the collusive terms and conditions for the national air-transport 
policies of the signatories. They were strictly duopolistic,40 and concerned only 
with publicly- owned national airlines operating licensed and scheduled41 air 
services within a framework of pooling inter-airline revenue-costs and 
revenue-sharing.42 No national legislation was therefore required for granting 
traffic rights to ail the signatories' scheduled air services.43
The various EC members' air-transport networks had a unique structure 
that was essentially a two-fold regulatory system: it referred (i) to the 
scheduled air services, and (ii) to a charter and independent airlines air 
services.44
Duopoly is the collusion of two airlines (suppliers) monopolizing the air services of a certain air route, e.g. the supply of 
air services on the Athens-London-Athens route by British Airways and Olympic Airways.
41 Scheduled air services have regular timetables for departures and arrivals, and listed prices.
42Cost and revene sharing was on a fifty-fifty basis in proportion to the capacity they offered on the route, and 
compensated the airline that carried fewer passengers.
43McGowan andTrengove, 1986: 5-6,67-68, 95-109; Shaw, 1993:123-24; Slot, 1989: 6-7.
“ Slot, 1989: 9; Villiers, 1989:4.
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For scheduled airlines, air-transport legislation applied to the granting of 
licences, access to the market, capacity and air fares. Unless stipulated 
otherwise, airlines were required to obtain a license. In accordance with the 
ECAC's International Agreement for the Procedure for the Setting of Tariffs for 
Scheduled Services of 10 July 1967,45 EC governments reserved the absolute 
right to approve or disapprove airline licenses, bearing in mind safety 
requirements and liabilities. Criteria and procedures for issuing licences varied 
from one member state to another. In some countries market access was 
restricted to licensed airlines, and required registered ownership and control 
by nationals, while the others applied similar de facto criteria. It was usually 
required that at least two-thirds of the capital was owned by their own 
nationals and the chairman, and that at least two-thirds of their directors, 
including the managing director and the general manager, also had to be 
nationals. Finally, it was only in the Netherlands, the UK and Ireland that the 
normal procedures of administrative law applied. In Belgium, Greece and the 
other member-states there was practically no possibility for administrative
46review.
It has been argued that the very fact that the EC member-states with 
the exception of Britain and of West Germany, did not have adequate licencing 
criteria and no provisions for an administrative review, was the result of one 
prime restrictive element in their regulatory structures: their refusal to permit 
competition between their national airline and other airlines - known as 
cabotage. For example in Greece, Portugal, and Spain the national airlines 
had a monopoly of both domestic and international air services. In France and 
Italy domestic services were operated monopolistically, but by airlines other 
than those flying internationally. Even air transport between member-states
45Cransand Biesheuvel, 1989: 223.
^Slot, 1989: 6-8.
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and their colonies was, in principle, reserved for the national carrier and 
known as grand cabotage. This applied for example, to the routes from the 
Netherlands to the Antilles and from Britain to Hong Kong.47
Some EC member-states even took the established air-transport 
regulations far too far. So for example in Belgium, under a Royal Degree of 30 
June 1966, the authorization of an air-transport licence was inter alia subject 
to certain conditions concerning the employment of travel agents. Moreover, a 
Royal Degree of 1965 obliged licence-holders to adhere to the prices and 
tariffs agreed upon or legally imposed.48
Configuration and quantity standards such as the control of air-fare 
levels and related air-transport conditions, if not explicit criteria for obtaining 
licences, were implied in the overall national and regulatory framework. They 
basically reproduced IATA directives whereby, according to a British law, 
airport operators and user-airlines adhered to a fixed-clause contract in 
respect of the package of services offered. Finally, regulations on cargo tariffs 
were usually absent.49
The legal status, type of management, financial structure, and degree 
of financial autonomy of EC airports varied considerably from one member- 
state to another. This diversity has been attributed, at least in part, to 
differences between the institutional structures of airport authorities, their 
relations vis-a-vis their governments, their overall objectives, the scope of 
activities undertaken by each authority, their financing sources and 
arrangements, and their accounting policies.50
EC airports were either under direct state or regional or local- 
government control, or operated by autonomous specialized bodies as
47Slot, 1989: 6-8.
4a Slot, 1989: 8.
49Slot, 1989: 8-9.
^ EC Commisssion. 22 May 1990: 4.
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concessions, or operated as private companies. Some were the proprietors of 
their own assets and tried to be self-financing, and others were operated on 
proprietor's behalf. For example, in West Germany only the Frankfurt airport 
was owned by a joint-stock company; all other major commercial airports were 
the property of private limited-liability companies. Athens airport, owned by the 
Greek state, was administered as an agent contributing to the fixed national 
assets. The airport-operating authorities for Rome, and those of provincial 
airports in France, operated as private companies on a concession basis, with 
some of the fixed assets owned, or loaned to them, by the state or the 
local/regional government and/or private shareholders. Finally in the UK, the 
British Airports Authority (BAA) operated airport services and facilities 
independently of the central government, and was run as a state corporation. 
All activities were conducted within the framework of a quasi-judicial system, 
which provided for public examination and special consultation. The Airports 
Act of 1986 dissolved BAA's control and in July 1987 privatized airport-control 
with a successor company, the BAA pic.51
In most EC member-states, however, national airports were run solely 
by the CAAs responsible among others for airport infrastructures,52 and usually 
favoured a single centralized and state-owned airport (hub), due mainly to 
military air restrictions.53 Secondary airports were used for the operations of 
national and foreign charter and independent airlines. EC member-states also 
allowed their national airlines54 to operate ancillary airport services, such as 
handling and catering. Most member-states had different systems for the 
allocation of airport slots55 and air-traffic control.56 Variations between national
51Checkley, 1990:4, 95-101: EC Commission. 22 May 1990: 3-4; Toms, 1988; Tritton, 1989:164-66.
52An airport infrastructure is an airports basic installatory framework, which includes the airspace traffic-control, both en 
route and within the terminal; air-side surface systems such as runways, holding pads, taxiways, and apron-gate; land- 
side systems such as terminal buildings, vehicle parking; and airport ground access systems such as aircraft 
maintenance, technical and baggage-handling facilities.
S3Civil aviation shares national airspace with military aviation. Specifically some flight levels and some airspace areas are 
reserved for operations and exercises by military aircraft.
54National airlines established a system of "grandfather rights", which consisted of particular slot rights (departure times) 
operated solely by them.
Slots are regulated by a fixed departure-timetable.
“ in general, the air-traffic rules and procedures in force, and the organization of scheduled and non-scheduled air traffic 
services conformed to ICAO standards, recommended practices and procedures.
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and international rules and procedures were listed in each member-country's 
Aeronautical Information Publications (AlPs).57
Finally, most EC states pursued social and regional air-transport 
policies based on the "public-policy" rationale. Certain members - for example 
Greece and Ireland, Italy, Spain and Portugal - were geographically separated 
from others member-states and depended on air transport as a prime means 
moving passengers and freight to and from other EC countries. Such traffic 
was crucial for their economic and social development and ensured linkages 
between the geographic centre and the periphery. Since most of the domestic 
routes were heavy losers (except for Ireland), they were directly subsidized by 
their respective governments or cross-subsidized through international air- 
services operations.58
Air-services by charter and independent airlines59 air services were 
based on the ECAC's Multilateral Convention on Commercial Rights for Non- 
Scheduled Services in Europe, signed in Paris on 30 April 1956.60 They 
operated within a looser regulatory framework concerning tariffs, routes, 
capacity, and frequency based on quotas and product definition. Their scope 
to compete with the scheduled airlines was restricted even though they 
provided more than half of the EC air-transport flights. Their services were 
usually sold to a tour-operating company,61 rather than direct to the 
consumers. However, all member-states published special decrees, orders or 
regulations setting out the conditions and obligations relevant to the various 
special and different categories of non-scheduled (charter) airline services -
57Abott and Thompson, 1989: 3; Airport Support. June 1989: 8-9; Ambrose, 1990: 26; Checkley, 1990; Dunham, 1990: 
13; Levine, 1991:11-12; O'Donovan and Beety, 1990:43; Pelkmans, 1986: 354-55; Slot, 1989:10-11; Sutton, 1990: 379.
“ For example, in 1919, France was the first to subsidize its airlines; Germany subsidized them during the interwar years
more than any other country; and the UK began to subsidize its airlines in 1921. See Bames, 1959; Barrett, 1987: 6-7, 9- 
11; Golich, 1990:171; Slot, 1989:11.
“ independent airlines are the regional and business-aviation airlines. All charter and independent airlines operate on 
demand (seasonal, leisure) air services otherwise called "non-scheduled air transport". According to ICAO, 47 per cent of 
ECAC-European passenger-kilometers were flown by charter and independent airlines in 1986. 
e0Crans and Biesheuvel, 1989: 223.
61 It leases the aircraft of a charter airline and sells the air-tickets to air-passengers as a package holiday.
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such as humanitarian, emergency and taxi flights, inclusive tours (IT), 
advanced booking (ABC), special events, affinity groups, closed groups 
(transport of students and migrant workers) and cargo charter flights. In 
Britain, for example, the Air Transport Licensing Board (ATLB) stipulated that 
the minimum price for inclusive tours could not be less than the full scheduled 
airline fare to the same destination.62
By the end of 1986, Air France, British Airways, and Lufthansa already 
controlled 40 per cent of scheduled flights in the EC. Added to them the 
national airline of Netherlands KLM Dutch Royal Airlines, of Spain Iberia and 
of Denmark SAS Scandinavian Airlines controlled roughly 70 percent of EC 
sceduled air-traffic and 60 per cent of the European market share. British 
Airways alone carried nearly 22 percent of all revenue passenger-miles served 
by EC airlines.63
Figure 2.3 below depicts the scheduled and non-scheduled intra- 
European passenger traffic of EC member-states for 1984. It is quite striking 
that in terms of scheduled services, the UK, West Germany and France, with a 
combined total of 36 m. passengers, flew approximately 7 m. more than all the 
remaining nine EC countries together, most of which transported fewer than 5 
million. The picture is rather different in respect of non scheduled services, 
where Spain prodigiously came first with 20 m. pass., the UK second with 
17.5, and West Germany third with 14m., followed by Greece in fourth place, 
well behind with only 4 m. passengers. What is surprising is that France’s non­
scheduled services accounted for a mere 4 million.
“ Member-states’ AIP documentation; Abbott and Thompson, 1989: 2-3; Button and Swan, 1989: 268-69; 1991: 93-94 
Doganis, 1989:5/1-9/1,1991:27-36; OECD, 1988: 26-37; McGowan and Trengove, 1986: 60-69, 99-119; Naveau, 1989 
107-09; 128-31; Poole, 1986: 9-13; Wassenbergh, 1983: 272-4; Wheatcroft and Lipman, 1986: 9-11, 26, 36-38, 114-24 
Pryke, 1991: 231-35; Sawers, 1986: 49, 69; Slot, 1989: 9; Van der Esch, 1989: 31-61; Van de Voorde, 1992: 514-16 
Williams, 1993: 72.
“ Dempsey, 1988: 683-84; Doganis, 1994: 23; Financial Times. 23 July 1987:44; Golich, 1990:167; Williams, 1993: 88.
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Figure 2.3: Scheduled and Non-Scheduled intra-European Passenger Traffic 
of EC Member-States in 1984.
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Source: Wheatcroft and Lipman, 1986: 8
Table 2.4 lists the pre-1987 international (including intra-European) 
passenger/aircraft kilometers provided by the EC-members’ state-owned 
(scheduled) and charter (non-scheduled) airlines in terms of passenger- 
kilometers and EC air routes served. It demonstrates that with 65.5 pass/kms 
internationally, the UK was very far ahead, by itself amounting to just bellow 
the combined total of France (39.5 pass/kms) and West Germany (26.6). The 
Netherlands, Spain, and Italy lagged well behind (with 19.8, 19.1, 16.9 
respectively). In terms of non-scheduled pass/kms the UK led again, with 25.9 
pass/kms, which is equivalent to triple the pass/kms of all the remaining 11 EC 
countries combined. These totalled a mere 8.8 pass/kms, with Spain 
responsible for 3.7 pass/kms and, unexpectedly, the Netherlands for 2.0 (the 
Antilles attracting international tourism). Denmark came in fourth place with
1.4 pass/kms. Disappointingly, France and West Germany could account for 
only 0.1 pass/kms each.
■  Scheduled Services 
D  Non-Scheduled Services
Table 2.4: Scheduled and Non-Sceduled International Air-Traffic Operated
by Members’ Airlines in 1986
Scheduled Non-scheduled Community
Passenger/kms-Aircraft/kms Passenger/kms routes 
(in bill.) (in mill.)__________ (in bill.)______________
UK 65.5 440 25.9 178
France 39.5 290 0.1 153
FR of Germany 26.6 254 0.1 173
Netherlands 19.8 130 2.0 65
Spain 19.1 160 3.7 108
Italy 16.9 140 0.7 99
Greece 6.4 49 0.2 39
Belgium 5.6 53 0.0 45
Portugal 4.5 40 0.0 33
Denmark 3.5 42 1.4 37
Ireland 2.5 21 0.6 43
Luxembourg 0.1 4 0.0 15
Sources: Button and Swann, 1989: 269, 1991: 100.
Over and above the aforementioned regulations, EC member-states or 
others wishing to operate air services to, from, or via any EC country had to 
observe its specific national air-transport rulings.
4. Individual EC Member-States Air-Transport Structures
The discussion of the various EC countries will follow the order of Table
2.1 which illustrates them according to their general pattern of interest 
intermediation.
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4.1 The Netherlands
In the Netherlands, the Air-Transport Act Luchtvaartwet established by 
Royal Decree of 29 January 1970, forms the basis of Dutch air-transport 
legislation. The Tariff Order for Scheduled Air Transport of 16 March 1977, 
No. 163 Tarievenbesluit Geregeld Luchtvervoer, regulates tariffs and other 
conditions of scheduled air transport. Licensing policy was the subject of a 
quite number of administrative legal decisions. Ministerial special and specific 
conditions (additional criteria) applied inter alia to issuing licenses for certain 
flights necessary for economic reasons or for stimulating competition (such as 
"no creation of excess capacity"); and in the case of charters sought to ensure 
that they would not disrupt the regular services or distort competition. Charter 
and independent flights were regulated by the Non-scheduled Air-Transport 
Order of May 197764 (Besluit Ongeregeld Luchtvervoer). The Netherlands had 
a somewhat more relaxed approach to tariff regulations than other EC 
member-states.65
Several provisions in the Dutch legislation related to ancillary services. 
Permission for take off or landing at certain favourable times being much 
sought after, slot allocation was an important policy instrument in regulating 
access to the Dutch air-transport system.66
While the Economic Competition Act (ECA) applied also to air-transport, 
agreements relating to international air transport were exempted from 
notification.67
The Dutch state held a majority interest in the country's largest national 
airline, Royal Dutch Airlines (Koninklijke Luchvaart Mij, KLM), founded on 7 
October 1919.68
“ Bulletin of Acts, Orders and Decrees 1975: 227.
65Crans and Biesheuvel, 1989: 224-28, 230-31; Directorate General of Air Transport and Infrastructure policy 
Documentation, 25 Mar. 1994:002602; Slot, 1989: 7, 9.
66Crans and Biesheuvel, 1989: 231-33.
87Slot, 1989:12.
“ Button and Swann, 1989: 266; Crans and Biesheuvel, 1989: 233-34; Golich, 1990:172; Hunter, 1993: 997-98; OECD, 
1988:45; Wheatcroft and Lipman, 1986:189-90.
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The Netherlands' Trade Union Confederation (FNV)69 and the Christian- 
Protestant National Federation of Trade Unions (CNV),70 were the exclusive 
representative organizations of all workers in the Netherlands. The FNV- 
affiliated Transport Workers' Union (Vervoersbond-FNV), with a membership 
of around 58,000 workers, included 4,100 air-transport and airlines personnel. 
The CNV-affiliated Transport Union had a membership of 14,500 including air­
transport workers. The Union of Netherlands Cabin Personnel (VKC) was the 
main union of cabin attendants for all airlines in the Netherlands, with a 
membership of 5,100.71
4.2 Belgium
In Belgium, the Air-Transport Act of 20 November 1946, as amended by 
the Air-Transport Act of 15 March 1954 (Royal Decree), regulated the 
country's Civil Aviation and established two regulatory and administrative 
bodies. The Air Routes Board (Regie des Voies Aeriennes RVA), was a legal 
entity in charge of constructing, fitting up, maintaining and running the airports, 
as well as ensuring the security of aviation; and the Aviation Security 
Committee, which had unrestricted fredom to control and supervise the strict 
observance of laws and regulations in the field of aviation. There was no 
Belgian system of tariff approval but a "special operation conditions" system. 
In respect of market entry the Royal Decree made no distinction between 
national and international traffic but between types flights: non-commercial, 
scheduled commercial and non-scheduled commercial. Furthermore Belgian 
law had no specific regulations on ancillary services. The Act of 27 May 
1960 On Protection Against the Abuse of Economic Power, applied to, but
69Federatie Nederiandse Vakbeweging with 900,000 members. It was formed in January 1976 by the pre-World War II 
Netherlands Federation of Trade Unions (NW ), and the Netherlands Roman Catholic Federation of Labour (NKV). 
roThe Christelijk Nationaal Vakverbond with 320,000 members was the third pre-World War II federation which did not join
the other Iwo.
71 Harper, 1987: 294-98; ITF News. Archives and Notes 1986 -1993.
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never overrode, the stringent national stringent regulatory arrangements in the 
air-transport sector. After the Second World War, the largely state-owned 
airline was SABENA (Societe Beige d' Exploitation de la Navigation 
Aerienne).72
The Belgian General Federation of Labour (FGTB),73 through its 
affiliated union General Central of Public Services (CGSP),74 organized 500 
workers (cabin crews included) from its civil aviation sector. The Confederation 
of Christian Trade Unions (CSC),75 through its affiliated Christian Transport 
and Diamond Workers' Union (CVD),76 comprised both air-transport workers 
and cabin crews. The General Confederation of Liberal Trade Unions of 
Belgium (CGSLB),77 represented a small number of air-transport personnel. 
The above three air-transport union federations incorporated around 70 per 
cent of the air-transport labour force in the national carrier Sabena. The Metal 
Industry Workers' Union78 numbered 2270 air-transport personnel among its 
members. Another inter-occupational federation in Belgium is the Cartel of 
Independent Trade Unions,79 which had only a very small number of air­
transport workers. It had two sections: the Cartel of. Independent Public 
Services Trade Unions,80 and the Cartel of Independent Private-Sector Trade 
Unions.81 Finally, the Association of Cockpit Crews and Flight Engineers of 
Belgium (ABPNL),82 represented approximately 75-80 percent of the 
commercial airline pilots and flight engineers in Belgium.83
72Button and Swann, 1989: 266; Delsaux and Stuyck, 1989: 203-10; Golich, 1990: 172; Hunter, 1993: 201; Wheatcroft 
and Lipman, 1986:190.
73Federation Generate du Travail de Belgique, with a membership of 1,200,000.
7*Centrale Generate des Services Publiques, Secteur Aviation Civile.
75Confederation des Syndicats Chretiens with a membership of 1,400,000.
76Centrale Chretienne des Ouvriers du Transport et des Ouvriers Diamantaires.
77Centrale Generate des Syndicats Liberaux de Belgique, with a membership over 200,000.
76Centraie de I'Industrie du Metal de Belgique.
79Cartel des Syndicats Independant de Belgique.
60Cartel des Syndicats Independants de Services Publics.
81 Cartel des Syndicats Independents de Travailleurs du Rive.
“ Association Beige des Rlotes et Navigants-Techniciens de Ligne.
83 Interviews with cpt Y. Enderle (7 Dec. 1990), F. Tack (14.Nov. 1990), and A. Gosselin (14 Nov.1990); Harper, 1987: 
39-45; ITF News. Archives and Notes 1986-1993.
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4.3 Denmark
In Denmark, air transport was regulated by the Danish Aviation Act No. 
252 of 10 June 1960. Section 2 (2) of the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices 
Supervision Act of 1955, as amended by the Monopolies Act, did not apply to 
air transport, but there was very little difference between scheduled and 
charter air-traffic regulations.84
Along with Norway and Sweden, Denmark exploited the jointly-owned 
Scandinavian Airline System (SAS), formed in 1951 as a multi-state venture in 
order to concentrate the three Scandinavian countries' international and 
domestic air traffic. The multinational air carrier was owned three-sevenths by 
the Swedish airline (ABA), two-sevenths by Denmark's one DDL, and two- 
sevenths by Norway's DNL. Each of the three national airlines was owned 
equally by private and government interests. The jurisdictive arrangements 
included joint national concessions applicable to SAS as a whole, and 
permission for the national parent companies to operate commercial air-traffic 
ventures under their respective national laws. Although the three countries 
carried out their politico-economic negotiations with other countries jointly, 
they signed separate bilateral agreements with the others, in which it was the 
national parent company, and not SAS, that was the designated party - 
disregarding the Chicago Convention regulations against such agreements.85 
SAS owned 50 per cent of Linjeflyg airline, 25 per cent of Greenlandair, 22 per 
cent of Wideroe, and the majority of shares in Scanair airline.86
There were four main Danish unions to represent air-transport personnel. 
The Special Workers' Union (SID),87 which includes the Transport Workers' 
Union, organized 4,500 air-transport employees and the Danish Metal
“ OECD, 1988:41-42; Sundstrom and Stahle, 1989: 288-90.
“ interviews with T. Gjertsen (29 Nov.1990); B. Stahle (4 Dec. 1990). See also Sundstrom and Stahle, 1989: 291.
“ Button and Swann, 1989: 266; Wheatcroft and Lipman, 1986:191-92.
67Special for bundet i Danmark, with a membership of 318,000 unskilled and semi-skilled workers.
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Workers' Union (DMWU)88 1,400 air transport workers. The Officers' and Civil 
Servants' Union (OCSU)89 that had approximately 1,000 air transport 
members. Finally, the main Cabin Crew Union of Denmark (CCU)90 
represented 1,300 members of cabin crews in Denmark.91
4.4 West Germany
In the Federal Republic of West Germany (FRG), the air-transport 
licencing system was regulated by the Air-Traffic Act (Luftverkehrsgesetz, Luft 
VG), and the Air-Traffic Licensing Ordinance (Luftverkehrs Zulassung 
Ordnung). Scheduled air-transport licenses were obtained through diplomatic 
channels ("Diplo Clearance''), but the Act required additional criteria for 
granting a license depending on routes, tariffs and other conditions. These 
regulations did not, however, apply to flights to or from the Berlin Air Corridor, 
and for this special permission was required. Exceptions were made for 
Britain, France, and the USA.92 Thus the Federal Cartel Act (competition law),
93Section 99 (1) did not, in principle, apply to air transport.
However Section 23 of the merger-control of the Federal Cartel Office 
(FCO) prohibited the concentration of German air transport. More specifically, 
Sections 24 and 26 (2), of the Act against Restraints of Competition (ARC), 
banned discrimination and prohibited the national airline from abusing its
94dominant position.
Lufthansa (Deutsche Luft Hansa-LH) was set up in 1926 as a result of 
the consolidation of various German airlines and in 1953 it became the
“ Dansk Metalarbejderforbund, with a membership around 140,000.
89Dansk Funktionaeforbund-Serviceforbundet.
°°KabinepersonaIe Foreningen A F 1966.
91 Harper, 1987:114-15: ITF News Archives and Notes, 1986-1993.
“ They were three of thhe four World War II allies responsible for West Germany, the other fourth being the ex-Soviet
Union.
“ German AIP Documentation, Nachrichten fur Luftfahrer publications 5 May 1988; Strathaus, 1986:19-22; Slot, 1989:6, 
12 .
‘"OECD, 1988: 43-44.
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principal state-owned airline. Other ailines operating domestic and charter air 
services were few and majority-owned by LH, although German charter 
airlines accounted for 50 per cent of Germany's outbound air traffic.95
There was only one transport union in Germany, the Public Service and 
Transport Workers' Union (OTV).96 It was one of the seventeen affiliated 
industrial unions of the German Federation of Trade Unions (Deutscher 
Gewerkschaftbund, DGB) accounting for more than 15 percent of its 
membership.97 The OTV covered around 30,000 West German air-transport 
personnel. The German Airline Pilots Association (Vereinigung Cockpit-VC) 
represented most of the country's pilots.98
4.5 The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg
In Luxembourg the first air-transport law to regulate civil aviation was 
promulgated on 31 January 1948. On 10 January 1948 the Luxembourg 
Airline's Company (Societe Anonyme Luxembourgeoise de Navigation 
Aerienne) had been founded, 40 percent of which was owned by Luxembourg 
and 60 percent by Britain's Scottish Aviation Ltd,99 which brought the planes, 
pilot crews, and technical advisers from Scotland. The air-crew licences had to 
comply with the standards demanded by the British Ministry of Civil Aviation. In 
fact, the airline represented UK rather than Luxembourg interests. It had no 
monopoly within or financial dependency on the Grand Duchy, although it was 
entitled to state subsidies (subject to strict governmental control). In October 
1961 the Luxembourg airlines were renamed Luxair. The freight-airline 
CargoLux was created in March 1970; it was again mostly privately owned,
“ Button and Swann, 1989: 266; Golich, 1990:171; Hunter, 1993: 614; Wheatcroft and Lipman, 1986:190-91. 
^Gewerkschaft Offentiiche Dienste, Transport und Verkehr.. After the unification of the West and East Germany OTVs 
total membership numbered over two million, 800,000 new members from Eastern Germany having signed up with the 
union. ITF News. Feb. 1991.
97DGB’s membership is around 7,700,000 workers.
“ Harper, 1987:165-70; Hunter, 1993: 613: ITF News Archives and Notes, 1986-1993.
“ Scottish Airlines flying charter flights was its major branch.
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Luxair holding only 33 percent. The regional Luxair Commuter SA was state- 
owned, however.100
The Luxembourg General Confederation of Labour (CGT-L),101 affiliated 
with the National Federation of Railway and Transport Officials and Salaried 
Employees (FNCTTFEL),102 represented all air-transport personnel including 
cabin crew employees. The Luxembourg Aviation Pilots’ Union (UPL)103 
represented all Luxembourg’s pilots.104
4.6 The United Kingdom
In Britain the regulation of air transport constituted the loosest 
regulatory system within the EC. After World War II the Labour government 
and the Minister of Civil Aviation nationalized UK air transport by the Civil 
Aviation Act (CAA) of 1946. The CAA set up the Air-Transport Advisory 
Council (ATAC), mainly a consumer council, and established the National 
Joint Council for Civil Air Transport (NJCCAT), an organization which 
negotiated employment conditions under the auspices of the Ministry of 
Labour. The Minister of Civil Aviation had powers of a general political 
character. The Civil Aviation (Licensing) Act of 1960 created much improved 
opportunities for private airlines and altered the licensing of scheduled air 
services by setting up an Air-Transport Licensing Board (ATLB).105
The Civil Aviation Act of 1971 established the Civil Aviation Authority 
and a more liberal national regulatory framework, although international airline 
services, other than charter flights, were excluded from the monopoly 
provisions of the Fair Trading Act of 1973 and the Competition Act of 1980.
1 “ Button and Swann, 1989: 266; Hamer, 1978:143-60, 264-69, 312-15; Hunter, 1993: 901.
101 Confederation Generate du Travail du Luxembourg, with a membership of around 44,000 workers and employees.
102 Federation Nationale des Cheminots, Travailleurs du Transport, Fonctionnaires et Employes Luxembourgeois. here 
were also the Luxembourg Confederation of Christian Trade Unions (Letzebuerger Chreschtleche Gewerkschafts-Bond- 
LCGB), with a membership of 15,000, and the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions (Onofhangege 
Gewerkschaftsvond Letzebuerg- OGB-L), a Confederation within the CGT-L, with a membership of 33,000 workers.
103 Union des Pilotes d’Aviation Luxembourgoise.
104 Hamer, 1978: 408; Harper, 1987: 264-65.
105Barrett, 1987: 30; Wheateroft, 1964: 22-45,129-97; Wheatcroft and Lipman, 1986: 25-26.
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The Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC), the Directorate General of 
Fair Trading (DGFT), and the CAA intervened only in instances of predatory 
pricing or in cases of possible detrimental effects deriving from airline mergers 
(such as an airline acquiring a dominant position on a particular air route), 
although they recognized that there were potential benefits from the national 
airlines competing with foreign ones.106
The chairman and board of the CAA were appointed by the Secretary of 
State for Trade, but CAA was constitutionally and financially107 independent of 
government, and its 7,400 employees were not civil servants. When the air 
transport was deemed to be public transport, the CAA required not only an air­
transport license but also an air-operator's certificate (AOC). The Civil Aviation 
Acts of May 1980 and 1982, and the licensing White Paper On Airline 
Competition Policy of 1984 introduced looser controls over domestic fares.108
In 1921 the UK operated three major airlines and in 1924 four which 
merged to form Imperial Airways Ltd. After the Second World War the Civil 
Aviation Act (CAA) of 1946 set up three state air corporations. They were 
British European Airways (BEA), the British Overseas Airways Corporation 
(BOAC), and British South American Airways which merged with BOAC in 
1949. In April 1974 the two remaining state-owned airlines merged and 
became today's British Airways (BA), the UK's only national, state owned and 
scheduled airline which accounted for just over 66 per cent of total UK air­
transport. In 1987 BA was fully privatized and merged with British Caledonian 
(BCal), an independent airline that had been operating since 1971. There 
were many charter airlines within the UK air transport such as Dan Air, 
Brittania, Air UK, and so forth.109
106OECD, 1988:47-48.
107Ordinary taxpayers (the general public) do not subsidize air transport, but solely the users of air transport.
108lnterview with R. Cotterill (31 May 1991). See also Button, 1991:19; Button and Swann, 1989: 261,1991: 97; UK-CAA, 
1979: 5,18-27,1982,1984; Naveau, 1989:156-57; Shaw, 1993:131-32; Toms, 1988: 24-26; Triton, 1989:153-64 166- 
67,185-86; Wheatcroft and Lipman, 1986:189.
1O0Buton and Swann, 1989: 266; Corke, 1986: 31-77; Golich, 1990:172; Wheatcroft, 1964: 24, 79.
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The Transport and General Workers' Union (TGWU)110 in its civil 
aviation section represented all UK airline workers, as well as air-traffic 
controllers, ground handling staff, and a substantial number of CAA 
employees, although it was not the main CAA union. It also organized cabin 
crews but not cockpit crews. Its membership was around 24,000 air- transport 
workers and airline employees. The Association of Scientific, Technical and 
Managerial Staff (ASTMS), included air-transport employees most of whom 
were members of the BA unions. The National and Local Government Officers' 
Association (NALGO) organized among others 2,500 air-transport employees, 
and the Institution of Professionals, Managers and Specialists (IPMS) 3,100. 
The union of Manufacturing Science Finance (MSF), was responsible for 
4,500 air-transport personnel, while the National Union of Rail, Maritime and 
Transport Workers (NURMT) had around 5,500 members from air transport. 
The British Airline Pilots Association (BALPA) unionized all UK pilots. Finally, 
the British Air-Transport Association (BATA), grouped together virtually all 
British airlines.111
4.7 France
France has traditionally had a highly regulated air-transport 
environment. Decree No.76-711/76 concerned the basic law in respect of 
approval of air fares. The rules of competition (Ordinance of 30 June 1945, 
amended by Ordinance of 1 December 1986) applied also to air transport.112
Since the end of World War II France has had two international airlines: 
Air France (AF), the state-owned national airline founded in 1933, and the 
Union des Transportes Adriennes (UTA), a privately-owned airline. The country's
110lt has a membership of 1,130,000 workers and employees.
111lnfbrmation from author's interviews with D. Cockroft (19 June 1991); H. Finstfein (5 June 1991); S. Howard (3 June 
1991 and 4 April 1993); G. Ryde (5 June 1991). See also Harper, 1987: 418-29; Hunter, 1993: 1346-353; ITF News 
Archives and Notes, 1986-1993. See also Financial Times. 5 Oct. 1990: 27.
11 information requested but not sent from the French Ministry of Housing, Transport and Tourism (documentation 28 
April 1994: 001603; Doganis, 1989: 7/1-7/31; OECD, 1988:43; Rapp, 1984:17; Villiers, 1989: 311.
85
domestic air-transport services were dominated 90 percent by Air Inter; 
several regionally based third-level carriers,113 such as Transport Aerien 
Transregional, (TAT), and Air Littoral covered the remaining 10 per cent.114
France had five main transport federations and syndicates for pilots, 
cabin attendants and flight engineers divided between Catholic, Socialist and 
Communist organizations. The General Federation of Transport and 
Equipment of the French Democratic Confederation of Labour (FGTE- 
CFDT),115 which included the Federal Air Transport Union (FATU), 
represented air-transport unions with around 1,500 members. It incorporated 
cabin crews from all French and foreign air carriers (including charters and 
regionals) as well as airport staff, the DGAC and the French meteorological 
services. The Federation of the Transport and Services Staff-Work Force 
(FETS-FO)116 had approximately 12,500 members from French airlines and 
airports, such as cabin crews, mechanics, and ground handlers. The National 
Syndicate of Airline Pilots (SNPL),117 represented all French airline pilots and 
the National Syndicate of Commercial Air-Transport Personnel (SNPNC)118 
represented arond 7,000 cabin attendants members out of the approximately 
10,000 employed by 30 airlines, French and foreign. Finally the National 
Syndicate of the Flight Engineers (SNOMAC)119 had around 1,300 members 
employed by all the French airlines.120
113These are airlines operating intra-regional air-transport services.
114Button and Swann, 1989: 266; Golich, 1990:172; Wheatcroft and Lipman, 1986:191.
115The Socialist Confederation Francaise Democratique du Travail (CFDT), was formed in 1964 by the majority faction of 
the French Confederation of Christian Labourers (Confederation Francaise des Travailleurs Chretiens (CFTC) The CFDT 
had a general membership of around 7,000 transport workers.
1167?je Federation Force Ouvnere (F.O) de /' Equipement, des Transport et des Services belongs to the General 
Confederation of Labour-Workers’ Force (Generate Confederation du Travail-Force Ouvrere, CGT-FO) which broke away 
from the largest of the unions and communist dominated General Confederation of Labour (Confederation Generate du 
Travail, CGT) in 1948, as a protest against communist influence therein. Force Ouvriers (FO) was a formerly Catholic and 
now independent small union organization.
U7Syndicat National des Riots de Ligne.
Syndic at National du Personnel Navigant Commercial.
U9Union Syndicale du Personnel Navigant Technique Nationale (USPNT-N).
120lnformation from author's interviews with C. Deslandes (21 Nov.1990), P. Laprevote (21 Nov.1990), J. P. Meheust, D. 
Jullien and G. Gomez (23 Nov.90), and R. Valladon (22 Nov.1990); Harper, 1987: 141-54; Hunter, 1993: 570; ITF News 
Archives and Notes 1986-1993; Keating, 1993:170-71; Wilson, 1990:125,130,132
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4.8 Italy
In Italy the regulation of air transport was one of the strictest in the EC. 
Under Article 776 of 30 March 1942, Air Navigation Code 342, as amended by 
Air Navigation Law 862 on 11 December 1980, scheduled air services might 
only be instituted and operated under government concession, issued by 
Presidential Decree. Those concessions had the dual function of (i) "instituting 
air-transport services", and (ii) "entrusting them under concession to air­
transport companies". The process was very rigid and it could take up to three 
or even four years for a licence to be approved. This exclusivity given to 
scheduled air services was consistent with the principles of the Italian 
Constitution, which ab initio gave the state the right to take under its wing 
public services which were of paramount public interest. Italian air transport 
was, therefore, governed neither by civil nor commercial law, but basically 
subject to administrative law.121
For non-scheduled carriers the authorization process for obtaining 
rights on new routes (without concessions) was less formal and less rigid. 
Non-scheduled air services were regulated by a Decree issued on 18 June 
1981, partially modified and integrated by another promulgated on 30 July 
1984.122
Alitalia (AL) was the national carrier, and was totally state-owned until 
1985, when it sold off some of its shares. Alisandra, the largest private airline, 
and ATI, a wholy state-owned subsidiary of Alitalia, were virtually the only 
airlines enjoying rights in the domestic air space. Regional airlines - such as 
Air Sardinia, Aliblu, Alinord, Avianova and Transavio - were very minor 
concerns, and some of them were partially owned by the three main Italian
123carriers.
121Boffitoand Martinelli, 1993:185-87; Giardina, 1989: 244-46; Siedentopf and Ziller, 1988:46.
122ltalian AIP Documentation, 12 Nov.1988, Ministry of Transport, 6 April 1994: 334502.
123Buttonand Swan, 1989: 266; Doganis, 1989: 8/1-8/14; Giardina, 1989: 244-46; Wheatcroft and Lipman, 1986:192-93.
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Two major transport federations and a section of a transport union have 
represented Italy's air-transport workers and employees. The Italian Transport 
Workers' Federation of the Italian General Confederation of Labour (FILT- 
CGIL),124 dominated by communists, represented roughly 6,700 civil aviation 
personnel, including cabin crews. The Transport Federation of the Italian 
Confederation of Workers' Unions (FIT-CISL),125 mostly under christian- 
democrat and some lesser socialist influence, represented 4,250 air-transport 
workers and employees, including ATI, the cabin attendants union. Finally, the 
Transport section of the Italian Labour Union (UIL-TRASPORTI),126 which 
broke away from the CISL and, was led by social-democrats and republicans, 
represented around 500 airline workers in its affiliated union UIGEA.127
4.9 The Republic of Ireland
In Ireland it was the Air Navigation and Transport Bill of 10 May 1936, 
amended in May 1961, that laid down legal regulations for air traffic. Aer 
Lingus, consisting of Aer Lingus pic, Aerlinte Eireann pic, and Aer Rianta, was 
the state-owned airline. Plenty of charter and independent airlines, with 
Ryanair the largest of them, operated air services on a number of international 
routes as well.128
Legislation on domestic competition did not apply to air transport, but 
this exemption was removed in late 1987.129
Three main unions organised air-transport workers and employees. The 
Irish Transport and General Workers' Union (ITGWU) included the Services,
™Federazione Italiana Lavoratori Trartsporti-Confederazione Generate Italiana del Lavoro-with 4,500,000 members.
A25Federazione Italiano Trasporti-Confederazione Italiana dei Sindicati Lavoratori with a membership of around three 
million workers and employees.
126C/n/one Italiana del Lavoro Trasporti, with roughly 1,400,000 members.
127Harper, 1987: 222-27; ITF News Archives and Notes, 1986-1993; Keating, 1993: 235-36.
123More detailed information requested but not received. Button and Swan, 266; Hunter, 1993: 798; Share, 1986: 1-56; 
Wheatcroft and Lipman, 1986:190.
129OECD, 1988: 45.
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Industrial, Professional and Technical Union (SIPTU) organizing air-transport 
personnel. The Federated Workers' Union of Ireland, Civil Aviation Branch 
(FWUI-CAB), was concerned mainly with cabin crews but also some other 
air-transport categories of workers and employees. Finally the Amalgamated 
Transport and General Workers' Union (ATGWU) also represented air­
transport personnel. With headquarters in the UK, it was closely affiliated with 
Britain's 7WGU.130
4.10 Greece
In Greece, Governmental Decree 714/1970 laid down the rules for the 
functions of the Greek CAA (YPA), the legal status of which was regulated by 
maritime laws. The first Civil Aviation Decree (No. 1815) was promulgated in 
1988. Since 1956, the national, then privately-owned airline Olympic Airways 
(OA), under governmental Decree 3560/1956, was granted complete 
monopoly of domestic scheduled and non-scheduled airlines. In 1975 the 
state bought the airline, setting up a subsidiary company, Olympic Aviation, to 
operate third-level domestic services serving mainly the islands.131
The Federation of Civil Aviation Unions (OSPA), represented 14,500 
workers of Olympic Airways and its affiliated companies. The Hellenic Airline 
Pilots' Association (HALPA), organized the OA pilots, and the Hellenic Flight 
Engineers Union HFEU) all flight engineers. The Flight Stewards and 
Stewardesses' Union (EISF or FAU) grouped around a thousand OA flight 
attendants, and the Licensed Airline Technicians' Union (ETEM&P) 700 OA 
aircraft-mantenance workers.132
130 Harper, 1987: 212-14: ITF News Archives and Notes, 1986-1993
131Doganis, 1989: 9/1-9/31; Shaw, 1993:172-74; Wheatcroft and Lipman, 1986:193-94.
1 “ information from author's interviews with G. Koutsogiannos (18 Jan. 1991); J. Rokolillos (22 Feb. 1990).
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4.11 Spain
In Spain, the state-owned airline Iberia exercized total control over the 
domestic airline Aviaco.133 There were three main national federations of 
unions which represented air-transport labourers as well. The National 
Federation of Transport, Communications and Sea (FETCOMAR-CCOO)134 
numbered 4,000 air-transport personnel, including cabin crews. The National 
Federation of Transport and Telecommunications (FETTC-UGT),135 
represented around 3,500 members, including the cabin crew union (STCP- 
UGT). The Federation of Transport of ELA-STV136 had only around 15 
air-transport members, and the Confederation of Independent Civil-Service 
Union (CS/)137, organized the civil servants working in Spain's air-transport 
industry.138
4.12 Portugal
Portugal had no Civil Aviation Act as such, and instead promulgated air­
transport legislation. The country's non-scheduled international air transport 
was regulated under Law (Decreto-Lei) No. 274/77 of 14 July 1977, and 
Portaria No. 129/79 of 22 March 1979.139 Transport Air Portugal (TAP), 
Portugal's state-owned airline was set up in 1945 as a government 
department. It was privatized in 1953, and re-nationalized in April 1975.140
133lnfbrmation requested from the Spanish Ministry of Transport but not respond received. Buton and Swan, 1989: 266; 
Wheatcroft and Lipman, 1986:193.
134 Federation Estatal de Transportes Communicac,iones y  Mar de CCOO. The Workers' Commissions Confederation 
Sindical de Comisiones Obreras, (CCOO) is close to the Communist Party of Spain (PCE), which had a membership of 
1,600,000.
135The Federation Estatal de Transportes y  Telecomunicationes de UGT. The General Union of Workers (Unio'n 
General de Trabajores- UGT) was associated with the Spanish Socialist Workers' Parly (PSOE), which had seven 
hundred thousand workers.
136Federation del Transporte de Euzko Langilleen Alkartsuna/Solidaridad de Trabajadores Vascos (ELA-STV) which is 
the Basque Workers' Solidarity was close to the Basque nationalist Party (PNV), and had a total membership of 110,000 
workers.
137Confederation Sindical Independiente de Funcionarios
138Harper, 1987: 369-73: ITF News Archives and Notes 1986-1993; Keating, 1993: 337-339.
139Portuguese Directorate General of Civil Aviation documentation, 004757, 26 May 1994.
140Button and Swann, 1989: 266; Doganis, 1989: 6/1-6/13; Fernandez, 1986:18; Wheatcroft and Lipman, 1986:193.
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The country had four main air-transport unions. The Syndicate of 
Aviation and Airport Workers (SITAVA)141 organized 5,200 air-transport 
members, the National Syndicate of Flight Atendants of Civil Aviation 
(SNPVAC)142 around 1,600 cabin crews members, the Civil Aviation Staff 
Union (SINVOO)143 roughly a thousand air-transport workers and employees, 
and the Syndicate of Aircraft Maintenance Technicians (SITEMA)144 roughly a 
thousand maintenance technicians.145
Table 2.5 below shows the ownership of the individual EC members' 
most important national airline and their trade union structures in the pre-1987 
period.
Turning to the level of the EC a brief description of this body's 
institutional structures, performance, and pre-1979 transport and air-transport 
developments is indispensable.
5. EC Institutional and Air-transport Structures
The Commission and the Council of Ministers are the institutions in the 
EC with the dominant role in shaping policy, and they utilize an intensive 
bargaining system to carry through the implementation of their decisions. 
Briefly: the Commission initiates and proposes and the Council of Ministers 
disposes. The EC has also, a consultative system (which is not a law-making 
body) in the European Parliament (EP)146 and its Economic and Social 
Committee (ESC or ECOSOC), and a judicial system in the European Court of
141Sindicato dos Trabalhadores da Aviacao e Aeroportos.
142Sindicato Nac.ionai do Pessoal de Voo da Aviacao CMI.
143 Sindicato dos Quadms de Aviacao Comercial.
144Sindicato dos Technicos de Manutencao de Aeronaves.
145Harper, 1987: 339-41: ITF News Archives and Notes, 1986-1993.
14&The EP was comprised of 518 members directly elected in the twelve EC member-states and appointed proportionally 
to the member-states population. In 1994 (post-Maastricht) the elected EP members increased to 567. It has 18 specialist 
committees on different matters such as the Transport and Tourism committee.
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Table 2.5: EC Members* National Airline Ownership. Participation in Other Airlines, and 
Main Trade-Union Fragmentation
Airline Stake Participation
(in %) in other airlines (in %)
Trade Unions
Belgium
Denmark
France
SN
private
SAS
private
AF
54.7
45.3
50*
50
99.4
Sobelair 71.1
Linjeflyg 50 
Greenlandair 25 
Wideroe 22 
Scanair (maj.)
Air Charter 80 
Air Inter 36 
Air Guadeloupe 45 
EuskalAir 29
GTB-CGSP, 
CSC-CVD, 
CGSLB, ABNLP
SID, DMWU, 
OCSU, CCU
FGTE-CFDT 
incl. FATU, 
FETS-FO, 
SNPL.SNPNC, 
USPNTN
Greece
Ireland
OA
AER LINGUS
100
100
Olympic Aviation 100
Aer Turas Teoranta 100 
Aer Lingus Commut.100
OSPA.HALPA 
FAU, ETEM&P, HFEU
ITGWU.SIPTU,
FWUI-CAB,
ATGWU
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
AL 100(1985) 
67.00 (1986) 
private 33.00
Luxair
private
KLM
private
20.9
79.1
36.9
63.1
ATI 100
Luxair Comm.SA 100 
Cargolux 33
Martinair 25 
Transavia 40 
NLM Cituhopper 100 
Netherlines 100
FILT-CGIL,
FIT-CISL
UIL-TRASPORTI
CGT-FNCTTFEL
UPL
FNV-CNV, VKC
Spain
TAP
IB 100
Air Portugal 100
Aviaco 100
Air Atlantis 100
FETCOMAR- 
CCOO.FETTC- 
UGT.STCP- 
UGT, ELA-STV
SITAVA, SINVOO, 
SNPVAC, SITEMA, 
SQUAC.
UK BA majority British Air Tours 100 
Cal Air Inter. 100 
British Caled. 100
TGWU, 
ASTMS, 
NALGO, IPMS, 
MSF, NURMT 
BALPA
W.Germany LH
public
private
74.3
7.8
17.8
Condor 100 
DLT40
LH-Cityline 100 
Aero-Lloyd (maj.) 
Cargolux 24.5
OTV, CV
•Including the other Scandinavian governments.
Sources: Button and Swann, 1991: 98; Harper, 1987; ITF News, archives and documentation (1986-1993)
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Justice (ECJ) at the Hague.147 Figure 2.4 illustrates the legislative process
(consultation procedure) of the pre-1987 (SEA) period.
The Commission itself comprises 17 commissioners, appointed for four- 
year terms by the member-states’ goverments. Germany, the UK, France, 
Italy, and Spain, have two commissioners each. The European Council148 
chooses the president of the Commission for a renewable two-year term. The 
commissions' bureacratic structure has 23 directorates-general (DGs), each 
with a specific functional task. All DGs have similar policy-making and 
hierarchical structures, presided over by a Commissioner (the analogue of a 
minister in a national government) and his or her private office staff or cabinet 
It consists of a chef and four to five people selected by the Commissioner from 
the EC institutions (especially the Commission itself) or from outside (often 
from national government service), and hold temporary appointments. The 
general director, the director and the heads of divisions are a typical instance 
of the hierarchical proliferation of EC bureaucratic structure under the 
commissioner's leadership.149
The Council of Ministers, one per member state, functions through its 
secretariat, which has working groups staffed by national experts, and the 
committee of permanent representatives (Coreper^), who are Ambassadors 
of the member-states to the EC. They not only serve as the link between their 
governments and the Commission but also prepare the work of the Council of 
Ministers before the appropriate ministers (their competencies depending on
147 The ECJ interprets and applies EC laws, arbitrates disputes between member-states and judges complaints from 
individuals or corporations about the effects of EC legislation.
Interview with N. Burlough (6 Dec.1990); Groeben, 1987: 8, Owen and Dynes, 1989: 30. For a thorough study of the EC 
institutional structures and functions see Bames and Preston, 1988: 9-12; Brealey and Quigley, 1989: xxiii-xxv; Brown, 
N., 1989; Henig, 1980; Grahl and Teague, 1990: 339-41; Hitzler, 1991: 21-23, 33-38, 125-27, 247-49; Hufbauer, 1990: 
54; Jackson and Fitzmaurice, 1979; Keating, 1993: 373-79, 382-83; Lodge, 1983,1989: 26-79,1993: 21-34; Molle, 1990: 
55-79; Morris etal, 1981; Nicoll and Salmon, 1994: 61-74, 79-113; Nugent, 1991:161-39; Peters, 1991: 75-122; Shapiro, 
1991:123-50; Sasseetal, 1977; Steiner, 1986:174-80; Wallace, 1983:403-36; Webb, 1983:1-41.
14SThe European Council comprises the heads of member-states or governments, their foreign ministers, and the EC 
president and the vice-president on foreign relations. It meets triannually and sets broad guidelines for the EC on issues 
of prime importance, such as the accession of new member-states, the common monetary system, or foreign policy. 
Bulmer and Wessels, 1987; Hufbauer, 1990: 54; Nicoll and Salmon, 1994:74-76; Steiner, 1986:173-74.
149lnterview with N. Burlough (9 Nov.and 6 Dec. 1990). See also Brealey and Quigley, 1989: xxiii; Hufbauer, 1990: 53; 
Lodge, 1993: 6-12,13-15; Nicoll and Salmon, 1994: 62-67; Nugent, 1989: 60-61; Peters, 1991:85-87.
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Figure 2.4: Consultative Procedures Pre-1987 (SEA). The Legislative Process
The c o m m is s io n  formulates a proposal (DGVII, DGIV)
i
T h e  c o u n c il  o f  
m in is t e r s  considers the
i
COREPER considers 
the proposal in 2 or 3 
working parties
E u r o p e a n  Pa r lia m e n t  
considers the proposal in 
committee and in plenary 
session
Ec o n o m ic  a n d  so cial  
c o m m it t e e  considers the 
proposal, if appropriate, in 
section and the full committee
T h e  c o u n c il  o f  m in is t e r s  a n d  t h e  c o m m is s io n  
are advised of parliament’s and the economic 
and social comnjiittees opinions
Does the parliament propose an amendment? __
i
YES
The commission considers parliaments 
endment (Art. 149.Par.2) does it agree?
YES7 '
T h e  c o u n c il  o f  
m in is t e r s  reviews 
the proposal
i
Does the proposal have a 
substantial financial 
implication?
YES r
T h e  c o u n c il  o f  
m in is t e r s  and a 
delegation from the 
European parliament try 
to reconcile their 
different viewpoints
i
T he  c o u n c il  o f  m in is t e r s  
considers the amended 
proposal. Does it accept the 
amendment unanimously?
YES
O
Pa r lia m e n t  
gives a fresh 
opinion
T h e  c o u n c il  o f  m in is t e r s  makes its «- 
final decision, and if it approves the 
proposal, adopts it as community law.N*
Proposal published in the 
official journal
Sources: Bames and Preston, 1988:14, Hitzler, 1991:14, Nicol and Salmon, 1994:81.
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the subject for consideration) meet for discussion. Prior to the provisions of the 
Single European Act voting rules required unanimity on all legislation adopted 
by the Council of Ministers.150 The presidency of the Council rotates among 
the member-states in alphabetical order, each president serving a six-month 
term.151
EC laws take the form of either primary legislation, which derives from 
the EC Treaties, or secondary legislation, which is designed to implement the 
policy guidelines laid down by the Treaties.152 Secondary legislation can take 
the form of regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations, and opinions. 
Regulations are legally binding on member-states and apply directly. 
Directives are equally binding as regards the aim to be achieved but leave the 
national authorities to decide upon the best method of implementation. 
Decisions are binding in every respect upon those whom they apply, whether 
member-states, firms or individuals. Recommendations and Opinions have no 
binding force. Needless to say, secondary legislation varies in importance from 
member-state to member-state, depending on its political, economic, and legal 
significance.153
Secondary legislation can be further divided into Council-of-Ministers 
laws and Commission laws. Commission laws differ from Council laws in that 
they do not require to be approved by other institutions, and deal basically with 
the implementation of legislation adopted by the Council of Ministers. While 
there is usually a time limit for the implementation of EC laws, there is none 
concerning the time a proposal should take to pass through the four stages 
before it is adopted. These are: the introduction of the legislation to and its
150After 30 June 1965, when France boycotted the EC meetings, the Luxembourg Compromise stated that no EC 
member-state could overrule another opposing to a piece of legislation, on the grounds that a vital national insterest being 
at stake.
151lnterview with N. Burlough (6 Dec.1990). See also Andersen and Eliassen, 1991: 179-81; Bames and Preston, 1988: 
10; Brealey and Quigley, 1989: xxi-xxii; Butler, 1986:137-38; Hitzler, 1991:16, 22; Hufbauer, 1990: 51-54; Lodge, 1993: 
15-21; Lintnerand Mazey, 1991:12-24; Nicoll and Salmon, 1994: 67-74, 76-78; Peters, 1991: 78-85.
152The overall EC consists of three separate bodies: the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Atomic 
Energy Commmunity (EURATOM), and the European Economic Community (EEC). By 1966 the three communities had 
merged to become the EC but nevertheless they retained their separate identities.
153Brealey and Quigley, 1989: xxv-xxix; Emerson, 1989: 470-72; Hitzler, 1991: 12-13; Keating, 1993: 380-81; Lodge, 
1993:12; Siedentorf and Ziller, 1988:14.
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drafting by the Commission, formal consultations, and its final adoption and 
implementation, which are the province of the Council of Ministers.154
Any EC legislation involves interdependence as well as co-ordination, 
and combines the competences of strictly national and EC policy and decision­
making. There are cases where (i) the degree of participation and co­
ordination depends, solely, on the member-state; cases which (ii) national 
policy is supplemented by EC policy, but the co-ordination is based on national 
instruments; cases which (iii) emerge as a cause of common concern (both 
national and EC institutions are involved in the process) but co-ordination is 
confined to EC competence; or where (iv) responsibilities have been clearly 
transferred from the national governments to the EC.155
Concerning now specifically air transport, this is the responsibility of two 
directorates general: the DG VII for Transport, which deals with overall air­
transport policies, such as technicalities and fares, market access, capacity 
and so forth; and the DG IV for Competition. Both DGs are of course greatly 
interdependent. The DG VII includes Directorate C for Air transport, transport 
infrastructure, social and ecological aspects of transport, Division 1 for Air 
transport; and the DG IV has the Directorate D on Restrictive practices, abuse 
of dominant positions and other distortions of competition III, Division 3 for 
Transport and Tourist industries. In some cases, three or more DGs may be 
involved: DG I for External relations, DG III for Internal Market and Industrial 
Affairs, and DG V for Employment, social affairs and education.
6. EC Transport and Air-Transport Primary and Secondary 
Legislation Until 1979
The Constitution of the EC was provided under the Treaty of Rome,
154lnformation from author's interviews with N. Burlough (9 Nov. and 6 Dec. 1990); C. Di Cremoni (5 Nov. 1990); N. 
Kontou (26 Oct. 1990); J. Miart (23 Oct. 1990); G. Radice (26 Oct. 1990).
155Bames and Preston, 1988:12-13; Jackson and Fitzmaurice, 1979:31-34.
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signed on 25 March 1957.156 A joint transport policy was one of the three 
common policies specifically mentioned in Article 3(e) of the Treaty, the other 
being foreign trade and agriculture. In Part 2, Title IV, the Transport Articles 
74-84 set out specific rules and empowered the Commission to make 
proposals for a common policy. One major obstacle was Article 84(1) which 
limited the scope of this policy to transport by rail, road, and inland waterways, 
and laid down (in 84(2) that the Council itself should decide (unanimously) 
whether and to what extent to act for sea and air transport. This failure to 
include air transport within the scope of a broader transport policy was 
mirrored in the exclusion of air transport from Part 3, Title I (Chapter I), Articles 
85-94, on competition policy.157 The basic Treaty competition and anti-cartel 
Articles 85 (anti-competitive practices, collusion and block-exemptions), and 
86 (abuse of dominant position whether with mergers or joint ventures), were 
directly sustained and developed by Articles 87-90, and indirectly by Articles 
91-94 (anti-dumping or predatory behaviour and state aids). The most
158prominent objective of EC competition laws was integration, the other two 
being efficiency and fairness in equity.159
Like all EC deliberations, the Communities' transport policy was an 
arena for conflict as each member-state strove to ensure its maximum self- 
interest. The main dispute was over reconciling the conditions and degree of
158The Treaty was signed by Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, and went into 
force on 1 January 1958. Hitzler, 1991: 3-11; Nicoll and Salmon, 1994:1-19.
1S7The Treaty does not define competition as such.
158lts known ultimate aim is a fusion of the member-states' governments, achieved by the removal of barriers to free trade. 
The goal is a supranational entity, with the EC institutions as controllers of members' policy decisions. Keating, 1993: 367- 
73; McLachlan and Swann, 1967; 3, 443; Preben, 1986: 7-8. For the development and prominence of neo-functionalist 
theory within the EC integration process see Haas, 1958 and 1964; Harrison 1974; Hu, 1981; Lindberg, 1963; Lindberg 
and Scheingold, 1970; Puchala, 1972; and Wallace 1990.For a general analysis of the problems and developments of the 
EC integration process see Busch and Puchala, 1976; Harrop, 1989; Green et al, 1991: 200-02; lonescu, 1972; Mendes, 
J., 1987; Molle, 1990; Nicoll and Salmon, 1994: 20-57, 213-75, 289-96; Taylor, 1975, 1983, 1989; Wallace, W., 1983: 
403-36,1990; Webb, 1983: 3-43; Willis, 1975.
159 AEA, 1989:10-16, 78-84; Argyris, 1989: 8-11; Balfour, 1990:19-34; Beselerand Williams, 1986; Bienayme, 1993:13- 
25; Brealey and Quigley, 1989: xvii-xxi, 159-160; 164-165; Bromhead, 122-123; Burke et al., 1991: 131-147; Button and 
Swann, 1989: 260, 269-271; EC Commission, 1990; Cook and Kerse, 1991: 67; Doganis, 1991: 83-84; El-Agraa, 1980: 
125-127; Greaves, 1991:1-22; Green et. al., 1991:197-204, 206-306; Haanappel, 1984: 86; Jacobs and Clark, 1991:18- 
142; Kark, 1989: 388; Lenz, 1990: 45-7; Maniet, 1989: 3-4; Mayes, 1993: 202-204; McGowan and Trengove, 1986: 81- 
82; McLachlan and Swann, 1967: 50-51; Naveau, 1989:184; Nicoll and Salmon, 1994:148; Nugent, 1989: 41; Rawlinson 
etal., 1990:197-199, 200-213; Rosenthal, 1990: 294-298; Schina, 1987; Van Der Esch, 1988: 34-36, 77-85; Verstrynge, 
1988:1-13 and 1989: 85-92; Winter, 1990; Witiox, 1988: 63-5; Whitelegg, 1988: 8-9. Appendix 11.1 refers to articles of the 
Treaty of Rome most relevant to air-transport policy.
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liberalization and the objectives of harmonization. This required adaptation of 
the various national transport policies to the broader EC transport legislation, 
and co-operation160 for joint economic benefits from a common transport policy 
- along side the differences in use of the various modes of transport161 as set 
out in Figure 2.5 below - by road (cars, coaches), rail, or air.
Figure 2.5: Passenger Transport in the European Community 1970-90 (%)
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As is immediately obvious, most travellers in the EC this period went by 
private car (between 76 and 79 per cent). Bus and coach transport was used
160 Co-operation is one of the three principles underlying the EC's economic legislation, the other two being liberalization 
and anti-competitive behaviour.
161 All forms of public transport are concessionary activities. In other words market access is not the result of individual 
initiatives alone, but heavily depends on right of access granted by the state.
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by between 8.9 and 11.7 per cent, and trains took from 6.6 to 10.0 per cent. 
Even in 1990 planes served only 5.6 per cent, up from 2.2 in 1970, but of 
cource these figures are for travel within the confines of EC and Europe. The 
question of whether the competition rules should apply also to EC air transport 
and maritime policies brought further controversy, and the dispute remained 
unresolved for twenty years in respect of shipping, and thirty years for air
transport. During all this time no common policy could be developed in either
162of these areas.
Concerning specifically EC air transport, four main events marked the 
period 1958-1979. The first was in 1958/1959, when four airlines of the then 
six EC member-states - Air France, Alitalia, Lufthansa and Sabena - decided 
to set up a joint organization called Air Union.163 Strong US interests, and the 
abrasive negotiations over conflicting interests by the above airlines' 
governments, doomed Air Union to failure, however.164 The second event 
came in 1961-1962, when the Transport Ministers' Council adopted Regulation 
141, which for an indefinite period exempted air and sea transport from 
Regulation 17 on competition, pending development of a common EC air­
transport policy.165 The third notable date fell in 1973, when the accession of 
three new member-states - Britain, the Republic of Ireland, and Denmark - 
brought a new liberalization trend. This had a decisive influence on the 
Commission, which proceeded to redefine the objectives of the EC's air­
162 Abatti, 1987:15, 61-64; AEA, 1989: 48-53; Bayliss, 1979: 29-32; Bromhead, 1979: 124-40; Burke etal, 1991: 49, 151; 
Commission of the EC. 1990: 231-51; Dagtoglou, 1981; De Jonge, 1988: 45-8, 56-9; El-Agraa, 1980: 123, 160, 165-82; 
Empel, 1988:17; Erdmenger, 1983: 31-32; Feldman, 1990:47-48; Folsom, 1978; Hurwitz, 1983; Gardiner, 1988:135-38; 
Greaves, 1991: 28-31; Groeben, 1987; Hopkins, 1981; Korah, 1987: 14-18; Levine and Mechem, 1991; McLachlan and 
Swann, 1967: 285-97, 301-02; Molle, 1990: 344, 339-40; Munby, 1962: 68-77; Neumann, 1989: 467-69; Nicoll and 
Salmon, 1994:138; Nugent, 1989: 213; Preben, 1986: 8-10; Van der Esch, 1989: 40; Vestrynge, 1989: 80; Weber, 1990: 
54-58; Whitelegg, 1988:1-16.
163Air Union was based on different projects and reports proposed by France on 20 April 1951, by Italy (for the unification 
of European air transport) on 3 May 1951, and by a consultative assembly in Strasbourg on the co-ordination of intra- 
european air transport on 5 May 1951.
164Two more airline unions were created in 1967. The first group (KSSU) comprised KLM, the Dutch Royal Airlines; SAS 
the Scandinavian Airlines; Swissair; and UTA (Union Transport Aerienne), independent French airlines. The second 
group (ATLAS) was formed by Air France, Alitalia, Lufthansa, Sabena and Iberia. The Irish state-owned airline Aer Lingus 
and the UK's airline BOAC joined the above two groups, and formed the Montparnasse Committee in 1969, which led to 
the creation of the Association of European Airlines (AEA) in 1973.
165 Regulation 17 was the mechanism for instituting foe EC competition policy.
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transport policy.166 Finally in 1974, the ECJ ruled167 that the general transport 
provisions of the Treaty of Rome applied also to sea and air transport.168
7. Conclusion
Comparative analysis of the EC member-states' domestic air-transport 
structures prior to 1987 shows substantial similarities. All member-countries 
applied strict and well developed regulatory and corporatist practices, with 
goals that were partly functional, partly national, part-bureaucratic, idealistic, 
geopolitical. Bilateral agreements among them and their airlines went hand in 
hand with national regulations. In consequence it was not surprising that until 
1979 a common EC air-transport sector did not develop, given that the 
member-states did not wish to destabilize the national air-transport systems 
they had developed to serve their national interests. It was not until after 1979 
that widespread deregulatory trends in the USA and worldwide began to exert 
pressure for liberalizing the EC air transport system. The developments 
between 1979 and 1987 will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.
1 “ Communication paper to the Council "On the development of the Common Transport Policy, Com (73) Commission of 
EC, 1973).
167Commission of the EC v. the French Republic Judgement of the Court of 4 April 1974, Case 167/73, also known as the 
"French Seamen's case. Third report on Competition policy (Commission of EC 1974).
168Amirault, 1987; Barett, 1987:14; Button and Swan, 1991:111; Goedhuis, 1957: 273-85; Haanappel, 1984: 87; Hamer, 
1978: 307-12; McGowan and Trengove, 1986: 82-85; Naveau, 1989: 183, 185-86; Nicoll and Salmon, 1994: 138; Rapp, 
1989: 21-23; Wheatcroft and Lipman, 1986: 49; Whitelegg, 1988:145-47.
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CHAPTER III
LEGISLATION, IMPLICATIONS, AND KEY NETWORKS IN EC AIR­
TRANSPORT LIBERALIZATION
” The political momentum of a free air transport market will spread around the 
world and...create fertile ground for the growth of true global airlines with 
multinational ownership and international strategic hubs. Frankly there is not 
going to be much difference between deregulation in the USA and liberalization 
in Europe."
Sir Colin Marshall, British Airways, 1989.1
After first comparing the US air-transport system with that of the EC this 
chapter will examine the pressures for reform inside EC air transport up to 
1986, and outline the evolution of the relevant post-1986 EC legislation that 
introduced competition into EC air transport. It also briefly examines the 
implications of the EC liberalization process for EC air transport generally, and 
assesses its failure to become common EC air-transport policy. Furthermore it 
introduces the key networks in EC policy-making during the period 1987-1993.
1. US/EC Comparison of Air-Transport Markets
Ever since deregulation was first introduced in the USA domestically 
and internationally, its proponents have suggested that the same policy should 
apply in Europe. However, most member-states in the Commission did not 
accept that deregulation was feasible for the EC economy. Member-states 
were unwilling to follow in US footsteps because this would have meant their 
losing direct control of their air transport and national airlines.2
A comparison of the domestic and international air services in the two 
regions shows that historically the EC's air transport was very different indeed 
from that of the US. To begin with, US air transport was chiefly domestic, 
whereas the European airlines served predominantly international routes.
1ITF Report, 1992: 30, 32.
2Golich, 1990: 163-4; Keeler, 1991: 155; Kay and Thompson, 1991: 39; Marsh, 1982: 419-20; Pelkmans, 1986: 356; 
Williams, 1993: 67.
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Eighty percent of the cross-border European air traffic (ECAC) was equal to all 
of America's domestic flights (in passenger/kilometers). The ratio was 76 
billion for all Europe to 330 billion inside the USA or 1:4. As shown in Figure 
3.1 below, the US air-transport system, being the biggest in the world, was 
almost double the size of that of the European countries, which amounted to 
52 percent of America's.3
Secondly, the internal structure of Europe's air transport also differed 
significantly from that of the USA. Europe had a substantial system of charter 
and independent air transport,4 which in the USA (before deregulation) was of 
no account (five per cent) and non-existent after it. Another difference was the 
average route length: 750 km in Europe against 1,300 km in the US. The 
substantially smaller volume of Europe's air traffic is due not only to 
geographical factors, but also, at least in part, to the existence of highly 
competitive surface traffic modes inside and across national borders (with 
average distances being under 700km), especially by high-speed trains5 and 
motorized highway services. In the USA the railway network is not very 
extensive and relatively little used for passenger transport.6 Figure 3.2 below 
illustrates the competitive possibilities of transport across Europe, comparing 
also that of US air transport. It shows that while in 1989 the market share of 
car traffic was largest for distances below 500 km, that of EC air services rose 
steeply over and above 1,500 km. Train services covered between 
approximately 10 to 30 per cent of the market on journeys up to 800 km or so, 
and thereafter became negligible. In contrast US air services rose steeply for 
distances just below 500 and roughly equalled that of EC airlines around 1,700 
km.
3Pelkmans, 1986: 348.
4ln the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) member-states, more than half of all passengers use charter 
services, and generate some two-thirds of RPKs (revenue passenger/ kilometers).
sHigh speed rail services - like the French Train a grand vitesse (TGV-Atlantique), the Spanish AVE, the German ICE, the 
Italian ETR 500, and the Danish IC, which reached speeds up to 500 km/h - have greatly affected EC airlines trying to 
feed their central hubs by short air routes distances of around 500-700 km.
®McGowan and Trengove, 1986: 60-67; Pelkmans, 1986: 349-51; Pryke, 1991: 235-38; Sowers, 1987:63.
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Figure 3.2: Comparative Models of Transport in Europe, Including US Aircraft in 1989 Market Share 
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Thirdly, air-transport costs and fares were very much cheaper in the 
USA than in Europe, although their detailed comparison is highly complicated 
because of different politico-economic and social factors. Broadly speaking 
however, the shorter distances in Europe increase operating costs (which 
consist of fixed and production costs such as administrative overheads, 
labour, ticketing and ground-handling, and so forth), while their spread over 
long distances decreased them in the USA. For example, over the years in 
Europe labour and fuel costs were 20-70 per cent and 20-30 respectively 
higher than in the USA. This obviously had a substantial effect on the general 
amount of costs of scheduled airlines, and consequently, to the air fares.7 
Fourthly, even prior to 1987 European national airlines already had 
established strong national hub-airports, rather than the geographical hubs 
that were established by US airlines after deregulation. Fifthly, while the US 
aviation industry was all privately-owned, the European one was substantially 
state-owned8 and airlines enjoyed state subsidies. Sixthly, protection of 
employees was and is rather less respected in the USA Europe than in 
Europe, where unions have been powerful and unionization is generally high.9
Table 3.1 below shows the international and domestic passenger/ 
kilometers traffic of the EC member-states and the percentage share of their 
domestic flights, as well as, the total ones of the EC, its member-states and 
the USA in 1989. The Table demonstrates that UK airlines flew almost twice 
as many kms as their nearest competitor (92.3 m. against France's 51.5 m.), 
followed by West Germany (36.3 m.), the Netherlands, Spain, and Italy 
(between 26 and 21.5 m. respectively); the figures for the remaining EC 
countries were mostly well below 8 m./kms. Britain also led the international
7Barett, 1991: 242; UK-CAA, 1977, 1983; Doganis, 1986; Dempsey, 1988: 621; McGowan and Trengove, 1986: 11-13, 
19-58, 70-79; Pelkmans, 1986: 350, 354; Sawers, 1987:17-22, 24-27,45-57; Villiers, 1989:14-15.
“Button and Swann, 1991: 105-07; Pelkmans, 1991: 197; Pryke, 1991: 235-38; Kark, 1989: 383-84; Me Gowan and 
Seabright 1989: 301; Shaw, 1993:130; Villiers, 1989:4; Williams, 1993: 67-68.
9Pelkmans, 1986: 355.
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flight-kilometers (87.7 m.), with the other eleven countries in much the same 
order as for their total figures. The picture is rather different in respect of 
domestic flights, where Spain (35.5%) and France (33%) led comfortably, 
followed by Italy (26.5%), Denmark, Greece, and Portugal (18.6, 16.3, and 
15.9% respectively). West Germany's scheduled internal air services 
amounted to a mere 8% of its total flights. Finally the overall figures for the EC 
countries compared with those of US air traffic shows a great difference of air 
traffic between them (280.1 against 693.3 m./kms total, of which 14.9 and 
75.5% were on domestic flights).
Table 3.1: Scheduled Air-Traffic Passenger-Kilometers Performed in 1989 
Country Total International Domestic Domestic/
(OOO.OOOs/km) (OOO.OOOs/km) (OOO.OOOs/km) Total (%)
~ 5!o 
33.0 
8.0 
0.0
35.5
26.5 
16.3
0.0
15.9
18.6 
2.0 
0.0
14.9
75.5
Source: Van De Voorde, 1992: 511.
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UK 92.3 87.7 4.6
France 51.5 34.4 17.1
West Germany 36.3 33.4 2.9
Netherlands 25.9 25.8 0.1
Spain 22.8 14.8 8.0
Italy 21.5 15.8 5.7
Greece 8.0 6.7 1.3
Belgium 6.8 6.8 0.0
Portugal 6.3 5.3 1.0
Denmark 4.3 3.5 0.8
Ireland 4.3 4.2 0.1
Luxembourg 0.1 0.1 0.0
Total EC 280.1 238.5 41.6
USA 693.3 169.6 523.7
2. Pressures for Reform in Air-Transport Regulation 1979-1986
In 1979 two main events stepped up the pressure for changes in the EC 
air-transport policy. The first was the implementation by the US of deregulation 
of its domestic and international flights. The second was the election of right- 
wing governments first in UK (May 1979) and then in West Germany which, 
along with the Netherlands and Ireland, were thereafter committed to 
neo-liberal politics and more vigorous competition. At that time the US and UK 
air-transport policies were in agreement with respect to their politico-economic 
ideology in general and their international and EC air-transport interests in 
particular. Both countries were determined to deregulate the air transport of 
the EC member-states (including, basically, the dismantling of structures of 
collective bargaining and domestic compromise), and stimulated a debate on 
whether the pre-1979 EC air-transport regime really served the best interests 
of the member countries. From the very beginning the USA and Britain 
endeavored to outflank the opposition by signing bilateral agreements which, 
they hoped, would eventually compel the Commission to propose the 
application of competition in EC airtransport.10
So in 1978 the USA concluded liberal agreements with the Netherlands 
(March) and Belgium (December). The US-Netherlands agreement was to 
become the trendsetter for subsequent American and British renegotiations 
with EC member-states. The US concluded liberal bilateral agreements with 
West Germany (1 November 1978) and Luxembourg, and attempted to 
establish a special regime for multilateral agreements with Europe on North 
Atlantic routes. Thus, in May 1982, and after intensive negotiations at the 
European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC), the first US-ECAC Memorandum 
of Understanding (MOU) was signed and went into force on 1 August 1982. 
For the ECAC this strategy represented an attempt to induce the USA to 
moderate its position. Other Memoranda were signed between the USA and
10Streeck and Schmitter, 1991:148
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ECAC in October 198411 and February 1987.12 These constituted a negotiated 
political consensus, seeing that they combined elements of opposed 
marketing and pricing systems. Meanwhile the UK government concluded 
liberal bilateral agreements with the Netherlands (20 June 1984-the most 
liberal),13 West Germany (December 1984), Luxembourg (March 1985), 
France (September 1985-the least liberal), Ireland (December 1985), Italy 
(March 1986), and Belgium (October 1986), and kept negotiating with 
Denmark, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain.14 It was certainly not coincidental 
that during the same period there was a proliferation of academic proposals, 
studies and press reports from European and EC institutions, concerning 
major changes in the regulation of intra-Community air services. Their aim was 
a more competitive and flexible air-transport policy so as to increase airline 
efficiency and improve consumer services.15
In 1979 the Commission issued Memorandum No.1, entitled 
"Contribution of the EC to the Development of Air-Transport Services, which 
stated the priorities in the field of air transport.16 In 1982 and 1985 the ECAC 
published two reports one on Competition in intra-European air-services 
(COMPAS), and A policy statement on intra-European Air Transport, and the 
ESC an opinion entitled Community competition p o lic y In 1983 the European 
Parliament, under the chairmanship of Britain's Lord Bethell, prepared to take 
the Council of Transport Ministers to the Court of Justice under Article 175 of 
the Treaty of Rome, given that they had failed to adopt common air-transport 
measures to liberalize the EC's air transport.17 In July 1983 an inter-regional
11This ended on 30 April 1987.
12This came into effect on 1 April 1987.
13A second agreement was signed in June 1985.
14 Barett, 1991: 6-7, 21-22; Button and Swann, 1991: 93; Dempsey, 1988: 626-27, 629-37; Doganis, 1991: 79-81; Eggers, 
1991: 113; Haanappel, 1984: 42-43, 166-67, 189-200; Hawk, 1989: 274; Golich, 1990: 166; ITF News. April 1987: 13; 
Kasper, 1988: 81; Me Gowan and Seabright 1989: 297-98; McGowan and Trengove, 1986:135-47; Naveau, 1989: ISO- 
52; Murias, 1989:194-02; Pelkmans, 1986: 357-58, 369-79; Sochor, 1991:155; Wheatcroft and Lipman, 1986:18, 26-29, 
39-40, 65-69,107-10.
15CAA, 1984; 1986; EC, 1981; Sorensen, 1984,1985; Standbrook, 1985.
16EC. Air Transport A Community Approach. 1979:13-20;COM (79) 311; EC Bull. Suppl. No. 5/79.
17The ECJ (the EC's judiciary body) upheld Case 13/83, European Parliament v.Council (1985), ECR, 1513 on the
grounds that Lord Bethell had no locus standi and that therefore his complaint was inadmissible.
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air-services directive was issued by the Council of Transport Ministers, 
introducing the liberalization of air services between regional airports so as to 
contribute to regional development.18 In 1984 the Commission proposed its 
Memorandum II: Progress towards the development of an EC Air-Transport 
Policy.19 On the basis of the above legislative developments, the Commission 
in 1985 issued both the European Competition Policy20 and the European 
Commission's Powers of Investigation in the Enforcement of Competition 
Law.2' Moreover, the Association of the European Airlines’ European 
Air-Transport Policy report of September 1985 introduced some improvements 
to the European air-transport system, and proposed a gradual evolution of the 
existing system through enhanced competition, taking under consideration, 
however, all major elements of the member-states' regulatory structures.22
The agreements between America, Britain, ECAC and individual EC 
member-states along with the Commission proposals, academic studies and 
press reports, exerted considerable pressure in favour of liberalization. By 
1986 the subject of EC air-transport liberalization had become a full-fledged 
and thorny political issue, being furiously debated in the EC. The three- 
cornered debate involved the protectionist or dirigiste states of Italy, Greece, 
Spain and Portugal; the moderates Belgium Denmark France, and Germany, 
who advocated regulated competition and flirted with protectionism, and the 
free marketers or deregulators represented by the UK, Ireland, the 
Netherlands and Luxembourg.23
1 “Council Directive (EC) 83/416/EC 25.7.1983, (OJ L237 26.8.83: 19), amended by Council Directives (EC) 86/216, (OJ 
L152 6.6.86: 47), and 89/463 (OJ L226 3.8.89: 4), revoked and replaced by Council Regulation (EC) 2343/90, (OJ L217 
11.8.90: 8).
’“Commission Communication COM (84) 72.
^ EC Commission. 1985: European File no. 6, Brussels.
21 EC Commission. 1985: European Documentation, Luxembourg.
“ AEA, 1985; Marsh, 1982: 420-21; McGowan and Trengove, 1986: 84-94, 110-26; Naveau, 1989: 187-89; Pelkmans, 
1986: 361-62, 368-69; Williams, 1993: 76-79.
“ Barett, 1987: 14-16, 68-72, 89-90, 1991a: 3-5, 1991b: 242; Button and Swann, 1991: 112; Dempsey, 1988: 628-29; 
Doganis, 1985: 72,1991: 82-83,1993: 79; Garland, 1986:196-198, 218-32; Greaves, 1991:168-69; Kark, 1989: 389-94; 
McGowan and Seabright, 1989: 293-94; Parr, 1990: 53; Pelkmans, 1986: 362-68; Standbrook, 1985: 52-55; Wheatcroft
and Lipman, 1986:40,45-64,105-07,110-13,127-28,130-37; Williams, G., 1993:80-81.
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3. EC Secondary Legislation on Air Transport and Competition
In 1986, the competitive pressures on the EC industries as a whole, led 
to the adoption of the Single European Act (SEA),24 considered a major UK 
achievement reflecting UK interests in a "nuanced and comprehensive way".25 
The SEA, which amended the EEC Treaty by the introduction of functional and 
institutional provisions, was signed on 17 February 1986 and came into force 
on 1 July 1987.26 Among other things the SEA (i) it increased the legislative 
powers of the European Parliament through the "Co-operation Procedure" 
shown in Figure 3.3;27 (ii) it enhanced the rule-making and implementation 
powers of the Commission through Article 13 which was inserted into Article 
8A of the original Treaty; (iii) it activated Article 84 (2) of the Treaty of Rome 
through Article 16 (5) and changed the Council of Ministers' unanimity rule to a 
qualified majority voting (QMV);28 and (iv) its Article 100A (supplementing 
Article 100 of the EC Treaty, harmonization of standards) set 1 January 1993 
as the deadline for completing the negotiations for a Single European Market 
(SEM). The SEA ruling leading to a single and competitive EC air-transport 
system,29 along with an ECJ verdict that the competition articles were 
compulsorily applicable to EC air transport,30 were the basic evolutionary 
ingredients of the EC air-transport integration process.31
24Official Journal, (OJ) L169 29 June, 1987:1.
^ h e  Thatcher government's emphasis on deregulation, privatization and market forces reflected a British preference for 
measures of negative integration, that is, the removal of discrimination against the economic agents of the member 
countries, as distinct from positive integration, namely the formation and application of co-ordinated and positive polices 
on a sufficient scale to ensure that major economic and welfare objectives are fulfilled. See Moravcsik, 1991; Simon and 
Taylor, 1994: 256-57; Taylor, 1989:14.
26EC Official Journal, (OJ) L169, 29.6.87:1.
27The SEA requires that the European Parliament approve all accession and association agreements with other states 
before the agreements are considered by the Council of Ministers. The act also requires two parliamentary readings of 
some EC legislation.
2SUnanimity is still mandatory for decisions on the alignment of national turover, excise and direct taxes, as well as 
employees' rights and interests, and Ihe free movement of people.
29Often called the "relevant air transport marker, meaning that it takes into account the relations between the EC and the 
national air-transport policies. See AEA, 1989; Van Houtte, 1990.
30Nouvelles Frontieres Judgement of 30. 4. 86, cases 209-213/84 (1986), ECR, 1425, Minist'ere Public v. Lucas Asjes et 
al, EV (1986) 3 CMLR173.
31 Basedow, 1988: 342-53; Brealey and Quigley, 1989: xi; Buhartand Burton, 1989; Butler, 1986:158-61; Cecchini, 1988; 
Corbett, 1989: 359-72; Dagtoglou, 1989:115-38; EC Commission. 1987; Gardiner, 1988:135-38; Goedhius, 1957; Grahl 
and Teague, 1990: 341-46; Green et al, 1991; Kark, 1989: 395-98; Lenz, 1990: 33-48; Maniet, 1989: 5-21, 37; Marshall, 
1989; McGowan and Trengove, 1986: 126-28; Naveau, 1989: 190-197; Nicoll and Salmon, 1994: 48-52; Nugent, 1989: 
45; Lintner and Mazey, 1991: 24-27; Parr, 1990: 53; Price, 1988; Pelkmans, 1991: 198-99; Rosenthal, 1990: 304; 
Siedentopf and Ziller, 1988:12-13, 30; Steel, 1988; Sundberg, 1990: 168-69; Whitelegg, 1988: 15, 151; Williams, 1990: 
10-13,1993: 81-85; Young, 1990.
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Figure 3.3: The  C o-O peration  P rocedure  (Post - SEA Legislative P rocedures)
Proposal lapses
Fails to actC o u n c il  
within three months
ECOSOC
Opinion
Council begins 
deliberating
C o u n c il  
Adopts act
Approves common 
position or takes no 
view
Proposal 
published in 
official journal
Amends common 
position by absolute 
 majority_____
C o u n c il  
Can overrule if unanimous
Rejects common position 
by absolute majority
EP Second reading within 
three months
Adopts EP 
amendments 
omitted by 
Commission if 
unanimous
Commission Proposal
Adopts Commission 
proposal by qual. Maj. or 
amends by unanimity
C o u n c il  
Adopts a common position 
by qualified majority
Possible extension by one 
month if EP agrees to a 
deadline
European Parliament (EP) 
first reading rejects, amends, 
withholds, emits opinion
Commission reviews EP 
amendment and may revise 
proposal within one month
Commission takes a view on EP 
opinion & possibly accommodates it 
in revised proposal
Sources: Grahn and Teague, 1990: 340; Hitzler, 1991: 16; Hufbauer, 1990: 59; Lintner and
Mazey, 1991: 25; Lodge, 1989: 71 and 1993: 29; Nicoll and Salmon, 1994: 82; Nugent, 
1989: 247
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As a result, between 1987 and 1992 the Council of Transport Ministers 
adopted three air-transport packages. Package 1 (of 14 Dec. 1987 and 
effective from 1 Jan. 1988 to 30 June 1990), legalized two Regulations (No 
3975/87 and 3976/87), one Council Directive (EC 87/601), and one Council 
Decision (EC 87/ 602). It thereby formally implemented the Treaty of Rome 
competition rules in the EC's air transport. In 1989 the Council of Transport 
Ministers adopted a merger-control Regulation 4064/89 (effective from 21 
Sept. 1990), providing the Commission with jurisdiction in all EC mergers, air 
transport included. Package 2 (of 24 July 1990, effective from 1 Nov. 1990 to 
31 Dec. 1992), consisted of three Regulations (2342/90, 2343/90 and 
2344/90). They replaced package’s 1 Council Regulation (3976/87), Directive 
and Decision, and legalized the gradual removal of capacity-sharing 
arrangements and the acceptance of the principle of double disapproval for 
fares,32 in an attempt to combine liberalization with harmonization in the EC's 
air-transport policy. Moreover Package 3 (of 23 July 1992, effective from 1 
Jan. 1993) included five Council Regulations (2407/92, 2408/92, 2409/92, 
2410/92, and 2411/92, amending Regulations 3975/87 and 3976/87), which 
established the abolition of licensing rights, capacity sharing, fare control, 
market access and cabotage rights (by 1997), in the EC air transport. Under 
the above three packages' adopted legislation the Commission passed air­
transport legislation between the period 1987-1993. In the meantime, the 
Maastricht Treaty on European Union,33 signed on 7 February 1992 and 
effective from 1 Nov. 1992, planned an economic and monetary union (EMU) 
and expanded the European Parliament's authority through the introduction of 
the co-decision procedure with the Council of Ministers on all EC legislation, 
air transport included, as it is shown in Figure 3.4 below.34
32Double disapproval means that an air-fare proposal can only be refused if both member-states involved object to it.
33By the Maastricht Treaty the European Community (EC) was transformed into a European Union (EU). It represented a 
compromise among different views of EC's future and proved extremely controversial in several member states.
^All three air-transport packages legislation, the Council Regulation 4064/89, and four Commission Regulations (2671/88, 
2672/88, 2673/88 and 3652/93) are given in Appendix 111.1, and all the EC air-transport legislation adopted between the 
period 1987-1993 is shown in Appendix III.2. Argyris, 1989:11-32; Balfour, 1990:84-109,128-47; Buhart and Burton, 
1989: 47; Button and Swann, 1991: 113; Cholmeley, 1990: 5-12; Cherson, 1990: 147-57; Commission of the EC. 1990: 
289-300, 319-23; Cook and Kerse, 1991: 157-75; Greaves, 1991: 169-83; Doganis, 1991: 86-89; Feldman, Feb. 1990: 
48, April 1990: 30-2; Fort, 1991:106-07; French, Jan. 1990: 36; Keating, 1993: 372-73; Levine, 1991: 24,1991:15;
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Figure 3.4: The C o-D ecis ion  P rocedure  (A rtic le  189b) o f the  T reaty o f
European Union (Post-Maastricht)
Commission Proposal
European Parliament (EP)
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within 6 months
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version
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End of procedure End of procedure
1 Amendments opposed by commission must be adopted by majority of MEPs. 2. By a majority of its members.
3. Qualified majority. 4 Qualified majority - Unanimously if commission opposes amendments tabled. 5. Unanimously. 
6. Simple majority. 7. Parliament: Simple majority; Council: Qualified majority.
Sources: Lodge, 1993:30, Nicoll and Salmon, 1994:83
Lewis, 1990: 383; McGowan and Seabright, 1989: 295-96; McGowan and Trengove, 155; Nicoll and Salmon, 1994: 140-
2, 276-89; Reed, April 1992: 52-56; Rosenthal, 1990: 343; Rouam, 1993: 28-29; Sorensen, 1991: 177-85; Tritton, 1989:
172-76; Slot and Dagtoglou, 1989: 315-62; Stasinopoulos, 1992: 83-87; Vincent and Stasinopoulos, 1990: 95-100; Van
De Voorde, 1992: 516-23; Verloop, 1988; Wassenbergh, 1988: 3-8; Williams, C., 1990: 20-24; Williams, G„ 1993: 81-85;
Zylich, 1992: 38-40.
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In consequence, in the period from 1987 to 1993 the above mentioned 
continuing evolutionary process of EC legislation on member-states’ airlines 
left them little choice but to formally liberalize their restrictive regulatory and 
corporatist air-transport policies. They were free, however, to control the pace 
and scope of this development.
4. The Impact of Air-Transport Liberalization and its Failure to 
become Common EC Policy
It has to be emphasized that the changes in the EC air-transport system 
between 1987 and 1993 were due far less to the willingness of the member- 
states to increase competition than to the international repercussions from the 
US implementing its deregulation policy domestically and abroad.
It was the threat from a proliferation of large US, and Asian and Pacific 
Rim airlines, the internationalization of capital35 and labour, as well as the 
pressures from worldwide competition that drove EC member-states to joint 
and individual legislation concerning their air transport, and made them adjust 
the corporatist and regulatory structures of their airlines accordingly. The latter 
were obliged to review the ways they operated, and to co-operate36 more with 
each other, in order to stabilize their position within and outside the EC air­
transport markets.37
Streeck and Schmitter (1991: 142, 149) argued in general, that the EC 
market integration, without the proportionate growth of regulatory institutions, 
brought a growing interdependence between EC member-states' national 
economies, and consequently, integration and deregulation became identical. 
For EC air transport in particular, academics argued that the adoption of a joint
35This acts as a structural constraint on the EC governments' domestic air transport decision making.
^Co-operation may be offensive or defensive, depending on the degree of competition and the airlines’ market share.
37lnterviews with D. Stasinopoulos (28 Oct. 1990); K. Veenstra (29 Oct. 1990). See also Ballantyne, Sept. 1992: 20; ITF 
Report, 1992: 61-66; Levine, 1991: 15; Marshall, 1988: 19; Nordio, 1988: 21-23; Streeck and Schmitter, 1991: 149; 
Tretheway, 1991; Williams, 1993: 67, 69; Willoughby, 1985.
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EC air-transport policy was considered by the member-states as a major step 
towards an EC air-transport deregulation, especially if it was to be decided that 
the transport competition rules of the Treaty of Rome were applicable also to 
the EC and the member-states’ national air-transport systems. It was not 
surprising, therefore, that, instead of allowing the application of the transport 
competition rules in the EC air transport unaltered, the EC states sought to 
formulate an EC air-transport competition policy in such a way as to retain 
control over the liberalization process in the EC as a whole, and to allow them 
to re-regulate their national air-transport and to re-structure their own airlines 
according to their best national interests. Their chief objective was to deal with 
the competitive pressures in the international arena, which they believed they 
could achieve by keeping a monopoly of their domestic market and, for strong 
member-states (like Britain, Germany, France, Italy and Spain) or with strong 
airlines (Denmark and the Netherlands), by dominating that of the EC, rather 
than by co-operative action within the EC air-transport system. This in effect, 
was the policy that had pursued in the pre-1987 period, having created what in 
their view was a very well-developed and stable bilateral system which in air 
transport had remained viable for more than forty years.38
Speaking generally therefore, during the EC air-transport legislative 
period (1987-1993), individual member-states were anxious to protect, 
preserve, and dictate their national interests, rather than willing to be directed 
by the Commission's increasing powers or by its liberalization legislation that 
tried to impose a common air-transport policy on the EC as a whole. They 
employed numerous delaying and/or accelerating tactics during the process of 
protracted deliberations on liberalization, depending on whether they 
perceived their national air transport interests as likely or unlikely to benefit. 
This was due to the continuing conflict among the individual countries’ air­
transport interests, and therefore, the lack of incentives for a common EC
“ Gardiner, 1988:135-38; Gialloreto, 1989; Pelkmans 1986: 360,1991: 200; Van De Voorde, 1992: 509.
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air-transport policy, which made them regard the EC and one another much as 
they had done before 1987.39 The process is described in greater detail in 
chapter IV.
Especially member-states refused to entertain the idea of merging their 
state-owned carriers (champions) to create a supra-national mega airline. 
Either because of EC bureaucracy or politico-economic manipulations, 
attempts at co-operation (such between Lufthansa and Air France) did not 
amount to much, and projected mergers (such as British Airways with KLM 
and Sabena, and of British Airways and KLM, or the European Quality Alliance 
(EQA), consisting of KLM, SAS, Swissair, Austrian Airlines and Finnair) simply 
failed.40 It was precisely because they had no common EC air-transport 
interests, but only national ones, that they did all they could to strengthen their 
domestic and international air-transport systems, areas where they had the 
absolute jurisdiction and any airlines' transactions were up to their primary 
determination.
The differing national interests, their unwillingness to break up their 
established air-transport patterns, and above all their refusal to risk 
compromising their airlines' national identity, required those with strong 
politico-economic powers and airlines, and those with strong airlines, in 
particular, to strengthen further their domestic monopolies by pursuing internal 
take-overs and mergers.41 At the same time they attempted to achieve 
domination of the EC and of international air transport through a nucleus of EC 
mullti-national mega-airlines, which enjoyed international airline management 
and marketing alliances, and equity minority or majority share holdings 
especially with US mega-airlines, their major international competitors. Unlike
^ Athens News Agency. 1989; Doganis, 1991:187: Financial Times of 27 Aug. 1988, of 8 Dec. 1989, of 22 Jan. 1990, of 3 
May 1990, of 20 June 1990, of 5 Oct. 1990, of 24 June 1992, of 28 Sept. 1993, of 8 Oct. 1993, and of 8 Dec. 1992: 2; 
Williams, G., 1993: 72, 75, 87-88.
^Burger, 1993; Greaves, 1991:185; ITF News. Jan./Feb. 1993: 30; Pavaux, 1988; Tigner, 1990; Van De Voorde, 1992: 
524-525.
41A merger in the air-transport industry is the acquisition of another airline also called a horizontal merger. See Rosenthal, 
1990:310-40.
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the North-American states, therefore, EC countries were unwilling to compete 
against each other, and proceeded directly to concentrate their own national 
and EC air-transport markets (see chapter VI).42
Member-countries also obstructed a common EC liberalization process, 
by deliberately exploiting the uncertainty regarding both the applicability of the 
EC Treaty competition laws (as concerning their content and structure), and 
the co-operation procedure available to implement a joint competition policy 
(legislation).43 Primarily this was the result of the EC air-transport competition 
laws (based on Articles 85 and 86) which, instead of offering scope for merger 
control beforehand, operated basically ex post facto, permitting EC airlines to 
dominate domestically, rather than prohibiting them from abusing their 
advantageous position. In other words, there was no clear line between 
legitimately competitive actions and those that were anti-competitive (e.g. 
predatory pricing, or unfair inducements to travel agents).44
One result of all this was that, although from the outset the Commission 
had unequivocally declared merger control to be just as important for EC air 
transport45 as in the USA, strong overt and covert political manipulations 
(horse-trading and back door manoeuverings) by member-states pressured it 
into accepting it as inevitable; and therefore, forced it to regard the merger 
effect as a market effect. It considered every merger on its individual merits - 
a policy explicitly based on a US market theory concept that had strongly 
influenced British and West German Neo-liberal attitudes. The core concepts 
of this theory were a combination of competition, co-operation, and control of 
aims and means, applied by firms to strengthen their relative positions in 
markets in which they operated.46
42Doganis 1991a: 193; Feldman, April 1990:4 and Oct. 1990:44; Gialloreto, Sept. 1992: 52-58; ITF Report, 1992: 25, 32; 
Katz, 1990; Pugh, 1989; Reed, 1990; Sochor, 1991: 72-85,187,201; Wijk, 1991: 38-42; Woolley, 1990:16-21.
43De Jong, 1988: 45-46, 48-60; Erdmenger, 1983: 29; Slot, 1989:17-21; Van Empel, 1988:15-29; Verstrynge, 1989: 63- 
113.
^De Jong, 1988: 46-48; Doganis, 1991: 193; Lipman, 1988; McLachlan and Swann, 1967: 71-87, 195-96; Maniet, 1989: 
32-36; Witlox, 1988: 61-76; Esch, 1988: 77-84; Williams, 1993:126-31.
45 Brittan, 1989: 89-90,1989a: 13-15; Vincent, 1987.
^Dobson, 1991: 279-83; Doganis, 1991:193; Pelkmans, 1986: 376; Siedentopf and Ziller, 1988:11-12; Whitelegg, 1988: 
152; Williams, 1993:123-24.
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In fact even within the Commission the leading policy-making officials 
were divided for and against the merger of EC airlines. For example F. 
Sorensen, head of the air-transport division of DG VII for Transport, argued
" Alliances and mergers were indispensable and inevitable because to some 
extent airlines needed to have a certain size to be able to compete" (interview 
12 Nov. 1990).
On the other hand N. Argyris, head of the transport and tourism industries of 
DG IV for Competition said
" The arguments in favour of mergers and alliances as the answer to the 
implementation of air transport competition policy, did not convince me" 
(interview 7 Dec. 1990).
Certainly this was not the main reason why the Commission as a supra­
national institution per se failed to draw up a cohesive common liberalization 
policy. The principal reason was that the strong member-states (Germany, 
France and UK) in reinforcing the Commission with air transport policy and 
decision-making powers, made sure that they controlled it through their 
governmental appointees (Commissioners) or even their national Eurocrats as 
it is shown in chapter V.
The Commission, therefore, instead of holding its supranational (non­
governmental) identity, became an intergovernmental institution controlled by 
the strong member-states’ air-transport interests. The Commissioners, 
responsible for air transport were caught between their transitional tasks and 
the exigencies of their governments' politics (This I call supra-national 
govern mental ism as distinct from intergovermentalism 47). The strategic 
response from the strong member-states1 airlines was, therefore, the 
continued pursuit of dominance over their internal, the EC, and international 
air-transport systems (see ch. V).
47lntergovemmentalists, although cognizant of the role played by supranational institutions, through their least common 
denominator theory - which suggests the level of intgration to be attained by member governments will be the highest 
level of agreement that still maintains consensus - believe further integration will result only from the agreement of 
member countries. See Taylor, 1989; Streeck and Schmitter, 1991:142-43.
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Domestically, airlines such as AF, BA, LH, AL, IB, KLM and SAS 
proceeded to eliminate and/or neutralize any potentially strong rivals, such as 
the pre-1987 charter and independent airlines. They did this by buying up 
airlines or engineering mergers with airlines that posed a potential threat, and 
by preventing foreign countries airlines from acquiring airlines based on their 
own territory. For example in the UK, BA merged with British Caledonian 
(BCal) in 1987, and in France AF acquired UTA and Air Inter in 1990. Both of 
these independent airlines had been serious rivals domestically, and therefore 
both take-overs have been regarded as clear examples of mergers that should 
never have been allowed.48 In fact the domination of BA’s international 
scheduled services increased from 82 to 93 percent. Finally LH, after the 
unification of the two Germanies, absorbed the formerly East German national 
airline Interflug.49
Given their single hub airport, the infrastructural constraints (such as 
airport and air-traffic congestion,50 access to take off and landing slots, 
scarcity of additional airports and runway capacity, and possession of the 
CRSs) provided state-owned airlines with compelling means for establishing 
effective barriers against competitive operations by charter and independent or 
new airlines. As noted already, in addition to intra-modal rivalry the charter and 
independent airlines had to contend with strong competition from surface 
traffic over medium distances, especially from high-speed trains, (state-owned 
and subsidized) and motorized road-services. They were obliged therefore, to 
accept either merging with state-owned airlines, or seeing the transfer of 
passengers to high traffic EC hub airports as essentially contributing to their
^Both cases will be discussed in details in ch. V.
49Doganis, 1991: 95-106; Golich, 1990:166; Greaves, 1991:183; ITF Report, 1992: 32; Keating, 1993:105; Pryke, 1991: 
239; Tigner, 1990; Williams, S., 1990: 30; Williams, G., 1993: 70, 85-87,115-22.
“ Air-space was already heavily congested and Europe's air-traffic control was fragmented into 22 different contol 
systems with 42 control centres linked only by a primitive communications network. Therefore air-traffic control was 
another area where harmonization and technological standards had to be set up. This task was entrusted to Eurocontrol 
Permanent Commission or Eurocontrol, the European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation. It was primarily 
responsible to develop a central air-traffic control unit (CACU) and a central air-traffic flow management unit (CFMU) out 
of the 22 national air-traffic control systems in Europe.
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own survival.51 In any case, almost no new airline was able to challenge the 
dominance of national state-owned carriers, which in some ways were virtually 
immune to pressures from competition.
Another development, which took place in parallel with the above, both 
within the EC and internationally, was that leading EC airlines attempted to 
control and/or acquire a stake in weaker EC or non-EC countries, and even in 
powerful US airlines for the purpose of creating a nuclei for EC mullti-national 
mega airlines. For example, AF came to own 37.5 per cent of the Belgian 
airline Sabena; Iberia bought minority shares in most of the Latin American 
airlines, i.e. 30 per cent in Aerolineas Argentinas, 45 per cent in Venezuela's 
Viasa, and 37 per cent in Chile's Ladeco; BA acquired 25 per cent of the 
French regional airline Transport TAT, and 25 per cent of Australia's Quantas; 
KLM held a 49 per cent stake in North West Airlines of the USA, and so forth.52 
As B. Stahle, SAS vice-president for the EC and governmental relations in 
Brussels supported
" Especially AF, BA, LH and KLM called for competition while they were blocking
the EC air-transport market for themselves" (interview 4 Dec. 1990).
Table 3.2 below shows the international and Community sales, 
passenger shares, and ranking in sales in 1991, worldwide revenue 
passengers/kilometers (RPK), and revenue passenger load factors in 1991, as 
well as the EC revenue passenger carried, passenger revenue, and available 
seat/kilometers (ASK) in 1989, of the three largest EC airlines Air France, 
British Airways and Lufthansa. As detailed study shows, Air France was first 
only in respect of worldwide sales with 10,196 m. US$ (4.85 per cent), in EC
51 Interview with A. Frohnmeyer (22 Oct.1990). See also AEA, 1989: 54-60; Air and Cosmos. 1989: 23; Airport Support. 
1989: 8-9; Button and Swann, 1991: 105-10; Doganis and Dennis, 1989: 42-47; Ellett-Tazewell and Donahue, 1990; 
Fernandez, 1986; Greece and International Transport Nov. 1992:12; ICAO, 1989; ITF News. Sept 1989: 21; Jennings, 
Jan. 1991: 11; Julien, 1991; Katz, 1991; Katz, 1991; Me Gowan and Seabright, 1989: 311-13; Neumeister, 1990; 
O'Donovan and Beety, 1990; OECD, 1988: 22-23; Ott, 1990; Pelkmans, 1991: 201-05; Pilling and Harrington, Mar. 1991: 
24-25; Reed, 1992: 53; Shaw, 1993:128-29; Thompson, 1991: 33; Van De Voorde, 1992: 508-09; Williams, G„ 1993: 70, 
115,121; Woolley, 1988:12-16,1990: 28-29; Woolsey, 1990:41
52ITF Report, 1992: 31-34, 99-105.
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Table 3.2: The International and EC Operations. Passenger Revenues. Load Factors, and Services of the Three Largest EC Airlines AF. BA, and LH 
in 1989 and 1991
Strong
Member
States
(TROIKA)
Airlines
Worldwide 
Sales 
(in millions, 
US $ and 
percentage) 
and of 1991 
(1)
EC Sales (in 
percentage) 
(end of 1991) 
(2)
Worldwide 
Passenger 
Shares 
(in mill.) 
end of 
1991
EC 
Passenger 
Shares (in 
Percentage) 
end of 1991
Worldwide 
Revenue 
Passengers 
Kilometers 
(RPK) (3) 
(in mill.) 
end of 1991
EC Revenue 
Passengers 
(RPK)
(in mill.) 
end of 1989 
(4)
Worldwide 
Revenue 
Passenger 
Load Factor 
(5) (in 
Percentage) 
end of 1991
EC Revenue 
Load Factor 
(in
percentage) 
end of 1989
EC Revenue 
Passengers 
carried 
(in 000) 
end of 1989
EC
Passenger
Revenue
(6)
(in mill.) 
end of 
1989
EC 
Available 
Seat (7) 
Kilometers 
ASK (in 
mill) end of 
1989
Worldwide 
Ranking 
(sales) 
end of 
1991
EC 
Ranking 
(sales) 
and of 
1991
AIR FRANCE
10,196
(4.85) 19.5 31.6 10 53,376 5,974.9 66.8 61.4 7,738.1 1,291.5 9,731.4 3 1
LUFTHANSA
9,746
(4.63) 18.6 29.5 12 52,344 6,864.7 64.0 60.3 8,529.2 1,715.8 11,386.3 5 2
BRITISH
AIRWAYS
9,090
(4.32) 17.5 25.4 15 65,896 9,248.1 70.2 66.0 11,296.1 1,703.1 14,013. 6 3
(1) The total worldwide sales of international airline industry was 210,344 millions US $.
(2) The total EC sales of EC airlines was 52,239 millions US $ or the 25 percent of the worldwide sales.
(3) One fare paying passenger transported one kilometer; computed by multiplying the number of revenue passengers by the kilometers they are flown.
(4) 1989 was the most profitable year for the international airline industry.
(5) The percentage of seating capacity which is actually sold and utilized: computing by dividing the revenue passengers kilometer (RPK) by the Available Seat Kilometers 
(ASK) on revenue passenger services.
(6) All passengers counted on a point-to-point basis, carried at a 25 percent of normal applicable fare for the journey.
(7) The total number of seats available for the transportation of revenue passengers multiplying by the number of kilometers those seats are flown.
Sources: Association of European Airlines (AEA), May 1990; Airline Business, Sept. 1992: 98; Gialloretto, Sept. 1992: 55.
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sales (19.5 per cent), and worldwide passenger shares (31.6 per cent in 
1991). The airline declined largely to third place as far as the other operations 
were concerned. By contrast, in the remaining international and EC services, 
British Airways took the lead, except for EC passenger revenue, where it was 
surpassed by Lufthansa. For the most part Lufthansa remained in the second 
position.
The above rearrangement in national, EC and international air transport 
naturally brought changes in the structures, ownership, labour relations and 
the employment conditions of the EC countries' airlines. Privatization53 and/or 
denationalization54 were prevalent in many EC countries, especially where the 
government was in favour of air-transport deregulation (Britain, Ireland, the 
Netherlands, and Luxembourg). The need for privatization/denationalization 
arose out of the airlines requiring management re-organization, a more 
commercial character, and cuts in public spending. For example AF and LH, 
while still largely state-owned, increasingly had to operate following 
commercial rather than public criteria. BA was fully privatized in 1987; more 
than half of KLM passed into private ownership; and the privatization of other 
national airlines was proposed for SAS, Iberia, Air Portugal, Alitalia, and 
Olympic Airways.55
Following the US example, it was the air-transport personnel and their 
unions that have paid most dearly for these changes, with massive loss of 
jobs, wage cuts, worsening working conditions, and attacks on trade-union 
rights, although after the mid-1980's the above results were a general 
phenomenon implied in all industries worldwide.56
53lt refers to the increase of private capital or asset ownership activities which surpass/es the 50 per cent of the total 
airline ownership. It is possible to liberalize without privatizing by introducing competition into the public sector, or 
privatize without subjecting industry to competitive forces. For theoretical arguments on privatization and its diverse 
forms, such as divestiture, contracting out and privatization by attrition see Andie, 1990: 37-9; Gayle and Goodrich, 1990: 
438; Golich, 1990:157, 171. For a thorough study of privatization politics within the EC member-states see Vickers and 
Wright, 1989.
Mlt refers to the increase of private capital or asset ownership activities which are less than the 50 per cent of the total 
airline ownership.
“ ITF Report, 1992:10-12.
“ ITF Report, 1992: 7.
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To keep down costs, the EC countries' national carriers introduced "flag 
of convenience" airlines through "wet leasing". This meant the use of low cost 
aircraft, part-time or temporary crews and employees, and the contracting out 
of a number of ancillary services. Besides reducing their work forces, airlines 
also instituted two-tier wages, deferred pay increases, demanded longer hours 
and reduced fringe benefits. For example, the 13,000 airline personnel of the 
Association of European Airlines-member airlines laid off in 1991, represented 
a three per cent cut in the above airlines’ work force, of which 7,600 were laid 
off by BA (4,600) and AF (3,000).57 (See Table 6.11).
The above policies by the leading EC member-states and their airlines 
had four main consequences. The most important of these was that the 
attempts to liberalize, solely through the introduction of competitive practices in 
the EC air transport, in fact, undermined the liberalization process itself. J. 
Miart a French expert in DG IV for Competition was certain that
" Air-transport competition policy destroyed what it was intending to achieve in 
the EC air transport" (interview 23 Oct. 1990).
The second consequence was that although the mergers between US 
and EC airlines, and especially with British ones, gave the US mega-carriers 
direct access to the EC and the European air transport market, the opposite 
was not the case.58 This jeopardized the position of the EC airlines in both the 
EC and the international arena. As R. Valladon, general secretary of the 
French Federation of the Transport and Services Staff-Work Force (FETS-FO) 
commented
" The alliances between the UK and other EC member-states with major US 
airlines were the Trojan horse by means of which the latter achieved access to 
the EC air-transport market" (interview 22 Nov. 1990).
The third major consequence was that small member-states and their 
airlines, although they retained overall domestic control, lost control over the
57ITF report, 1992:41-45, 55-59, 66; ITF News. June/July 1992: 22.
“ Feldman, 1991a: 19-24, 1991b: 33-35; Frankel, 1989; Jennings, 1992; Keating, 1993: 367; Moore, 1991; Reed, Feb. 
and Mar. 1990; Scocozza, 1990; Tretheway, 1991.
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EC air-transport policy. They were incapable of advancing their national air­
transport interests and were more or less reduced to spectators as far as EC 
air-transport developments were concerned. Greece was a typical example.
Finally the fourth consequence was the weakening of corporatist 
arrangements, from member-countries whether against (e.g. France and 
Germany), or for liberalization (e.g. Britain, Ireland and the Netherlands). All 
labour unions' representatives, whom I interviewed, agreed that there was a 
great shake up of corporatist interest intermediation, as well as, a frustration of 
labour unions following the EC air-transport liberalization.59
In the years 1991-1993 the opinion was gaining ground that the 
response to liberalization by the various governments, Commission politicians, 
and airlines was a strategic game played by the strongest in both mercantile 
and decision-making terms. It was suggested that these countries' main 
objective was to avoid competition, both domestically and in the EC air space. 
For example in Britain, the most liberalized EC member-state, and supposedly 
a proponent of the US deregulation policy being extended to EC air transport, 
continued regulation and the absence of any anti-trust policy enhanced the 
privatization value of BA, and its dominance of air transport at home and in the 
EC. During 1991 a significant part of BA's air services operated in markets 
where competition was largely absent, and by the end of 1993 BA controlled 
more than 70 per cent of Britain's scheduled domestic and international 
passenger traffic.60 As it has been generally argued
” While mutual recognition and the resulting inter-regime competition devalue 
nationally institutionalized power resources, they leave property rights untouched 
or even increase their value" (Streeck and Schmitter, 1991: 150).
“ information from author's interviews with D.Cockroft (19 June 1991); C. Deslandes 21 Nov. 1990); Y. Enderle (7 Dec.
1990); A. Gosselin (14 Nov.1990); S. Howard (3 June. 1991 and 4 April 1993); C. Iddon (30 Oct. 1990); G. 
Koutsogiannos (18 Jan. 1991); P. Laprevote (21 Nov.1990); J. P. Meheust, D. Jullien, and G. Gomez Qoint, 23 
Nov.1990); G. Ryde (5 June 1991); F. Tack 14 Nov. 1990); R. Valladon (22 Nov. 1990).
80 AEA, 1989: 7-8, 40; Air and Cosmos. July/Aug. 1990: 44; Balfour, 1990: 20; Bass, 1991: 216-17; Beng, 1991: 24; 
Brittan, 1989a: 13-15; 1989b: 98-105; Butterworth-Hayes, Dec. 1990:1099-102 and Mar. 1991: 72; Doganis, 1991:193; 
Feldman, April 1990: 30; Gialloreto, 1989: 68-69, Sept. 1992: 52-58; ITF Report, 1992: 30; Keating, 1993: 104-05; Kay 
and Thompson, 1991: 29; Lang, Sept. 1989: 60- 62; Lewis, 1990: 385; Lipman, Sept. 1988: 38; OECD, 1988: 19-20; 
Pelkmans, 1980: 337 and 1991:195-215; Pryke, 1991: 239-40; Shane, 1990: 2; Swann, 1991: 46-47; Sutherland 1988; 
Sutton, 1990; Williams, 1990: 30; Woolley, 1990:16-18; Zylicz, 1992:1922.
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During 1992 and 1993, a number of EC countries - Belgium, France, 
Greece, Ireland, Spain and Portugal - and their airlines asked for financial help 
(already sought after the Gulf crisis) which was considered sympathetically 
and approved (or to be approved) by the Commission. Some cautioned 
against the destabilization likely to be caused by too rapid total liberalization if 
the commission was to proceed with its 1993 plan. Belgium and France went 
so far as to ask the commission to reintroduce passenger capacity quotas, 
which had been abolished only one year earlier.61 As cited by Golich, (1990: 
166), H. Ruhnau, the former chairman of Lufthansa and secretary-general of 
IATA, explained
" The truth is that no government has an aviation policy based on altruistic 
concerns for the consumer."
In the meantime, at the beginning of 1993 the British neo-liberal 
Commissioner for Competition Sir Leon Brittan was succeeded by Belgium’s 
Socialist Commissioner for Transport Karel Van Miert, described by his 
detractors as an "old-fashioned socialist". In fact Van Miert's appointment 
represented an about-turn by the EC in respect of its competition policy, and 
general acceptance of state monopolies and state aid for the EC’s air­
transport industry, suffering from recession after the Gulf War.62 Immediately 
after Karel Van Miert took office he announced
" I do not share the view that the only credo should be less and less state 
intervention, but if there is still state intervention it needs to be efficient."63
By the end of 1993 no common EC air-transport liberalization policy 
could be applied, at least theoretically, to the individual member-states’
61Bass, 1991: 216; Doganis, 1991: 193; Financial Times of 28 Sept. 1993, of 27 March 1992, and of 22 Sept1993. See 
also Hilbrecht, 1992.
62Brummer, 1990: 34.
^Financial Times. 13 Jan. 1993:1.
125
regulatory and corporatist arrangements. The chief factor missing was a 
harmonization policy, a basic element of integration theory, which required a 
minimum regulation tailored as a sine qua non to meet consensual socio­
economic goals effectively.
In the EC air-transport policy-making there was a multiplicity of actors 
and interest groups who interacted with and within the Community institutions 
and with one another via different channels. These I shall now elaborate.
5. Key Actors, Interest Groups, and Policy Networks 
in EC Air Transport
Theorists have argued that the concepts of policy networks and policy 
communities have acquired primary importance for an analysis of the EC's 
policy-making process in terms of policy innovation and change. In the air­
transport sector policy communities comprise all actors and interest groups64 
who share common interests and influences with a view to benefiting from the 
EC air-transport policy beyond politico-bureaucratic relationships. The policy 
networks (channels) describe the links of their functional interdependence and 
interacting relationship which integrated all tangible and intangible variables in 
the EC air-transport policy-making, as illustrated in Figure 3.5 below.65
These factors were institutional interests, member-states, airlines 
(employers), trade unions and flight-crew associations (employees), 
consumers and voluntary organizations, and airport policy communities and 
policy networks.
“ For a brief analysis on interest groups theories, their structural and functional differences (types, attitude, degree of 
membership, unity or fragmentation and tactics used), and the mobilization of their interests see Nugent, 1989: 194-206; 
Wilson, 1990:1-37.
“ For a general analysis on "policy networks" and "policy communities" see Atkinson and Coleman, 1992; Beer, 1973, 
1978; Dunleavy, 1981; Heclo, 1978,1981; Jordan, 1981; Rhodes, 1986,1988; Sharpe, 1985; Smith, 1989,1991; Wright, 
1988.
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Figure 3.5: Actors and Interest Groups Interactions in the EC Legislative Process (Policy and Decision Making) 
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5.1. Institutional
The EC institutional interests were represented by key actors making 
and shaping the EC air-transport policy. They were the commission officials or 
eurocrats (the permanent Commission officials) and the Commissioners (the 
temporary governmental and Commission appointees).
In the period under discussion (1987-1993) the President of the 
Commission was the Frenchman Jacques Delors, a Socialist, who was the 
French Minister of Finance before he was appointed to the Presidency in 
1985.
In the period between 1985 and 1988 the Briton Lord Clinton Davis was 
appointed by the Commission as the Commissioner of DG VII for Transport. 
He was appointed by the UK Conservative government and he was an 
opposition spokesman for Transport in the House of Lords. The Spaniard E. 
Pena Abizanda was the Director-General, the Frenchman D. Vincent was the 
director of Directorate C (air transport, transport infrastructure, social and 
ecological aspects of transport) and the Dane F. Sorensen was the head of 
the air transport division. At the same period, the Irishman P. Sutherland, a 
neo-liberal former Attorney General, was appointed by the Commission as the 
Commissioner of DG IV for Competition.The Italian M. Caspari was the 
Director-General, the Irishman J. K. Temple Lang was the director of 
Directorate D (restrictive practices, abuse of dominant positions and other 
distortions of competition III) and the German H. Kreis was the head of the 
transport and tourist industries division till the end of 1987, replaced by the 
Briton N. Argyris. The official responsible for air transport was the Dutch 
administrator of the Directorate D B. Van Houtte.
In the period between 1989 to 1992 the Belgian (Flemish) Karel Van 
Miert, a Socialist former Minister, was appointed by the Commission as the 
Commissioner of DG VII for Transport. The Spaniard E. Pena Abizanda was
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the Director-General till 1991, replaced by the Briton R. Coleman, the 
Frenchman D. Vincent and the Dane F. Sorensen were again the director of 
Directorate C and the head of the air-transport division. At the same period, 
the Briton Sir Leon Brittan - a neo-liberal who was a Minister of Trade and 
Industry of the Conservative government in 1986 - was appointed by the 
Commission Commissioner of DG IV for Competition. The German C. D. 
Ehlermann was the Director-General, the Irishman J. K. Temple Lang was 
again the director of Directorate D and the Briton N. Argyris was the head of 
the transport and tourist industries division till the end of 1990, replaced by the 
German H. Kreis. The official responsible for air transport was again the Dutch 
administrator of the Directorate D B. Van Houtte.
5.2. Member-states
In this thesis member-states* interests are regarded simply as another 
interest-group (political actor), although academics are skeptical of such an 
arrangement because of the complicated nature of the state's functions and its 
role.66 In the EC institutional framework, the member-states’ air-transport 
interests were represented by their national representatives in the European 
Parliament, their national transport cabinets or bureaucracies, the study 
groups of their national air-transport experts, their permanent representatives 
in the EC (Corepers), and their Ministers of Transport in the Council of 
Transport Ministers.67
At the EC level their major representatives were the regional 
organization of the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC), and the Joint 
Airworthiness Authority (JAA), which later was called Joint Aviation Authorities, 
primarily responsible for directing technical issues connected with EC air 
transport.
“ Nedelmann and Meier, 1979: 98-99; Schmitter, 1985: 40-44; Steiner, 1986: 82-85.
67 Their functions and interactions will be discussed in detail in ch IV.
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ECAC is a European inter-governmental organization, established in 
1955 at the initiative of the Council of Europe and with the active support of 
the ICAO. In 1990 ECAC had 25 member-states: the EC twelve, the non-EC 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) members, and Cyprus, Hungary, 
Malta, Monaco, Poland, Turkey and Yugoslavia.68 ECAC's objective is to 
promote the safe and orderly development of civil-aviation routes within, as 
well as to and from Europe. It closely co-operates with the EC in order to 
harmonize civil-aviation policies and practices among its European member- 
states, and to promote an understanding on policy matters between them and 
other parts of the world. The ECAC meets annually in Plenary Session. 
Directors General of Civil Aviation convene at more frequent intervals for 
decisions on urgent policy matters, which can also, when the need arises, be 
handled at the level of Ministers of Transport. The ECAC's work program, 
established triannually, covers economic policy, technical matters and 
questions related to facilitation and security. The work is carried out on a 
continual basis by four standing committees, each of which is assisted by 
working groups staffed by government experts, and by a wide circle of 
observers representing consumer opinion and sectors of the civil-aviation 
industry. The work is steered by a co-ordinating committee made up of the 
ECAC President, its three vice-presidents, and the chairmen of the standing
69committees.
The Joint Airworthiness Authority is an institution created in 1986 by the 
four largest air-transport and aircraft-manufacturing EC member-states - 
Britain, France, West Germany and the Netherlands. While the JAA has a
“ EFTA was set up in January 1960 as a rival organization to the EC, and originally consisted of UK, Denmark, Iceland, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Austria, Portugal and Lichtenstein. Finland was associated but did not become a full 
member until 1986. The aim of EFTA was to eliminate trade tariffs on industrial products in Europe, but did not extnded to 
common external tariffs or economic or political integration. In December 1960 the Organisation for Economic Co­
operation and Development (OECD), was founded in Paris as an instrument of international co-operation in economic 
affairs. It comprises 24 mostly industrialized Western countries, the EC and EFTA members, the USA, Canada, Japan, 
New Zealand, Turkey and Yugoslavia (under special status). See Hitzler, 1991: 353-55; Nugent, 1989: 335; Williams, G., 
1993: 88.
89 Information from author's interviews with L. Barbin (23 Nov. 1990); E. Hudson (20 Nov. 1990). See also ECAC, 1990; 
Naveau, 1989: 68-72.
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director and secretariat, it is actually a body of director-generals of the civil 
aviation’s authorities of the EC and two EFTA countries, but in the beginning 
its sole interest was on EC air transport. The JAA staff consists entirely of 
professional civil-aviation experts. The JAA endeavoured to go beyond EC 
legislation and jurisdictions, and to develop regulations on the certification of 
air worthiness and proper utilization of air-transport personnel, such as crew 
licensing, and flying and duty time limitations (FDTL),70 under the auspices of 
the JAA Operations Committee (JAA-OPS). The original JAA decisions were 
called Joint Air worthiness Requirements (JARs), but then expanded to include 
aircraft maintenance and operations; they are now known as Joint Aviation 
Requirements or Regulations (JARs). The central JAA and the secretariat 
were located at Gatwick airport UK and was an associated body of ECAC.71
5.3. Airlines
The Association of European Airlines (AEA), established in 1973,72 is 
the main policy network for all EC state-owned airline policy communities. In 
1990 It had a membership of 25 scheduled airlines and some of their affiliated 
charter airlines.73 The AEA is a flexible and small in structure regional 
organization. The general secretariat consists of a general secretary, his 
deputy, and four general managers heading four committees: aero political, 
commercial, research and planning, and technical. Each state-owned airline 
has one representative on each committee. The structure of the AEA is 
depicted in Figure 3.6 Although strong EC member-states and big airlines 
obviously carry more weight, AEA members always attempt to reach a 
consensus, so as to present a firm air-transport strategy in the EC. The
70 To be discussed in detail in ch. VIII.
71 In the end of 1991 JAA moved from Gatwick to Hoofddorp Netherlands. Interview with T. Middleton (13 June 1991). See 
also ITF News. Aug. 1991:8-9; Sutton, 1989: 783-85.
^Formerly the European Air Research Bureau, (EARB).
73lt also includes EFTA-member airlines: Finnair, Icelandair, Swissair, Austrian Airlines and British Caledonian, (merged 
with BA in 1988), Turkish Airlines (THY), the French privately-owned airline UTA (merged with AF in 1989), Air Malta, the 
Yugoslav airlines (JAT), and the Hungarian airlines Malev.
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Figure 3.6: Structure o f the  A ssoc ia tion  o f European A irlines
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general secretariat works in close liaison with governmental and 
administrative bodies, and reports to the heads of the member airlines. While 
offering advice and services, it has no authority to intervene in any member 
airline, or in the commercial agreements between them and other airlines 
such as alliances, buy-outs etc. AEA-member airlines accounted for around 
92 percent of the scheduled international passenger traffic in Europe in 1990 
(in terms of passenger/kilometers).1
In addition there are two regional and one main EC policy networks in 
the form of associations of independent charter, regional and business 
airlines. They are the Independent Airlines Association to the EC (ACE);1 the 
European Regional Airlines Association (ERA); and the European Business 
Aviation Association (EBAA). They welcomed any steps towards a fast and far 
EC air-transport market liberalization and hoped that, through the 
opportunities it would create, the dominance of the EC's state-owned airlines 
could be challenged.
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ACE evolved in 1979 as a private organization out of the European Air 
Carrier Assembly (EURACA)74, and the Air Charter Carriers Association 
(ACCA)75 in 1979, specifically to represent the interests of certain independent 
EC airlines in the EC. Some of them (Dan Air, Air Europe and Britannia) 
operated scheduled services as well. ACE is therefore a bimodal association. 
Its 21 airlines from six member-states have 400 aircraft, and carry around 37 
million passengers per year. The ACCA, EURACA and ACE all work under a 
president, vice-president, director general, and a board of directors.76
ERA was founded in 1980. Affiliated to either the big or independent 
regional airlines, it serves the so-called secondary or third level air transport 
markets for intra-regional flights. In 1987 it had 14 member airlines, which by 
1991 had increased to 46. Its administrative secretariat is under a director 
general.77
The European Business Aviation Association (EBAA)78 represents the 
proprietors of professionally flown multi-engined aircraft owned either by 
business corporations or by air taxi enterprises. The company-owned aircraft 
usually carry company staff and guests and as so-called corporate aircraft are 
part of general aviation which covers all kinds of flying operations from 
microlights and hot-air balloons to air ambulances, commuter airlines, aerial 
photography, agricultural aviation, pilot-training and helicopters, as well as 
private and corporate jets. The air-taxi planes are owned by operators who 
charter them out to exactly the same kind of business passengers. Although 
they operate the same services as corporate aircraft, legally speaking, they do 
not belong to general aviation but are part of the commercial air transport. The 
EBAA consists of full and associate members, with only full members being 
entitled to vote. Associate members may be individuals or firms providing
74EURACA was formed in 1977 and has 47 airlines from 14 European countries, EFTA countries included.
75IACA was formed in 1971 by ICAO and had a total of 53 airlines from 17 countries worldwide.
70lnterview with R. Hollubowicz (15 Nov. 1990). See also Naveau, 1989: 79.
^Interview with M. Ambrose (30 May 1991). See also Naveau, 1989: 79; Wheatcroft and Lipman, 1986:124-27.
78EBAA is under the worldwide umbrella of the International Business Aviation Council Ltd (IBAC), which represents the 
international business aviation community and is located in the UK; it meets once every nine months.
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products and services to business aviation (e.g. handling agents, aircraft 
manufacturers, etc.). The EBAA has a president, a board of governors, a 
chairman, treasurer, and chief-executive.79
The above EC airline industry umbrella groups have had constantly 
issued information papers, yearbooks and statistical appendices as well as 
newsletters and news bulletins in order to inform their member airlines for their 
positions on Commissions' proposals and Council of Transport Ministers EC 
air-transport legislation.
5.4. Trade unions and flight crew associations
The International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) has for decades 
been the chief umbrella group for all main trade unions of all modes of 
transport throughout the world. It covers over 400 transport unions in a 
hundred countries, including those of Eastern Europe, and its total
membership is around 6 million workers. Today it also represents all EC air­
transport unions, and most cockpit and cabin crews. In 1975 the ITF
established the Committee of Transport Workers’ Unions in the EC (the 
Brussels Committee CTWU), as a link-office between the ITF and the EC 
specifically charged with lobbying EC institutions, and promoting the dialogue 
with other transport policy partners including air-transport ones.80
The International Federation of Airline Pilots Associations (IFALPA), 
numbers a total membership of roughly 75,000 pilots, and is the main
international umbrella organization for the European Airlines Pilots'
Association (Europilote), which itself represented all West-European countries'
79Busy executives from industrial corporations and major commercial firms have operated their own aircrafts or have had 
regular contracts with private air charter operators because they found them very cost-effective. Especially to busy 
executives whose time is money and whose earnings reached the 50/60,000 pounds a year the 350 pounds an hour of 
flying seemed very cheap to spend in order to travel confortably and to accomplish a business deal. For example 
scheduled flights used some 200 airports in Europe in 1990. An executive jet or air taxi could use some 200 licensed 
airfirlds in the UK alone and more than 2,000 in Europe. Thus although business aviation represents a very small part of 
general and commercial air transport, is not a luxury but a 'tool to make 111006/ .  Interview with J.F. Mac Fariane Obe (29 
Nov. 1990). See also Checkley, 1990: 91-94.
“ interviews with D. Cockroft (19 June 1991); C. Iddon (30 Oct. 1990). See also Chomeley, 1990: 119-120; ITF News. 
Sept. 1989: 21; Wheatcroft and Lipman, 1986:43.
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national-airline pilot associations. IFALPA, with headquarters in the UK, has 
different committees for industrial, technical and operational matters. All pilots 
are members of IFALPA, most of them of ITF, and all EC ones of Europilote.81
5.5. Consumers, voluntary organizations and airports
The European Bureau of Consumers' Union (BEUC) is the umbrella 
group looking after the interests of all production and service consumers in the 
EC, including those in air transport. The latter are represented by the 
Federation of Air-Transport User Representatives in the EC (FATUREC), 
created in 1983 by the Air-Users' Committee (AUC) of the EC, and the French 
Association of Air-Transport Users (AFUTA).82
A body called Intelligence Service for Air Transport in the EC 
(AEROPA) was set up in 1985 as an informal working-party trying to define 
and voice positions held in common by various organizations supporting the 
liberalization of EC air-transport. It is a non-profit making, loosely affiliated 
voluntary EC-aviation pressure group of 15 totally different organizations. 
Some of them are: airport authorities, the independent and regional airline- 
consumers associations, regional bodies and chambers of commerce such as 
BEUC, ACE, ERA, the Independent Aircraft Handling Association (IAHA), 
associations of cities and towns, Europilote, the Association of European 
Chambers of Commerce and Industry (Eurochambers), the International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the International Organization of Consumer 
Unions (IOCU), as well as airport authorities. Although most of them already 
belonged to their respective associations, they created AEROPA because their 
interests were very specific and restricted, and they were too small to be able 
to lobby and influence the EC air-transport policy.83
81 Information from author's interviews with D. Cockroft (19 June 1991); Y. Enderle (7 Dec. 1990); T. Middleton (13 June
1991); J. Rokofilos (17 July 1990).
82Wheatcroft and Lipman, 1986:43-44, 70-78.
“ interview with P. Jeandrain (27 Nov. 1990). See also Ryan, 1991: 67-69; Shaw, 1993:199-209.
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As P. Jeandrain, general director of AEROPA, pointed out
"AEROPA is a watchdog organization which ensured that their interests were 
known and taken into account within the EC institutions" (interview 27 Nov.
1990).
Consumer/user organizations are concerned neither with unrestrained 
nor with controlled competition, but only in free and fair competition. They held 
that airlines should be run in the best interest of their passengers - not those 
of the trade unions or parties in government. They tend to think that member- 
state governments should intervene in normal consumer protection only to 
ensure a safe air-transport system and to prevent anti-competitive (predatory 
and monopolistic) behaviour.84
However, Eurocrats and the Commission have questioned the 
existence of the consumer/user organizations and the role of their 
representatives as concerning the authenticity of their real membership and 
purposes. As L. Van Hasselt, air-transport division administrator of DG IV for 
Transport indicated
" Those organizations have a trivial membership and they are not in touch with the 
air transport users per se. Thus I am not sure whether they actually represent 
the consumers' air-transport interests or their special interests" (interview 8 Nov.
1990)
Therefore, in the EC, the Commission has created the Consumer 
Consultative Committee (CCC), a political body which allows consumer 
organizations to formally support their interests in the Commission's 
proposals. The CCC is divided into production and service committees, one of 
them being the Air-Users committee of the EC. In addition, in 1990 the Euro 
parliament developed its All-Party Inter-Group on Consumer Affairs, which is 
chaired by one of its members.
^Information from author's interviews with S. Crampton (28 May 1991); P. Jeandrain (27 Nov. 1990); L. Mosca (7 Dec. 
1990); J. Parr (4 June 1991); D. Prentice (31 May 1991); and J. Sabourin and C. Grenier (23 Nov. 1990). See also NCC, 
1983:1-2,1986: 27-47; Villiers, 1989:13-14.
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Finally the International Civil Airports Association (ICAA),85 and the 
Airport Operators' Council International (AOCI), which is part of the Airport 
Associations Council (AACC), co-ordinate airport interests all over the world. 
Because of the new collective structure of the international airline industry, 
ICAA and AOCI were integrated to become the Airports Association Council 
International (AACI). Its European region covers over 200 airports, and its EC 
bureau alone over 160.86
All the above EC air-transport interests and actors - which were 
organized at supranational level (i) within the Commission; (ii) maintained their 
own offices in Brussels; or (iii) were in constant contact with their EC 
counterparts representing them in Brussels - created a certain pattern of 
entrenched expectations and demands for and against regulation and 
liberalization of the EC air-transport policy, which is set out in Table 3.3 below.
Table 3.3: EC Air-Transport Interests
Free Marketeers 
(for deregulation)
Moderate Dirigistes
(for regulated competition) (Against competition)
EC Members 
(individual)
UK, Netherlands
Ireland,
Luxembourg
France, Germany 
Belgium, 
Denmark 
ECAC, JAA
Italy, Spain
Greece
Portugal
Industry 
(individual 
state -owned 
and independent 
airlines)
BA, KLM, 
Aer Lingus 
LUXAIR
ACE, ERA, EBAA
AF, LH, SN,
SAS
AEA
AL.IB 
OA, TAP
Unions. ITF, CTWU
and Airports
consumers BEUC, FATUREC. 
ICAA, AACC, 
AOCI, AACI
85Based on Paris, ICAA interest is strongly concentrated on Europe.
“ ICAA-AEA Report, 1990:1.
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Because consumer/user, airport interest groups and business aviation, 
like before 1987, had a minimal participation in the EC air transport decision­
making - compared to airline and trade union which had direct vested interests 
in the 1987-1993 period - they were not researched separately but in 
combination with their interlinking relationships and behaviour in the EC air­
transport policy.
6. Conclusion
During the period between 1987 and 1993 the Commission solely 
attempted to shape a common air-transport liberalization policy through the 
implementation of a competition policy in the EC air transport. This not only 
was no panacea for bringing about greater competitiveness, but in practice 
provided the airlines of strong member-states with the motivation to 
monopolize their domestic air-transport systems as well as to try to dominate 
that of the EC and even the international one.
In fact it led to the destabilization of national politico-economic and 
social structures. This accentuated the existing nationalist, mercantilist and 
regulatory trends in the individual member-countries, and so militated against 
a joint air-transport liberalization policy being adopted by the EC. Such EC 
legislation, as did come into being, grew out of ideology and the need to 
survive external (international) competitive pressures, rather than out of the 
willingness, let alone the evaluation of the best interests of individual EC 
states.
State-owned airlines in the EC countries avoided co-operation or 
competition among each other at EC level. The airlines in fact, increasingly 
believed that their EC and international survival required not only a dominant 
position in their own air transport systems, but had to be buttressed by
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mergers and alliances with airlines in other blocs if their own continued access 
to international routes was to be assured.
The only two potent countervailing influences for the liberalization of the 
various regulatory structures of the EC member-countries were (i) the major 
deregulation of the US international air transport, and (ii) the pursuit by some 
EC-states (primarily Britain, Ireland, and the Netherlands) of a similar policy 
within the EC. The US example led to rearrangements for the EC members' 
airlines; the European support of deregulation led to monopoly practices in EC 
air transport instead of free competition.
The EC countries' strong reluctance to adopt a common EC air­
transport policy stood fully revealed in 1993. Although the Commission's 
legislative work from 1987 to 1992 had been directed by neo-liberal 
Commissioners for Competition such as Ireland's R. Sutherland and Britain's 
Sir Leon Brittan, the implementation was left to the Belgium's Socialist Karl 
Van Miert who reconsidered the question of EC air-transport liberalization.
The above EC air-transport interests created an interest-group network 
of EC member-nations, of airlines in their capacity as employers, and trade 
unions representing the employees, with each group putting forward and 
defend its own point of view as a means of blocking the EC's air-transport 
competition-policy objectives. The existence of this spectrum of conflicting 
positions explains why there has been such marked resistance to changing 
the national arrangements, and why the EC liberalization policy has failed to 
become the common EC air-transport policy.
The remainder of this thesis will explore the influences and interactions 
of the above interest groups in an attempt to show in detail how and why they 
precluded liberalization of the EC air-transport policy, and related decision- 
making.
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CHAPTER IV
EC POLITICS IN AIR-TRANSPORT DECISION-MAKING AND POLICY
" No matter how expert you are in air transport when you get to Brussels you can't 
control your own product and you get very frustrated" (from the author’s 
interview with R. M. Cotteril, head of the economic policy division of the UK's 
Civil Aviation Authority, 31 May 1991).
This chapter concentrates on the formal and informal intricate 
relationships and political manipulations of factions and interests in the EC air­
transport institutions. It describes the ways and means of lobbying and 
negotiating between Commissioners, Eurocrats, and member-states for 
accommodating their national and personal air-transport interests in the EC 
air-transport policy and decision. Specifically it delineates (i) how the attitudes 
of the Commissioners and Eurocrats translated into direct or indirect political 
power games, managed to override any supranational guarantee for neutrality; 
and (ii) how the member-states exerted pressures and influences that actually 
became incorporated in EC air-transport politics as an integral part of it.
1. The Attitudes and Policy Styles of Air-Transport Eurocrats
In attempting to identify the general characteristics of a Eurocrat 
scholars have relied on a hybrid1 model of civil servant, the super-bureaucrat. 
This "Eurocrat" represents a new breed of policy-maker and, though closely 
related to the "European polity model", far more resembles the national 
politician-bureaucrat. According to this academic model Eurocrats are highly 
competent and politically skilled, and therefore enjoy full recognition and 
legitimacy in the conflicting politics of the EC's supra-national interests.2
1 Hybridization defines the amalgamation of the political and administrative/bureaucratic roles of the civil service, in 
contrast to the bifurcation of politics and bureaucracy, or the artificial dichotomy between politics and administration, 
which have been observed in national bureaucracies and have been dubbed "politicized bureaucracy" or "bureaucratized 
politics" respectively.
Aberbach et al, 1981: 18-19; Campbell and Peters, 1988: 79-82; Gregory, 1991: 307-10, 325; Dogan, 1975: 89-98; 
Dunleavy, 1991:148-50; Mayntz and Derlien, 1989: 393; Nugent, 1991: 96-98; Page, 1992: 53; Peters, 1991: 77, 90-91; 
Self, 1976:140.
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Like other EC officials air-transport Eurocrats were basically recruited 
as a rule from a careful balance of nationalities according to the power and 
size of the member-states, and not in technocratic terms as air-transport 
specialists.3 Therefore, although acknowledged by all air-transport interest 
groups and experts as highly intelligent and competent super-bureaucrats, 
they were also considered as rank amateurs in air-transport matters and 
unfitted for regulating it with the exception of F. Sorensen, the air-transport 
head of the EC's Directorate General (DG VII) for Transport.4 As R. 
Tsimbiropoulou, OA's senior superintendent of EC aeropolitical affairs stated
" Unfortunately the Eurocrats came in to regulate the EC's air transport, which for 
them was a terra incognita" (interview 24 Jan. 1991).
Air-transport Eurocrats were at the receiving end of the highest-rated 
and professional air-transport lobbying and bargaining.5 Although as an 
"adolescent bureaucracy" they were susceptible to external evidence6 - drawn 
into a quasi-clientelistic dependency relationship with the interest groups’ 
policy communities - they claimed full authority by virtue of their supposed 
competence in specific air-transport activities, and appeared in EC air­
transport as knowledgeable professionals. They also constantly projected the 
status and prestige of their sophisticated self-image. As a result, the air­
transport officials in the EC, like those in the national governments, maintained 
and manipulated a small and cohesive transnational, politico-administrative 
elite network. For all that, the power of the air-transport Eurocrats was not 
unlimited and frequently conflicted with the invidious political pressures from
2Technocracy rests upon specialized Knowledge, science and rationality which I called "issue community expertise" in 
ch.2 and is usually employed for the purpose of obtaining power. Bureaucratic expertise is one of a number of factors that 
contribute to the power of the bureaucracy. See Eisner, 1993:130; Putnam, 1976: 383-412.
information taken from author’s interviews with D. Cockroft (19 June 1991), R. P. Holubowicz (15 Nov. 1990), A. 
Corcodilas (18 Jan. 1991); P. Laprevote (21 Nov. 1990); R. Tsimbiropoulou (24 Jan. 1991); K. Veenstra (29 Oct. 1990). 
For a detail discussion on their culturally fragmented ascriptive attitudes (race, language, and religion), and achieved 
attitudes (occupation and education) see Steiner, 1986: 202.
Especially from private consultants who, as in national bureaucracies, acted as quasi-interest groups practicing 
“cryptopolitics".
aFor a general discussion see Hull, 1993:86; and Mazey and Richardson, 1993:10, 21.
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Commissioners and member-states - ail part of the political elite model of 
policy and decision-making in the EC7 - who dictated to them their own code of 
conduct and deadlines.8
" Policy-making in the EC can be conceived as a process of bargaining among 
national and Commission elites who attempt to maximize certain interests 
inherent in their roles" Busch and Puchala (1976: 246).
Arguably, from top down one could identify a central problem in the air­
transport Eurocrats' use of their discretion. As a matter of fact, many 
interviewees have complained that, although it was part of Eurocrats’ duties to 
be accessible to, as well as consult with, designated air-transport interest 
groups, they insistently refused to share with them any power in EC air­
transport policy-making, which they considered as a waste of time.9
Nevertheless, involved as they were in EC air-transport politics they did 
what they could to assert their air-transport priorities by influencing the EC air­
transport policy in politico-economic terms. As a result, unlike national 
bureaucracies (where bureaucrats are often budget-maximizers and/or 
bureau-shapers)10, air-transport Eurocrats were power-maximizers often 
involved in struggles and clashes among themselves and vis-a-vis their 
Commissioners who, in their turn, frequently competed for power and the 
promotion of their own national air-transport interests in the EC's two 
Directorate General (DG VII) for Transport and (DG IV) for Competition. This 
being so, the common assumption by outside observers of the EC that 
conflicts exist only between the supra-national aims of the Commission and 
the national ones of the member-states needs to be corrected. It should be
7This model focus on their considerable concentration of power at all EC levels. See Nugent, 1989: 254.
information from author's interviews with M. Ambrose (30 May 1991); D. Cockroft (19 June 1991); J. F. MacFarlane Obe 
(29 Nov. 1990); J.P. Meheust, D. Jullien, and G. Gomez (23 Nov. 1990); G. Ryde (5 June 1991). For a general 
theoretical background on elite theory see Dunleavy and O’Leary, 1989: 136-202; Page, 1992: 80; Peters, 1989: 39-69; 
Putnam, 1977: 383-412 and for the EC specifically see Busch and Puchala, 1976: 237-42; Grant, 1985: 15; Sargent, 
1985: 236-44; Steiner, 1986:181.
9 Information from author's interviews with M. Ambrose (30 May 1991); D. Cockroft (19 June 1991); J. F. MacFarlane Obe 
(29 Nov. 1990); J.P. Meheust, D. Jullien, and G. Gomez (23 Nov. 1990); G. Ryde (5 June 1991).
°Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1989:114-19; Dunleavy, 1991: 200.
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given a broader perspective in EC air-transport politics, where the Commission 
members (Commissioners and some Eurocrats) were competing for power 
among themselves as well as serving their national air-transport interests.
2. Competences and Conflicts between and among Eurocrats and
Commissioners
Just as in the overall eurocracy, in the EC air-transport sector there was 
a clear delineation of competences and a hierarchical relationship between 
Commissioners and Eurocrats. The Commissioners’ chief aim was to assure 
full compliance with their wishes and to prevent any usurpation of their power 
in the Eurocratic air-transport policy communities. As R. Tsimbiropoulou, OA's 
senior superintendent of EC aeropolitical affairs, has said
" The first thing Eurocrats leam when they enter the EC is whom and how to 
obey. Otherwise they know that their positions are immediately jeopardized" 
(interview 24 Jan. 1991).
The EC air-transport Commissioners were owed the highest loyalty and 
political patronage by their chief of cabinet and air-transport advisors - who 
formed the staff of the high secretariats where air-transport politics and EC 
practices coincided. Commissioners were often so busy with lectures, public 
relations and other meetings, that they totally relied on their cabinet chief and 
staff and delegated tremendous power to them. This meant that air-transport 
issues that would normally go to divisional officials might gravitate instead to 
more strictly political actors whose activities counterbalanced the abilities of 
veteran officials. F. Sorensen, for instance head of the air-transport division of 
DG VII (Transport), could not adopt considerable strategies of obfuscation, 
delay, and the use of political and bureaucratic rules and practices.11 As E. 
Seebohm, air-transport administrator of DG VII (Transport) revealed
11 Information from author's interviews with N. Argyris (5 Dec. 1990); J. M. De Bastos (8 Nov.1990); and L. Van Hasselt (8 
Nov.1990); E. Seebohm (6 Nov. 1990).
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" The Commissioner's level is purely political...we do not have a full transparency 
...sometimes we get back some instructions that we cannot explain but only 
speculate on, and maybe some months later, and more or less by accident, we 
get to know what really happened" (interview 6 Nov. 1990).
The lack of greater latitude for exercising their own independent power, 
left air-transport Eurocrats with only discretionary policy-making powers, which 
depended on the importance of the air-transport issue, and whether their draft 
proposals happened to coincide with the Commissioners’ national air-transport 
interests. If an air-transport issue was of very great importance, even heads 
and principal administrators of the air-transport divisions were ignored and it 
was the high-ranking officials, such as the Directors, the General Directors, 
and the Commissioners, who shaped the final policy.12
On the other hand, like their national bureaucratic counterparts,13 air­
transport Eurocrats knowing their Commissioners' predisposition and politico- 
economic and social constraints, were likely to anticipate the latter5 reactions. 
Eurocrats were not, therefore, loyal followers, but collaborators who complied 
more or less with their Commissioners' explicit air-transport goals. For 
example F. Sorensen of DG VII (Transport) had direct policy problems with 
both his Commissioner Lord Stanley Clinton Davis and Karel Van Miert, due 
to politico-economic differences: he wanted to proceed further and faster with 
the liberalization of the EC air-transport than his Commissioners. On the other 
hand N. Argyris, of DG IV (Competition) collided with his Commissioner Sir 
Leon Brittan and his Director J. Temple Lang, as well as with his air-transport 
subordinate because he was readier to reconcile DG IV proposals with the 
Commission’s rules than they were. Taking into consideration the broader 
circumstances of the EC air-transport system, he was against massive 
mergers and alliances of EC airlines in the interests of liberalization, because
12lrrformation from author's interviews with N. Argyris (5 Dec. 1990); J. M. De Bastos (8 Nov.1990); and L. Van Hasselt (8 
Nov.1990); E. Paganelli (7 Nov. 1990);E. Seebohm (9 Nov. 1990); D. Stasinopoulos (28 Oct. 1990).
13Jackson, 1982:116; Maynlzand Derlien, 1989: 384; Page, 1992: 2,63; Peters, 1989: 28-30, 51-53, 207-08.
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he felt this was bound to affect the EC air-transport policy negatively, 
especially in the case of BA and AF. So he too clashed with his 
Commissioners' and the airlines' particularistic air-transport interests.14 As E. 
Paganelli, a lower-grade official in DG VII stated
" The Commissioner is the uppermost policy-maker. Very many are involved in, 
but very few actually shape the air-transport policy in the Commission" (interview 
7 Nov. 1990).
The above-mentioned heads of the two EC air-transport divisions have 
had many and obvious power conflicts with their subordinates as well as their 
super ordinates, although for opposite reasons: F. Sorensen because of 
power-maximization, and N. Argyris for power-minimization.15
The conflicts and struggles for power between Commissioners and 
Eurocrats were most frequent and obvious concerning DG VII (Transport) and 
DG IV (Competition). The main problem was that DG IV had been assigned a 
status and legally defined powers and obligations very parallel to those of DG 
VII which was basically responsible for the making of the EC air-transport 
policy. For example, as regards the legal procedure in anti-competitive 
practices (EC Regulation 3975/87), responsibility for overseeing the 
interpretation and the implementation of the Treaty of Rome competition rules 
lies with DG IV (Competition).16 As N. Argyris, head of transport and tourism 
devision of DG IV (Competition), has explained
" We interpret how the Treaty competition rules are to be applied, and we are 
authorized by the Council regulations to implement them in the EC air-transport 
market. We have legal constraints and powers which, inevitably limit our 
activities, but strengthen decision power" (interview 6 Dec. 1990).
14lnformation from author's interviews with S. Crampton (28 May 1991); L. Van Hasselt (8 Nov. 1990).
15Both cases will be elaborated in detail in ch. V.
16 DG IV (Competition) acts as a quasi-court for member-states' activities, and especially their airlines' obligations, since it 
scrutinizes and authorizes all their agreements. For example, under Regulation 17 (Articles 1-25) the Commission during 
its information-gathering for a case is empowered to search premises and take away copies or extracts of records, but it 
is obliged to keep all information confidential. See Appendix IV. 1 for a Commission press report on action against 
anti-competitive airline agreements. Information from author's interviews with N. Argyris (7 Dec.1990); N.Kontou (26 Oct. 
1990); G. Radice (26 Oct. 1990); B. Van Houtte (9  Nov.1990). See also Jacobs and Stewart-Clark, 1990:119-34.
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The eventually enhanced air-transport decision-making powers of DG 
IV, and the interdependencies and overlaps of DG IV and DG VII inevitably 
resulted in serious conflicts.17 E. Paganelli, a lower grade official of DG VII told 
the author
" DG VII and DG IV are in a situation of black and white" (interview 7 Nov. 1990).
As a result air-transport Eurocrats18 in the two DGs accuse each other 
of trying to undermine the role of the other in their power struggle. So 
Eurocrats of DG VII charged that others in DG IV had tried to impose their 
views because it would make them look more competent than their DG VII 
colleagues. DG VII officials alleged that the formal daily formulation of new 
conditions for competition in the EC air-transport industry was promoting a 
logical and consistent EC air-transport policy, not merely a competitive system 
that might destroy the EC air-transport market which in fact was working very 
well. On the other hand, DG IV Eurocrats accused those of the DG VII of 
discriminating against smaller and new airlines in favour of big and well 
established ones. Although according to some Eurocrats, the two DGs
contributed jointly to the EC air-transport policy - and in the end they had one 
policy - and one position, which seemed to prove that the two DGs
complemented rather than rivaled each other - in fact they were serving totally 
different air-transport goals and aims.19
As a matter of fact DG VII regarded EC air-transport issues politico- 
economically, while DG IV was seeing them in legal terms. In other words, DG 
IV Eurocrats adopted a litigation-minded, normative and idealistic (what should
17Wallace, H., (1983: 60) argues that individual Commissioners have found it difficult to operate outside the vertical 
relationship with the DGs for which they are responsible.
18Although it was impossible to reach and interview the two Commissioners responsible for air-transport the interviews 
with the Eurocrats gave the impression that relations at the top of the hierarchy were as bad and even worse than at 
eurocrat level.
19lnformation from author's interviews with N. Argyris (5 Dec. 1990); C. Chene (5 Dec. 1990; L. Van Hasselt (8 Nov.
1990); B. Van Houtte (9 Nov.1990); F. Sorensen (12 Nov. 1990); D. Vincent (6 Dec. 1990).
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happen) EC air-transport policy; while DG VII Eurocrats adopted one that was 
efficiency-minded, positive, and realistic (what was happening). As a result, 
although the proposals from DG VII were indispensable for the overall EC air­
transport policy, DG IV considered them illegitimate in terms of the EC air­
transport competition rules. This obliged all national and EC air-transport 
interest group networks to circumvent DG IV, when attempting to deal with the 
Commission. Instead, they went straight to DG VII, leaving it to negotiate the 
overall politico-economic issues of EC air-transport policy with DG IV - a fact 
which further aggravated the relations between the two Directorates General.20 
As a matter of fact when F. Sorensen of DG VII (Transport), was called to the 
UK House of Commons Transport Committee hearings, on the development of 
EC air-transport policy, and asked to testify on the two DG's formal relations, 
he answered
"You are asking me to wash our dirty linen in public."21
During the period 1987-1993, the Commissioners of DG IV, 
(Competition) Sir Leon Brittan and Karel Van Miert of DG VII, (Transport) as 
well as Commission president Jacques Delors along with certain Eurocrats 
responsible for air transport, were accused by the press, air-transport interest 
groups and experts of serving only their own countries' national air-transport 
interests instead of the common ones of the EC. This in fact had been the 
basic element in the Commissioners' struggles and clashes. It not only 
negated the formal role and goals of their officials, it also, at least as in EC air 
transport was concerned, gave the lie to the broader conviction that 
Commissioners and Eurocrats served only supra-national and collective goals.
^Information from author's interviews with J. Brown (16 Nov. 1990); Y. Castro (16 Nov. 1990); A. Corcondilas (18 Jan.
1991); N. Remmer (9 Nov. 1990); B. Stahle (4 Dec. 1990); R. Tsimbiropoulou (24 Jan. 1991); K. Veenstra (29 Oct 1990).
21 As described by J. Parr, director general of Air Transport Users Committee and ex-director of the air-transport and 
shipping division of the Council secretariat, and S. Crampton, secretary of Consumers in the EC group of UK. Interviews 
with the author on 4 June and 28 May 1991 respectively.
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Not surprisingly, the true situation was well-known and sometimes accepted 
as inevitable among all EC air-transport interest group networks.22 As Director 
General J. Parr, of the UK Air-Transport Users Committee and ex-director of 
air-transport and shipping division of the Council secretariat noted
" Eurocrats were genuinely motivated by their Commissioners and their member- 
states to be pragmatic - not in terms of the EC 'supra-national' ideal, but by the 
standards of EC 'national' politics" (interview 4 June 1991).
Four instances that look briefly at the behaviour of two officials and, 
more important, at that of the Commissioners, are set out in ch. V. In these 
cases the Commissioners and Eurocrats concerned served their own national 
air-transport interests, or were caught up in such activities.
3. Member-states1 Pressures and Influences on 
Air-Transport Legislation
An air-transport proposal passes basically through two legislative 
channels in the EC air-transport policy and decision-making process. The first 
is the Commission, where the proposal is introduced, drafted, and adopted; 
the second is formal consultation by the working groups of member-states' 
air-transport experts (issue communities), the Permanent Representatives 
Committee (Coreper), and the Council of Transport Ministers final decision.
3.1. Preparations at the Commission
During the introductory stage, the appropriate air-transport division 
estimates a timetable for how long it will take for the Commission to discuss, 
negotiate and adopt a specific air-transport proposal. Since the Commission
22 Information from author’s interviews with J. Brown (16 Nov. 1990); Y. O. Castro (16 Nov. 1990); Y. Enderle (7 Dec. 
1990); R. P.Holubowicz (15 Nov. 1990); C. I. Del Olmo (31 Oct. 1990); T. Middleton (13 June 1991); E. Paganelli (7 Nov. 
1990); J. Parr (4 June 1991); M. Pisters 12 Nov.1990); F. Sorensen 12 Nov. 1990); B. Stahle (4 Dec. 1990); D. 
Stasinopoulos 28 Oct. 1990); D. Vincent (6 Dec. 1990); S. Yuksel (31 Oct 1990).
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does not have the means or the expertise to conduct investigations for an air­
transport proposal, it closely co-operates with the European Civil Aviation 
Conference (ECAC), hires air-transport specialists and academic groups, 
and/or asks private companies and interest organizations to conduct research 
on its behalf.23 A specific budget covers such specialized studies, and 
invitations for tenders are sent to a list of consultants and the lowest bid is 
approved.24
Since 1987 it has been mostly ECAC that has carried out the EC's air­
transport policy research, although the EC Commission has been given the 
credit for it. Unlike the Commission, ECAC has the time, the facilities, the 
technocratic and financial resources,25 to ensure efficient, rapid, and flexible 
working methods from its national Civil Aviation Authorities (CAAs) experts 
who do the job on a day-to-day basis. Between 1987 and 1993 ECAC's 
leading European air-transport policy-making role changed from a formal to an 
informal and a complementary one, because the national CAAs were obliged 
to report on their own respective air-transport interests to the Commission 
instead of to ECAC.26 Although ECAC was considered less political than the 
Commission, D. Stasinopoulos, principal administrator of DG VII (Transport), 
believed it to be largely controlled by France and Germany.27
The introductory stage ends with the preparation of a discussion 
document or a preliminary draft proposal. No member-state representatives 
are involved at this stage although preparations for negotiations with, and 
influential pressures on the Commission take place at a national level.28
23For instance the Transport Studies Group of the Polytechnic of Central London; Euroscope; the Bureau of EC 
Consumers’ Union (BEUC); AEA, or ACE. See Keating, 1993: 379-80.
24lnformation from author's interviews with N. R. Burlough (9 Nov. 1990 and 6 Dec. 1990); E. Seebohm (6 Nov.1990); P. 
Webber (5 Dec. 1990).
25ECAC had assets of a $ 1.4. billion in 1990.
“ information from authors’interviews with S. Barbin (23 Nov. 1990); R. M. Cotterill (31 May 1991); E. Hudson (20 Nov. 
1990); R. P. Holubowicz (15 Nov. 1990); G. Ryde (5 June 1991); K. Veenstra (29 Oct. 1990); S. Yuksel (31 Oct. 1990).
27 Interview 28 Oct. 1990.
“ information from author's interviews with N. R. Burlough (9 Nov. 1990 and 6 Dec. 1990); E. Seebohm (6 Nov. 1990); P. 
Webber (5 Dec. 1990).
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The drafting stage forms an institutionalized pattern of an oral or written 
Commission consultation and a series of pre-arranged and/or ad hoc joint 
advisory committees meetings, the so called "arm's length" Euro-quangos 
(quan ECs).29 The main participants at those meetings are experts from 
member-states, other air-transport institutions, EC airline and trade union 
associations, and consumer organizations, and their purpose is to collect 
information and acquire detailed knowledge to facilitate further analytical 
communication and debate. In parallel there is a continuous flow of 
consultation between the responsible Directorates General, the European 
Parliament (EP) and the Council. The Economic and Social Committee 
(ECOSOC) may, at its discretion, draw up a formal Opinion on the suggested 
proposal. The EP Transport and Tourism Committee appoints a rapporteur, to 
discuss and negotiate the proposal with the Commission, and to propose it to 
the EP plenary session at Strasbourg, sometimes with and sometimes without 
amendments. On the basis of the above consultations the air-transport division 
assesses the feasibility of the proposal in technical and politico-economic 
terms, and revises its drafts, sometimes quite radically.30
It is at this stage that Eurocrats have been charged with unwillingness 
to co-operate with EP politicians (MEPs) because they considered the MEPs 
as their main legislative power adversaries who, moreover, function on strictly 
national and party political/economic criteria, promoting exclusively national 
air-transport interests.31 As K. Tsimas, a Greek MEP has noted
“ Quangos stands for "quasi non-governmental organizations". For a general theoretical description see Lewis, 1990: 67, 
Nugent, 1991:108-11,283-87; Sargent, 1985: 240-42.
“ information from author's interviews with N. Alexopoulos (7 Nov. 1990); R. De Borger (5 Nov. 1990); J. Brown (16 Nov. 
1990); N. R. Burlough (9 Nov. and 6 Dec. 1990); Y. O. Castro (16 Nov. 1990); N. Denton (12 Nov. 1990); L. Van Hasselt 
(8 Nov. 1990); C. Ibarz Del Olmo (31 Oct 1990); A. Van Der Noordt (12 Nov.1990); N. Remmer (9 Nov. 1990); E. 
Seebohm (6 Nov. 1990). M. Stoquart (5 Nov. 1990). Appendix IV.2 is an example of formal communication between the 
commission (Commissioner of DG IV for Competition, Sir Leon Brittan) and the EP ( B. Visser rapporteur on the second 
air-transport package in 1989 and 1990) and Appendix IV.3 presents an example of a questionnaire and three drafting 
versions on the common rules for the slot-allocation proposal at EC airports all through 1990.
31lnformation from author's interviews with the MEPs G. Anastasopoulos (19 Jan. 1989); J. Stamoulis (7 Dec. 1990); K. 
Tsimas (17 Oct. 1990).
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"Eurocrats hate and boycott us because they are afraid of losing legislative
power and that their politico- bureaucratic survival is at stake" (interview 17 Oct.
1990).
It is here that the Eurocratic policy-networks have the greatest 
negotiating strength vis-a-vis the member-countries' air-transport policy- 
networks and issue communities consisting of transport counsellors and 
national experts. At this stage they do not negotiate among themselves very 
much but each of them separately tries to influence chiefly the Commission. 
By contrast, at the Council of Transport Ministers' level, they chiefly negotiate 
among each other to obtain the best result for their member states. However, 
at the drafting stage they prepare a clearly defined strategy for the proposals’ 
air-transport articles which they use all through their negotiations with the 
Commission and the formal consultations among themselves in the Council of 
Ministers.32
Assessing the proposal's importance in terms of their own as well as 
other countries' national interests they take into consideration (i) the politico- 
economic status of the EC country and its air-transport industry; (ii) the 
nationality of the Commissioners responsible for air-transport policy; (iii) the 
competence and personal prestige of their own national air-transport 
experts33; (iv) the other countries' probable arguments and counter-arguments 
to specific articles in order to avoid isolation in their group alliances-making in 
the Council's formal consultation level; and (v) which of the articles of the 
proposal have the greatest importance for them, on which of them they take a 
neutral stand, and which do not interest them at all. In practice the last two 
categories of the articles are used for putting pressure on the other member- 
countries, represent a kind of artificial blackmail, and are used as negotiating 
ammunition in the debates in order to assure themselves a good position for
32 Interview with N. R. Burlough (6 Dec. 1990).
33 In practice air-transport experts were few and well-known worldwide, and usually high-ranking officials, very close to 
their Commissioners as well as to their national Transport Ministers. For a general discussion see Sargent, 1993: 214- 
216.
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defending the articles really important to them. Since each member-states' 
game represents only one-twelfth of the overall argument, two conditions have 
to be satisfied: to find out whether the articles used for bargaining hold the 
same or greater/lesser importance for the other countries, and to persuade the 
others to the very end of the negotiations that these two kinds of article are 
actually very important to one's own country and that relinquishing them 
should result in the others also relinquishing articles in which they are greatly 
interested. In other words, member-states pretend that some air-transport 
articles have greater importance than they do, in order to bargain with them for 
those that really are important to them.34
In particular, because national experts do not permanently represent 
their member state on the Commission and, like transport Ministers, have to 
travel to and from the EC every time the proposal comes up for debate, only 
EC transport counsellors (diplomats) are part of the main lobbying and 
negotiating procedures. A constant exchange with their national government 
of documentation, information and instructions, underlines their role as 
messengers and communication channels between their country's capital and 
Brussels. The more limited their knowledge concerning the air-transport 
proposal, the closer the instructions from their national government; and the 
clearer their country's air-transport strategy, the rarer their government's 
intervention.35 As N. Remmer, Denmark's transport counsellor to the EC 
explained
" I tell Copenhagen what is the climate, and how to best approach specific air­
transport issues according to other member-states' commitments and interests. 
Meanwhile, I always suggest ways of manoeuverings, for example whether we 
should withdraw, be reserved or go ahead" (interview 9 Nov. 1990).
34 Information from author's interviews with S. Barbin (23 Nov. 1990); A. C. Mota (13 Nov. 1990); A. Van Der Noordt (12 
Nov. 1990); N. Remmer (9 Nov. 1990); R. Tsimbiropoulou (24  Jan. 1991).
“ information from author's interviews with R. De Borger (5 Nov. 1990); J. Brown (16 Nov. 1990); Y. O. Castro (16 Nov. 
1990); N. Denton (12 Nov. 1990); C. Ibarz Del Olmo (31 Oct. 1990); A. Van Der Noordt (12 Nov.1990); N. Remmer (9 
Nov. 1990); M. Stoquart(5 Nov. 1990).
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At this stage member-countries do not believe that the Commission 
could draw up a proposal to which all twelve have agreed, no matter how 
protracted the consultations. Nevertheless, their transport counsellors and 
national air-transport experts approach the air-transport Commissioners and 
Eurocrats informally in all kinds of ways: through their respective national 
Commissioners and Eurocrats; by telephone calls to their offices and homes; 
with invitations for dinner or an evening out; as well as indirectly via other 
individuals or nationals who might knew them better. The main purpose of 
these approaches is, of course, to discover the Eurocrats’ intentions on 
specific air-transport issues, and to lobby them to act more in the interests of 
the interlocutor's member-state.36 As R. M. Cotteril, UK head of the Economic 
Policy Division of CAA, frankly acknowledged
"We tried to persuade the Commission to put forward the proposals that we 
wished, in other words closer to the UK's air-transport interests, just as any other 
member- state would attempt to do" (interview 31 May 1991).
In particular, national representatives tell the individual Eurocrat(s) or 
the heads of divisions responsible for drafting the air-transport proposal, about 
their main concerns and suggest alternative solutions. Whether at the 
Commission or at the Council, they always make it quite clear to the 
Eurocrats, the presidency and each other, which articles of the air-transport 
proposal are negotiable and which they will not permit to pass. When they 
were adamantly opposed to some specific points, it has always been because 
it has concerned genuine air-transport problems or interest of their country.37
However, the political game does not permit letting one's country's air­
transport interests be known in advance. National representatives always
“ interviews with F. Sorensen, 12 Nov. 1990); Y. O. Castro (16 Nov. 1990); J. Brown (16 Nov. 1990).
37lnformation from author's interviews with R. De Borger (5 Nov. 1990); J. Brown (16 Nov. 1990); Y. Castro (16 Nov. 
1990); N. Denton (12 Nov. 1990); A. Van Der Noordt (12 Nov. 1990); C. I. Del Olmo (31 Oct. 1990); N. Remmer (9 Nov.
1990); M. Stoquart(5 Nov. 1990).
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avoid giving the Eurocrats any written commitment that would indicate their 
intentions and cramp their manoeuvering for a specific air-transport issue.38 As 
N. Remmer, Denmark's transport counsellor to the EC, admitted
" We do not even trust our own nationals such as F. Sorensen. It is better to
leave things in the air than to be committed beforehand" (interview 9 Nov.
1990).
Most EC member-states tried to co-operate with the Commission 
consensually, whereas other, especially the Netherlands and the UK, were 
more bellicose. Although all countries went along with or opposed the 
Commission's air-transport proposals more or less on the grounds of their 
national air-transport interests, those countries always reacted dynamically to 
the pace of liberalization in the Commission's air-transport proposals, even 
obliging the Commission - after a long period of bargaining, lobbying, and 
pressuring - to change its proposals. The UK especially developed a peculiar 
way of promoting its air-transport interests: it seemed to object on principle, 
and always had a counter-argument to any air-transport proposal, even if 
there was full consensus among the other eleven. In the end it always 
managed to further its own air-transport interests or if it did compromise, it still 
found ways of demonstrating that the UK was the real winner in any 
confrontation.39
When the above discussions and negotiating procedures of the air­
transport proposal have been concluded and agreed to by the Commissioner's 
chief of cabinet, it is sent to the Secretariat General of the Commission, which 
communicates the proposal to all cabinet chiefs of the seventeen 
Commissioners. Once the Commission passes the proposal it goes to the 
plenary session of the Commission, where the responsible Commissioner 
presents it to his colleagues, and all of them together decide on its adoption
“ interview with N. Remmer (9 Nov. 1990).
“ information from author's interviews with G. Radice (26 Oct 1990); N. Remmer (9 Nov. 1990); F. Sorensen (12 Nov.
1990); R. Tsimbiropoulou (24 Jan. 1991).
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and allocate its legislative form (Regulation, Decision, and so forth). Then the 
proposal is forwarded to the Secretariat General of the Council of Ministers - 
General Direction D: Research, Energy, Transport, Environment and 
Consumer protection, division of Air transport and Shipping - and is always 
addressed to the presidency of the Council. In the case of an air-transport 
proposal for Commission law only, approval by the college of Commissioners 
means that the proposal then passes directly to the implementation stage.40
3.2. Formal Consultations by the Council of Ministers
At this level, whichever country holds the presidency of the Council of 
Transport Ministers must make out a case of agreeing with the air-transport 
proposal submitted to it, which most of the time has been drawn up entirely by 
either DG IV (Competition) or DG VII (Transport), but is officially known as the 
presidency's compromise proposal. The purpose of this is to create a 
negotiating environment with the minimum of uncertainty, risks, conflicts, and 
competition, and the maximum possibility of compromises and concessions.41 
The task of achieving this falls chiefly to the Council's transport working group 
which consists of the Eurocrats who had drafted the air-transport proposal, 
national experts, transport counsellors, and the director of air-transport and 
shipping division and principal administrator of air-transport of the Council of 
Ministers' Secretariat, and is chaired by a transport expert of the member-state 
in the presidency, which along with Council Secretariat’s officials, attempts a 
synthesis of the twelve divergent air-transport interests by negotiating each 
article of the proposal. The presidency's formal role is supranational and very 
important to the weaker member-states. This transport working group is the 
only stage where they are able to promote their own air-transport interests,
40 Interviews with N. R. Burlough (9 Nov. 1990 and 6 Dec. 1990); E. Seebohn (6 Nov. 1990).
41 When a presidency is planning its activities may decide to take initiatives on certain subjects or introduce matters it 
considers of special importance and which it prefers not to leave to the Commission to initiate. The final outcome in every 
case is always a blend of national and EC interests. See Nicoll and Salmon, 1994: 76-77.
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because if no compromise can be reached there, the proposal is going 
forward to the Council of Transport Ministers where strong members can 
always do better, given their weightier votes.42 It is here therefore that the 
member-countries’ policy networks have the greatest negotiating strength vis- 
a-vis the eurocratic ones whose job is to defend and forward the air-transport 
proposal adopted by the Commission, and also to amend thorny articles so 
they will meet the objections of the delegations.43
As mentioned already the negotiations are not usually based on any 
firm deal between member countries but employ constant trade-off 
arrangements, using as their main negotiating strategy "log-rolling" or "side 
payments" procedures. Every country's air-transport experts (issue 
communities) endeavour to sacrifice the minimum and profit the maximum 
while negotiating an air-transport legislation as close as possible to its national 
air-transport interests. This is the bottom line of the transport working 
groups.44
In attempting to elaborate their own positions, member-states remain in 
constant contact with their governments and among themselves, in order to 
form alliances with others in the defense of some specific articles. Such 
bargaining and political manipulation - whether in the transport working groups 
or in the Council of Transport Ministers per se - takes place in private or in the 
corridors, and without witnesses, because the formality and collective nature 
of meetings restrains them from expressing openly their views and from 
understanding each other.45
42 In the EC the weight of a member-countrys vote depends on that country's politico-economic status and size. So 
Germany, France, Italy, and UK rate 10 points each for their vote, Spain 8 points, Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands, and 
Portugal 5 points, Denmark and Ireland 3 points, and Luxembourg 2 points. Total of 76 points. A qualified majority is 
made up of 70 per cent or 54 points. Conversely the blocking minority is 23 points. See also Hufbauer, 1990: 53; Lodge, 
1993:16;Nicoll and Salmon, 1994:68; Sbragia, 1991: 82-83.
43lnformation from author's interviews with J. M. De Bastos (8 Nov. 1990); L. Van Hasselt (8 Nov. 1990); J. Parr (4 June
1991); N. Remmer (9 Nov. 1990); E. Seebohm (6 Nov. 1990); M. Stoquart (5 Nov.1990). See also Nugent, 1991: 74-77, 
289-98.
“ On the general application of group negotiating strategies or distorted input politics see Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1989: 
103-06 and Dunleavy, 1991: 39-40.
^Information from author's interviews with J. Brown (16 Nov. 1990); Y. O. Castro (16 Nov. 1990); N. Denton (12 Nov.
1990); A. Van Der Noordt (12 Nov. 1990); N. Remmer (9 Nov. 1990).
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After the working groups exhaust their ability to reach a compromise, 
the presidency sends the proposal to Coreper where political manipulation for 
the greatest possible compromises or concessions prior to the Council of 
Transport Ministers is usually extremely high. If Corepers reach agreement in 
specific air-transport articles or the overall proposal, they forward them/it to the 
Council of Transport Ministers as an "A" point, to be adopted without a debate. 
In case of controversy they either label the air-transport issues still being 
disputed as a "B" point and send them to the Council of Transport Ministers, or 
they refer them back to the transport working groups. However, the Coreper 
role in air-transport has been minimal because of the special technicalities 
involved, and therefore the final decision has always been taken at the Council 
of Transport Ministers.46
At the meetings of the Council of Transport Ministers, all member- 
states attempt to increase their piece of the EC and international aviation pie 
as much as possible. Every country has always one or two air-transport issues 
on which if feels very strongly, and is willing to concede others in return for 
having its demands met. Therefore at this stage group alliances are very 
important for every member-state, big or small, but especially for the latter that 
alone or without the support of other member-countries have no influence if 
they wish to make sure that an air-transport proposal should not be 
accepted.47 Member-states' group alliances themselves approach and are 
approached by others in an attempt to gradually reach a common platform for 
the voting at the Council of Transport Ministers. If small member-states 
promote air-transport issues that are opposed by large and strong ones, the
^Information from author's interviews with M. De Bastos (8 Nov. 1990); N. Remmer (9 Nov. 1990); C. I. Del Olmo (31 
Oct. 1990).
47Greece is an example of an EC member state that most of the time remained isolated, has always been a follower, and 
is a passive party in the Council of Transport Ministers. Greece has constantly disregarded EC air-transport working 
groups and group alliances, a fact which has been interpreted as apathy and lack of concrete plans and positions. As a 
result, Greece has contributed almost nothing to the EC air-transport policy.
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small countries come to a dead end due to their limited voting power.48 As the 
Danish transport counsellor N. Remmer pointed out
" The Council's big boys' are primarily France, UK, Germany and secondarily 
Spain and Italy. They are the member-states that in the end decides on any 
air-transport issue left to be concluded by the Council of Transport Ministers” 
(interview 9 Nov. 1990).
There are, four basic and overlapping groupings at the Council of 
Transport Ministers stage. The first grouping involves the northern or central 
countries of Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands and the UK.49 The second grouping takes in the southern or 
peripheral ones of Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. The third 
grouping consisted of Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the UK which 
believed that fast liberalization and even total deregulation should be the basic 
principle of the common air-transport market. The fourth grouping teams up 
Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, 
which have claimed that, on the contrary, it is liberalization through 
harmonizing the various national air-transport policies and the conditions of 
competition at EC level that is really the principle underlining a common air­
transport policy.50
So during 1989-1990, when the Council of Transport Ministers was 
discussing an air-transport proposal on slot allocation, northern member- 
states, whose aviation operations are for the most part scheduled, created a 
group alliance against those whose operations are chartered. For example in
^Information from author's interviews with R. De Borger (5 Nov. 1990); J. Brown (16 Nov. 1990); D. Cockroft (19 June
1991); A. Corcodilas (18 Jan. 1991); A. Van Der Noordt (12 Nov. 1990); C. I. Del Olmo (31 Oct. 1990); N. Remmer (9 
Nov. 1990); F. Sorensen (12 Nov. 1990); D. Stasinopoulos (28 Oct. 1990); R. Tsimbiropoulou, (24 Jan. 1991); S. B. 
Yuksel, (31 Oct. 1990). See also Vima Greek Journal, 1993: 23.
49Northem and southern are not simply geographical terms, but inextricably bound with the huge regional problems 
derived from historical, political as well as social causes in the whole of Europe since the Industrial Revolution.
50The countries in group 4 were reluctant to accept liberalization without a "safety net", meaning that at least the national 
airlines should have a minimum share of the EC air-transport market. If an air-carrier went below that minimum, the EC 
should have an "air transport crisis mechanism” or a regulatory "safeguard clause". Therefore they wanted a longer 
transition period than the ardent supporters of EC air-transport liberalization, arguing that both the above requests 
ultimately undermined the liberalization policy of the EC air-transport market. Information from author's interviews with M. 
A. Ambrose (30 May 1991); J. Brown (16 Nov. 1990); Y. O. Castro (12 Nov. 1990); C. I. Del Olmo (31 Oct. 1990); A. Van 
Der Noordt (12 Nov. 1990); N. Remmer (9 Nov. 1990). See also Financial Times of 8 Dec. 1992: 2, of 24 June 1992:18, 
of 23 June 1992:1, and of 27 Mar. 1992: 2.
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Spain, 80 per cent of aviation operations are non-scheduled, while in Germany 
80 per cent are scheduled. By contrast when member-states debated EC air­
transport competition proposals, it was the two groupings for and against 
liberalization that were the adversaries. For example the Irish Presidency (1 
Jan. - 30 June 90), which was keen on fast liberalization, had full co-operation 
with those whose national and EC air-transport interests converged, and none 
at all with the rest. The opposite happened during the Italian Presidency (1 
July - 31 Dec. 90), which wanted to delay the liberalization of the EC air­
transport policy.51
With respect to individual member-states, Ireland - a peripheral and 
northern country - had conflicting air-transport interests with other northern as 
well as with other peripheral states. Denmark was much allied with Germany52 
as well as with Ireland and the Netherlands, (which had strong ties with the 
UK, Ireland, and frequently with France). Moreover, some member-state 
alliances were strongly supported by France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain, all of them Mediterranean countries with points in common regarding 
their air-transport. One of the best-known allied grouping with strong geo­
political (northern or central) and cultural ties is that of the three Benelux 
countries (Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg), whose strong and 
stable alliance has been a stable collective entity in EC air-transport decision­
making. Although small and with few votes in the Council of Transport 
Ministers, they were always heard precisely because they did not stand alone 
but each had the backing of the others in support of its air-transport interests. 
The Benelux grouping was a good alliance to join for any other small or large 
member-state in isolation or with convergent air-transport interests, and in fact
51 Information from author's interviews with R. De Borger (5 Nov. 1990); J. Brown (16 Nov. 1990); D. Cockroft (19 June
1991); A. Corcodilas (18 Jan. 1991); C. I. Del Olmo (31 Oct. 1990); N. Remmer (9 Nov. 1990); F. Sorensen (12 Nov.
1990); D. Stasinopoulos (28 Oct. 1990); R. Tsimbiropoulou, (24 Jan. 1991). A. Van Der Noordt (12 Nov. 1990); S. B. 
Yuksel, (31 Oct. 1990).
S2Denmark considered Germany to be its most reliable partner, and France the least reliable.
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formed the base for "blocking minorities or majorities" in the Council of 
Transport Ministers.53
There are other regular, if less well-accepted alliances. So for instance 
there have been many accusations by the majority of small member-states 
against the "troika" - politico-economically strongest countries of France, 
Germany and the UK - and against the alliance in favour of fast liberalization, 
consisting of Ireland, the Netherlands and the UK. The three "troika” countries 
were accused of blatantly intervening in EC air-transport decision-making to 
boost their own interests against the collective EC ones. They have very large 
air-transport industries, and so major air-transport interests in the EC. They 
therefore created their own dynamo of lobbying to influence what in the end 
was regarded not as the air-transport legislation of the EC, but as that of the 
EC troika. The fast-liberalization group, on the other hand, was charged of 
attempting to shape the EC air-transport policy and market according to the 
US industry deregulation standards. They believed that their respective airlines 
were already strong enough to survive against a competitive EC and 
international air transport, and they were unwilling to let the other member- 
states stabilize their national air-transports and to create mechanisms to 
protect their weaker and smaller airlines. Since their vital national air-transport 
interests happened to be vital to the Commission as well, they were able to 
occupy a strong negotiation position. Every time the Commission prepared 
proposals for liberalization they were right there to accelerate their adoption in 
the Council of Transport Ministers.54
However academics and interviewees have argued that, in particular, 
the UK enthusiasm for liberalization of the EC air transport market was largely
"information from author's interviews with R. De Borger (5 Nov. 1990); J. Brown (16 Nov. 1990); D. Cockroft (19 June
1991); A. Corcodilas (18 Jan. 1991); C. I. Del Olmo (31 Oct. 1990); N. Remmer (9 Nov. 1990); F. Sorensen (12 Nov. 
1990); D. Stasinopoulos (28 Oct. 1990); R. Tsimbiropoulou, (24 Jan. 1991). A. Van Der Noordt (12 Nov. 1990); S. B. 
Yuksel, (31 Oct. 1990).
^Information from author's interviews with N. Remmer (9 Nov. 1990); G. Ryde (5 June 1991); D. Stasinopoulos (28 Oct. 
1990); R. Tsimbiropoulou (24 Jan. 1991).
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due to its traditional mercantilist objectives. Aiming to gain maximum 
advantage for its national airline BA, the UK declared itself ready to implement 
competition within the EC air-transport market, but its real objective seems to 
have been, however, to usurp it, by means of unfair competition. Ireland and 
the Netherlands on the other hand, as small member-states with strong 
outgoing air-transport markets and small incoming ones, were in quite an 
advantageous position: they had much to gain and nothing to lose from a fast 
liberalized and competitive EC air-transport market. In reality they, as well as 
the UK, were posing competitive threats not only to the EC but to the US 
air-transport market as well. Ireland especially had a considerable interest in 
the EC air-transport industry, because for it aviation was a means to advance 
its national trade and not solely its national air-transport industry. It needed a 
low cost and therefore competitive EC air-transport market, given that it had to 
transport practically everything by air.55
As a result of the above EC member-countries' group alliances, tactics, 
maneuverings and accusations, most of the time nobody knew until the very 
last minute what the outcome of any particular air-transport debate might be, 
but there was much speculation, creating a climate of uncertainty and 
unpredictability in the Council of Transport Ministers. In such circumstances 
any member-state could suddenly change its position and isolate its allies on a 
particular issue or article.56 For example, in the June 1990 Council of 
Transport Ministers, Spain successfully seceded from its alliance with the UK57
55 Information from author's interviews with M. A. Ambrose (30 May 1991); J. Brown (16 Nov. 1990); Y. O. Castro (12 
Nov.1990); A. Corcodilas (18 Jan. 1991); T. Middleton (13 June 1991); A. Van Der Noordt (12 Nov. 1990); C. I. Del Olmo 
(31 Oct. 1990); N. Remmer (9 Nov. 1990); G. Ryde (5 June 1991); F. Sorensen (12 Nov. 1990); D. Stasinopoulos (28 
Oct. 1990); R. Tsimbiropoulou (24 Jan. 1991); S. B. Yuksel (31 Oct. 1990). See also McGowan and Trengove, 1986: 
148; Pelkmans, 1986: 367.
“ For a general discussion on politics of uncertainty see Mazey and Richardson 1993:17.
57Spain had vetoed the first air-transport package in July 1987 because of the inclusion of the Gibraltar airport in the list of 
regional airports covered by it and became involved in a row with UK over the national status of Gibraltar's airport in the 
EC air-transport market After long negotiations between the Commission and government ministers they finally reached 
an unanimous conclusion on the first package at the end of 1987 with an agreement between Spain and Brittain over 
Gibraltar airport. The final compromise agreed between the two member-states was to exclude Gibraltar from the first air­
transport package agreement. See Financial Times. 2 July 1987: 3; ITF News. Jan. 1988: 9.
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and Germany, thereby isolating those two countries, and eventually achieved 
that a specific air-transport issue on slot-allocation went through.58 Its adoption 
was purely a matter of high diplomacy and last-minute manoeuvering by 
Spain. During the intermissions of that Council session all national 
representatives were huddling in corners, feverishly trying to find out what 
exactly was happening. Like much else of the legislation passed by meetings 
of the Council of Transport Ministers, air-transport legislation on a specific slot 
allocation issue was passed thanks to sheer exhaustion at two o' clock in the 
morning. By then nobody cared much about anything except to finish and go 
home. This is reason a lot of air-transport compromises have come very late. 
Even when the air-transport issues were very important but the negotiators 
were tired they sometimes all gave up and agreed to an issue over which they 
had dug their heels in earlier. Another instance of the instability of alliances 
occurred at the December 1990 meeting of the Council of Transport Ministers. 
Although Denmark and France had agreed to support each other whatever 
direction the negotiations might take, at the last minute France reneged and 
left Denmark exposed and isolated. The reason was that France already had 
another air-transport issue in mind, and pulled away from Denmark before it 
was too late, realizing that it could promote its national air-transport interests 
better without that country.59
In view of the above it may appear surprising, but is nevertheless true, 
that with respect to air-transport the EC member-states have always adopted
"in  feet the thorniest issue for Spain was that the shortage of slots at airports such as London Heathrow and Frankfurt 
was hindering the development of new services by its national airline Iberia. Therefore it insisted on the right of member- 
states to slow down the disbandment of capacity-sharing agreements if charter traffic was unduly hindering the ability of 
their scheduled airlines to compete. See Financial Times. 20 June 1990: 2.
"in fact Denmark had air-transport problems with the EC as a whole, because it had to negotiate a mandate taken from 
Sweden and Norway (its air-transport partners in the jointly-owned Scandinavian airline SAS), which required that all 
three had equal rights in EC air transport. In other words, with Denmark, their gateway to the EC air-transport, they 
attempted to become EC member-states as far as aviation was concerned. After protracted negotiations in 1992 an 
agreement was signed between the EC and the Kingdoms of Norway and Sweden on civil aviation (A 0718 (01) OJ L 200 
18 July 1992 p. 20-21). Information from author's interviews with J. Brown (16 Nov. 1990); N. Denton (12 Nov. 1990); C. 
I. Del Olmo (31 Oct. 1990); A. D. Lothe (13 Nov. 1990); A. Van Der Noordt (12 Nov. 1990); N. Remmer (9 Nov. 1990); B. 
Stahle (4 Dec. 1990); R. Tsimbiropoulou (24 Jan. 1991). See also Financial Times. 8 Oct. 1991: 2; Official Journal of the 
EC. 18 July 1992: 20-21.
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proposals unanimously. This is explained by the fact that votes cast today can 
be bargained for future air-transport issues that may be more important. If on 
occasion two or more member-states felt strongly opposed to a particular 
issue, the Council of Transport Ministers would always try to formulate 
alternative suggestions or rephrase the offending passage, and so smooth 
over the anxieties and move towards a consensus-based arrangement that 
actually relied on political bargaining. So if, for example, one country wanted a 
deadline for an air-transport issue to be implemented in the national air­
transport markets, and another/others did not the Transport Ministers' Council 
might suggest changing the words "must be met" in the text of the decision to 
"the best efforts will be made to meet this date". This ironed out the difficulty 
and both sides were satisfied.60 According to J. Parr, Director General of 
ATUC and ex-director of the air-transport and shipping division of the Council 
secretariat
" No one wanted to leave a member state in disagreement today, because no one
wanted to be in such a situation tomorrow" (interview 4 June 1991).
One is left with some important questions: has the Council of Transport 
Ministers ever collectively accepted as rational81 an individual member-state's 
air-transport proposal? and have individual member-states pursued their own 
national air-transport interests as though they were rational, knowing them to 
be collectively irrational? Since each individual member-state has always 
considered as rational the implementation of their own national air-transport 
interests in the EC air-transport decision-making only, even their rational 
arguments in this respect could hardly convince the Council of Transport
“ interviews with A. Van Der Noordt (12 Nov. 1990); N. Remmer (9 Nov. 1990); R. Tsimbiropoulou (24 Jan. 1991).
61 Rational decision-making (Rational model) implies objective procedures for identifying problems, setting goals, 
evaluating all possible alternatives, and adopting the best for the common interest. In EC air-transport decision-making it 
was rather political interests (Political Interests model) and the organizational procedures (Organizational Process model) 
that ruled the process: the interaction of competing interests, the variable power exerted by these interests, how the rules 
and understandings shaped the nature of the decisions and the bargaining and self-interested compromises (frequently 
reached through a lowest common denominator approach), underlay the decisional outcome. See Nugent, 1989: 253- 
254.
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Ministers collectively of their rationally being in favour of the EC air-transport 
market in general. As A. Van Der Noordt, Transport Counsellor of the 
Netherlands to the EC told the author
" If an air-transport issue was rational for a member state because it promoted its 
national air-transport interests, it was irrational for the Council's collectively per 
se. So what was rational for us was irrational for the others and vice versa" 
(interview 12 Nov. 1990).
In other words given the rule that the only rational air-transport 
argument for each individual member-country is to impose, by one means or 
another, its national air-transport interests on the others in the Council of 
Transport Ministers it does not matter whether its argument is rational or not; 
the other countries consider the proposal a priori as irrational. As a result, in 
the long run this attitude has advanced only the strong member-states (the 
troika's) national air-transport interests within the EC.
4. Conclusion
During the period 1987-1993, EC Commissioners, Eurocrats and 
member-states played what should have been mutually supportive roles in 
policy and decision-making. Based on exerting continual influence on the 
decision-making apparatus, the process functioned in such a way that the 
performance of every role depended upon the complementary performance of 
all others. In practice, Commissioners and Eurocrats initiated huge and 
obvious conflicts either by promoting their own country's air-transport interests 
instead of the common EC ones, or by endeavoring to increase their political 
power and personal prestige in EC air-transport policy-making. The EC 
member-states on the other hand, which gave priority to their national air­
transport interests, as the chief actors in the negotiating, bargaining, and
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decision-making, were obliged to find a common denominator for their 
divergent interests through reliable coalitions, political-economic compromises 
and pay-offs, tactical maneuverings, and procrastination.
In the end, although the EC adjusted its air-transport liberalization 
policy to fit the conflicting reality of the strong member-countries (the troika of 
France, Germany and the UK) divergent air-transport interests, as well as of 
the rest member-countries following them, it did not finally reach a joint EC air­
transport policy, since its deliberations were not those of rational decision­
making. There was a perversion and/or distortion of the EC air-transport policy 
and decision-making process that obviated any prospect for an EC air­
transport policy common to all member-states. The four cases of chapter V will 
substantiate the above.
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CHAPTER V 
FOUR CASES: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
" Commissioners shall neither seek nor take instructions from any government or 
from any other body....Each member-state undertakes ....not to seek to influence 
the members of the Commission in the performance of their tasks”.1
The four cases which follow are presented to put to the proof the 
assumption that air-transport policy making by the EC Commission is supra­
national. Some examples have already been given in the preceding two 
chapters of the Commissioners’ and Eurocrats’ attitudes and actions and their 
interacting roles and the political manipulations they engaged in, to 
accommodate their personal and national air-transport interests. However, I 
have not systematically examined all the participants, or the specific situation 
and conditions in which they occurred.
Whilst admittedly cases as such confirm nothing, the four that are given 
below are absolutely typical and representative of the situation in the EC air­
transport sector, and therefore can be used to disprove at any rate the 
assumption that the Commission played a supra-national role. This 
assessment is further substantiated by the fact that two Commissioners and 
two Eurocrats concerned were the main actors in EC air-transport legislation. 
Now defining the criteria for selecting EC cases is like walking headlong into a 
layer of a quicksand. A promising individual case may prove unsuitable from 
the EC point of view or from the perspective of individual member-states and 
specific Commissioners and Eurocrats; or the nature of the air-transport policy 
issue may be too specialized as an illustration of EC policy-making generally, 
and more of a research project in air transport itself. On the other hand, if a 
particular aspect of a case is quite clear-cut in political terms, does this not 
indicate some element of typicality of the case as a whole?
1 The conditions governing the appointment of EC Commissioners. Vincent, 1987: 14.
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A main point of consideration concerns the question of the similarity of 
a set of cases. This is apposite here, given that in all four cases a bias 
emerged favouring the relevant countries' national air-transport against the 
joint EC air-transport interests. In defense of my case selection I will say that 
the two cases concerned with the Commissioners' air-transport politics are 
wholly relevant and related to the issue raised earlier, concerning how 
particularistic national air-transport interests may appear far more vital to the 
member-country than common EC ones. Why otherwise would the 
protagonists of EC air-transport liberalization and fighters for the 
supra-national role of the Commission - people like P. Sutherland and Sir 
Leon Brittan, Commissioners of DG IV (Competition); Lord Stanley Clinton 
Davis and Karel Van Miert, Commissioners of DG VII (Transport); and 
Jacques Delors as president of the Commission - in practice obstruct the 
process of liberalization of the EC air-transport market becoming a common 
EC air-transport policy, and betray the supra-nationality of the Commission?
The two cases of Eurocrats show contrasting roles, yet both of which 
again totally related to national air-transport interests. The important point is 
the paradox of the denouement. One Eurocrat F. Sorensen, head of the 
air-transport division of DG VII for Transport), who was engaged in power 
politics and domestic air-transport priorities, was not so badly hurt when his 
activities were seen too blatantly to contradict his supposedly supra-national 
role. The other Eurocrat (N. Argyris head of the transport and tourist industries 
of DG IV for Competition), while serving the common EC air-transport interests 
for liberalization, was caught between his subordinate's power politics and his 
super ordinates’ national air-transport interests and was replaced from his 
post. This is a case where a supra-national actor lost his position because his 
colleagues behaved unscrupulously.
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Finally, it should be noted that elements from actual case studies are 
indispensable to research on policy-making in order to put across its dynamic 
nature and evolution -in this instance of EC air-transport politics. None of the 
static models usually employed have captured the flavour of the EC political 
environment. While keeping in mind the caution concerning typicality and the 
representatives of these four instances for the EC as a whole, each case will 
now be examined in brief. I regret I can not give the more detailed account I 
had planned, but I was considerably restricted in access to key sources. While 
certain facts could be gleaned from the press and, of course, from interviews, 
my interviewees were rather reluctant to say very much on these highly 
controversial matters.
1. F. Sorensen
In 1987, Denmark's F. Sorensen, head of air-transport division of DG 
VII, had already served 10 years in it. This meant that in the period 1987-1990, 
when the main EC air-transport legislation was promulgated, he was the most 
powerful Eurocrat involved and eventually the chief EC air-transport legislator. 
While keeping a low profile, F. Sorensen was undoubtedly an independent EC 
air-transport policy-maker and he enjoyed high esteem and respect from all 
air-transport policy communities in the EC, as well as from worldwide air­
transport networks.2 As J. Brown and Y. Castro transport counsellors of 
Ireland and Portugal respectively agreed
" When F. Sorensen was not present at the meetings no one knew what to do" 
(interviews 16 Nov. 1990).
His status was such that most of the time he had a completely free 
hand vis-a-vis his Commissioners, their cabinets, the director general and the
information from author’s interviews with J. Brown (16 Nov. 1990); Y. Castro (16 Nov. 1990); R. P. Holubowicz (15 Nov. 
1990); T. Middleton (13 June 1991); J. Parr (4 June 1991); R. Tsimbiropoulou (24 Jan. 1991); L. Van Hasselt (8 Nov.
1990); S. Yuksel (31 Dec. 1990).
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director.3 As R. P. Holubowicz director general of the Association of 
Independent Airlines in the EC (ACE) commented
" Sorensen was a valuable assistant for the Commissioner. This power derived to 
a large extent from his air-transport expertise, but equaled the Commissioners’ 
political power" (interview with the 15 Nov. 1990).
On the debit side F. Sorensen has been charged at one time or another 
by most EC air-transport communities with having amassed his power in air­
transport by (i) his personal interest in monopolizing the EC air-transport policy 
making process and succeeding in drawing much political support in the EC 
and worldwide; (ii) of serving the strong member-states and their airlines' air­
transport interests; and (iii) of manipulating the EC air-transport market for 
solving the problems of his national airline SAS. As a result there was much 
silent hostility from his subordinates, super ordinates, and the representatives 
of other member-states.4
Some of his colleagues below him in the EC hierarchy alleged that his 
enormous influence in EC air-transport policy-making was due to his having a 
monopoly of access to information, which he then selectively withheld from 
both his super ordinates and subordinates. They said he was reluctant to 
delegate power and kept important papers and special cases for himself. If he 
eschewed as far as possible the intervention of his colleagues in the air­
transport division, it was because he was to a large extent protecting himself 
and his strong position from them. Nevertheless on the other hand, by 
concentrating as much power as possible in his own hands, he had become 
so extremely busy that he was obliged to delegate part of his work to his 
colleagues in the air-transport division, who therefore found the opportunity to 
use their power to partly control and influence specific air-transport proposals
interviews with L. Van Hasselt (8 Nov. 1990); R. P. Holubowicz (15 Nov. 1990).
Confidential information given to the author in various interviews with EC officials and member-states representatives 
wishing to remain anonymous.
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such as the slot-allocation one. Finally they alleged that, by handling ail the 
US-EC air-transport negotiations himself, he had laid himself open to easy 
manipulation by different air-transport interests, and that this had made him 
the pawn of his colleagues.5
My interviews with his colleagues of all levels revealed further 
contradictory views on him. While F. Sorensen in fact had strongly supported 
his subordinates' air-transport competences and expert roles in his division, 
most of them overtly or covertly disregarded his authority in air transport.6 His 
French director D. Vincent, on the other hand, expressed the highest respect 
for him and his very considerable competence in air-transport matters, may be 
because he was totally depended on him as concerning the air-transport policy 
in Directorate C of DG VII (Transport).7
As mentioned in ch. IV, F. Sorensen had intra-DG VII problems with his 
socialist Belgian Commissioner Karel Van Miert and his Spanish director 
general E. Pena Abizanda, because he wanted to proceed with the 
liberalization of the EC air-transport market faster than they wished, and 
without special regard for their respective national air-transport interests. He 
felt frustrated because these two men's attitudes and motivation in the matter 
ran directly counter his own air-transport philosophy. Highly skilled in political 
manipulation and manoeuvering, and in order to assure himself of the 
necessary backing for his attempts to use his position to satisfy Denmark's 
national interests, he was able to selectively deal with and eventually serve the 
"troika" (France, Germany, the UK) and their airlines in matters such as AF, 
BA, LH take-overs, alliances and mergers.8 As C. I. Del Olmo, Spain's 
Counsellor of Transport in the EC expressed it
Confidential information given to the author in various interviews with colleagues of his division who wished to remain 
anonymous.
6The author reached this conclusion from various interviews he had with EC officials who wished to remain anonymous.
7 Interview with D. Vincent (6 Dec. 1990).
Confidential information given to the author in various interviews with EC officials and member-states representatives 
who wished to remain anonymous.
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" The dossier of SAS, Denmark’s national airline, was Sorensen's main priority" 
(interview 31 Oct. 1990).
This was no secret, the interest-representatives of the SAS contended. 
As the SAS representative in the EC, Denmark had very specific air-transport 
problems and, as might be expected, tried to use its national F. Sorensen to 
influence EC air-transport policy on behalf of its SAS partner-countries and its 
own national air-transport interests. They alleged that other EC member-states 
did likewise with their nationals, an example being Spain with E. Pena 
Abizanda, director general of DG VII (Transport), who was F. Sorensen's 
superordinate, who came into conflict with F. Sorensen because he himself 
was trying to serve Spain’s national air-transport interests.9 As N. Remmer, 
Danish transport counsellor to the EC explicitly stated
" In March 1990 I went to C. Chene, transport adviser of Commissioner Karel Van 
Miert, and explained to him that in order to solve Denmark's air-transport 
interests, Copenhagen and I should stay in close contact and co-operate with 
Sorensen" (interview 9 Nov. 1990).
In January 1991, as a result of all the above allegations against F. 
Sorensen, Commissioner Karel Van Miert and director general E. Pena 
Abizanda of DG VII (Transport) decided to relieve him of the full extend of his 
air-transport responsibilities by decentralizing his sphere of authority in EC air­
transport policy-making: Directorate C on Air-transport was split into four 
divisions instead of three, with Sorensen continuing as head of air-transport 
division with slightly reduced power.10
However, even though F. Sorensen had discriminated in favour of 
Denmark's particularistic national and EC air-transport interests, his ability to
information from author's interviews with A. D. Lothe (13 Nov. 1990); N. Remmer (9 Nov. 1990); B. Stahle (4 Dec. 1990). 
^Information from author’s interviews with E. Paganeili (7 Nov. 1990); J. Parr (4 June 1991); D. Stasinopoulos (28 Oct.
1990). To my knowledge the real reasons behind the change were not mentioned in the press
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be the center of power politics with the "troika" interests and his expertise in 
air transport kept him in another powerful post in the EC air-transport division. 
This was why, despite the usual flexibility in the appointment and deployment 
of Eurocratic posts, F. Sorensen, who by the end of 1990 had already served 
for thirteen years in the EC air-transport division, continued to do so and does 
so still. This is particularly interesting in contrast to the Argyris case below.
2. N. Argyris
N. Argyris' case was totally different from that of Sorensen. As 
mentioned in ch. II, in 1989 the British national N. Argyris replaced the 
German H. Kreis as head of the transport and tourist industries division when 
Sir Leon Brittan became Commissioner of DG IV (Competition). To my 
knowledge it was his nationality and his neo-liberal beliefs that were the two 
determinant factors in his appointment. He was neither an expert in air 
transport nor a lawyer, however (two crucial qualifications in this division), and 
therefore was a priori outside EC air-transport power politics.
As a result, he fell foul of politics of his Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan, 
Irish Director J. Temple Lang, and his Dutch subordinate B. Van Houtte, all of 
whom wanted to promote their national air-transport interests, and were in 
favour of the speedy and extensive liberalization of the EC air-transport 
market. In other words he had acted in accordance with EC rules, while his 
superiors wished to proceed particularistically in favour of their national air­
transport interests. Moreover, as discussed in ch. IV, N. Argyris was accused 
by his superiors of having conciliated more of the DG VII politic-economic 
directions than the latter wished.11
More specifically N. Argyris, who was in the center of the political 
manipulations of the Commissioners, disagreed with and in due course
11 Interview with L. Van Hasselt (8 Nov. 1990).
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clashed with his own DG IV Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan, because he was 
against the latter’s non-competitive practices in EC airline industry alliances, 
mergers, and buy-outs, (particularly those between strong member-states’ 
airlines such as AF, BA, and LH, which are further discussed below). This 
attitude earned him the displeasure of France and Germany as well, aside 
from the UK’s. He was caught in the middle. On the one side were the 
Commissioner, his own Irish director general, and his Dutch subordinate, all 
interested in pushing for fast and extensive liberalization. On the other was the 
DG VII for transport which was chiefly interested in arriving at a common policy 
for more gradual liberalization through steady negotiation. Argyris’ main 
objective was to achieve a compromise between these two sides, DG IV 
(competition) and DG VII (transport), specifically as concerning a more 
restrained pace of liberalization.12
In consequence, both his Irish Director and his subordinate B. Van 
Houtte, interfered almost daily in the EC air-transport competition policy. In 
fact N. Argyris was stopped from time to time by his director from what he was 
doing, while some other times he felt that his actions did not have his director's 
backing. B. Van Houtte on the other hand, who as the main air-transport 
policy-maker of DG IV (Competition) had been in charge of both air-transport 
competition legislation packages adopted by the Council of Transport 
Ministers, during my interview with him did not in any way acknowledge the 
existence let alone the role of N. Argyris in any EC air-transport competition 
policy-making process (though Argyris was the main negotiator for legislation 
on competition). Gradually therefore N. Argyris was losing ground and had 
less and less authority in the air-transport policy-making of DG IV, and not a 
day passed without power struggles and strong disagreements between the 
three men over EC air-transport competition policy. In the end N. Argyris, 
endeavouring to apply the Commission rules but also to adapt them slowly to
12 Interview with L. Van Hasselt (8 Nov. 1990).
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the EC air-transport market by reconciling them with DG VII proposals, was 
made the scapegoat for his Commissioner's, director's, and subordinate's 
unscrupulous pursuit of their air-transport interest. At the beginning of 1991 his 
position was taken over de facto by the German H. Kreis (whom he had 
himself succeeded originally in 1989), but even in 1992 Kreis name did not 
appear on the official personnel list as head of the division, merely as deputy 
head.13
3. Commissioners Serving UK interests
As mentioned in ch. II, in 1987-1988, the UK effectively had two 
Commissioners to look after its national air-transport interests. One was the 
UK’s own Lord Stanley Clinton Davis of the opposition Labour Party, who was 
head of DG VII (Transport). The other was Irish Commissioner Peter 
Sutherland of DG IV (Competition). Sutherland was a neo-liberal who saw 
competition as essential for serving the best interests of Ireland which 
depended largely on transporting exports/imports by air. Since this ideology 
happened to agree with Britain’s, Sutherland was willing to support the 
conservative new point of the UK in certain matters, if this indirectly helped his 
own country.14
The important purchase in December 1987 by the UK's privately-owned 
airline British Airways (BA) of the country's second largest airline British 
Caledonian (BCal) was both the starting point of controversial mergers in EC 
air-transport, and an illustration of the UK's air-transport strategy in the 
domestic, EC, and global air-transport markets.15
13 All the information on the Argyris case stems from my interview with L. Van Hasselt (8 Nov. 1990). To my knowledge 
there were no press reports on the case. I was also unable to get other people to confirm or deny the facts as here set 
out. Argyris himself, after first refusing for two months to see me at all, in the end was extremely guarded in his 
comments. During our long intervieew (approximately 1 h. 45') he never mentioned anything about his situation although 
he was well aware of his near future replacement.
1 financial Times. 20 June 1990: 2; Gialloreto, 1989: 9-10; Golich, 1990:166; Whitaker, 1989: 31.
1sDailv Telegraph of 23 Oct. 1992: 24, and 2 Oct. 1992: 24-25; Marshall, 1988:19; McCowan, 1987: 58-63; Tritton, 1989: 
160-62; Woolley, July 1988:13-14.
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As reported by G. William (1987: 7-19), BCaPs creator Sir Adam 
Thomson clarified in his autobiography High Risk, that it was the British 
conservative government that forced the BCal merger with BA at a higher 
price than BA would have liked, and Irish DG IV Commissioner P. Sutherland 
accepted that merger in the absence of any regulations to the contrary, and 
despite the fact that this merger did not serve Ireland’s best interest. In 
particular it was both the UK's Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) 
and the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) that actually controlled, planned and 
imposed the proposal for the BA-BCal merger on the Commission on which 
Sutherland was then serving. The latter, in an attempt to conceal the limited 
extent of its powers,16 through Sutherland investigated the merger on British 
Midland's complaint, but did not actually issue a ruling. On the contrary, the 
Commissioner approved the BA-BCAI merger the selfsame year it had refused 
it to SAS, justifying its decision by saying that BCal had to stay in British 
hands. In fact P. Sutherland pretended he was very concerned about the 
effects the merger would have on EC air-transport competition but at the same 
time he declared that it was not anti-competitive on grounds of size. This 
caused considerable controversy within the Commission and the EC air­
transport sector, the upshot of which was that in March 1988, Sutherland’s DG 
IV (Competition) announced that as a condition for accepting the takeover, BA 
had to allow other airlines fair access to the UK air-transport market. These 
fair access conditions were actually no different from those already in force in 
the form of domestic concessions between the UK government and BA's 
management (which, it is worth noting, represents entrenched private air­
transport interests as well as the UK's national ones).17
16The first package, giving powers to the DG IV for Competition, was not yet in effect
17Balfbur, 1990: 31; Brummer, June 1990: 26; Financial Times, of 24 July 1987: 2, of 23 Dec. 1987: 1, and of 23 July 
1987; ITF News. Jan. 1988: 10; Kasper, 1988: 41; Pilling, March 1991: 12; Sochor, 1991: 203; Tritton, 1989: 160-62; 
Vima. Greek Newspaper, 1992: 61; Woolley, July 1988:14. See also MMC: BA and BCal: Report on the proposed merger 
(1988) and House of Commons Transport Committee, 1990: 7.
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From 1989 to 1992 the UK government had its neo-liberal political 
appointee, Sir Leon Brittan as Commissioner of DG IV (Competition), whose 
major tasks were: (i) to further secure the UK's national air-transport interests; 
(ii) to guarantee BA a superficial competition scrutiny in the EC air-transport 
market; (iii) to promote New-Right politico-economic practices in the EC air­
transport competition policy; and (iv) to balance the powers and restrictive 
influences of the socialist French Commission President Jacques Delors and 
the socialist Belgian Commissioner of DG VII (Transport) Karel Van Miert.18
After Sir Leon Brittan took office and all through the period 1989-1992, 
under his and the UK government's blessings BA, by means of non­
competitive practices, ousted most of the domestic independent and charter 
airlines from the UK air-transport market.19 The Commission's acceptance that 
these BA acts were not incompatible with the EC air-transport competition 
policy, caused anxiety and confusion in the EC air-transport industry, and 
accusations against Sir Leon Brittan for back-stage manoeuvering of political 
manipulation jointly with President Jacques Delors and Commissioner Karel 
Van Miert of DG VII (Transport) were a frequent phenomenon in EC air­
transport policy communities and the press.20 As R. P. Holubowicz, director- 
general of the Association of Independent Airlines in the EC (ACE), stated
" Sir Leon Brittan started as a tough fighter for air- transport competition but he 
gave up as soon as BA's interests were accommodated within the EC" 
(interview 15 Nov. 1990).
4. Commissioners Serving French Interests
In the same period (1987-1993) the interest of France and its airline AF 
national and their anti-competitive and restrictive practices had the support of
18lnformation from author's interviews with J. Brown (16 Nov. 1990); Y. Castro (16 Nov. 1990); D. Cockroft (19 June
1991); J. M. De Bastos (8 Nov. 1990); R. P. Holubowicz 15 Nov. 1990); J.P. Meheust and D. Jullien (23 Nov. 1990); C. 
Ibarz del Olmo (31 Oct. 1990); J. Parr (4 June 1991); M. Pisters (12 Nov. 1990); E. Paganelli (7 Nov. 1990); G. Ryde (5 
June 1991); F. Sorensen (12 Nov. 1990); D. Stasinopoulos (28 Oct.1990); D. Vincent (6 Dec. 1990).
19AII BA's domestic anti-competitive practices will be discussed in detail in ch. VI.
^ ITF News. March 1992: 11; Lewis, May 1990: 38-56; Vima. Greek newspaper, 8 March 1992: 22; Woolley, July 1988: 
14.
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the socialist French Commission President Jacques Delors,21 and after 1989 
that of Commissioner Karel Van Miert of DG VII (Transport), also a socialist. 
They were both involved in attempts to satisfy their own national and their 
airlines’ interests. Van Miert in particular was a close collaborator of President 
Delors, given that they had similar political ties and identical air-transport 
interests.22
In fact, after the BA-BCal merger, under their blessings, AF imitated 
BA's domestic air-transport strategy and purchased both its domestic rivals: 
the privately-owned airline Union des Transposes Aeriennes (UTA), and the 
partially-private airline Air Inter. As in the BA and Sir Leon Brittan case, the 
Commission’s finding that AF's actions were acceptable in the framework of 
the EC air-transport competition policy, sowed apprehension and doubt in the 
EC air-transport policy communities and the press. Jacques Delors and Karel 
Van Miert were charged with unfair discrimination, of entrenching AF's and 
national air-transport interests, and with horse trading and political bartering 
with Sir Leon Brittan who as head of DG IV (Competition) was responsible for 
the mergers.23 As R. M. Cotterill, head of economic policy division of UK/CAA 
underlined
" If one knows the nationality of influence [Delors] in the Commission, one can
draw one’s own conclusions about the AF case" (interview 31 May 1991).
In the section that follows, the two above cases are combined to 
illustrate in detail these political bartering, power struggles, and national air­
transport machinations engaged in by the three Commissioners serving their 
own national and domestic airline's air-transport interests in the Commission.
21 AF chairman Bernard Attains brother Jacques was a close adviser of the French President F. Mitterand, who had a very 
close collaboration with the Commission President Jacques Delors.
“ information from author's interviews with J. Brown (16 Nov. 1990); Y. Castro (16 Nov. 1990); D. Cockroft (19 June
1991); J. M. De Bastos (8 Nov. 1990); R. P. Holubowicz 15 Nov. 1990); J.P. Meheust and D. Jullien (23 Nov. 1990); C. 
Ibarz del Olmo (31 Oct. 1990); J. Parr (4 June 1991); M. Pisters (12 Nov. 1990); E. Paganelli (7 Nov. 1990); G. Ryde (5 
June 1991); F. Sorensen (12 Nov. 1990); D. Stasinopoulos (28 Oct.1990); D. Vincent (6 Dec. 1990).
“ interview with S. Webb (4 June 1991). See also Cameron, 1990:13; Financial Times. 26 June 1990; Miert, 1990; Pilling, 
March 1991:12.
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AF's purchase of UTA and Air Inter especially revealed a mass of under-the- 
table political agreements between the three men. This case, as well as two 
more BA cases, are examined below.
5. Political Manipulations
In December 1988, UTA filed a complaint with DG IV (Competition) 
against the French government for refusing it EC transatlantic routes in 
competition with AF. Not surprisingly, the DG IV delayed a decision in UTA's 
favor for thirteen months, until the beginning of 1990, that is. The reasons for 
the delay were that (i) at the beginning of 1989 DG IV (Competition) had 
finalized drafting the second air-transport package (due to be presented to the 
Council of Transport Ministers by September of the same year and to be 
adopted by it in December) which put forward the main liberalization legislation 
of the EC air-transport market through a number of air-transport competition 
regulations; and (ii) in the second half of 1989 France, one of the stronger and 
more restrictive member-states, held the EC presidency, and touchy internal 
politics and vigorous lobbying and negotiations took place between the 
Commission and the strong "troika" member-countries, and therefore also 
between Jacques Delors, Sir Leon Brittan and Karel Van Miert.24 As M. 
Kanganis, UTA's head of multilateral affairs, verified
" Our complaint was delayed due to AF and Delors’ political pressures and 
consequent DG IV back door manoeuvering" (interview 22 Nov. 1990).
At the beginning of 1989 France, as well as Germany, were against a 
fast moving pace of liberalization, and had opposed the second air-transport 
package proposed by British Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan of DG IV
^Interviews with M. Kanganis (22 Nov. 1990); R. Valladon (22 Nov. 1990). See also Brummer, June 1990: 26; Feldman, 
April 1990: 31; ITF News of Nov. 1991: 31, and April 1992:19; Pilling, March 1991:12; Whitaker, Jan. 1989: 30; Woolley, 
July 1988:14-15.
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(Competition). While in the presidency (1 July - 31 Dec. 1989), France became 
very tough in opposing the whole air-transport package, and threatened that it 
would not allow it to pass in the Council of Transport Ministers. On the other 
hand, the member-states in favor of liberalization, and especially the UK and 
Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan, having urgent and entrenched national air­
transport interests to serve, started complex and highly political negotiations 
and bartering to ensure that the second air-transport package would be 
certain to be adopted by the Council of Transport Ministers by the end of 
1989. As a result of internal German-French lobbying and pressures, mainly 
from President Delors and the German President of AEA H. Neumeister, Sir 
Leon Brittan consented to AF's anti-competitive practices in the domestic and 
EC air-transport market. France and AF were given assurances by the 
Commission President Delors and the DG VII (Transport) Commissioner Karel 
Van Miert that AF would be allowed to purchase UTA and Air Inter. In parallel 
in September 1989, on the basis of the Commission's political machinations 
and politico-economic re-arrangements in the EC airline industry, and in order 
for France and Germany to show their irrevocable decision to accept an 
equally important role for BA within the EC air-transport market, the French 
state-owned airline AF and the German state-owned Lufthansa announced a 
marketing co-operation agreement on 15 September 1989. Presumably this 
strategic alliance met with considerable skepticism in the DG IV which 
investigated the case, but it issued no decision. Once France had served its 
national air-transport interests, and had secured AF alliances, mergers, and 
other profitable ventures in the domestic and EC air-transport market, it 
became gradually more amenable to increased liberalization and further 
compromise with the second EC air-transport package proposed by DG IV. So 
two months later, in November 1989, the French Transport Minister M.
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Delabarre accepted the second air-transport package, and in December its 
proposals were unanimously accepted on principle by the Council of Transport 
Ministers. In fact the French presidency, along with French-German 
politico-economic machinations in the Council of Transport Ministers as well 
as the European Parliament, had set the harmonization of all member-states1 
different economic, operational, and technical regulations as a primary pre­
condition of the liberalization of EC air-transport market.25 As D. Vincent, head 
of directorate C of DG VII (Transport), has commented
" Although at one point the second package had been totally opposed by France 
and Germany, three months later they accepted it, due to a lot of trilateral 
compromises" (interview 6 Dec. 1990).
It was not coincidental that at the beginning of 1990 Chargeurs, the 
owner of UTA sold 54.58 per cent of his 82 per cent shares in UTA to AF. This 
meant that AF automatically acquired also UTA's charter subsidiary 
Aeromaritime, plus UTA's 35.8 per cent share in Air Inter. Jacques Delors and 
Karel Van Miert publicly approved. They had palmed off the AF deal on the 
Commission so that AF would be able to acquire Air Inter indirectly, in this way 
circumventing a previously negative Commission decision concerning the deal. 
In doing so they characteristically ignored Sir Leon Brittan who was known to 
oppose it as being against BA's air-transport interests. His displeasure 
sparked an angry controversy within the Commission's policy communities. Sir 
Leon Brittan saw the AF affair as a case of the political bosses elbowing him 
aside in a publicly insulting fashion and, despite the inevitability of the matter, 
he insisted on opening an investigation into AF's take-over of UTA and Air
25 In fact the Intelligence Service for Air Transport in the European Community (AEROPA) had vigorously and openly 
accused with newsletters the French government and presidency, the Council of Transport Ministers as well the 
European Parliament and its rapporteur Dutch Socialist B. Visser of nationalism and of vehemently opposing a single EC 
air-transport market and common EC air-transport policy. Interviews with R. P. Holubowicz (15 Nov. 1990); C. I. Del 
Olmo(31 Oct. 1990). See also Aeropa newsletters Sept. 1989-Feb. 1990; Cameron, 1990:13; Campbell, Feb. 1990:106- 
09; Feldman, Feb. 1990: 48, April 1990: 34, and Oct. 1990: 51; Financial Times. 8 Dec. 1989: 3; House of Commons 
Transport Committee. 1990: 6; ITF News. Sept. 1989: 22; Lewis, May 1990: 384-85; Pilling, 1991: 52-53; Sutton, May 
1990: 378-79; Tigner, Jan. 1990:10.
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Inter in mid-February. The French government and AF retaliated by reminding
him that they had informed him prior to the purchase, and that DG IV
(Competition) had approved BA's acquisition of BCal after some face-saving
conditions had facilitated BA to make the combination more palatable
politically. For the same reason Sir Leon Brittan was obliged to announce that
AF would permit new non-French or secondary French airlines to extensively
compete with it on eight internal and fifty international routes, on condition that
AF would relinquish its 35 per cent stake in Transport Aerien Transregional
(TAT), France's fourth largest airline. These "conditions", like those in the BA-
BCal case, were taken simply as formalities, although, as is discussed below,
BA's chief priority was the acquisition of a stake on TAT, as concerning its
26pursuit to put a foothold in the French domestic market.
Meanwhile other negotiations and political barterings were taking place 
at the beginning of 1990, involving the three Commissioners and Belgium, the 
Netherlands and the UK, and concerning mainly BA's attempt at an intra­
community alliance with the Dutch national airline KLM and Belgium's 
SABENA, to create a new company called SABENA World Airways (SWA). For 
this BA and KLM would acquire a 20 per cent stake each in SABENA. 
Because BA's sole wish was to dominate the Brussels hub-airport, Sir Leon 
Brittan was willing to make concessions, although such a big cross-border 
alliance risked upsetting the delicate politico-economic balance of the EC air­
transport market. The deal and its implications were well understood by 
Jacques Delors and Karel Van Miert who therefore put forward their own 
proposal. Although there was a great deal of back-door manoeuvering 
between BA and DG IV in the Commission, in the end no satisfactory 
agreement was reached and the proposed alliance was dropped. The main
“ interview with G. Ryde (5 June 1991). Feldman, April 1990: 31-32; Financial Times. 1 Feb. 1991:14; ITF News of Mar. 
1990:14, of Nov. 1991: 31, and of April 1992: 19; Pilling, March 1991: 12; Whitaker, Jan. 1989: 30; Woolley, July 1988: 
14-15.
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reason for this failure was said to be DG IV's (Competition) opposition to it 
after vigorous lobbying by independent airlines' private interests, and 
especially that of Belgium's charter airline Trans-European (TEA). Although 
BA during that time had indeed made overtures for a controlling stake in TEA, 
which was on the verge of bankruptcy, the real reasons behind the abortive 
BA-KLM-SABENA alliance were, one, that Sir Leon Brittan and Karel Van 
Miert respectively did not consider BA's and SABENA’s interests satisfied; two, 
that Jacques Delors was asking for major concessions in the wake of AF's 
merger with UTA and Air Inter, and for other alliances like the AF-LH 
marketing co-operation agreement, which would have damaged BA's air­
transport interests; and third, that the BA/KLM/SABENA merger - bringing 
together the two private-sector heavyweights (BA and KLM) - caused 
considerable hostility from German and French lobbies, which ultimately 
blocked it.27
Concomitantly with Jacques Delors and Karel Van Miert's successful 
promotion of AF's interests, BA embraced an attempt to hit AF in its own 
domestic air-transport market: it opened negotiations with the privately-owned 
Transport Aerien Transregional (TAT) to redeem more than the 35 per cent 
stake conceded by AF in connection with its UTA-Air Inter merger. Sir Leon 
Brittan did not discuss the buy-out with Delor and Van Miert because he knew 
them both to be absolutely against it, and neither did he need to: he had the 
power under the EC air-transport legislation to approve the redemption, 
whether they consented or not. After long and difficult negotiations, the two 
airlines reached agreement in October 1992, and Sir Leon Brittan approved 
the redemption of 49 per cent of the TAT French airline by BA. In February 
1991 Sir Leon Brittan, in his attempts to further promote BA interests and to
27Air and Cosmos.Jul./Aug. 1990: 44; Cameron, 1990: 13; Feldman, April 1990: 31-32 and Oct. 1990: 50-51; Financial 
Times of 1 Feb. 1991:14, and of 10 Jan. 1992; ITF News. Nov. 1991: 31; Lewis, May 1992: 384; Pilling, March 1991:12; 
Reed, Feb. 1990: 95-6; Vima Greek newspaper, 8 Mar. 1992: 22; Williams, 1990: 30.
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soften the attacks on him by the UK independent airline British Midland 
Airways for favouring BA's interests, had fined the Irish national airline Aer 
Lingus, their major competitor on the London-Dublin route, with 750,000 ECU 
(US $ 890,000) after a complaint by British Midland for refusing it to grant 
reciprocal ticketing rights. Finally, at the end of November 1992 he also 
approved the merger between BA and the bankrupted UK charter airline Dan 
Air. Inevitably, further serious controversy and long-term political machinations 
between Sir Leon Brittan on the one hand, and Jacque Delors and Karel Van 
Miert on the other, were the result.28
The DG IV (Competition) decision on the BA-TAT deal was indeed a 
provocative one, given that AF owned 33 per cent of TAT, and TAT was 
France's foremost independent airline. AF accused Sir Leon Brittan of 
discriminating against AF in favour of (i) BA's national and private interests 
and (ii) TAT's private ones, and of using a double standard. In fact, in mid- 
November 1992, AF president Bemand Attali had threatened legal action 
against the Commission and especially against Sir Lion Brittan because the 
latter, in deciding the take-over of Dan-Air was contravening Brussels 
jurisdiction. Also, Sir Lion Brittan should have prevented the purchase of TAT 
from going ahead during the four-week investigation into BAs attempt to 
acquire the 49 per cent stake in TAT. The conflicts between the two camps 
throughout 1987-1992 were a major causes for Sir Leon Brittan's replacement 
by Karel Van Miert as DG IV (Competition) Commissioner in 1993. In fact 
Karel Van Miert retaliated against UK's and Sir Leon Brittan's machinations 
and EC private air-transport interests by approving, among other state-owned 
airlines, a governmental financial aid to the Irish national airline Aer Lingus 
which was the most important air-transport competitor of UK airlines and 
especially BA and British Midland.29
28 Campbell, Feb. 1990:108; Greece and International Transport. Dec. 1992: 41; ITF News. April 1992: 20; Vima Greek 
newspaper, of 6 Dec. 1992: 37, and 21 Feb. 1993: 34.
29 Financial Times of 28 Sept. 1993:19, of 22 Sept. 1993: 30, of 28 Nov. 1992: 2, and of 15 Jan. 1993:12; ITF News.
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6. Conclusion
The four cases above show how and why key air-transport actors gave 
priority to serving their own countries' air-transport interests as well as those of 
strong EC member-states, instead of the joint EC ones. They also show how 
and why a certain Eurocrat not willing to participate in political manipulation 
and power struggles was obliged to resign, while another who did so 
participate remained in his post (although with less power). This is yet one 
more proof that the Commissioners, breaking their oaths and acting against 
the constitutional ethos of the EC, manipulated national air-transport interests. 
It was the machinations of their power politics that prevented the liberalization 
policy in the EC air-transport market from becoming common EC air-transport 
policy.
There was quite clearly a definite hiatus between what these key air­
transport actors had officially professed and how they actually behaved in the 
pursuit of their daily duties. Serving personal and national interests - from 
whatever motive - was, of course, a deviation from their supposedly supra­
national roles, and essentially repudiated the Commission’s supra-national 
character and the spirit of the EC generally.
April 1992: 20; Vima Greek newspaper of 6 Dec. 1992: 37, of 21 Feb. 1993: 34, and 21 Mar. 1993: 34.
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CHAPTER VI
COLLECTIVE EC AIRLINE INDUSTRY STRENGTHS AND 
CONFLICTS, AND STRATEGIC RESPONSES TO LIBERALIZATION
" We are likely to see further attempts by big airlines and their governments to 
slow down the liberalization process." Sir Michael Bishop chairman of the UK 
independent airline British Midland.1
" Let the market go-if tomorrow LH and AF want to merge, I strongly recommend 
to allow that, to face the day after tomorrow's competition from US airlines."
Pierre Godfroid, chairman of SABENA.2
This chapter examines why and how the EC national airlines, and 
especially those of the strong member-states, accommodated their air­
transport interests in the domestic, EC, and international markets during the 
course of the liberalization process. The focus is (i) on the strength of their 
diverse positions and on the continuing conflicts of national and private 
interests in the policy communities attempting to influence the EC air-transport 
policy and decision-making process; and (ii), on the strategies employed by 
the EC national airlines, led by the champions, for monopolizing their domestic 
markets and dominating both in the EC and internationally at the expense of 
the independent and smaller state-owned airlines.
As mentioned in ch. Ill European airline industry interests are 
represented in the EC by their umbrella groups' policy communities, such as 
the Association of European Airlines (AEA), the Association of the 
Independent Airlines in the EC (ACE) and the European Regional Airlines 
Association (ERA). Their relative lobbying strengths in the EC differed mainly 
because the AEA was the main body representing the twelve national airlines' 
interests which (as shown in previous chapters) had come to dictate their 
members’ attitude and decision-making in air-transport policy as a whole. The 
above three policy communities did not, however, share a uniform policy. Their
financial Times. 24 June 1992:18.
2Cited by ITF Report 1992: 32 as quoted in J. Gallacher, "Searching Times", Airline Business. June 1991.
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marked and strong collisions were due above all to their irreconcilable national 
and private air-transport interests in both their domestic and the EC air­
transport markets during liberalization.3
1. Group Strengths
Between 1987 and 1993 the role of the champion national airlines in 
the AEA - i.e. Air France (AF), British Airways, Germany's Lufthansa - was 
centrally laid down by AEA and consequently EC policy. The smaller national 
airlines - i.e. the Netherlands' KLM, Scandinavia's SAS, Italy’s Alitalia, Ireland's 
Aer Lingus (AE), Spain's Iberia (IB), and Belgium's SABENA (SN) - played a 
secondary role and followed the champion airlines' collective and individual 
strategies. Greece's Olympic Airways, Luxembourg's Luxair, and TAP Air 
Portugal had no effective say in EC airline policy networks. Usually only the 
champion airlines and KLM and SAS participated in the AEA working groups 
dealing with the Commission's draft proposals. Although most of the smaller 
national airlines were well aware that the collective interests in the AEA were 
manipulated by the champions, they nevertheless considered them their 
representatives on AEA's working groups, especially since most of the time 
they themselves had more or less the same national and EC interests. In any 
case smaller national airlines lacked the facilities to engage in commercial and 
aeropolitical matters themselves or, like the Greek national airline Olympic 
Airways, had no inclination to do so.4
The AEA was the best organized and most influential of the policy 
communities,5 and managed to become a vested institution in the cohesive 
policy networks at EC level. The Commission invariably consulted it, almost as 
a matter of right, in both formal and ad hoc meetings, and the AEA frequently
information from author’s interviews with D. Cockroft (19 June 1991); Y. Enderle (7 Dec. 1990); G. Ryde, (5 June 1991); 
R. Tsimbiropoulou (24 Jan. 1991).
information from author’s interviews with M. Pisters (12 Nov. 1990); R. Tsimbiropoulou (24 Jan. 1991); S. Webb (4 June 
1991). See also Financial Times. 8 Dec. 1989: 3.
5AEA member airlines count around 92 per cent of the international scheduled passenger traffic (passenger/ kilometers) 
in Europe in 1990. AEA Yearbook. 1991.
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itself initiated EC air-transport policy. This position was mainly the result of this 
group being the heart and hub of all of its members' interactions whether co­
operative or antagonistic.6
For example, in 1991 the AEA was engaged in heated controversy with 
the Commission which - under pressure from independent airlines (scheduled, 
charter, and regional) and the strong and influential lobbying of private 
interests they represented - had introduced a draft proposal on slot allocation 
for rationing take-off and landing at over-crowded airports as essential for 
developing genuine liberalization.7 All the AEA member airlines were upset, 
and objected that the slot allocation proposal had deliberately been drafted at 
a time of uncertainty caused by the Gulf War. They felt they were being 
coerced into handing over slot-hours8 at congested airports to smaller and 
even new airlines, which would then develop niche markets to compete with 
them. They demonstrated that in no other industry were large and well- 
established companies forced to surrender hard-won assets (such as airport 
slots) with such dogmatic insistence on co-operation instead of free 
competition.9 As M. Pisters, AEA deputy secretary general and responsible for 
social affairs argued
" Imagine how a big department store with a prime site on a big street would feel 
if someone suddenly came along and told it he was taking away 3,000 sq.ft. in 
order to increase competition with smaller stores" (interview 12 Nov. 1990).
elnfbrmation from author's interviews with J. M. de Bastes (8 Nov. 1990); Y. O. Castro (16 Nov. 1990); A. Corcondilas (18 
Jan. 1991); T. Middleton, (13 June 1991); C.l. del Oimo (31 Oct. 1990); R. Tsimbiropoulou (24 Jan. 1991); M. 
Vanderiinden (24 Oct. 1990); K. Veenstra (29 Oct. 1990); D. Vincent 6 Dec. 1990); S. Yuksei, 31 Oct. 1990). See also 
McGowan andTrengove, 1986:110-32.
7 Since 1987 the number of flight delays in EC had almost doubled. Alarmed by this trend and following up an earlier work
commissioning a study on the costs and benefits of a single European air traffic control system, the AEA had carried out a
study Air Traffic Control in Europe, which had appeared in February 1989. The AEA white paper Towards a Single
System for Air Traffic Control in Europe was published in August 1989. it had concluded that the inefficiency of European
air traffic control was mainly due to the fragmentation of the EC and European air-traffic control system, as mentioned in
ch. ill. It had showed that the inefficiency of air traffic control had cost air travellers, airlines and the European economy
as a whole US $ 4.2 billion in 1988. In other words, about 8 per cent of the average intra-European ticket price was
wastefuliy spent. In 1989 23.8 per cent of all AEA international short and medium haul flights were delayed by more than
15 minutes, an increase of 11.3 per cent on the 1986 figure. A single European air traffic control authority, the 
Eurocontrol, was estimated that it would save up to US $ 500 million, approximately 30 per cent of the yearly operating 
costs of the present fragmented system. In April 1990 the Transport Ministers of the 23 ECAC states had approved a 
report on The Integration of European Air Traffic Control Systems'. Neumeister, 1990: 79; O’Donovan and Beety, 1990: 
42-43.
&Slot hours are specific times (such as 13.10 or 22.17) when airlines must take off from a certain runway on a certain 
airport.
“interview with M. Pisters (12 Nov. 1990). See also Financial Times of 5 Oct. 1990, of 23 June 1992: 1, of 24 June 1992: 
20, and of 8 Dec. 1992: 2.
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A market based approach for a slot-allocation proposal might involve 
four main options: one was to auction off slots to the highest bidder which, 
however, was considered disruptive as well as politically problematical. A more 
practical solution was to let the incumbents hold on to their present slots while 
giving new entrants preference in bidding for space capacity. The third would 
create a "slot pool" by distributing a proportion of both newly created slots and 
any surrendered voluntarily by incumbent airlines. A last possibility was a 
combination of allocating new slots and clawing back existing ones from the 
big airlines. All of the above options were, however, considered a new 
bureaucratic and legal mechanism which would complicate rather than ease 
the problem of scarce airport space.10
In consequence the Commission's attempt in the EC Council of 
Transport Ministers to obtain better access to landing and take-off slots at 
major EC airports for independent airlines was abandoned under the 
burdensome pressures of AEA national airlines. Even in the 1992 third air­
transport package the issue of slot allocation was still not addressed 
collectively; it remained the subject of separate negotiations until the beginning 
of 1993 when the Council of Transport Ministers adopted a Regulation (No 
95/93 of 18 Jan. 1993) on common rules for the allocation of slots at EC 
airports.11 By that time, however, the champions had totally monopolized their 
domestic air-transport markets.12 Two examples especially show the AEA 
champions' strength and their practices in the matter of slot concentration at 
EC airports.
In 1987, at national level, and after BA's take-over of BCal, BA 
accounted for 43.2 per cent of the total scheduled passenger/ kilometers traffic 
through UK airports, or for 19.5 million out of 44.2 m. passengers on
10Brummer, 1989b: 17: Financial Times of 5 Oct 1990, and 24 Jan. 1991:20.
"Official Journal L 014 22 Jan. 1993:1.
12Financial Times of 5 Oct. 1990, of 23 June 1992:1, of 24 June 1992: 20, and of 8 Dec. 1992: 2.
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scheduled flights. At Gatwick alone it controlled 60 per cent of scheduled slots 
in 1988; and 40 per cent of take-off and landing slots at Heathrow in 1991. In 
1992, after the bankruptcy of Air Europe in 1990 and BA’s acquisition of Dan- 
Air in October 1992,13 BA controlled more than 70 per cent of all the scheduled 
UK traffic.14
At the EC level at the end of 1992 after the take-overs of France's UTA 
by AF, and TAT by BA and AF, BA controlled 98.6 per cent of all flights 
between Gatwick and all Paris airports, and had a monopoly on flights 
between Gatwick and Lyons. In terms of all of London's airports together, BA 
had increased its share of the London-Paris air-traffic from 49 to 52 per cent, 
and from 45 to 58 per cent on the London-Lyons routes; AF, the second airline 
in both markets, had 33 per cent and 41.5 per cent respectively. This meant a 
much tighter duopoly between the UK and French airports than had obtained 
in the pre-1987 EC air-transport market.15
Another major issue indicating the AEA lobbying strength in the EC was 
the Commission's approval of state subsidies to state-owned airlines because 
of the Gulf Crisis (Aug. 1990 to Jan. 1991). According to IATA, the crisis lost 
the world airlines US $ 2.7 billion on international scheduled services in 1990, 
the worst financial disaster in the 46 year history of post-war civil aviation. The 
AEA members collectively lost more than $ 100 million in the first week of the 
Gulf War alone, and more than $ 2.5 billion in the first six months of 1991. For 
the period 1990-1993, the EC's state-owned airlines alone were expecting to 
lose about $ 10 billion. In consequence the AEA met with the Commissioner of 
DG VII (Transport) Karel Van Miert on 30 January 1991 to request suspension
13Dan-Air was UK’s oldest charter airline founded in 1953 and owned by the conglomerate Davies and Newman.ln 1988 
Air Europe and Dan Air began systematically to develop an extensive scheduled network strategy as low-cost and low- 
fare airlines, aiming at massive and rapid expansion. Having overreached themselves, they collapsed and went out of the 
UK and EC air-transport markets altogether.
14Financial Times of 23 Dec. 1987:1, and of 1 Feb. 1991: ITF News. Nov. 1992:13; Pilling, March 1991:13; Vima Greek 
newspaper, 21 Feb. 1993: 34.
15Financial Times. 28 Nov. 1992: 2; ITF News. Nov. 1992: 13; ITF Report, 1992: 30; Pilling and Harrington, Sep. 1991: 
24-25.
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of all EC liberalization measures, and to pressure the Commission to approve 
EC governments aid grants to the airlines to help them sustain their disastrous 
losses.16
Table 6.1 below lists the actual 1992 profits and losses of the twelve EC 
state airlines as they resulted from the Gulf crisis. All but BA and Luxair were 
affected negatively. BA’s comparatively healthy position in 1992 nevertheless 
represented a considerable drop from its 1990-91 profit of 345 m. pounds as 
discussed in greater detail in section 3.1 below.
Table 6.1: Profits and Losses of the Twelve EC National Airlines at the End
of 1992 (in 000 of US $)
Airline Airline
Aer Lingus -195,600 Lufthansa -250,000
Air France -617,000 Luxair +600
Alitalia -11,900 Olympic Airways -224,000
British Airways +297,700 SABENA -11,700
Iberia Airways -339,800 SAS -127,000
KLM Dutch Airlines -319,000 TAP Air Portugal -199,800
Source: ICAO 1993
The Commission announced that to approve state-aids it would 
evaluate the situation of any specific airline under the criteria of an internal 
charter which conditioned that the companies had to restructure, and 
governments could not inject additional subsidies. On 20 Feb. 1991 a package 
of state-aid was approved to the state-owned airlines Iberia of Spain, (with 120 
billion peseta), to SABENA of Belgium (with BFr 30 billion), and Air France 
(FFr 3 billion).17
18Brummer, 1990: 34; Financial Times of 21 Feb. 1991:4, of 1 Aug. 1991, and of 8 Dec. 1992: 2; ITF News of Feb. 1991: 
2, and of Dec. 1991: 9; Pilling, Mar. 1991:13.
17Doganis, 1994:19: Financial Times of 21 Feb. 1991: 4, of 28 Mar. 1991: 2, of 27 Mar. 1992: 2, and of 18 Jul. 1991: 2; 
ITF News of July 1993: 24, of Dec. 1991: 9, and of Aug. 1992: 12; Vima Greek newspaper, of 13 June 1992: 23, of 29 
Nov. 1992: 37, of 28 Feb. 1993: 24, and of 21 Mar. 1993: 34.
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Meanwhile the AEA's privately-owned airlines BA and KLM, and the 
ACE independent airlines, and ERA regional ones, had accused the state- 
owned airlines vigorously but in vain of anti-competitive behaviour and of 
fatally obstructing the liberalization process of EC air-transport. They alleged 
that state subsidies further prolonged the transitional period in EC air­
transport, and so inhibited the development of an environment of genuine 
competition between privately and state-owned airlines, quite apart from 
making the existence of independent airlines more hazardous.18
The above accusations were seen in 1993 to have been well-founded 
when Karel Van Miert took office as Commissioner of DG IV (Competition). He 
took off the pressure on EC state-owned airlines by declaring that state aids 
would continue because the airlines needed more time to grow stronger in a 
liberalized internal EC market before that market could be fully opened to 
internal and external competition, especially to US airlines. He suggested that 
the airlines themselves should be allowed to decide how they wished to deal 
with objections from the Commission and with mergers among themselves. He 
announced that although the existing competition rules would remain 
unchanged, there might be a different philosophical attitude on how to apply 
them while trying to broaden competition among EC state-owned airlines on 
the model of the German and Japanese approaches - also taking into account 
other influences, such as industrial, environmental, regional and social 
pressures.19
Contrary to the AEA umbrella group's high political status, the 
independent airlines in the EC (ACE)20 and the European regional ones 
(ERA)21 were rather less integrated as umbrella-group policy communities in
18lnformation from author's interviews with M. Ambrose (30 May 1991); R. P. Holubowicz (15 Nov. 1990); S. Webb (4 
June 1991).
1 financial Times of 13 Jan. 1993: 1, of 15 Jan. 1993: 12, and of 8 Oct. 1993: 6; Vima Greek newspaper, of 13 June 
1992: 23, of 29 Nov. 1992: 37, and of 28 Feb. 1993: 24.
“ ACE member airlines carried 37 million passengers per year in 1988,1989, and 1990.
21 ERA had grown at an average rate of 23 per cent a year, nearly four times the total average European traffic growth. In 
terms of the total number of flights per annum in Europe alone, it doubled those of LH, the biggest European airline 
operator. Many ERA member airlines - such as DLT, KLM-CITY HOPPER etc.-were daugther carriers of major
companies.
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the EC air-transport network.22 The main reason for this was that they did not 
have the backing of their governments. However, as was seen above with the 
Commission's slot allocation proposal, they had developed considerable clout 
in the EC due to the private interests they represented. They commanded a 
very powerful and influential domestic and EC lobby, and their air-transport 
objectives coincided with the Community's for liberalizing the EC air-transport 
market. Independent charter and regional airlines - like the UK's Air Europe 
and Dan Air, France's UTA, Air Inter, and TAT, Ireland's Ryanair,23 and the 
Netherlands' Transavia among others - were regarded by the Commission as 
challenging the dominance of the EC state-owned airlines, and used by it as a 
countervailing power to AEA pressures and counter-proposals - always in vain, 
however. As a matter of fact certain Eurocrats and members of AEA 
secretariat frankly unveiled to the author that they did not see independent 
airlines as having any future in the liberalized EC air-transport, and would 
most certainly be the losers instead of being the winners, as they expected 
before 1987.24
2. Group Conflicts
The major aeropolitical conflict among EC national airlines in the AEA 
exactly reflected the wider differences between the member-states.25 On the 
one side were the more efficient privately-owned airlines - i.e. BA and KLM - 
whose labour costs were lower, and whose productivity was increasing, and 
who wanted the liberalization process in the EC air-transport market to be
“ The 34 per cent of the world's passenger/kilometer in Europe, and 65 per cent of international passenger/kilometer in 
ECAC (1977-1988) were covered by charter airlines, according to ICAO 1989.
“ Created in 1986 by the three Ryan brothers.
24lnfbrmation from author's interviews with M. Ambrose (30 May 1991); R. P. Holubowicz (15 Nov. 1990); B. Stable (4 
Dec. 1990); F. Sorensen (12 Nov. 1990); R. Tsimbiropoulou (24 Jan. 1991); D. Vincent (6 Dec. 1990); K. Veenstra (29 
Oct. 1990); S. Yuksel, 31 Oct. 1990). See also Financial Times. 28 Nov. 1992: 2; Gallacher, Sept. 1990: 72; Katz, Feb. 
1991: 32-41; Vima Greek Newspaper, 1 Nov. 1992.
25There was also a North-South gap within the AEA, but it was less intense than the overall politico-economic power 
struggle of the member-states in the EC air-transport market. The northern countries' airline industries and airlines were 
more efficient than those of the southern ones.
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accelerated. On the other side (i) airlines with higher costs and less efficiency - 
i.e. Aer Lingus, AF, LH, Luxair SABENA and SAS - which seized the 
opportunity to radically transform their cost bases and productivity levels; and 
(ii) the airlines with the highest costs and lowest efficiency - i.e. Alitalia, Iberia, 
Olympic Airways, and TAP Air Portugal - which, while trying to improve their 
productivity and reducing costs, were reluctant to invite a confrontation with 
their employees through large-scale lay-offs. All these airlines demanded a 
slower and more gradual liberalization in step with the harmonization process. 
They were worried about liberalization rendering them highly vulnerable in 
competition with the first group's private airlines. Therefore, although in overall 
AEA terms the EC airline industry was regarded as falling somewhere 
between a public utility and a commodity service, most national airlines still 
considered their operations as purely public utilities.26
This split of the major AEA air-transport interests divided its four 
champion airlines and their follower ones into two groups - BA and KLM, and 
AF and LH - which kept accusing each other of delaying or accelerating the 
pace of EC air-transport liberalization. So for example BA charged the AEA's 
German secretary general Karl-Heinz Neumeister (a former employee of LH 
with responsibilities for market research and worldwide route planning, and 
since 1983 AEA secretary general) with having tried to slow down the pace of 
air-transport liberalization in favour of LH and AF air-transport interests and at 
BA's expense. BA alleged that the reason LH, although a committed AEA 
member, only rarely participated in the ordinary AEA working groups was that 
it could advance its own interests better in direct consultation with the AEA 
secretary general.27
“ information from author's interviews with A. Corcondilas (18 Jan. 1991); K. Veenstra (29 Oct 1990); F. Sorensen (12 
Nov. 1990).
^Interview with S. Webb (4 June 1991). See also Beng, 1991: 24; Financial Times. 22 Oct 1992: 3; ITF News. July 1993: 
23; Lewis, 1990: 385; Nederkoom, 1991:151.
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As a result BA and KLM, and especially the former, were isolated from 
the other state-owned national airlines. They relied on the AEA less and less, 
judging their collaboration with it to be detrimental to their best interests. Both 
airlines found it very difficult to moderate or occasionally suppress altogether 
their air-transport views and strategies to allow the AEA to present a more or 
less united front. On the other hand, neither of these two airlines could afford 
to leave the Association, not even BA, a multinational company with well- 
developed lobbying and negotiation strategies of its own in the EC. Active 
participation in the AEA umbrella group offered even the champions the 
possibility of highly influential collective lobbying and the opportunity of 
modifying or preventing altogether the AEA's pursuit of unwelcome air­
transport policies.28
In addition, the practices and strategies of the champion airlines 
concerning EC air-transport liberalization brought them into conflict with the 
independent and smaller state-owned airlines. Similar conflicts developed 
between the latter themselves and state-owned and private airlines interests.
Overall, small state-owned and independent airlines protested that the 
champion airlines' anti-competitive mergers and alliances (blessed by the 
Commission as a triumph of competition) were a means for keeping their 
national and EC air-transport markets to themselves, and so undermined the 
efforts at liberalizing EC air transport. They maintained that while the letter of 
the liberalization process had changed, the spirit of it had not, and that the 
avowed policy of giving smaller national and independent airlines greater 
access to the market and preventing the champions from forming cartels 
remained null and void.29 C. Mullan, chief executive of the Irish airline Aer
“ information from author's interviews with D. Cockfbrt (19 June 1991); R. P. Holubowicz, (15 Nov. 1990).
“ information from author's interviews with M. Ambrose 30 May 1991); R.P. Holubowitcz (15 Nov. 1990); B. Stahle (4 
Dec. 1990). See also Financial Times. 22 Jan. 1990: 2.
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Lingus speaking about the marketing co-operation by Air France and 
Lufthansa, said
" They are like two Roman soldiers who have tied themselves back to back to 
fend off the invading Huns".30
One objection raised by the independent airlines was that the new EC 
air-transport legislation was neutralizing EC air-transport competition so as to 
enable state owned airlines (particularly the weaker ones likely to be driven 
out of the EC market as a result of genuine competition) to adapt to the 
liberalized market by means of state-aids and consolidation. They argued that 
the main consideration should be not whether the whole harmonization 
process could be achieved in parallel with liberalization by the end of 1992, but 
rather whether harmonization was desirable at all. Competition should be the 
result of existing as well as new airlines having proper access to routes and 
airport facilities. It should not simply be a matter of removing the general 
restrictions that since 1987 had done nothing to bar such access nor helped 
new or existing independent airlines in matters such as the very high start-up 
and marketing costs, lack of adequate feeder services, and especially the 
shortage of suitable landing and take-off slots to link regional airports with the 
many large airports that prevented the independent airlines from taking proper 
advantage of the terms and provisions of the liberalization policy.31
With respect to such conflicts it has been pointed out repeatedly that 
refusing to allow an independent airline to be set up or to enter the market was 
not a case of protecting national air-transport interests per se, but the result of 
a struggle between private domestic air-transport interests. In Italy, for 
example, where the national airline Alitalia's political manipulations firmly 
prevented the creation and survival of an independent airline, this was a
^ Financial Times. 22 Jan. 1990: 2.
31lnformation from the authro's interviews with M. Ambrose 30 May 1991); R.P. Holubowicz (15 Nov. 1990). See also 
Doganis, 1994: 23; Financial Times of 17 Jul. 1989: 21, of 5 Oct. 1990, and of 24 June 1992:18; ITF News. March 1992: 
12; Gallacher, Sept. 1990: 72; Katz, Feb. 1991: 32-41; Pilling and Harrington Sept. 1991: 24-25; Pilling, March 1991:13.
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matter of conflicting private interests, since 15 per cent of Alitalia was privately 
owned. When the charter airline Air Europe s.p.a. was set up, foreign private 
capital (coming from the "European consortium of airlines", founded by the 
UK's independent airline Air Europe) was channeled into Italy through private 
interests: a prominent Italian industrialist held the majority of the shares and 
members of his family were on the board of directors to make the airline look 
Italian. Similarly foreign private capital might set up a charter airline in 
Germany and make it look German. However, private domestic capital (Italian, 
German, and so forth) always insisted on a low profile for the airline in the 
domestic air-transport market32 because, as ACE director general R. P. 
Holubowicz, explained
" You do not bring an airline into Italy or Germany by publicly invoking your right 
to do so. Never. You buy it you make it look like an Italian or German airline and 
you apply for traffic rights" (interview 15 Nov. 1990).
Finally, the small member-states were divided over the question of 
whether the concentration of EC national airlines was desirable at all. So SAS 
was in favour of and itself pursued mergers and alliances, as long as they 
aimed at strengthening the airlines' position in the international arena. Aer 
Lingus on the other hand, was against the creation of big groupings of EC 
airlines and did not wish to participate in a leading capacity, but believed it 
could play a major role as an individual airline.33
In the next section I shall examine the strategic tactics that were 
pursued by the EC champions, whether state or privately owned, as well as by 
certain smaller national airlines, in response to international air-transport 
competition, the globalization of airlines, and the consequent move by the EC 
in 1987 towards liberalization of its air-transport market.
“ interviews with R. P. Holubowicz (15 Nov. 1990); and R. Tsimbiropoulou (24 Jan. 1991).
“ interviews with T. Gjertsen (29 Nov. 1990); B. Stable (4 Dec. 1990). See also Financial Times of 22 Jan. 1990: 2, and of 
16 Jan. 1993: 3.
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3. National Airline Responses and Key Strategies
All airlines, whether large or small and state or privately owned, aside 
from their obvious sensitivities about their future as national airlines, were fully 
aware that competition between them would make them more vulnerable to 
the growing commercial threat from US mega-carriers and fast growing 
Asian/Pacific airlines. This was a threat that could be satisfactorily met only by 
consolidation and reasonably strong groupings. They therefore eschewed 
competition among themselves, and instead pursued concentration tactics in 
their domestic, EC, and international air-transport markets.34
Making the most of their considerable size (benefits of large scale) the 
champion airlines AF, BA, and LH above all, but also Alitalia, Iberia, KLM 
Dutch Royal, and SAS Scandinavian Airlines, pursued three main strategies:
(i) to reinforce their already dominant position and ensure the total 
monopolization of their domestic air-transport; (ii) to secure a dominant 
position in the EC and other European air-transport markets; and (iii) to 
strengthen their presence in the international air-transport arena.35
The first strategy involved the elimination of existing national 
competitors by means of mergers and buy-outs or their control through major 
shareholding and alliances, or to force them to operate in a manner that did 
not create competition in the domestic markets. Other tactics were the 
dissuasion of potential rivals coming into the national market, setting up 
barriers in the form of landing and take-off slots, and preventing other EC 
member airlines from acquiring small or medium independent airlines in one's 
own country, especially any that were operating scheduled international 
services. In particular any domestic charter airline attempting to operate
Interview with H. Finstfein (5 June 1991). See also Financial Times. 24 June 1992:18; ITF Report 1992: 25.
“ Doganis, 1994:17; Williams, G., 1993: 86.
197
scheduled flights (which was essential for its survival) was straightaway 
bought from larger domestic scheduled national airlines and especially the 
national champions. In some instances airlines, while not operationally 
dependent on their country's national airline, simply recognized the futility of 
locking horns with such overwhelmingly powerful adversaries and kept their 
heads down.36 However, in 1991 the Financial Times noted
" It remains to be seen how far the EC itself will permit such concentrations at a 
time when its overall air-transport policy is dedicated to increasing competition"
(1 Aug. 1991).
Table 6.2 below lists the ownership by EC national airlines of small and 
medium independent carriers in their domestic markets at the end of 1993.
The second strategy, involved co-operative alliances and the buying of 
shares of other EC national airlines; shareholding in independent airlines 
already established; creating new low cost subsidiary ones; as well as 
mergers, alliances and share acquisition in the domestic markets of other EC 
or non-EC European countries, especially in France, Germany, and the UK.37
In practice, except for the AF-LH marketing co-operation, most of the 
attempts to create alliances with other EC or non-EC European airlines or to 
acquire shares in them did not succeed. A whole battery of thorny politico- 
economic problems, including historical ties, labour union objections, and the 
difficulties of choosing a specific US airline-partner hopelessly complicated the 
issue with respect to both the domestic and EC air-transport markets. Rather 
more successful were the airlines' attempts at cross-border share acquisition 
from smaller state-owned and independent airlines in the EC and the rest of 
Europe.38
“ ITF Report, 1992: 30; Vima Greek newspaper, of 7 Feb. 1993: 24, of 1 Nov. 1992, of 6 Dec. 1992: 37, and of 21 Feb. 
1993: 34; Williams, G., 1993: 87,115,123.
^Interviews with A. Corcondilas (18 Jan. 1991); D. Stasinopoulos (28 Oct. 1990). See also Doganis, 1994:17; ITF, 1992: 
32; Williams, G„ 1993: 87.
“ information from author's interviews with H. Johannes (23 Oct. 1990); R. Tsimbiropoulou (24 Jan. 1991); S. Webb (4 
June 1991). See also Burger, 25 April 1993: 53; Doganis, 1994: 24-25; Financial Times of 12 Nov. 1990: 2, of 1 Feb. 
1991, and of 10 Jan. 1992: 14; ITF News of Jan./Feb. 1993: 30, of Aug. 1992: 12, and of Nov. 1992: 16; Nea Greek 
newspaper, 27 Mar. 1993: 21; Vima Greek newspaper, of 12 Sept. 1993: 26, of 28 Nov. 1993; and of 26 July 1992: 37.
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Table 6.2: EC National Airline Ownership of Independent Carriers (end of 1993)
Airline Acquired Airlines since 1987 Ownership (%)
Air France39 Air Inter 72
UTA 100
Air Littoral Operates on behalf of AF
Brit Air Operates on behalf of AF
TAT 35
Aeromaritime 49
Air Charter 49
Euro Berlin France 51
Air Guadeloupe 45
Air Madagascar 3.5
Alitalia Avianova
(jointly owned with Meridiana) 50 
Eurofly 45
British Airways40 British Caledonian 100
Dan Air(1992) 100
Birmingham European 40
Brymon 40
Iberia Aviaco 33
Binter Canarias 100
Binter Mediterranean 100
Viva Air 96
KLM Transavia 80
Martinair 35
Air Holland went into liquidation in 1989.
Lufthansa41 NFD Operates on behalf of LH
RFG Operates on behalf of LH
Interflug42 Absorbed
SABENA Delta Air Transport 49
TEA went into liquidation Oct. 1991
SAS SAS commuter 100
Scanair 100
TAP Air Portugal LAR 100
Sources: Airline Business. Dec. 1990: 11; Doganis, 1994: 17-19; Financial Times. 26 June 
1990; ITF News. 1992: 13; ITF Report, 1992: 30, 34, 99-105; Williams, G., 1993: 116-17, 159- 
83.
“ AFs share of the French air-transport market in terms of passengers/kilometers went up from 78 per cent to 97 per 
cent.
40BA and its associated airlines carried nearly 100 m. passengers, produced about 20 billion revenue per tonne-kilometer 
and generated more than US$ 20 billion in sates.
41 LH operated 99.8 per cent of all German air-transport traffic (pass./km).
42ln 1990 LH had announced its intention to acquire a 26 per cent stake in Interflug but was opposed by the Federal 
Cartel Office and the former East-German airline shut down. ITF News of April 1990: 9, of Jan. 1991, and of Mar. 1991: 8.
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Table 6.3 shows unsuccessful cross-border alliances and Mergers 
between EC national and/or with non-EC airlines during the period 1987-1993. 
Table 6.4 provides the detailed cross-border share acquisition by EC national 
airlines; and Table 6.5 shows the distribution of the seven largest EC airline 
groupings that generated 76.2 per cent of the scheduled domestic and intra- 
European pass./km traffic and carried 77.7 per cent of the total passengers. 
The low figure for the KLM grouping reflects the fact that KLM itself chiefly 
served destinations outside Europe.
Table 6.3: Unsuccessful Alliances and Mergers Between EC National and
Other European Airlines (end of 1993).
Airlines Type
BA/KLM/SABENA(1990-91) 
BA/SABENA (1991) 
BA/KLM (1991)44
European Quality Alliance (EQA)46 (1990-1993)
Alcazar46 (1993)
stake acquisition43 
stake acquisition 
merger
co-operation/merger
co-operation/merger
Sources: Doganis, 1994: 24-25; Financial Times. 24 June 1992: 18
43Discussed in ch. V.
44This merger was called off on 27 February 1991, although there was a joint British and Dutch union agreement on it. 
See ITF News of Jan./Feb. 1992: 21, and March 1992:11.
45Consisting of SAS, Swissair, Finnair and Austrian Airlines.
^Consisting of the EQA airlines plus KLM Dutch Royal Airlines. One of the main problems was Austrian Airlines having to 
decide between an LH offer for alliance, and the alliance and creation of a totally new airline. The Austrian airlines' trade 
unions were in favour of the LH/Austrian alliance because they believed that ft could create fewer lay offs than the 
creation of the new airline. The country's Conservative party also wanted the alliance with LH, and insisted that Austrian 
airlines should keep its name, national identity, flag, and business tradition. The Social Democratic party on the other 
hand, was in favour of the creation of a new airline to help the Austrian carrier survive. In the end it was the alliance with 
LH that carried the day.
200
Table 6.4: Cross-Border Share Acquisition by EC National Airlines in
Europe (end of 1993).
Airline Acquired Airline Country of Origin Ownership (%)
Aer Lingus Futura Int. Spain 25.0
Air France Austrian Austria 1.5
CSA (1992) Czechoslovakia 40.0
SABENA (1992) Belgium 37.5
Alitalia Malev (1992) Hungary 35.0
British Airways GB A/W Gibraltar 49.0
Deutsche BA (1992)* Germany 49.0
Air Russia(1992) Russia 31.0
TAT (1992) France 49.9
KLM Royal Air Littoral France 35.0
Dutch Airlines Air UK UK 15.0
Delta AT Belgium 29.0
Lufthansa Austrian Austria 10.0
Lauda Air Austria 26.5
Luxair Luxembourg 38.0
Cargolux Luxembourg 24.5
Sun express unknown 40.0
DHL Corporation unknown 5.0
SAS British Midland UK 40.0
* Ex-German airline Delta Air, serving nineteen destinations within Germany and Europe.
Sources: Airline Business. Dec. 1990: 11; Doganis, 1994: 18, 21, 24; ITF News of May 1992: 
14, of Nov. 1992: 16, and of Jan./Feb. 1993: 30; ITF Report, 1992: 30-34, 99-105; Vima 
Greek newspaper, 7 Feb. 1993: 24; Williams, G., 1993: 110-17.
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Table 6.5: Percentage of EC Airline Groupings in Scheduled Intra-
European and Domestic Passenger/Kilometers (end of 1993).
Airline grouping Pass./km (%) Passengers (pax) (%)
(1) AF, UTA, Air Inter
TAT, SABENA and CSA* 19.6
(2) BA, BCal, Dan Air.BEA,47 
Deutsche BA, TAT** 14.0
(3) IB, Aviaco, Viva. 11.6
(4) LH, Lauda Air**, Luxair, 11.1
(5) SAS, BMA, Linjeflug,
Loganair 9.8
(6) AZ, Malev 6.7
(7) KLM, Air UK,
Transavia, Martinair** 3.4
Total intra-European/domestic 76.2
17.1
12.0
11.5
13.3
13.3
6.7
3.8 
77.7
* CSA was the then Czechoslovak national airline.
** No data available for Deutsche BA, Transavia, Martinair, Lauda Air nor pax 
numbers for TAT.
Sources: Doganis, 1994: 23; ITF News. Nov. 1992: 13.
Finally the third strategy was to forge partnerships and seek equity 
investments with international airlines. The purpose of this was to create blocs, 
especially in the two rival markets where the EC airline industry was not well 
represented and preferred to collaborate rather than compete - i.e. with the 
US airlines, particularly if they could offer air-service feed for transatlantic 
traffic, and the East Asian/Pacific ones. Where such attempts did not succeed 
it was due to reasons similar to those given above (for the second strategy).48 
Table 6.6 below shows the actual and attempted EC national airlines cross- 
border share acquisition and co-operative alliances with international airlines 
for the period 1987-1993.
47Brymon European Airways was formed on 25 October 1992 from the merger of two other UK regional airlines (Brymon 
and Birmingham European Airways), in which BA and Maersk Air, a Danish charter airline, were each holding 40 per cent 
of the shares.
^Interviews with A. Corcondilas (18 Jan. 1991); D. Stasinopouios (28 Oct 1990). See also Doganis, 1994: 17; Financial 
Times. 24 June 1992:18; ITF Report 1992: 32-33; Williams, G„ 1993:123.
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Table 6.6: EC Airlines’ Cross-Border Ownership, and Co-Operative Alliances with non-European 
Airlines (1987-1993)
Airline__________ Acquired Airline (actual/attempted) Country of Origin Ownership(%)TypeJResult
Air France Air Canada Canada % N.A*
attempted 1992 failed
Canadian Airlines Canada % N.A
(through Air Canada) attempted 1992 failed
Air Mauritius St. Mauritious 12.8
Cameroon Airlines Cameroon 25.0
Air Djibouti Djibouti 32.3
Middle East Airlines Lebanon 28.5
Royal Air Maroc Marocco 3.9
Tunis Air Tunis 5.6
Vietnam Airlines (attempted) Vietnam R.U**
Aeromexico Mexico C.A***
Alitalia Canadian Airlines Canada C.A
United Airlines USA C.A
US Air USA C.A
British Airways40 Quantas1992 Australia 25.0
Air New Zealand 1992 (through Quantas) New Zealand 20.0
US Air/attempted 1991-1992s6 USA 15.0
Royal Jordanian Jordan C.A
HAT Carribean C.A
An sett Australia C.A
Iberia51 Aerolineas Argentinas/ Austral 1991 Argentina 30.0
Viasa1992 Venezuela 45.0
Ladeco 1992 Chile 37.0
Pluna/attempted 1993 Uruguay**** 51.0 R.U
KLM Royal Dutch Northwest Airlines USA***** 49.0
Garuda Airlines Indonesia C.A
Mexicana Mexico C.A
Japan Airlines (JAL) Japan C.A
Air Nippon Cargo Japan C.A
Lufthansa American Airlines USA C.A
attempted 1993 failed
United Airlines USA C.A
attempted 1993 failed
Air New Zealand New Zealand C.A
Cathay Pacific Hong-Kong C.A
Japan Airlines Japan C.A
Canandian Airlines Canada C.A
Garuda Airlines Indonesia C.A
Aeromexico Mexico C.A
SABENA All Nippon Airways Japan C.A
Air Canada Canada C.A
Garuda Airlines Indonesia C.A
Thai Airways Thailand C.A
United Airlines USA C.A
SAS Continental Airlines USA 18.4
Ladeco Chile 35.0
Thai Airways Thailand C.A
Canadian Airways Canada C.A
Air New Zealand New Zealand C.A
All Nippon Airways Japan C.A
TAP Air Portugal52 Varig Colombia C.A
TAAG Angola C.A
* Not available. ** Result unknown. *** Co-operative Alliance. **** Uruguayan government had privatized its national airline 
***** With only 25 per cent voting stock
Sources: Doganis, 1994: 17, 18, 21, 24; Financial Times, 12 Nov. 1990: 2; ITF News of Nov. 1991: 31, of Jan./Feb. 1993: 30, and of 
Nov. 1992:14,16; ITF Report, 1992: 30-34, 99-106; Vima Greek newspaper, of 7 Feb. 1993: 24, and of 12 Sept. 1993: 26; Williams, G., 
1993:110-117,144.
49BA was the dominant UK and European airline in transatlantic traffic, flying to 10 American gateways or hubs from four UK airports.
50 This was the biggest attempted equity deal of all, the combined operations of which were to link the world's biggest international air- 
network with the third biggest US domestic one. However on 24 December 1992 Clinton's presidential victory p it paid to it  US airlines 
had exerted intense pressure on the US government and made it a main feature in the election campaign that the UK would not concede 
sffi "open skies” air treaty with the US/UK talks. The deal would have given BA access to the US market, while US airlines were barred 
from the European one. As a matter of fact both sides were guilty of excesses. Bob CrandaH, the president of American Airlines, went as 
tor as to threaten that he would pirf his airline up for sale if the deal went through, while BA and USAir had threatened the loss of 
hundreds of US aircraft-manufacturing jobs by switching their aircraft purchases away from American Boeing to the UK/German/French/ 
Spanish Air Bus, if the deal should be blocked.
B Iberia also bid for stakes In the Dominician airline Dominicana de Aviacion, and in Paraguay's Lineas Aereas Paraguayas (LAP).
52TAP Air Portugal also attempted to build links with the Brazilian airlines VASP and Trans-Brazil.
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Table 6.7 below ranks the twelve national airlines in the EC and the 
international air-transport markets in terms of revenue between 1989 and 
1991 (at 1991 prices). It shows that the various strategies to cut costs, create 
groupings etc. bore fruit especially for AF, which improved its position from 
ninth place to third between 1989 and 1991. BA fared much less well, and 
actually deteriorated steadily over this period despite its concerted practices to 
the contrary. The ratings of these EC airlines, of course, depend also on 
factors extraneous to their individual performances, and in addition are 
affected by e.g. US and Asiatic/Pacific carriers, their operations, their 
bankruptcies and so forth.
Table 6.7: International and EC Ranking of the Twelve Member-States National
Airlines in Terms of Revenue (1989-1991. at 1991 steady prices)
Airline
1991
International Ranking 
1990 1989
Air France 3 S3 3 9
Lufthansa 5 4 6
British Airways 6 5 4
SAS 12 12 13
Alitalia 14 15 15
KLM 15 19 18
Iberia 19 18 19
SABENA 35 44 35
Aer Lingus 39 39 40
Olympic Airways 51 47 47
TAP Air Portugal 47 50 n.a.*
Luxair 89 95 86
* Not available
Sources: Airline Business Sept. 1990: 54-57, Dec. 1990: 11, and 1992: 98-101; Doganis, 
1994: 17; Financial Times. 26 June 1990; ITF Report, 1992: 30.
S3First and second place went to the US airlines United and American.
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Some EC airlines, and especially the champions, while attempting to 
achieve air-transport marketing benefits from large-scale operations, also saw 
the need to operate on commercial rather than public-service criteria, and to 
use cost-cutting strategies and new marketing tools.
The first objective of the EC's commercial air transport as a whole was 
the partial or entire privatization of state-owned airlines. On the one hand this 
would relieve the member-countries' governments of the heavy financial 
burden their airlines represented, as well as free them of unpalatable political 
choices; on the other it would allow the airlines to cut costs and increase 
profits by adopting tougher labour policies and tackling union rules and actions 
that were protecting inefficient labour practices. Nevertheless, although most 
of the EC's national airlines had drawn up plans for privatization they were not 
prepared to implement them, because selling the airline to private interests 
would have meant selling it at far below its actual value. Besides, privatization 
was obviously no panacea for the industry's ills. EC champions like AF and 
LH, which retained majority state-ownership after having been re-organized, 
acted like private companies; the other two champions, BA and KLM, having 
been privatized or largely so prior to 1987, still behaved as if they were state- 
owned and constantly required government protection of one kind or 
another.54 G. Ryde, national secretary of the UK's Transport and General 
Workers Union, expressed his opinion
" Capital and politics were always interdependent but not in air-transport. It is not 
a politico-economic conspiracy between capitalists and politicians, but today I 
believe that it is not politics that control the EC air transport any more but 
capital" (interview 5 June 1991).
Table 6.8 depicts the state shares in the ownership of the twelve EC 
members' national airlines (end of 1993). It shows that most of the EC national
^Information from author’s interviews with D. Cockroft (19 June 1991); A. Corcondilas (18 Jan. 1991); J. P. Meheust (23 
Nov. 1990); G. Ryde (5 June 1991). See also ITF Report, 1992: 9-13.
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Table 6.8: State-Ownership of the Twelve EC National Airlines (1993).
Airline Ownership (%)
Aer Lingus 100.0
Iberia 100.0
Olympic Airways 100.0
TAP Air Portugal 100.0
Air France 99.0
Alitalia 89.6
Airline Ownership (%)
Luxair 69.0
SABENA 54.7
Lufthansa 51.0
SAS 50.0
KLM 38.2
British Airways 0.0
Sources: ITF Report, 1992: 99-105; Williams, G., 1993: 159-83.
airlines remained state owned. Only KLM has a majority of private interest and 
BA is fully privately owned.
Of all of the EC national airlines, it was especially those privately-owned 
(BA and partly KLM) that were doing all they could to bypass the air-transport 
unions. They endeavoured to break restrictive labour rules and policies in 
concerted efforts to reduce both the numbers of their personnel and the unit 
cost of labour - the chief items in their operating cost55 - and did so even more 
determinedly from early 1991 and all through 1993 as a result of the Gulf 
crisis. Meanwhile the champions AF and LH and all other smaller national 
airlines, although they did not rule out lay-offs, had done everything possible to 
avoid lay-offs through natural wastage - mainly early retirement and non­
renewal of fixed-term contracts - and the renegotiation of pay packets and 
conditions of employment (reduction in wages, two-tier wages, flexible and 
more intensive working practices and increased use of part-time and 
temporary employees, especially among cabin crew and maintenance staff). 
So LH had negotiated a two-tier wage system and introduced a new system 
for calculating shift-pay; Aer Lingus introduced multi-skilling and almost total
“ All other major operating costs are mentioned in Table 2.3.
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integration of craft skills; and SAS imported a "lean production" method from 
the Japanese auto industry, which involved a radical overhaul of traditional 
working practices to end strict demarcation of work duties, and asked ground 
staff to cut down turn-around times from 25 to 15 minutes. AF recruited 
students as seasonal cabin crews and maintenance staff, while TAP Air 
Portugal hired cabin crews on six month temporary contracts which it then 
constantly renew. KLM obliged its employees to forego its contributions to their 
pension scheme, British Airways in 1993 was planning to cut holiday-pay 
supplements, and in the same year, SABENA negotiated wage cuts with its 
workforce ranging from 2.5 to 17 per cent. In 1991 alone the AEA member 
airlines reduced their total workforce by 3 per cent (19,000 employees), the 
largest reduction on record in any one year.56
Table 6.9 below depicts the capital to labour utilization ratio of selected 
EC airlines in 1990. It demonstrates that BA with 4.34 per cent had the highest 
utilization ratio, which however, was well below from the figure of 7.61 of an 
average low-cost airline. On the other hand, KLM in second place with 3.27, 
SAS with 3.26, and TAP Air-Portugal with 3.09 are around the utilization ratio 
of the high cost average (3.10). Finally, Iberia with 2.89 and Alitalia with 2.19 
are far below the high-cost average, meaning that those carriers could not 
operate efficiently or effectively because their labour costs amounted to 
approximately a third and a half of their respective operating revenues.
Table 6.10 below illustrates the relationship between airline labour 
costs and productivity, and the percentage of labour costs in the total 
operating costs of selected EC airlines in 1990. The most productive employee 
is the one from LH with 258,000 available tonne/km (ATK) per employee. 
Second comes KLM with 256,000 ATK, and third BA with 247,000 ATK.
“ information from author's interviews with D. Cockroft (19 June 1991); Y. Enderle (7 Dec. 1990); S. Howard (3 June 
1991); G. Ryde (5 June 1991). See also AEA Yearbook. 1992; Doganis, 1994: 18-19; Gallacher, April 1991: 25; ITF 
Report, 1992: 41-44; ITF News of Jan./Feb. 1993: 30, and July 1993: 19-23; Transport and General Workers' Union. 
1990. Ch. VII will examine in detail the labour unions' responses to such EC airline actions.
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Table 6.9: 1990 Capital to Labour Utilization Ratios (in 000 of US $)
Airline Operating Labour Utilization
revenues costs ratio
BA 6,856,700 1,576,934 4.34
SAS 3,180,600 974,581 3.26
Alitalia 2,064,100 939,143 2.19
KLM 2,798,600 855,778 3.27
Iberia 2,840,400 980,640 2.89
TAP 729,000 235,811 3.09
Average high-cost airline 3.10
Average low-cost airline 7.61
Source: Interavia Aerospace Review, Sept. 1990: 711.
Table 6.10: 1990 EC Airlines' Labour Costs and their Percentage of Total 
Operating Costs (productivity measurement: available 
tonne/km (ATK) per employee)
Airlines ATK per Wage costs per Labour cost Total operating
employee employee per 000 ATK costs %
__________ (000)______ (in 000 $)_______________________________
AL 198 62.1 314 35.9
BA 247 40.0 162 24.6
KLM 256 38.8 152 32.5
LH 258 51.7 200 30.3
SAS 143 48.6 340 31.9
Source: Airline Business, April 1991:25.
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Surprisingly, SAS with 143,000 ATK is the lowest, next to AL with 198,000. 
Moreover, the LH employees, as the most productive, are much better paid ($ 
51,700) than BA’s employees with $ 40,000 who, however, are comparatively 
far below paid as concerning their productivity. The lowest wage cost per 
employee were those of KLM ($ 38,800), although its employees were the 
second highest in productivity. By contrast AL, with the second lowest ATK, 
had the highest wage cost per employee ($ 62,100). As a result, LH is the 
third-lowest airline in terms of labour cost (200,000 ATK per employee), 
second to BA (162,000), with KLM in first place with 152,000 ATK labour cost. 
Increasingly enough, while AL had the highest wage cost per employee, its 
labour cost per 000 ATK amounted to only 314, coming in second place after 
SAS with 340. Naturally SAS with the least productive employees, had the 
highest labour cost per 000 ATK. Finally we see that BA, the only wholly 
privatized airline, had the lowest percentage of total operating costs (24.6), 
well below that of the second-place LH (30.3 percent); the wholly-state own 
AL, operating within a very strict regulatory environment, had the highest total 
operating cost of all (35.9 per cent).
Table 6.11 depicts planned and actual lay-offs for the twelve national 
EC airlines from 1987 to 1993. The list is headed by BA, for reasons 
discussed below. The next highest lay-offs were SAS, with 9,500 total and AF 
with 5,400.
Another way of getting around existing labour agreements was for 
national airlines to set up or operate low-cost subsidiaries in their domestic 
and other EC country markets for short-haul EC and international air transport. 
This measure also allowed more decentralized bargaining units, and resulted 
in more flexible terms of employment. For example, after serious labour 
disputes BA formed Deutsche BA in 1992 in Germany as well as British 
Airways Regional operating transatlantic routes from Birmingham and
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Table 6.11: Actual and Planned Job Cuts Between 1987 and 1993.
Airline Actual lay-offs Planned lay-offs
British Airways 15,00057
4.600 (1991)58
1.600 (1992)
Yes
Scandinavian Airline (SAS) 3,500
6,000(1992)
Yes
Air France 5,400s9 (1990-1993) 4,000
SABENA 3,200 (1992)60 None
Iberia 3,000 (1992) Yes
Lufthansa 1,800 (1992) 3-6,000 
(end of 1994)
Aer Lingus 1,500 Yes
Alitalia None None
KLM Dutch Airlines None None
Luxair None None
Olympic Airways None None
TAP Air Portugal None 1,500
Sources: Doganis, 1994: 18; Gallacher, April 1991: 25; ITF News. Jan./Feb. 1993: 30; ITF 
Report, 1992: 45, 91.
57During the private-ownership period (1986-1987) lay-offs were part of the redundancy process.
“ Equivalent to 12 per cent.
593,000 of them after the AF merger with UTA in January 1991.
“ Planned as part of a two-year restructuring programme resulting from the Air France/Sabena merger.
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Manchester; Aer Lingus created Aer Lingus Express; LH set up Lufthansa 
Express in 1993; and AF maintained a multitude of air links with small airlines 
such as TAT and Crossair, and KLM did likewise with Air Littoral. Finally LH, 
KLM, and Iberia used their low-cost subsidiary charter airlines (Condor, 
Transavia and Viva Air respectively) to operate scheduled services in leisure 
markets.61
Furthermore, EC national airlines in high-wage economies such as 
those of Germany, France, and Italy started to move certain activities from 
their domestic air-transport markets to other countries where wages were 
rather lower. For example LH set up Shannon Aerospace to provide major 
aircraft-overhaul and maintenance facilities, taking advantage of much 
reduced labour costs in Ireland. AF subcontracted some of its Boeing 737 
maintenance to its cheap-labour partner, the Czech airline CSA in Prague. 
Alitalia, in attempting to expand into the US air-transport market and to build 
up a commanding position on transatlantic routes between the USA and Italy, 
has ignored certain basic requirements of US labour law and abused its US 
workers in a way that would be illegal in Italy (by exploiting the US labour-law 
flexibility against trade unionism).62
The champion airlines in the EC, finally, trying to maintain commercial 
operations while coping with the increasingly complex tariffs resulting from 
greater pricing freedom, introduced management-marketing techniques such 
as the computerized yield-management system (VMS), "frequent flyer 
programmes" (FFP),63 code sharing64, leasing,65 and franchising.66 They even
61 Interview with M. Ambrose (30 May 1991). See also Doganis, 1994:19; ITF Report, 1992: 58-59; ITF News of Jan./Feb. 
1993: 30, and July 1993: 20-23; Gallacher, Sept 1990: 72; Katz, Feb. 1991: 32-41.
“ Doganis, 1994:19; ITF News. April 1993:14.
63 Both identical to those used by US airlines discussed in ch.l.
“ While code-sharing was not a new phenomenon in Europe, it had usually involved a smaller airline using a larger 
airline's flight code as a way of increasing its markets profile and attracting feeder traffic. The smaller airline might or 
might not be part-owned by the larger one.
“ Leasing reduces an airline's heavy capital costs, and enables the legal responsibility for the aircraft to be transferred 
from the state of registry to the operator. Ireland supplies one of the world's largest leasing fleets of aircraft through the 
GPA Group, a worldwide major leasing company. See Booth, Dec. 1989: 54; Sochor, 1991: 207-12.
“ This involves the franchised use of a larger and well known airline's name, aircraft livery, flight codes, and brand image 
by a new smaller and unknown feeder airline, which pays a fee. One consequence of such a franchise is that the newer 
airline no longer poses a potential threat to the larger carrier. Doganis, 1994: 21.
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hired professional management consultants such as Mackinsey of the USA 
and Indevo of Sweden.67
Examples of the above practices are BA's introduction in 1990 of a 
frequent-flyers air-miles scheme in Europe, which allots air miles to 
passengers not only for actually flying but also for using certain shops, banks, 
hotels or gas stations. In October 1993, following signature of a new USA- 
Germany air services agreement, LH and the US airline United promptly 
announced a new code-sharing agreement. In the summer of 1993 KLM 
developed code-sharing on transatlantic routes with the US airline Northwest; 
and AF created a leasing company on some islands belonging to the 
Netherlands and in the Carribean. Early in 1993 BA agreed a franchise with its 
Gatwick-based airline City Flyer Express which since then is operating as 
British Airways Express. A similar agreement was made between BA and the 
Danish airline Maersk to operate services from Birmingham, and between the 
independent UK airline Virgin Atlantic68 and the new Greek entrant airline 
South-East European Airlines (SEEA) to operate between Athens and London 
(Gatwick) in June 1993.69
Below, the specific strategies in the domestic, EC, and international air­
transport markets of two national airlines will be examined - one a winner and 
the other a loser. Both were strong proponents of quick and far-reaching 
liberalization of the EC air-transport market. They are the EC champion and 
privately-owned BA of the UK, and the smaller and state-owned Aer Lingus of 
Ireland. These two cases are a good illustration of the fact that a small airline 
without access to EC politiking has no chance of survival in such a competitive 
market unless subsidized by state funding. BA, on the other hand, while 
operating entirely on private funding, could go from strength to strength by
^ITF Report, 1992: 70.
6SVirgin Atlantic was established in 1984 by Richard Branson as a cargo airline and then became a passenger carrier.
Today it is the second biggest airline in the UK and operates as a scheduled airline.
“ interview with J. P. Meheust (23 Nov. 1990). See also Doganis, 1994: 20-21; Vima Greek newspaper of 11 April 1993:
44, and 17 Oct. 1993:47.
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relying on unethical practices, not excluding blackmail, as well as on the 
indirect backing of its government. The comparison also shows that 
liberalization itself was not enough to result in a commonly adopted policy for 
EC air transport as a whole.
3.1. British Airways
BA, the airline vociferously canvassing and issuing declarations for fair 
competition and multi-designation of airlines in the EC air-transport market, 
nevertheless acquired a rather controversial reputation for itself with its 
unprecedented moves for consolidation against both its domestic and EC 
competitors, as well as its anti-labour practices.
Having transformed itself from a sluggishly bureaucratic national airline 
into a productive and profitable private one, BA was the most successful at the 
EC level, not only in acquiring airlines from other member-countries but 
especially in penetrating the other two largest EC air-transport markets - those 
of France and Germany. The slow pace of air-transport liberalization in the 
Community was in fact highly beneficial to BA, in that it allowed the company 
ample time for adaptation, a process that differed completely from the tenor of 
BA's public pronouncements on the issue and the speed it urged at the EC 
meetings.70
After its privatization in 1986 BA changed its consensual industrial- 
relations style of public-sector services for the more aggressive profit-geared 
style of private sector business. Its new structure of corporate management 
imposed new working conditions following minimal consultation with the 
unions. BA had frozen all recruitments, cut capital expenditures, halted 
overtime, and offered its staff unpaid leave or shorter working hours. The new
^Interview with S. Webb (4 June 1991). See also Doganis, 1994: 18; ITF News. Oct. 1992: 8; and British Airways
Manifesto for air-transport in Europe. May 1991.
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method of management (originally introduced in the US airline industry during 
the deregulation process) also included massive lay-offs, the creation of 
counter-union employment, and the contracting-out to private tenders of 
activities such as catering, aircraft cleaning, maintenance, loading and 
baggage handling and security. It made BA into what is known as a "core 
airline", one which considers as truly indispensable for an airline only its 
aircraft and the cockpit and cabin crews.71
On 4 June 1993, however, the first ever and biggest national strike in 
the history of the airline forced the company to recognize that its days of 
cavalier management were over. BA was forced to agree that every major 
company policy, whether it was contracting out, overseas-based cabin crews, 
or the set up of a subsidiary, had to be negotiated and required the approval of 
the unions. In the end BA had to draw up and sign a staff charter. No other 
company in the UK had ever been obliged to accept such directives for its
future decision-making.72
On the home front, and consonant with its treatment of personnel, BA 
set about quite systematically to eliminate or buy out the other UK airlines. It 
was ready to pay any price, and frequently threatened and even blackmailed 
the UK government when it baulked at the company's ruthless activities. In 
1990, for instance, BA rigorously opposed the slot allocation proposal by the 
Commission and the UK government's wishes that there should be slot- 
sharing at UK airports with competitors of BA such as Air UK, Brittania,73 
British Midland, and Virgin Atlantic. It should be mentioned that the above­
listed UK airlines were flying relatively small aircraft, operated at high costs, 
were expanding very slowly, and had a rather limited impact in the UK market.
71 Information from author's interviews with D. Cockroft (19 June 1991); S. Howard (3 June 1991 and 4 April 1993); G. 
Ryde (5  June 1991). See also Doganis, 1994:18-19; Gallacher, April 1991: 25; Financial Times of 18 Jul. 1991: 2, and 1 
Feb. 1991; ITF Report, 1992: 55-57; ITF News of April 1991: 13, and July 1993: 19; Pilling, Dec. 1990: 710-14; Vima 
Greek newspaper, 29 Nov. 1992: 37.
72ITF News. July 1993:19.
^Brittania was the largest UK charter carrier which later became a scheduled airline.
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Nevertheless BA succeeded in keeping them out of the country's airports, 
arguing that to let them in it would be detrimental not only to its own domestic 
operations, but above all because it would allow other EC airlines to penetrate 
the UK airports while remaining protected in their own. BA more than once 
considered the actions of its domestic competitors as a casus belli. It alleged 
that they were constantly scheming to take away bits from BA in order to 
expand, and it denounced the government's slot-sharing policy as not at all a 
move to promote expansion or competition, but an attempt to curtail BA's 
interests in favour of the other UK airlines. All complaints by BA's rivals 
concerning its unethical behaviour and allegations of predatory practices, 
whether addressed to the UK government or the EC Commission, were in 
vain.74 Lord King, the then chairman of BA, publicly disclosed that in its 
agreement with Britain's conservative government
" BA had been given assurances at the time of privatization that there would be
no arbitrary changes in its routes and in regulatory policies.” 75
Another instance of BA's ruthlessness was the warning that the 
company would drop its planned purchase of Dan-Air, so causing a great 
many more unemployed, if the UK government should refer the proposed 
take-over to its Monopolies and Mergers Commission.76
Eventually as a result of its unfair dealings with its competitors and 
specifically a smear campaign against UK's Virgin Atlantic Airlines, BA was 
taken to court by the latter and in January 1993 ordered to pay damages of 
3.5 million pounds (approximately the amount it had saved in its cost-cutting 
programme). BA's president Lord King retired shortly after the court finding, 
and was succeeded by Sir Colin Marshal, until then BA's vice-president.77
74Doganis, 1994:18, 22; Financial Times of 3 May 1990: 26, of 5 Oct. 1990, of 24 Jan. 1991: 20, of 1 Feb. 1991, and of 8 
Dec. 1992: 2; ITF News. Nov. 1992:16.
75Financial Times, 1 Feb. 1991.
7aITF News. Nov. 1992:16.
77ITF News. Jan./Feb. 1993: 30: Vima Greek newspaper, 22 Nov. 1992: 36.
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Although badly hit by the national and worldwide economic recession 
and the Gulf War, purely on the business side, BA in 1990-91 in Europe only 
(including UK domestic operations) reported revenues of over Pounds 1.9 bn. 
It nevertheless had a deficit of Pounds 34 m., but the revenues of the BA 
group as a whole, amounting to over Pounds 4.9 bn, produced a final surplus 
of Pounds 167 m. Also, BA was one of the most profitable airlines in the entire 
world. It reported a 345 million pounds net profit, and forecast a 230 million 
pounds profit for the next twelve months - while its competitors were predicting 
losses which indeed became a reality in 1992, as shown in Table 6.1 above.78
3.2. Aer Lingus
Aer Lingus was a state-owned airline in the forefront of the movement 
to liberalize EC air transport. Already in 1986 it had introduced a greater 
pricing freedom on the Dublin-London (Luton airport) route, along with the new 
independent Irish airline Ryanair and BA. During the financial year 1987-1988 
it recorded a profit of 15.2 Irish pounds. It was also the first to take full 
advantage of the "fifth freedom" provisions by developing first Manchester 
airport and then Birmingham as new EC hubs and key components of its 
strategy. When its services between Birmingham and the main EC hubs, 
especially Brussels, did not prove successful, the airline decided to 
concentrate on Manchester. From 28 March 1988 onwards Aer Lingus flew to 
several European destinations from Manchester (Dublin-Manchester), 
including Amsterdam, Brussels, Copenhagen, Hamburg, Paris, and Zurich, 
representing a catchment area of some 20 m. to 22 m. people - a huge market 
compared to the domestic Irish one.79
78Financial Times of 1 Feb. 1991, and of 1 Aug. 1991; Transport and General Workers' Union fTGWU) News Bulletin. 
1990.
79Financial Times of 26 May 1988, and of 22 Jan. 1990: 2.
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At the beginning of 1991 Aer Lingus realized that big flag carriers were 
going to capture the EC and European market for themselves by engaging in a 
series of non-aggression pacts or absorbing smaller airlines before the 1993 
deadline, when the liberalization policy was to go into full force. C. Mullan, the 
airline's chief executive, commented somewhat bitterly that
" A major problem with airline deregulation in Europe is that everybody currently 
pays lip-service to the idea of liberalization, but everybody has a tendency to 
cheat."80
In these circumstances the airline's management decided it could not 
wait until the end of 1992 to further liberalize its air transport and attempted to 
dynamically claim its own share from the European market. It accordingly 
started on a campaign for an EC air-transport policy that would give the 
smaller airlines greater access to the market and prevent the champions from 
setting up cartels prior to 1993. Since Aer Lingus was a very small airline in a 
country of 3.5 m. people located on the periphery of Europe, a key part of its 
strategy for the 1990s was to move beyond dependence on business in and 
out of Ireland. In 1990 air transport to Ireland was double that of 1987 and had 
risen to 3.6 m. people, while it accounted for about 60 per cent of Irish-UK 
travel business. Another factor boosting air-travel had been the continuing 
emigration of about 30,000 people a year from Ireland to the UK, many of 
them of the younger generation.81
Furthermore, in 1990 Aer Lingus believed that expansion of its services 
to Europe would be a major factor in its talks with other airlines seeking 
partners to boost their competitiveness. The airline did not seem particularly 
eager to play a leading role in one or other of the big European airline 
groupings taking place in the period 1987-1993. Neither was it willing to be 
drawn into a broad alliance of airlines from various peripheral European
^Financial Times of 22 Jan. 1990: 2.
81 Financial Times of 22 Jan. 1990: 2.
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countries, but while this was a project that looked attractive on paper, it was 
never realized in practice. In fact, as noted earlier, Aer Lingus seemed more 
anxious to expand its European and North American services than enter into 
any new grouping. It should not go unmentioned that while seeking new 
openings to expand its airline services, Aer Lingus was one of the first airlines 
to consider the cyclical nature of aviation profits by seeking other activities to 
underpin its airline core business.82
In 1990 however, Virgin Atlantic and British Midland came into the 
Dublin-London market, and altogether six airlines were involved in a cut-throat 
price-cutting war on fares, eventually offering unrestricted fares that were less 
than half the normal economy price. Aer Lingus could not hold out such 
frenzied competition, especially in the climate of the Gulf-crisis recession, and 
by the end of 1992, had accumulated losses exceeding 90 million Irish 
pounds, plus debts of over 600 million Irish pounds. The same general 
economic environment had caused BA in 1990 to discontinue all its flights to 
the Republic of Ireland after 44 years of uninterrupted service.83
As a result, early in 1993 the Irish government, a determinedly 
liberalizing force in the EC air-transport market, was obliged to seek the EC 
Commission's approval of a 400 million Irish pound grant to its state-owned 
airline in financial aid. Somewhat later it requested permission to provide 
additional funds of 175 million as part of a package deal involving extensive 
job cuts to reduce operating costs by 10 per cent or (Ipounds 50 m. annually), 
so as to staunch the losses that were running at Ipounds 1.2 m. a week. State 
investment in Aer Lingus became a quite major issue in the 1992 general 
election, and the results in a number of Dublin constituencies were decisively 
affected by debates on whether Aer Lingus should be sold off or not. The 
Commission's policy on state-aid to Aer Lingus was also being challenged by
“ Financial Times of 22 Jan. 1990: 2.
“ Doganis, 1994:19; Financial Times of 22 Jan. 1990: 2, and 1 Feb. 1991; Reed, Oct. 1989: 37; The Sunday Times. 14 
June 1987.
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British Midland, Aer Lingus1 main rival on the Dublin-London route. British 
Midland’s management argued that Aer Lingus' financial problems were partly 
caused by exaggeratedly low fares on the above route, and partly because the 
Irish airline (although roughly the same size as British Midland) in 1987 
employed 8,000 people compared with British Midland's 2,500. On 31 March 
1993 the Aer Lingus net debt stood at of Ipounds 540 million.84
At the same time the carrier's financial problems brought conflicts 
between the airline management and the trade unions, as well as party- 
political disputes at national level. B. Cahill, as the new Aer Lingus president 
charged by the Irish government unconditionally to restore Aer Lingus' 
financial and market position, ordered the lay-off of 500 airline employees from 
the airline's 5,500 workforce, raising the spectre of compulsory redundancies 
which the trade unions pledged themselves to fight. In the end the airline 
management and unions agreed on a complex three-phase conciliation and 
arbitration procedure through Ireland's Labour Relations Commission, to be 
concluded before the deadline on 31 October 1993. Then, halfway through 
1993, senior figures within the Labour Party, the junior partners in the coalition 
government, saying they would not support compulsory redundancies, 
threatened a dangerous split in the coalition and a possible government crisis. 
Finally, there was a serious warning from the banks that the financial taps to 
the carrier would be turned off if a rescue plan was not in place by late 
summer.85 As far as I know, neither of these dire possibilities was realized. 
Meanwhile, Aer Lingus continues to operate normally.
4. Conclusion
The EC airline industry was not a collectively homogeneous policy 
community in the EC's policy networks. On the contrary: there were serious
^ Financial Times of 22 Sept. 1993: 30, and of 28 Sept. 1993:19; Vima Greek newspaper, 21 Mar. 1993: 34.
85Financial Times of 22 Sept. 1993: 30, and of 28 Sept. 1993:19; ITF News. Jan./Feb. 1993: 30.
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and irreconcilable divergences between national and private air-transport 
interests that brought all EC airlines into serious conflicts with each other. The 
AEA umbrella group, which represented among others the twelve EC member- 
countries' national airlines, played a central role in shaping the Community's 
air-transport policy and decision-making process, and in slowing down the 
pace of air-transport liberalization.
From 1987 onwards it was not air-transport liberalization as such that 
had the major impact on the EC airline industry, but the inevitability of 
international competition in air-transport and the threat of the US and the 
growing Asian/Pacific mega-airlines to dominate the international and EC 
markets. This meant that the main consideration and tactics were concerned 
with sheer survival. In consequence the EC's national airlines, and especially 
the champions, opted not for competing among themselves, but to pursue a 
strategy of concentration involving offensive and defensive alliances and 
mergers with foreign and domestic airlines, so as to prevent independent or 
new airlines from emerging as rivals in the EC air-transport market. Most of 
those latter airlines collapsed quickly and disappeared as separate companies 
through merging with or being partly acquired by one of the national airlines.
In effect the major airlines deliberately delayed liberalization of the EC 
air-transport market, and did not adhere to the economic programme of the 
EC liberalization policy. On the contrary, EC air-transport was becoming 
increasingly oligopolistic, with the big airlines forming de facto cartels, 
suggesting that national airlines would eventually disappear as independent 
units and became parts of conglomerates. At the same time, however, certain 
national airlines that were strong advocates of liberalization or even complete 
deregulation, were nearly bankrupted while others went from strength to 
strength, although they were accused of predatory and consolidation 
practices. So Aer Lingus, while starting out promisingly with fair competition on
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specific air-routes, was then obliged to engage in price reductions and a fare- 
war with other airlines, and very nearly collapsed. On the other hand BA is an 
example of a definite winner. Contrary to its official pronouncements, the 
actual policy of its private interests was growth at all costs. This, of course, ran 
exactly counter the common EC liberalization policy, which envisaged an air­
transport market in which smaller state-owned and independent airlines had a 
chance of expanding. To begin with, the latter would have required amicable 
co-operation for harmonizing the divergent domestic and EC air-transport 
interests, which would have meant joint operational measures and conditions. 
Instead they were faced by out-and-out competition by their co-national 
companies.
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CHAPTER VII
1987-1990: UNIONS RENDERED PASSIVE SPECTATORS IN EC 
AIR-TRANSPORT LIBERALIZATION
"As a major cost item that is under direct management control and of which 
significant savings can be achieved relatively quickly, labour costs have come 
under pressure from airline managements needing to improve their competitive 
positions." (International Labour Organization (ILO), 1988)1
This chapter investigates the internal and external factors that between 
1987 and 1990 impeded the air-transport unions and pilot associations, on 
both the national and the EC level, from influencing the Community's air­
transport policy. The focus is on conflicts among themselves, which were the 
result of divergent national, ideological, and economic interests, and on the 
negative attitudes to them of their countries' airlines and the Commission.
A better understanding of the obstacles in the way of EC air-transport 
unions and pilot associations having a say in EC policy-making may be helped 
by a brief resume of the EC's overall labour policy and the general trade union 
problems and conflicts in the member-countries and in the EC prior to the 
introduction of the air-transport competition policy in 1987.
1. EC Labour Policy and Unions General Problems and Conflicts
In the course of the 1970's the Commission attempted to rectify a 
certain imbalance in industrial relations by encouraging the trade unions to 
organize more coherently at the EC level, and so act as a counterbalance to 
the power of the individual member-countries and the employers, as well as to 
organized capital. For all that the Commission's attitude to the unions was 
ambivalent. While on the one hand it encouraged employers and unions to
1ITF Report, 1992: 39.
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participate in its negotiations, on the other it maintained a certain distance 
because, since member governments would always have the final say, the 
Commission could not in fact guarantee the terms actually negotiated. Besides 
the Commission considered that there was a limit to how far EC employers 
and their unions could be expected to intelligently co-ordinate views at EC 
level. They were, after all, sectional organizations for the protection of their 
members’ interests. In the end, the Commission proposals for establishing 
special committees or work councils in certain production and service sectors 
failed utterly.2
In 1980 the Commission introduced its two most ambitious labour 
market projects: the Vredelinq directive, which concerned the right of 
employees to information and consultation in multinational companies; and the 
Fifth Company Law directive on employees' participation at board-level. Both 
of them failed to apply because of pragmatic imperatives of global competitive 
pressures, if not an ideological shift among EC governments towards politico- 
economic market priorities in the early 1980s.3
In any case they prevented the Commission from fulfilling its self- 
imposed task of balancing the respective power of member-states, employers, 
and employees. In the final instance this meant that the EC trade unions have 
not aspired to set a 'political role’ at the EC, and have thus not produced one, 
defying the forecasts of the early functionalists that social policies would slowly 
coalesce and that the Commission would be the 'motor' of integration.4
At that time (early 1980's) the member-countries and employers were 
generally opposed to tripartite meetings, when employers and trade unions 
(on a formal and regular basis at EC level) would report directly to the 
Commission, without channeling their information through the national
information from author's interviews with D. Cockroft (19 June 1991); C. Deslandes (21 Nov. 1990); S. Howard (3 June 
1991 and 4 April 1993); P. Laprevote (21 Nov. 1990); G. Ryde (5 June 1991); R. Valladon (22 Nov. 1990).
information from author's interviews with D. Cockroft (19 June 1991); C. Deslandes (21 Nov. 1990); S. Howard (3 June 
1991 and 4 April 1993); P. Laprevote (21 Nov. 1990); G. Ryde (5 June 1991).
4Rhodes, 1991: 245.
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ministries. They preferred to keep labour negotiations a national concern and 
to bargain face to face. In defense of their position they argued that the time 
had not yet come for tripartite meetings at the EC level. Existing structural 
rigidities of labour unions, and the huge gap between wages and labour costs 
dividing the richer EC member-states (e.g. Denmark and Germany) and the 
poorer ones (e.g. Greece and Portugal), which was of the order of four or five 
to one, needed to be overcome first. Positive economic integration in the form 
of the adoption of common policies would have to be achieved first if the 
labour market was to become fully mobile. They suggested that until the 
labour market had adjusted to the internationalization of EC industries, it was 
only sensible to substitute capital for labour in bargaining processes with the 
Commission. It was quite obvious that especially the employers were much 
more successful both in co-ordinating their EC/national policies, and in 
lobbying the crucial centers of power at national and EC level, when they were 
not subjected to the unions' restraints and demands.5
The above consideration gave rise to a debate in the EC countries on 
the precise connection between industrial relations and economic 
performance, which questioned the wisdom of corporatism at national level. It 
was pointed out that there had been an overall decline in the efficacy of 
macro-corporatist arrangements in favour of more conflictual forms of 
micro-corporatist arrangements that were emulations of the pluralistic and 
more sectorally-based (decentralized) model of US industrial relations.6
All of the above, plus the unions' traditional mistrust of the EC 
institutions, and the apparent ease with which employers had made successful 
representations to the Commission over the years, made the unions more 
suspicious of the Commission's motives for proposing the participation of trade 
unions in companies structures at the EC level. They alleged that such a 
proposal was almost certainly a matter of political expediency, and a device to
5Gobeyn, 1993: 3-4; Grant 1985:15, 27; Rhodes, 1991: 247-49, 273-75.
6 Gobeyn, 1993: 3-4; Rhodes, 1991: 249.
224
integrate the unions into the market system. The upshot was that the unions 
felt frustrated and alienated, and no longer sought to forge closer links with the 
Commission. They were all too bitterly aware of their weak role and position 
throughout the EC, given that there was no labour legislation at EC level to 
harmonize their rigid national structures and working conditions, and the fact 
that unlike the employers, they had no alternative channels of representation 
at the EC level.7
Specific issues aside at the overall EC level, the trade unions in the 
various EC countries differed considerably in their historical development and 
ideological attitude to the role of workers in the EC. For example unions such 
as the French Confederation Generate du Travail (CGT), and its Spanish 
counterpart the Commisiones Obreras, due to their communist Party links 
were basically hostile to the notion of a united Europe. They refused to join the 
European Trade Union Congress (ETUC), the confederation of all European 
workers, opposed other ETUC members, and took a strong stand against 
worker participation in companies. While the socialist unions were less radical 
and supported parity representation with employers on the board, none of the 
more strongly political groupings were firmly committed one way or another, 
and in fact often divided internally. On the other hand the Christian-democrat 
white-collar unions (in member-states such as Belgium, Denmark, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands) supported one third representation.8
The ideological differences of trade unions were particularly marked 
between France and Germany over the interpretation of objectives such as 
"the control of working conditions" or the "aim to achieve work-force control". 
The latter was understood by the German unions to mean statutory co­
determination on company boards, while the former was perceived by the 
French socialist unions (such as the French Confederation of Workers CFDT, 
and the Belgian General Federation of Workers, FGTB), as aiming to achieve
information from author's interviews with D. Cockroft (19 June 1991); C. Deslandes (21 Nov. 1990); S. Howard (3 June 
1991 and 4 April 1993); P. Laprevote (21 Nov. 1990); G. Ryde (5 June 1991).
“Rhodes, 1991:271.
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the control of the factors of production. The latter declared that trade unions 
did not seek the institutionalization of relations between the two sides of 
industry( which in their opinion, was favouring the work of employers and not 
that of the workers), because this would curtail their freedom to present 
employers with tough demands. They did not believe that it was possible to 
democratize a company structure unless the market economy was utterly 
transformed in respect of ownership of the means of production. They 
considered progress possible only through contractual bargaining from relative 
power positions that were in a constant state of flux. The Dutch, Danish, and 
Luxembourg unionists supported the German approach for the most part; the 
British, Greek, Italian, and Irish unionists were in favour of the French and 
Belgian positions.9 This disparate range of views did not make the task of the 
EC umbrella groups any easier.10
The EC umbrella groups in individual industries and the ETUC 
remained just reasonable interlocutors concentrated at least for the 
dissemination of information from the Commission to the national unions, and 
for producing research papers and proposals to the Commission, but they 
failed to shape a co-ordinated view by all the EC member-state trade unions 
into a coherent lobby. So the unions’ role was distributive with regard to 
information, rather than aggregative with regard to interests.11
Until the mid 1980s the EC as a whole had largely abdicated 
responsibility for any labour input and planning at EC level, and combined 
weak corporatist arrangements (with capital only) and weak pluralist and 
parliamentary arrangements. As a result, the EC was not likely to boost the 
spread of any corporatist arrangements in the way it was applied in its 
member-states political systems.12
“Portugal and Spain were not yet members of the EC.
1 “Rhodes, 1991: 272.
11lnformation from author’s interviews with D. Cockroft 19 (June 1991); S. Howard (3 June 1991); G. Ryde (5 June 
1991). See also ITF Report, 1992: 79, 84.
12Grant, 1985:15, 27; Sargent, 1985: 229-53; Scholten, 1987:140-42; Wallace etal, 1983:46.
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Adoption in 1986 of the Single European Act (SEA) legalized the global 
competitive pressures EC by introducing the philosophy of the Treaty of Rome, 
basically constructed on US politico-economic lines.13 Among other things it 
decided to implement competition policy in the EC air-transport sector. 
However, as in the case of the EC's pre-1986 legislation on production and 
service sectors, there was no provision for harmonizing the member-countries' 
social measures to protect minimum working conditions during the air­
transport liberalization. As a result the SEA implied a threat to existing air­
transport workers' rights both at a national and EC level.14
From 1987 onwards serious internal and external problems in their 
home country and in the EC impeded trade unions and pilot associations from 
gaining access to and participating as equals in the liberalization policy for the 
EC air-transport market. Kept outside the process in terms of actual airline 
practices, their own country, and the EC as a whole, they were reduced to a 
merely passively reactive15 role.16
The internal factors that stood in the way of EC air-transport trade unions 
and pilots associations taking an active attitude towards EC liberalization were 
due to a large number of insoluble difficulties that stemmed from their being 
specific interest-group organizations dependent on their airlines' strategies 
and interests, as well as suffering from ideological, organizational, and elitist 
cleavages of their own.
13lt has been argued that direct US pressure for integration was exerted on Western Europe for the purpose of keeping 
the West European anti-communist governments united against the Soviet threat. On the other hand the USA had a 
vision of a United Europe with politico-economic policies identical to its own and certainly conforming to its own structure 
of a federal system of government. The Truman government’s Marshall Plan aid, to the countries of Western Europe, 
initiated in 1948 had been viewed by academics as the path to European Union and the Common Market. Preben, 1986: 
5-7.
14ITF Report, 1992:41, 74. For a general consideration on EC policies see Rhodes, 1991: 253.
15lt is an incremental and gradual adjustment with marginal change policy which however indicates a conservative 
behaviour.
16 Information from author’s interviews with D. Cockroft (19 June 1991); C. Deslandes (21 Nov. 1990); V. Enderle (7 Dec.
1990); H. Finstfein (5 June 1991); S. Howard (3 June 1991); A. Gosselin (14 Nov. 1990); G. Koutsogiannos (18 Jan.
1991); P. Laprevote (21 Nov. 1990); J. P. Meheust, D. Jullien, and G. Gomez (23 Nov. 1990) T. Middleton (13 June 
1991); G. Ryde (5 June 1991); F. Tack (14 Nov. 1990); R. Valladon (22 Nov. 1990).
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2. Internal Problems of Unions and Pilot Associations
There were a great many reasons for the air-transport labour unions 
and pilot associations failing to play a more assertive role at both national and 
EC level between 1987 and 1990. To take the home front first, the air­
transport personnel enjoyed a very stable, well-paid and glamorous 
employment, and excellent working conditions in an environment without a 
very high degree of emancipation, but a very high level of trade unionism. This 
was because the politico-economic ideology of certain EC member- 
governments had readily met their air-transport unions and pilot associations 
demands. Moreover, the more powerful the EC member-state, the higher the 
social status of its air-transport personnel, and the more prestigious the 
air-transport unions, and vice versa. Also, the smaller the air-carrier, the more 
energetic its unions' policy tended to be. For example the Belgian, French, and 
German air-transport unions owed much of their considerable strength to their 
countries' pro-union legislation. Also the dynamic unions of the Greek airline 
Olympic Airways did not enjoy as high a social status as did those of Air 
France, but had a much more coherent policy towards their employer. As a 
result there had been little friction between the unions and employers and 
generally not much trade-union agitation at all.17
These factors tended to lead the trade unions and pilot associations to 
become moderate organizations, problem-solvers rather than strategy- 
planners. Besides on the one hand they had seen no reason to allocate their 
resources and plot their future policy in the way best suited to counter any 
possible anti-labour practices of their airlines and to deal with vehement 
changes in the EC airline industry. On the other hand the liberalization of the 
EC air-transport market was the second best solution for them and it was only
17lnfbrmation from author's interviews with N. R. Burlough (9 Nov. 1990); Kanganis (22 Nov. 1990); F. Tack (14. Nov.
1990); G. Ryde (19 June 1991).
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natural that they should try to defend the status-quo of the pre-1987 
corporatist and more rigid national air-transport systems in which their own 
entrenched interests were very well accommodated.18
Secondly, although trade-union membership in the EC airline industry 
was virtually 100 per cent, there was a notable lack of militancy. Most of the 
responsibility for this lay with the union officials who did not provide any kind of 
active leadership in terms of discussing issues which affected members and 
what strategies the unions should adopt. The reason for this was that many of 
them were dependent on party politics. The president of the Greek Federation 
of Civil Aviation Unions (OSPA), for instance, was a member of the Pan- 
Hellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) and after he became head of General 
Confederation of Greek Workers (GSEE) he was elected as a PASOK 
member of parliament in the 1993 national elections. On the other hand G. 
Ryde, secretary of Transport and General Workers' Union (TGWU), said 
however, that the EC air-transport liberalization process had created a totally 
new situation and it was advocating an air-transport system different to that 
which the air-transport workers and their unions were used to in their national 
environment. This meant a lot of difficulties, especially with regard to effecting 
a drastic change in many of the basic views and habits held in the aviation 
industry for four decades.19
Another reason for the unions' lack of dynamic action was the absence 
of any joint policy in their own national environment. Finding themselves faced 
with zero-sum choices some of trade unions and pilot associations, especially 
those closer to a more conservative ideology, sympathized with the 
liberalization of the EC air-transport market, while others saw it as inevitable 
and irreversible. There was much debate in the air-transport unions over 
whether they should oppose liberalization at all costs, or whether they should
18 Interview with G. Ryde (19 June 1991).
19lnformation from author's interviews with S. Howard (3 June 1991); G. Koutsogiannos (18 Jan. 1991); G. Ryde (5 June
1991).
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simply opt for the better deal. In other words, although the air-transport unions 
considered liberalization as anathema they said they were obliged by the EC 
to accept it. For example the Belgian Christian-democratic air-transport union 
stated that while the liberalization of the EC air-transport market was welcome, 
the anti-labour practices of the EC airlines were not. Other unions and pilot 
associations however went further and argued that labour-cost reduction was 
a mistaken airline strategy, because it was not the highly paid employees who 
were at the roof of fare increases, but the price fixing by the airlines, which 
was a result of the control over air access exercised by each of the EC 
countries. As long as this situation continued, EC air-transport liberalization 
was nothing other than slashing wages to increase productivity. Finally, other 
unions and pilot associations declared that the Employee Stock Ownership 
Plan (ESOP) policy was excellent for the airlines as well as the unions and 
pilot associations, because it provided incentives for the employees to invest in 
the company's capital, and to increase their own interests in its profitability, in 
addition to facilitating possible promotion into the airlines' management.20
There was, of course, a considerable overlap and interdependence 
between the interest of the trade unions and their airlines, a circumstance that 
made their confrontations much less intense in the air-transport sector than 
elsewhere. While the unions and pilot associations might be fighting their 
airlines to protect their own interests, they would equally fight for these same 
airlines to have the best possible position in Europe and internationally. All of 
the Air France unions - which are very numerous and constantly at 
loggerheads - in the final instance would do anything to ensure that AF 
profited to the utmost in the EC and international air-transport markets.21
“ information from author's interviews with D. Cockroft (19 June 1991); C. Deslandes (21 Nov. 1990); Y. Enderle (7 Dec.
1990); H. Finstfein (5 June 1991); S. Howard (3 June 1991 and 4 April 1993); A. Gosselin (14 Nov. 1990); G. 
Koutsogiannos (18 Jan. 1991); P. Laprevote (21 Nov. 1990); J. P. Meheust, D. Jullien, and G. Gomez (23 Nov. 1990) T. 
Middleton (13 June 1991); G. Ryde (5 June 1991); F. Tack (14 Nov. 1990); R. Valladon (22 Nov. 1990). See also 
Wallace etal, 1983:46.
21 Interviews with D. Cockroft (19 June 1991); J. P. Meheust, D. Jullien, and G. Gomez (23 Nov. 1990).
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Not surprisingly, the most energetic unions were those that had the 
closest relationship with their national airline and its management. Obvious 
examples were the German air-transport unions which understood the LH 
strategy very well and participated in the airline's management. After the 
failure of the December 1989 Strasbourg summit to adopt the Social Charter 
for instance, the Federation of German Industry and the German Trade 
Unions issued a joint policy statement on the charter which met with majority 
approval in the European Parliament even from the non-socialist parties. 
Furthermore in July 1992 president M. W. Mathies of the German transport 
union of Public Service and Transport Workers' Union (OTV), representing 
among others all air-transport workers, met with German Foreign Minister 
Klaus Kinkel to press for scrapping the German-American Air-Traffic Treaty. At 
the end of August the same union reached agreement with LH on a wide 
range of productivity issues and for reducing redundancy measures, as well as 
on the extent of active participation by the employees in the future shaping 
and monitoring of developments within LH.22
However, close links between a country's air-transport unions and 
members' employers did not rule out occasional conflicts concerning the 
extent of the unions' support of the airlines' strategies. So the close 
collaboration between LH and its trade union and pilot association, and the 
latter’s acceptance of a two-tier wage system, threatened other airline unions. 
Especially affected were those of AF, which were apprehensive that, due to 
the AF/LH marketing co-operation, they might find themselves in a similar 
situation to their German counterparts. According to the French trade unions if 
AF was to imitate LH by negotiating a two-tier wage system with them, they 
would take it not only as an anti-labour move, but they would consider it as an 
indirect way of deregulating, instead of liberalizing, the French air-transport
“ interviews with D. Cockroft (19 June 1991); J. P. Meheust, D. Jullien, and G. Gomez (23 Nov. 1990); See also Europe 
1993:119; ITF News. Oct. 1992:10.
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market. On the other hand, according to ITF, BA set up a cabin crew union, as 
a "break away union", which in fact it was ideologically affiliated with the 
conservative UK government, and related to BA's anti-labour strategy.23
Last but not least the air-transport unions and pilot associations were 
beset by major contentions over the latter’s elitist attitude towards the former 
because pilot associations never collaborated and had always negotiated 
separately with the airlines. The unions conceded that undoubtedly the pilots 
were extremely important in their airline's operations and deserved the respect 
accorded to them by airline management. However, if their specialization and 
competency was compared to that of other airline and airport jobs, it had to be 
admitted that all aviation jobs required an equally high level of training and just 
as much experience, and were all equally necessary to get a plane into the air. 
They recalled the occasion of the Australian pilots' strike, which did not have 
the support of the other unions and ended with them all being laid off - 
demonstrating that pilots were no more and no less important than any other 
air-transport employees. The only difference was that although pilots 
accounted for three per cent of an airline's personnel, the fact that their 
salaries represented 35 per cent of the total wage bill made them feel superior 
towards their fellow employees. Aeropa accused the pilot organizations of 
playing a disreputable game, because their elitist attitudes found expression in 
economic demands that they did not feel other employees to be entitled to.24
It was not only pilots who were accused of showing this kind of elitist 
attitude in the national air-transport systems. The pyramid of relative worth of 
the various kinds of airline personnel had the pilots at the top, flight engineers 
in the second layer, then the flight crews, ground hostesses in the fourth layer, 
administrative employees in the fifth layer, and so on. This elitism gradually
“ information from author’s interviews with C. Deslandes (21 Nov. 1990); S. Howard (3 June 1991 and 4 April 1993); J. P. 
Meheust, D. Jullien, and G. Gomez (23 Nov. 1990);P. Laprevote (21 Nov. 1990); R. Valladon (22 Nov. 1990).
24lnformation from author's interviews with D. Cockroft (19 June 1991); P. Jeandrain (27 Nov. 1990); T. Middleton (13 
June 1991).
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diminished in time as the job became less demanding in terms of technical or 
administrative knowledge. In any case, neither the attitude nor the more or 
less rigid hierarchy were equally strong in all EC member countries. In 
Denmark, for instance, the pilots always had a good relationship and close 
collaboration with the unions, and there was no obvious hierarchical ranking in 
the Scandinavian airline SAS.25
Partly because of the various internal rights and problems outlined 
above, the EC air-transport unions and pilot associations failed to establish 
any concrete lobbying, or a bargaining body, to deal specifically with air­
transport matters and/or proposals they were vital for them at EC level. This 
paucity of bodies to defend their interests was due to a number of further 
reasons.26
First the only formal EC body, that of the Economic and Social 
Committee (ECOSOC or ESC) (created under Articles 193-196 of the Treaty 
of Rome) for discussions between employers and the unions, had advisory 
status only, and wielded no power. It was the umbrella groups of the 
International Transport Workers' Union (ITF) and the International Federation 
of Airline Pilot Association (IFALPA) that had for decades represented the 
interest of unions in ail main types of transport throughout the world. The 
Committee of the Transport Workers' Unions in the EC (CTWU) (a link-office 
between the ITF and the EC), and the European Airlines Pilots’ Association 
(Europilote), did the same at the EC level and for all European airline pilots. All 
these groups were operating with quite insufficient financial and human 
resources, and the demands imposed on them by the international nature of 
civil aviation were inevitably much greater than those in other modes of 
transport, and could not be funded by their revenue from the aviation unions'
25 Information from author's interviews with D. Cockroft (19 June 1991); C. Deslandes (21 Nov. 1990); S. Howard (3 June
1991); P. Jeandrain (27 Nov. 1990); G. Koutsogiannos (18 Jan. 1991); P. Laprevote (21 Nov. 1990); J. P. Meheust, D. 
Jullien, and G. Gomez (23 Nov. 1990) T. Middleton (13 June 1991); G. Ryde (5 June 1991); F. Tack (14 Nov. 1990); R. 
Valladon (22 Nov. 1990).
“ information from author's interviews with N. Alexopoulos (7 Nov. 1990); D. Cockroft (19 June 1991); C. Deslandes (21 
Nov. 1990); P. Laprevote (21 Nov. 1990); J. Miart (23 Oct. 1990); G. Ryde (5 June 1991); F. Sorensen (12 Nov. 1990).
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contribution. It was not until December 1988 that the ITF launched a 
worldwide Civil Aviation Week campaign (with leaflets handed out to 
passengers at all airports, press conferences and so forth), which strongly 
opposed deregulation of the international air-transport market. Thereafter, 
however, and until 1990, the ITF Civil Aviation Section met generally only once 
between annual congresses with occasional meetings of the technical 
committees.27
Another reason for the lack of dynamic union involvement was that co­
ordinating actors such as the EC air-transport unions to do something actively 
constructive at EC level is very different from co-ordinating actors to prevent 
something from happening (the latter, even though was much more difficult to 
be achieved, was the ITF's view). However, not only did the EC air-transport 
unions evince little interest in active initiatives, but were not really able to act 
for the reasons enumerated above - especially prior to 1987, when the EC air­
transport system was not yet being hit. An example from the labour union 
congress in Luxembourg in 1986 is characteristic. The ITF's opening address 
on the harmonization of working conditions and qualifications, along with the 
protection of employees' jobs and incomes in a liberalized EC air-transport 
market sparked a massive debate - with the air-transport unions charging the 
ITF leadership with proposing the deregulation of the EC and European air­
transport industry.28 As ITF secretary D. Cockroft noted
" I do not think that if five years ago the ITF had put forward a well-thought-out air 
transport strategy on how air-transport unions should restructure their approach 
to their national and EC aviation industry, any trade union whatsoever would 
have shown the slightest interest in it because then they were actually very 
happy with the status quo" (interview 19 June 1991).
It must also be remembered that the air-transport unions did not as a 
rule seek ties with other unions in the EC. Even in their national environment,
^Interviews with N. Alexopoulos (7 Nov. 1990); D. Cockroft (19 June 1991). See also AEROPA. Bulletin News. Jan. 
1990; ITF News of Mar./April 1988: 7, of Oct. 1988: 6-7, and of Jan. 1989:12-13.
“ interview with D. Cockroft (19 June 1991).
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air-transport unions and pilot associations tended to co-operate haphazardly, 
rather than through formal affiliation or other more permanent arrangements 
for jointly voicing their demands or protests. The EC was both newfangled and 
remote. An example of this attitude is the complete apathy shown by the 
Greek air-transport unions, not only with regard to collaborating with other EC 
unions, but even to becoming members of the ITF and participating in its 
activities. Greece is the only member state the majority of whose civil aviation 
unions do not participate in any ITF meetings. The only unions that did take 
part regularly were ground technicians (ETEM&P) and flight engineers (HFEU) 
- truly minuscule bodies. This almost zero input from the Greek air-transport 
trade unions as a whole has been justified by them as due to their lack of 
personnel and financial resources.29
A final point concerning the apathy of air-transport unions in the EC is 
that they did not at first realize the inability, let alone unwillingness, of the EC 
Commission, to support or satisfy their demands. Even where certain trade 
unions did try to approach Eurocrats of their own nationality, they were unable 
to contact and influence them for varying reasons. As R. Valladon, secretary 
general of the Federation of Transport and Service Workers (FETS-FO), 
remarked
" It is difficult to contact and influence French employees in the Commission 
because they are divided according to their politico-economic ideologies" 
(interview 22 Nov. 1990).
In addition to the internal factors that prevented air-transport unions and 
pilot associations from playing a more active part in the EC's air-transport 
liberalization, there were a number of external ones.
“ information from author's interviews with D. Cockroft (5 June 1991); S. Howard (3 June 1991 and 4 April 1993); C. 
Iddon (30 Oct. 1990); G. Koutsogiannos (18 Jan. 1991); J. Miart (23 Oct. 1990); G. Ryde (19 June 1991); F. Sorensen 12 
Nov. 1990); F. Tack (14 Nov. 1990).
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3. External Problems of Unions and Pilot Associations
As it was pointed in ch. VI, in 1987 the national and EC environment of 
the air-transport workers became unsympathetic. It was heavily influenced by 
neo-liberal ideologies, and the national airlines' response to the exigencies of 
international deregulatory policies that Europeanized/globalized the EC 
champion airlines through transnational coalitions. Although the unions and 
pilot associations were interested in the liberalization of the EC air-transport so 
as to avoid the union-busting30 and social-dumping31 that had accompanied 
the domestic air-transport deregulatory policy in the USA, they nevertheless 
suffered lay-offs and wage concessions.32 Did the EC member-states, their 
airlines, and organized capital, as well as the consumer interest groups (the 
main representatives of social interests) actually initiate the break down of 
their national micro-corporatist arrangements, in a wish to prevent their air­
transport labour force from acquiring an advantageous position at the EC 
level?
The answer has to be in the affirmative, although these developments 
were not a matter of any planned strategy, but an inevitable consequence of 
implementing the competition policy in EC air transport, in the wake of 
worldwide deregulatory pressures that favoured private capital. In these 
circumstances, private capital interests in the independent and national EC 
airlines manipulated their governments, whatever their politico-economic 
ideology, into supporting the specific air-transport interests; and often the first 
priority of private capital was to neutralize organized air-transport unionism.33
30Union busting is direct competition on air-routes by non-union airlines and underpay of air-transport personnel.
31 Social dumping is a consequence of union busting, and affects the trade unions' social terms and collective bargaining 
rights. More specifically it means that disparate levels of social-security and labour protection will tempt companies to 
divert their investments to the lower labour regions and less robustly regulated labour markets which arise as the result of 
divide-and-rule policies in the labour market. See Molle, 1990:16; Rhodes, 1991: 246, 251.
“ information from author's interviews with N. Alexopoulos (7 Nov. 1990); D. Cockroft (19 June 1991); C. Deslandes (21 
Nov. 1990); S. Howard (3 June 1991 and 4 April 1993); P. Laprevote (21 Nov. 1990); G. Ryde (5 June 1991). For a 
general analysis of EC labour problems see Rhodes, 1991: 252.
Information from authors interviews with D. Cockroft (19 June 1991; S. Howard (3 June 1991 and 4 April 1993); G. 
Ryde (5 June 1991).
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On the other hand there was strong opposition against corporatist 
arrangements at any level from consumer interest groups, which in fact 
themselves represented private-capital interests. They denounced corporatism 
as fascist and elitist, since by definition it is against general social well-being 
and promotes the vested interests of a very small group of people - that 
between the state, the employers, and the employees in the civil-aviation 
sector. They accused the EC air-transport unions of being the most extreme 
and conservative forces in the EC, and without any legitimate right to pass on 
the rising cost of inefficient airline operations to the air passengers.34
In this prevailing climate the EC member-countries and their state- 
owned airlines were strongly inclined to rid themselves of the financial burden 
involved, and to break up the existing consensus-based micro-corporatism at 
home in favour of more conflictual arrangements at EC level. In fact the 
Association of European Airlines (AEA) quite clearly voiced its opposition to 
collective EC agreements. It regarded them as "unrealistic" because they 
could be costly and were liable to have a disruptive effect on EC state-owned 
airlines attempting to survive international competition. The AEA urged trade 
unions to radically change their tactics vis-^-vis their governments and airlines, 
and stop being so overbearing and to start co-operating with the airlines to 
support their efforts in a liberalized EC air-transport market. They pointed out 
that it was no longer the job of the unions to decide which strategy private or 
public airlines should follow in the EC, and that their social endeavours must 
necessarily take second place to improving productivity and increasing 
profitability.35
When the International of Transport Workers' Federation (ITF), which 
had lobbied for years for a transnational EC committee on civil aviation,
“ information from author's interviews with S. Crampton (28 May 1991); R. P. Holubowicz (15 Nov. 1990); P. Jeandrain 
(27 Nov. 1990); M. Kanganis (22 Nov. 1990); L. Mosca (7 Dec. 1990); D. Prentice (31 May 1991); J. Sabourin and C. 
Grenier (23 Nov. 1990).
“ information from author's interviews with K. Veenstra (29 Oct. 1990); M. Pisters (12 Nov. 1990); S. Yuksel (31 Oct. 
1990).
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demanded formal status to bargain with the employers and the Commission 
on Commission proposals, the air-transport unions and pilot associations 
found themselves in a power-sharing conflict with Eurocrats. As D. Vincent, 
head of the Directorate C in the DG VII (Transport), stated quite bluntly
" Air-transport policy-making is the job of neither the airlines nor their workers, it 
is the job of the Commission" (interview 7 Dec. 1990).
In fact Eurocrats in the DG IV (Competition), using the delegated 
powers given them by the Council of Transport Ministers for liberalizing the EC 
air-transport market, developed a very single-minded and robust attitude 
towards the civil-aviation unions, and treated their interest groups with haughty 
arrogance. For example, no such union was ever able to gain access to DG IV 
(Competition) Eurocrats.
On the other hand, socialist Commissioners, like the French 
Commission president Jacques Delors and Karel Van Miert or Lord Clinton 
Davis of UK's Labour Party, as well as heads of member-state presidencies 
with ideological labour affinities, made the unions ambivalent and unrealistic 
promises that had no likelihood of ever being fulfilled. The EC air-transport 
unions denounced the marked hypocricy of both member-states and the 
Commissioners. As F. Tack, the national secretary of the General Central 
Public Services of Telecommunication and Aviation of the General Federation 
of Belgian Workers (FGTB-CGSP), stated
" The Commissioners and some member-states with close labour ties always 
talked with big words which never gave us the impression that they ever took 
our real needs into consideration" (interview 14 Nov. 1990).
However, C. Chene, adviser to Commissioner Karel Van Miert of DG VII 
(Transport), counterargued that his boss was always ready to fight for air-
“ infbrmation from author’s interviews with D. Cockroft (19 June 1991); C. Deslandes (21 Nov. 1990); P. Laprevote (21 
Nov. 1990); J. P. Meheust (23 Nov. 1990); G. Ryde (5 June 1991).
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transport union interests, but added
" It is not enough to put on the table of the Council of Transport Ministers an air­
transport proposal perfect in social terms, if there is no chance of it being 
adopted. If the air-transport unions insist on pursuing such totally useless 
practices I wish them good luck” (interview 5 Dec. 1990).
In fact there was a constant official rhetoric encouraging the unions to 
bring their problems to the Commission officials and/or members of European 
Parliament (MEPs), whether individually or collectively, but it was only during 
the pro-union presidencies (Belgian, French, German and so forth) and with 
socialist/left MEPs that the unions succeeded in having regular formal and 
informal contact with them; under the neo-liberal and monetarist presidencies 
(British, Irish, Dutch and so forth) and with the respective MEPs the unions 
soon realized there was no point in even trying to approach them.37
When the European Council (consisting of the leaders of the twelve EC 
member-states) at the Strasbourg summit on 9 December 1989 failed towards 
the end of the French presidency to adopt the social charter (mainly because 
of the sole dissenting voice of the UK), this caused further disillusionment 
among the air-transport unions and pilot associations, as well as throughout 
the EC labour movement. Originally proposed by the Commission president 
Jacques Delors and DG V (Social Affairs) Commissioner V. Papandreou, the 
charter was designed to legalize the fundamental social rights of workers 
throughout the EC.38 It meant to introduce a set of EC regulations to 
counteract the potentially destabilizing consequences of the Single European 
Market (SEM) with respect to the basic social rights of all EC workers, and to 
harmonize all wages and labour costs between the richer and poorer member- 
states. The demand for this had been put forward by the European Trade
37 Information from author's interviews with D. Cockroft (19 June 1991); C. Deslandes (21 Nov. 1990); Y. Enderle (7 
Dec. 1990); S. Howard (3 June 1991 and 4 April 1993); J. P. Meheust (23 Nov.1990); P. Laprevote (21 Nov. 1990); G. 
Ryde (5 June 1991); F. Tack (14 Nov. 1990); R. Valladon (22 Nov. 1990).
^ h e  preliminary draft of the social charter, based on the "opinion” of the Economic and Social Committee (ECOSOC or 
ESC), covered the following areas: (1) freedom of movement; (2) employment and pay; (3) working-time and improving 
conditions; (4) social protection; (5) freedom of association; (6) vocational training; (7) equal treatment; (8) information, 
consultation, participation; (9) health and safety; (10) young workers; (11) the elderly; and (12) the disabled.
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Union Confederation (ETUC), and the social-democrats, socialists, Christian- 
democrats, and the European People's Party in the Strasbourg parliament.39 
At the December 1989 summit J. Delors declared that
"...strengthening the economic power and the social unity of the twelve is the 
essence of the union of the social market economy which both sustains an 
equilibrium of productivity and solidarity and unites the rich and poorer member- 
states" (Bohle, 1990: 120).
The socialist French government, was the most active proponent of 
socially viable Community. It appeared anxious to enshrine its own principles 
of "solidarity" in EC legislation, in part perhaps to protect its home innovations 
in this area against antagonistic French employers and future governments of 
the Right. The period of the French presidency of the EC was of the utmost 
importance for the French government because its negotiations preparing the 
second air-transport package gave it the opportunity for much back-stage 
manoeuvering with the other two strong members of the troika, (especially the 
UK, as mentioned in ch. V) and helped it solve all its major concerns. It is 
interesting to note that the German government, although neo-liberal, under 
pressure from the powerful German unions called for the charter to make 
stronger demands of labour in the EC. Margaret Thatcher of the conservative 
British government, however, described the social charter as "inspired by the 
values of Marxism and the class struggle". Under strong pressure from the 
other eleven countries regarding adoption of the charter, and while partaking 
in the political haggling with France and Germany to solve the troika's overall 
problems in EC air-transport liberalization (see ch. V), the UK remained 
resolutely opposed to any attempts to counter its own deregulatory policies via 
Brussels. Together with Ireland, and to some extent Portugal and Spain, 
Britain expressed itself apprehensive that harmonization of labour-market
“ Bohle, 1990:119; ITF News. Oct. 1989: 3; Keating, 1993: 370; Rhodes, 1991: 254-65, 275-76.
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rules would increase labour costs, and discourage foreign investment. 
However, as mentioned already, there were two other reasons for its stiff­
necked obstinacy. One was that Britain did not wish to appear as having given 
in to the pressure of France and Germany over issues it was well known to 
oppose; the other was pique that the French presidency had in fact achieved 
its overall demands and had emerged from all those political wrangles as the 
winner and the politically most astute of the EC's member-states.40
On the EC level, the employers’ lobby of the Union of Industry (UNICE) 
was implacably opposed both to a new set of transnational regulation, and to 
demands for a pan-EC system of industrial relations in which Euro-bargaining 
between EC unions and employers would become an increasingly important. 
The Commission itself had wavered between an interventionist stance (when 
implicitly advocating a detailed set of EC laws on labour issues) and a 
minimalist one (when pledging itself to the principle of "subsidiarity", which 
limits EC law to those matters that cannot be dealt with effectively by the 
member-countries themselves). The emphasis on "subsidiarity" in the social 
charter was reflected in the Commission's social action programme, designed 
to implement the charter principles. This was a package of 45 social measures 
in 13 main areas, to be presented to the EC Council of Social Policy Ministers 
by the end of 1992.41 However, even by the end of 1993 no real action had 
been taken, and only a very few proposals had been tentatively implemented, 
given the absence of harmonization of working conditions for air-transport 
personnel.42
Although the EC member-countries did not adopt the social charter, the 
French presidency had clearly indicated the future demands of the EC civil-
^ ITF News. Oct. 1989: 3; Rhodes, 1991: 246.
41The major new measures proposed by it were (1) labour market information and documentation; (2) employment and 
remuneration; (3) improvement of living and working conditions; (4) freedom of movement; (5) social protection; (6) 
association and collective bargaining; (7) information, consultation and participation; (8) equal treatment for men and 
women; (9) vocational training; (10) health protection and safety at the workplace; (11) protection of children and 
adolescents; (12) the elderly; and (13) the disabled. See Europe 1993:119-20; Rhodes, 1991: 264-65, 273-76.
42lnformation from author's interviews with D. Cockroft (19 June 1991); C. Deslandes (21 Nov. 1990); Y. Enderle (7 Dec. 
1990); S. Howard (3 June 1991 and 4 April 1993); J. P. Meheust (23 Nov.1990); P. Laprevote (21 Nov. 1990); G. Ryde (5 
June 1991); F. Tack (14 Nov. 1990); R. Valladon (22 Nov. 1990).
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aviation unions and pilot associations. In fact, earlier than the European 
Council summit in December 1989, the French ideological and social 
perspectives, as well as Germany's friendly attitude towards labour, motivated 
Transport Minister M. Delabarre and six EC air-transport unions to call a 
meeting in Paris on 6 October 1989, at which the twelve transport ministers 
and DG VII (Transport) Commissioner Karel Van Miert were invited to 
presented their views in an attempt to reach a social agreement. At this 
meeting the air-transport unions and pilot associations received promises that 
a body would be set up at EC level within the following year (after a decade's 
opposition) to express and negotiate their interests. It would specifically take 
care of the harmonization of their pay and working conditions, particularly in 
the field of personnel licensing, as well as concerning and flight, duty, and rest 
times (FDTL). Ostensibly this was part of a general agreement between the 
French presidency and all member governments, the Commission, and the 
European Parliament, to give the EC a socially "human face" in the 1990's. 
However, the real and major reasons for this change, at least as far as EC air 
transport was concerned were (i) to impart a fast pace to the liberalization 
project, and (ii) to help deal with the problems expected to arise for the twelve 
countries and their national airlines during the period 1990-1993, after the 
adoption of the second air-transport package in the end of 1989.43
4. Conclusion
During 1987-1990, the EC air-transport unions and pilot associations 
were understandably on the defensive, given that the projected liberalization of 
the EC air-transport market definitely ran counter their interests. Their 
opposition had, however, a very different result from that which they were 
pursuing, and resulted in the break-up of their national micro-corporatist
^Information from authors interviews with D. Cockroft (19 June 1991); C. Deslandes (21 Nov. 1990); C. Iddon (30 Oct.
1990); P. Laprevote (21 Nov. 1990); J. P. Meheust (23 Nov. 1990); G. Ryde (5 June 1991). See also ITF News of Sept. 
1989: 21, of Oct. 1989:1-2, and of Nov /Dec. 1989:20.
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structures from consensus-based (strong) arrangements to conflictual (weak) 
ones, reflecting their inability to organize transnational^, and complete failure 
to negotiate at EC level. Not only were the EC civil-aviation employees at that 
time taking no interest in the EC liberalization project, they accepted 
developments entirely passively - which reduced their role to that of a 
spectator. Given that they were also impeded by the Commission, their own 
governments, their airlines, and by problems among themselves, they exerted 
no influence at all on the EC air-transport policy in this period - in the course of 
which the EC legislated two basic air-transport packages to introduce its 
competition policy. In other words, their passivity and all around impediments 
lost them the opportunity for effective participation in the shaping of EC air­
transport policy.
The major reason, however, behind the failure of the Community's air­
transport unions and pilot associations to oppose and perhaps thwart the EC 
liberalization process between 1987 and 1990 was the paradox that, while the 
EC and its member-countries did not have a common air-transport 
liberalization policy, they had maintained a relatively joint labour policy at both 
national and EC levels.
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CHAPTER VIII
1990-1993: ACTIVE REPRESENTATION OF AIR-TRANSPORT 
PERSONNEL
" No carrier can declare war on its workers and successfully re-organize". W. L.
Scheri, airline co-ordinator, International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers, Denver, Colorado, 29 May, 1992.1
This chapter examines how in the early 1990s the majority of the EC 
countries and most national carriers in the Association of European Airlines 
(which had reservations about the pace and implication of EC air-transport 
liberalization), set up a representative body for EC air-transport personnel at 
Community level. The purpose of this body was to prevent the interests of 
private capital from further proliferating in the EC air-transport market, and to 
slow down the EC liberalization process during the period 1990-1993. It is 
shown how the creation of loose micro-corporatist arrangements at EC level, 
for the harmonization of working conditions resulted in further conflicts among 
the EC airlines, on the one hand, and the EC air-transport work force on the 
other, as well as between the two. Despite these difficulties, the civil-aviation 
unions and pilot associations agreed to make common cause, and to 
collaborate more closely with their national airlines against the planned 
liberalization of the EC air-transport market.
As mentioned in greater detail in the preceding chapters, during the 
French presidency (1 July - 31 Dec. 1989), France and Germany, their 
national airlines Air France and Lufthansa, and their respective national 
Commissioners were involved in a great deal of political haggling concerning 
the second air-transport package and the pace of liberalization. As a 
consequence of all these back-stage manoeuvers, it was widely felt desirable 
to slow down liberalization for the time being. Among those wishing for a more 
moderate pace were most of the member-airlines in the Association of
1ITF Report, 1992: 69.
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European Airlines (AEA) and especially so AF and LH; the German AEA 
general secretary K.-H. Neumeister; specific Commissioners on behalf of 
particular national airlines, such as the French president of the Commission J. 
Delors for AF, DG VII (Transport) Commissioner Karel Van Miert for SABENA, 
and DG V (Social Affairs) Commissioner V. Papandreou for Olympic Airways. 
Their specific reasons, and the means used to achieve the slow down, are 
discussed below.2
1. Reasons for Setting up a Transnational Representation
On 1 August 1990 the EC, by decision of the EC Commission, 
established a Joint Committee for Civil Aviation (JCCA). This was an advisory 
body formed by the DG V for Social Affairs,3 to stimulate the social dialogue 
and bargaining process between employers, employees, and the Commission, 
in order to obtain a certain basic level of harmonization in working conditions 
and qualifications of air-transport personnel.4
The JCCA consisted of 54 members representing airlines, airport 
associations, trade unions, and pilot associations, 27 of them employers' and 
27 employees' representatives. The employers' seats were allocated to AEA 
member-airlines (14), to the Independent and Charter Airlines' Association in 
the EC (ACE), the European Regional Association (ERA), the Charter Airline 
Association (ACA),5 and International Civil Airports Association (IACA). The 
employee’s seats were taken by representatives from ITF-affiliated national 
trade unions and the International Federation of Airline Pilots' Associations 
(IFALPA).6 The chairmanship rotated between the two groups every two years, 
and JCCA was planned to meet twice a year.7
information from author’s interviews with D. Cockroft (19 June 1991); S. Howard (3 June 1991 and 4 April 1993).
3 DG V (Social Affairs) was one of the weaker DGs in the EC.
Commission Decision (EC) 90/449 (OJ L 230, 24 Aug. 1990: 22). See Appendix VI11.1.
Charter carriers affiliated with AEA such as Condor, Balair and so forth).
6Pilots had three seats in the JCCA.
information from author's interviews with D. Cockroft (19 June 1991); S.Howard (3 June 1991 and 4 April 1993); G. Rude 
(5 June 1991). See also Chomeley, 1990:117-123; ITF News. Oct. 1990: 7.
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The JCCA’s first joint assembly meeting on 13 September 1990 set up 
four working groups. They were to work on the regulation of "flight, duty, and 
rest time for the cockpit crews" (FDTL);8 and on directives (i) for the 
standardization of working conditions of air-transport workers; (ii) for the 
representation of air-transport employees on airline subsidiaries in the EC; 
and (iii) for the protection and working conditions of air-transport personnel 
required to work in an EC country not their own. The working groups consisted 
of eight members each, four of them trade unionists and four employers' 
representatives. Further meetings were scheduled for 3 October and 6 
November.9
Why did the Commission, the EC member-countries, and their airlines 
establish a representative body to negotiate the harmonization of working 
conditions and qualifications in the air-transport unions and pilot associations 
that had so strongly opposed them in the late 1980s?
First, the establishment of the JCCA is said to have been a kind of 
overdue debt paid by the AEA, and especially its secretary general K.-H. 
Neumeister and Lufthansa, to the EC air-transport unions as the result of a 
secret deal going back to 1984.10 The circumstances were as follows.
Prior to 1987 all twelve of the AEA national airlines were state-owned 
and opposed to any liberalization measures then being suggested by the 
Commission (see ch. III). Since the early 1980's, Germany's LH, the only EC 
airline with a single trade union, had been under particularly strong pressure 
by it to push the Commission to set up a body like the future JCCA. In 1984, 
the German socialist MEP M. Klinkenbourg, rapporteur of the Transport and 
Tourism Committee of the European Parliament at the time, had to present a
®Flight-time limitation put a ceiling on the number of hours cockpit and cabin crews could work.
information from author's interviews with D. Cockroft (19 June 1991); S.Howard (3 June 1991 and 4 April 1993); G. Rude 
(5 June 1991). See also ITF News. Oct. 1990: 7.
interview with R. P. Holubowicz, 15 Nov. 1990.
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report on the Memorandum on Civil Aviation No. 2, which was expected to 
propose radical EC air-transport measures. Because LH and its trade union 
did not want these Commission proposals to be adopted by the Council of 
Transport Ministers such as it was, its ex-employee and future AEA secretary 
general K.-H. Neumeister was asked by LH and its labour union to make a 
deal with the other EC air-transport unions. He was empowered to promise 
them that he would make sure that the AEA and LH would push for the 
creation within the EC of a body to represent the interests of air-transport 
personnel, in turn for the unions supporting the Klinkenbourg report by 
sending a report position on air-transport market liberalization to the socialist 
and communist parties in the European Parliament (EP). LH and H.-K. 
Neumeister knew that the socialist-communist MEP's held the majority in the 
EP, and out of ideological affinity always supported trade-unions interests.11
Why were the AEA secretary general and LH so interested in the 
Klinkenbourg report? It appears that LH had invited Herr Klinkenbourg to its 
headquarters and persuaded him to present to the EP as his own a report 
already drawn up by LH and AEA. He agreed, and the EP adopted without 
changes what became known as the Klinkembourg report. The report was in 
favour of the EC air-transport liberalization but expressed considerable 
misgivings about the pace of its implementation, due particularly to the social 
implications. This in fact implied a further delay of the EC air-transport market 
liberalization. In consequence, despite the member airlines’ opposition to a 
body like the JCCA the AEA secretariat and LH never stopped pushing for it. 
The relentless pressure, erupting at times into bitter animosity between the 
German secretariat and LH and the other member airlines, lasted more than 
six years before the AEA secretary general and LH could redeem its promise 
to its national and EC air-transport unions for having supported the AEA/LH
11 Interview with R. P. Holubowicz (15 Nov. 1990), who is my only source of this information.
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authored Klinkembourg report. At the beginning of 1990 the AEA secretariat 
and LH finally persuaded the other AEA member airlines to consent to ask the 
Commission to go ahead with the creation of the JCCA.12
Second, the Flight and Duty Time Limitations (FDTL) issue - which had 
last been regulated in the 1960s when pilots were still flying propeller-driven 
planes - had been of major importance for all crews cockpit and cabin crews 
ever since 1987, when a whole series of disputes began between them and 
the EC airlines, which had obliged them to work more hours at the expense of 
their rest time. In 1988 for example, BA, after its privatization, had reduced its 
cockpit personnel (which led to extended animosity), and at TAP Air Portugal 
relations with the cabin crews were also strained because of the airline 
contravening regulations on rest periods. As a result, the unions and pilot 
associations had urged the Commission to establish a joint committee to draw 
up legislation for FDTL, as well as personnel licenses in civil aviation for both 
pilots and cabin crews.13
Third, as noted already, in the beginning of 1990 the primary reason for 
setting up the JCCA was that France, Germany and most AEA airlines had 
decided that EC air-transport liberalization had proceeded too far too fast, and 
they wanted some means to delay it. As D. Cockroft, secretary of the 
International Transport Workers' Federation (ITF) summed up
" The AEA airlines' participation in the JCCA had a very important aim: to 
approximate to social legislation as closely as possible to the EC air-transport 
liberalization policy, in order to slow down the EC air-liberalization process. As a 
result, the main objectives of the ITF and the AEA coincided. Both the AEA and 
the ITF had thrown a great many harmonization proposals into the EC's 
institutional pot, and the first and foremost point was the FDLT proposal to be 
discussed in the JCCA" (interview 19 June 1991).
The fourth and final reason for the setting up of JCCA was that in the 
middle of 1990 the socialist Commissioners (president J. Delors, DG VII
^Interview with R. P. Holubowicz (15 Nov. 1990), who is my only source of this information.
13lnformation from author’s interviews with D. Cockroft (19 June 1991); Y. Enderte (7 Dec. 1990); T. Middleton (13 June
1991). See also ITF News of June 1987: 7, of Feb. 1988: 8, and of Sept. 1989: 21.
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(Transport) Karel Van Miert, and DG V (Social Affairs) V. Papandreou) as well 
as the socialist/left majority in the European Parliament were exerting pressure 
on the EC to accommodate certain social rights for air-transport personnel. 
For example, the European Parliament's socialist groups held a conference on 
air transport in Brussels on 10 and 11 May 1990, where the committee of the 
Transport Workers Union to the EC and the ITF issued a statement entitled 
Social Aspects of Civil-Aviation Liberalization. Among other things it 
concerned the issues of liberalization versus social harmonization, social 
dumping, union busting, operational safety, and infrastructure.14
When the Commission, under the pressure of AEA airlines and the pilot 
associations, finally decided to address itself to social matters in its air­
transport policy, and especially to the question of flying hours (FDTL), the 
Commissioners of DG VII (Transport) Karel Van Miert, and of DG V (Social 
Affairs) V. Papandreou presented a draft FDTL regulation for airlines pilots, 
which resulted in a major fracas between all EC airlines and the 
Commission.15
In particular R. Frommer, German head of the social and ecological 
aspects division of DG VII (Transport), presented the draft proposal to regulate 
the FDTL, and a draft directive on the mutual provision of personnel licenses 
in the civil aviation that did not, however, include cabin crews, but were 
regarded as being too far closer to the position suggested by the pilot 
organizations. This was so because the FDTL draft regulation proposed that, 
for reasons of safety, the maximum working day should not exceed eight 
hours, which meant 700 hours a year. R. Frommer wishing to support the 
pilots (especially German ones), had consulted the pilots only on technical 
matters concerning their job in the cockpit, and had based her proposal largely 
on the information obtained. There was vehement opposition against her and
14lnfbrmation from author's interviews with C. Iddon (30 Oct. 1990); J. Stamoulis (7 Dec. 1990); G. Ryde (5 June 1991).
15 Interview with G. Ryde (since 1991).
249
DG VII (Transport) from all the EC airlines, protesting especially the 
independent and regional airlines, that neither the Commission nor R. 
Frommer knew anything about how the pilots earned their pay. They claimed 
that the DG VII safety arguments had no basis at all in reality, since the EC 
had acknowledged that the EC airlines were complying with EC safety rules 
and regulations, even when the flight time of pilots in the independent charter 
and regional airlines had always been well over a thousand hours per annum. 
They also declared that if the FDTL proposal was adopted, it would mean very 
severe economic repercussions for the EC airlines. According to their 
calculations, the cost of the cockpit crews would increase by 30 per cent 
because more pilots would have to be engaged - with deleterious effect on the
EC airlines' competitiveness vis-&-vis non-EC carriers.16 In fact R. P.
Holubowicz, secretary general of ACE noted
" Frommer's support for the pilots resulted in the Commission putting forward 
the worst ever proposal on FDTL" Onterview 15 Nov. 1990).
As concerning AEA all its national airlines, whether privately or
state-owned, and especially strong carriers like AF, BA, KLM and LH, found 
the draft proposal completely unrealistic if they were to survive international 
competition. They had asked the Commission that the proposal should provide 
FDTL harmonization for national and independent airlines, and giving the 
maximum number of hours. They had alleged that were unable to compete 
with independent airlines (charter or regional), because their pilots were flying
16 hours a day17 or about 1,500 hours per annum, while the AEA airlines 
ranged between maximum 10 to 14 hours a day or 1,000 a year. Besides,
16lnformation from author's interviews with M. Ambrose (30 May 1991); D. Cockroft (19 June 1991); Y. Enderie (7 Dec. 
1990); R. P. Holubowicz (15 Nov. 1990); M. Pisters (12 Nov. 1990); K. Veenstra (29 Oct 1990).
17 More than hatf the pilots in EC and non-EC countries flew independent airiines and were paid the basic salary plus 
premiums for additional hours of flight. They therefore had an incentive to fly more hours than pilots of state-owned 
airlines. Interview with R. P. Holubowicz (15 Nov. 1990).
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pilots on independent airlines were much less expensive than those on 
national and scheduled airlines.18
The independent airlines retaliated by charging the AEA airlines but 
especially the two Commissioners Karel Van Miert and V. Papandreou, with 
making a great show about presenting an FDTL proposal, purely for the 
purpose of demonstrating to the civil-aviation unions and pilot associations 
that the Commission was actively concerned with legislation to prepare the air­
transport personnel for the implications of liberalizing civil-aviation in the EC.19 
In fact ACE secretary general R. P. Holubowicz stated
" We have been at daggers drawn with the Commissioner of DG V for EC Social 
Affairs, V. Papandreou. Her social aspirations were fundamentally wrong and 
dangerous. She both ignored our views and our request for an appointment" 
(interview 15 Nov. 1990).
The air-transport unions too were dissatisfied, because the draft 
directive on personnel licenses for civil aviation did not extend to cabin crews. 
They alleged that the suggestions from the ITF and other air-transport unions 
had not at all been taken into consideration by R. Frommer and the 
Commission, and that licensing standards should be introduced for all groups 
responsible for in-flight safety. The unions, nevertheless, praised Frommer's 
honestly concerning the proposal for the pilots, which remained uninfluenced 
by private or national air-transport interests. But since Frommer allowed 
herself to be caught in the middle of the clashing interests of the pilots and 
their airlines, she became persona non grata with all of them,20 and as the 
scapegoat Eurocrat of the Commission's DG VII she was replaced in her 
position at the beginning of 1991.21
^Interviews with M. Pisters (12 Nov. 1990); K. Veenstra (29 Oct. 1990).
19lnterview with M. Ambrose (30 May 1991); R. P. Holubowicz (15 Nov. 1990).
20 Her case recalls that of N. Argyris, discussed in ch. V.
21 Interviews with D. Cockroft (19 June 1991); Y. Enderie (7 Dec. 1990). See also ITF News. Feb. 1990:10.
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As ITF secretary general D. Cockroft remarked
" R. Frommer approached the FDTL issue like a bull in a china shop, and did not 
care who was hurt in the process" (interview 19 June 1991).
Given the FDTL proposal's unfavourable reception by the airlines (and 
their member-countries) DG VII (Transport) Commissioner Karel Van Miert, 
expert at political obfuscation, managed to rescind it by putting the blame on 
R. Frommer. The Commission then prepared a second draft on FDTL which, 
according to the unions and pilot associations resembled the UK's regulations, 
proposing a maximum 14 hour day, or approximately 1,000 hours a year. The 
pilot organizations themselves, originally being against the JCCA, when they 
realized that the FDTL regulation proposal was hurting their interests 
immediately required from the Commission the establishment of the JCCA and 
the co-operation of the other air-transport unions as it was available in the 
JCCA where they all took part in air-transport debates. The other trade unions 
kept their distance and were willing to support the pilots' interests only if the 
pilots were willing to support theirs. Political manoeuverings finally achieved 
that the FDTL issue would be regulated separately by the JCCA and the Joint 
Aviation Authorities (JAA)22 operations committee.23
When the pilots had reluctantly decided to join the EC air-transport 
debate the AEA airlines in turn realized they too needed the JCCA if they were 
both to exert any influence on the union and pilot associations input and to 
confront a concrete and solid EC air-transport labour front. They were 
perfectly well aware that the JCCA's micro-corporatist structure could make 
only weak arrangements (further debilitated by the JCCA having a purely
“ As mentioned in ch III, the JAA grouped together the aviation authorities of EC and non-EC European countries, and 
dealt with all aspects of aircraft operations as well as airworthiness and maintenance. Its rules were planned to replace 
those of the existing authorities by 1993. In 1991 JAA was in the process of transforming itself into an international 
organization.
23lnfbrmation from author’s interviews with D. Cockroft (19 June 1991); Y. Enderle (7 Dec. 1990); S. Howard (3 June 
1991 and 4 April 1993); T. Middleton (13 June 1991); G. Ryde (5 June 1991). See also ITF News. May 1991: 8.
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advisory role), and that the major ideological and hierarchical (elitist) 
cleavages among the civil-aviation unions themselves and between the latter 
and the pilot associations (see ch. VII) would render the work of the JCCA all 
but impossible. This would certainly delay the liberalization process of the EC 
air-transport market, an aim desperately pursued by most AEA airlines.24 In 
the course of the proceedings R. P. Holubowicz, ACE secretary general and 
JCCA member, called the JCCA "a petit fleur presented by the Commission to 
the unions to show them its good will."25
Since the set up of the JCCA there were a number of clashes of 
interests between the airlines, the trade unions and pilot associations.
2. The JCCA Conflicts
The inaugural JCCA meeting was a veritable Tower of Babel, with all 
the participants persistently at cross-purposes. The representatives of the 
independent airlines initially reserved their right to take legal action against the 
Commission for establishing the JCCA at all, but eventually agreed with the 
national and scheduled airlines to elect Dr. M. Bischoff, secretary general of 
AEA allifiated charter airlines (ACA) as JCCA chairman; the unions elected M. 
Holzel of the German OTV as vice-chairman.26
The discussion - if it can be called that - was at sixes and sevens. The 
independent (charter and regional) airlines had very different views from 
national and scheduled airlines. Airport representatives for their part also had 
an altogether different perspective from any airline operators. In effect, much 
of the argument at the meeting was conducted between the different employer 
organizations, rather than between the airlines and the unions, and this gave
24lnformation from author's interviews with D. Cockroft (19 June 1991); S. Howard (3 June 1991 and 4 April 1993); T. 
Middleton (13 June 1991).
“ interview, 15 Nov. 1990.
“ ITF News. Oct. 1990: 7.
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the impression to the unions and pilot associations that because the EC 
airlines had no common official line to present, they were opposing and even 
boycotting the dialogue. The unions also protested that the airline side was 
represented by secretaries of airline associations who had never dealt with air­
transport unions before, while their side was represented by people familiar 
with air-transport negotiations in their own countries. They also felt that the 
JCCA should not be limited to an advisory role but be a policy-making 
committee able to convert an agreement into a resolution legally binding for all 
parties.27
In addition, the EC airlines alleged that they were prevented from 
discussing air-transport issues, seeing that the chairman and vice-chairman 
were arrogating airline-employee relations to themselves as the 
representatives of the two sides. It soon became apparent that airlines and 
employees decidedly did not see eye to eye, particularly concerning the 
question of whether the JCCA should deal only with social aspects of the EC 
air-transport issues (the purpose for which it was created), or unilaterally with 
all the air-transport questions, without reference to the air-transport market 
reality the unions and pilot associations pursued.28
The JCCA meeting brought to general notice the problems and conflicts 
of the civil-aviation unions themselves, and between them and pilot 
associations in different countries as well as in the EC. Before long the 
discussion degenerated into exchanges between different kinds of trade union 
and/or pilot associations from different or even the same countries, concerning 
what demands they had or had not achieved. With regard to the Commission's 
proposal on pilots' FDTL the other airline-union representatives were generally
^Interviews with D. Cockroft (19 June 1991); S. Howard (3 June 1991 and 4 April 1993); A. Gosselin (14 Nov. 1990). See 
also ITF News. Oct. 1990: 7.
“ information from author's interviews with M. A. Ambrose (30 May 1991); M. Kanganis (22 Nov. 1990); M. Pisters (12 
Nov. 1990); B. Stahle, 4 Dec. 1990); K. Veenstra (29 Oct. 1990).
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unsympathetic to the pilots' views because they considered pilots too highly 
paid to be very sensitive to trade unions' interests.29
At that first JCCA meeting there were also major internal conflicts 
among the pilot associations over their JCCA delegations' internal 
organizational powers. This was due to the different pilot interests between EC 
and EFTA countries.
In particular since the Frankfurt meeting on 16 June 1989, the two 
major pilot associations - the British Airlines' Pilots Association (BALPA) and 
its German counterpart Vereiningung Cockpit (VC) - being concerned about 
the EC airlines' globalization were worried about the possibility of a 
member-state using lower-paid pilots to avoid employing pilots from countries 
with higher labour costs. They alleged that an airline using pilots from three 
different countries would have a tremendous advantage in manoeuvering the 
relations between employers and employees. Since, however, three different 
countries’ pilot organizations would have to get together for joint union 
representation the EC pilots had decided not to allow their airline management 
to manipulate one pilot organization to the disadvantage of another, and 
agreed not to accept to work for another country, whether in a member of the 
EC or not. At the beginning of 1990, therefore they had taken the initiative for 
creating an effective bargaining structure in the EC. At first glance the two pilot 
associations had seen little point in setting up a new machinery of this kind, 
because they could more easily ask their European umbrella group (the 
European Airlines Pilots’ Association, Europilote) to re-orientate itself to serve 
the EC pilots' purposes. After careful reflection, however, they concluded that 
this was not really feasible, since the aims and requirements of the these pilot 
organizations were too different. Europilote tended to deal with matters of 
general air-transport interest, and could not be expected to confine itself to
“ interviews with C. iddon (30 Oct. 1990); M. Pisters (12 Nov. 1990).
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controversial issues in EC air-transport industrial relations. So BALPA and VC 
decided to create a new negotiating body, the European Cockpit Association 
(ECA)30, which had around 13,000 EC pilots and flight engineers. The 
creation of ECA came as a total surprise to the EC pilots’ policy communities, 
since it was set up without any consultation with the other pilot organizations, 
which were understandably angry.31
This meant that as soon as the JCCA was set up ECA found itself 
involved in a power conflict both with its international umbrella group ((the 
International Federation of Airline Pilots' Association, IFALPA), and its 
European one (Europilote). It clashed with the ITF as well, because ten years 
earlier the ITF and IFALPA had agreed that some of the labour-union seats in 
the new body should go to IFALPA, which at the time was the only 
organization representing the majority of EC member-state pilots. A 
substantial number of EC pilots were not, however members of either the ITF 
or Europilote (created much later). So when the JCCA came into being, the 
ITF had invited IFALPA to nominate its representatives, something which did 
not please the ECA pilots at all. Although the pilot unions in ECA, Europilote, 
and IFALPA were exactly the same, the representatives nominated by IFALPA 
were not the people whom ECA wished to have as its JCCA representatives. 
The ECA pilots therefore denounced the ITF for sabotaging their 
representation in the JCCA.32
After the JCCA's inaugural meeting, the pilots managed to procure an 
agreement first between Europilote and IFALPA, and then between Europilote 
and ECA, which obliged ECA to change its name from European Cockpit 
Association to Europilote Cockpit Association. It was a new negotiating body 
set up in November 1990 along trade union lines, specifically so that the ITF 
could recognize ECA as the IFALPA representative in the EC and the JCCA.33
“ ECA had a steering group of four pilots each from BALPA and VC.
31 Interview with D. Cockroft (19 June 1991).
“ interview with D. Cockroft (19 June 1991).
“ interview with D. Cockroft (19 June 1991).
256
In the JCCA the FDTL regulation for aircraft crews was the most 
contentious and controversial issue discussed between the Commission, the 
airlines and the trade unions in the JCCA, and between the Commission and 
the trade unions and the JAA in the EC as whole. In part this was so because 
meanwhile the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) Operations Committee (JAR- 
OPS), which had also been attempting to regulate on FDTL, had succeeded in 
suspending any JCCA and Commission decisions until the results of the JAA 
work were known. This was so because the JAA proposals were designed to 
supersede all existing national FDTL regulations throughout the EC and EFTA 
countries. The other major reason for the imbroglio over the FDTL regulation 
were a number of clashes of interests in the JCCA debates between the 
Commission, the airlines, the trade unions and pilot associations. The 
discussions dragged on for three years (1991-1993) and eventually resulted in 
eighteen different drafts, meanwhile throwing the EC air-transport 
harmonization policy into confusion - and concomitantly delaying the 
liberalization of the EC air-transport market.34
3. The FDTL Debate
In January 1991 the Gulf crisis created further problems for the EC 
airline industry. At the JCCA meeting the EC airlines, but especially the 
national carriers in the AEA, by invoking the Gulf War economic recession 
managed to avoid discussing the FDTL proposal because of the further 
serious financial losses it could imply to them, and expressed their anxiety 
about the pace of the EC air-transport liberalization. At the 28 Feb. 1991 
JCCA meeting therefore the AEA airlines and unions joined forces to call on 
the Commission to halt the liberalization measures, which were doing further
^ITF News of Jan./Feb. 1992: 22, of April 1992:18, and of July 1993: 21.
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damage to the EC airline industry, already weakened by the effects of the Gulf 
War, as well as by economic recession in a number of member-countries. 
They issued a joint statement on the collaboration of airlines and trade unions 
so as to mitigate the effects of the crisis. They stressed the desirability of not 
declaring redundancies but protecting and promoting employment and urged 
the Commission to provide the airlines and their unions with ample 
opportunities to discuss initiatives for the harmonization of social, safety, and 
technical measures. The Gulf crisis had brought the two sides in the JCCA 
closer together.35
When the ITF Civil Aviation Section Committee met on 10-11 April 1991 
in London, it recognized the urgent need for a clear FDTL policy in view of 
developments at the JAA and in the EC. At that point the EC was in the 
process of introducing two pieces of FDTL legislation, each with different 
working hours for the flight crews, and so quite incompatible. One was a 
Commission regulation for implementing the JCCA recommendations on 
FDTL, and the other a Commission draft directive, called the Harmonization of 
technical requirements of civil aviation, for implementing the JAA's 
recommendations on FDTL. Moreover, although a Commission observer 
always attended JAA meetings, the JAA had shown no interest whatsoever in 
the EC or the Commission. It was most extraordinary that there was no 
dialogue at all between the JAA experts and DG VII officials. The unresolved 
politico-technical competence problem between the Commission and the JAA 
made it unlikely that the incompatibility of the two pieces of EC air transport 
legislation would be resolved. In consequence the air-transport unions, pilot 
associations in the JCCA and the Commission took the initiative of sending a 
joint paper to the JAA to present their views on its proposal.36
^Interview with D. Cockroft (19 June 1991). See also ITF News of Feb. 1990: 10, of Mar. 1991: 7-9, and of April 1991: 
14.
^Interview with D. Cockroft(19 Jyne 1991). See also ITF News of Mar. 1991: 7-9, and April 1991:14.
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In a parallel development, the unions of licensed aircraft-maintenance 
engineers met in London on 21 May the same year, to formulate a response to 
a JAA regulation concerning them, which was known as JAR 65 of the JAA's 
Joint Maintenance Committee. It was discussed whether all personnel who 
worked on aircraft should be licensed, or only those responsible for signing the 
release to service. This was a controversial point, since current practices 
varied enormously from country to country.37
The effects of the Gulf crisis, the conflicts between the Commission, the 
JCCA, and the JAA, and the inclination of certain Commissioners to give a 
social character to the EC air-transport policy, turned the JCCA activities 
concerning FDTL regulation into something of a game. Although all parties 
pretended to wish for a common platform on the FDTL regulation, none were 
willing to pursue a minimalistic attitude so that a compromise solution could be 
obtained. Instead, their arguments and requirements expressed a persistently 
maximalistic stance, which only added to the difficulties between all groups 
concerned and achieved nothing but the delay of the EC air-transport 
liberalization.38
The airlines, especially the national ones that enjoyed the full support of 
their governments and therefore of the JAA, continued to denounce the 
maximum possible flight hours, and were not willing to even discuss the 
possibility of fewer hours. They argued that the FDTL regulation would cost 
them millions of pounds, which was not acceptable in a period of general 
economic recession, the airlines' loss of billions of pounds due to the Gulf War, 
and the planned job cuts.39
The air-transport unions and pilot associations equally stubbornly 
required the minimum of hours and had countered that without harmonization 
in respect of the EC air-transport labour force the exploitation of air-transport
37ITF News. May 1991: 8.
“ interview with D. Cockroft (19 June 1991). See also ITF News. Aug. 1991: 5.
“ interviews with D. Cockroft (19 June 1991); G. Ryde, (5 June 1991). See also ITF News of Feb. 1991: 1, of March 
1991: 7, and of Dec. 1991: 9.
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personnel paying and working conditions would continue - something that was 
unacceptable. Meanwhile the ITF attempted to include in the FDTL 
discussions the cabin crews as well, not only pilots who were certain to 
conform anyway with the decision of the majority in order to acquire an 
organized voice in the JCCA.40
The Commission on its part had objected that not all EC air-transport 
interests were collectively represented by the proposal, that some point raised 
by one side or the other was a breach of the Treaty of Rome, and so on. As a 
result tempers ran high, accusations were flung right and left, and everyone 
else was a scheming villain and utterly in the wrong. At the end of the day, 
therefore, matters had not progressed one iota.41 As D. Cockroft, of the ITF 
commented
M Fortunately for us they made such a mess of it [FDTL], because after years of 
work they scratched out everything they had done and started their study all 
over again. On the other hand the trade unions’ input to the Commission and 
the JAA had luckily been carried out all the way by the same group of experts" 
(interview 19 June 1991).
In the course of the discussions between the JCCA and JAA on the 
FDTL draft proposal, the unions and pilot associations had already 
demonstrated considerable flexibility and willingness to compromise in the 
interests of a jointly agreed position, but in vain. They met with a total rebuff at 
a meeting of the JAA Operations Committee (JAA-OPS), because many of the 
national authorities, under severe political pressure from their national airlines, 
had made each new draft proposal more favourable for the airlines and less 
acceptable to the air-transport unions on both safety and social grounds. 
Unions and pilot associations called a meeting in London on 19 December 
1991, therefore, to discuss the Commission's stand that in matters of purely 
"technical" issues it would agree, more or less without change, to the new JAA 
draft proposal on FDTL which was expected to be adopted by the JAA in
^Interviews with D. Cockroft (19 June 1991); G. Ryde, (5 June 1991). See also ITF News of Feb. 1991: 2, of Mar. 1991: 
8, and of Dec. 1991: 9.
41 interview with D. Cockroft (19 June 1991).
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Copenhagen on 29-30 January 1992. This stand the unions opposed 
unanimously. They therefore called an urgent meeting in Brussels.42
When thirteen European air-transport unions met in Brussels on 18 and 
19 February 1992, they acknowledged that there was an urgent need for the 
civil-aviation unions to co-ordinate their collective-bargaining activities in the 
light of the liberalization of the EC air-transport industry and the growing 
international links between airlines. They were agreed that neither the 
individual EC countries nor the airlines had shown any flexibility, or at least 
desire for a jointly agreed compromise concerning FDTL which only the 
previous month the airlines had described as "too left wing". The unions, on 
the other hand, were utterly against accepting a draft proposal on FDTL from 
the JAA and declared that they would attempt to lobby their national 
governments in the hope of influencing the decision-making process in the 
JAA.43
In March 1992 all ITF flight-crew unions planned a protest campaign for 
June, in order to denounce the entire process and to prevent the adoption of 
the JAA’s Operations Committee (JAA-OPS) draft proposal on FDTL, unless 
serious improvements were made to it. They asserted that the proposal was 
so totally unacceptable that its adoption would mean danger to aviation safety. 
Meanwhile the Commission had announced that it was still waiting for a joint 
JCCA/JAA opinion on the FDTL regulation, but added that its patience was 
running out. It would put a regulation proposal forward by the summer 1992, 
with or without that joint opinion, which remained outstanding because of the 
airlines' opposition, on the one hand, and that of the JAA on the other.44
Although the JAA had announced that it was determined to reach 
agreement on a final FDTL package by the beginning of April 1992, a number 
of points, including some which the unions found particularly objectionable,
42ITF News. Jan./Feb. 1992: 22.
43lTF News. March 1992:12.
44 ITF News. April 1992:18.
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had been sent back to the JAA's study group for further work. The 
representatives of both the airlines and unions were excluded from this phase 
of work. Meanwhile, the first exchange of views between unions and airlines 
on the question of European cabin-crew licensing took place in the JCCA on 
22 April 1992. The airlines, while accepting the importance of safety-training 
for cabin crew, were divided on whether a license was needed to ensure high 
standards. Following a long debate on the principles of licensing, both sides 
agreed to hold a second meeting in July 1992.45
An ITF worldwide cabin-crew meeting (Cabin Crew Technical 
Committee), held in Washington on 19-20 May 1992, pointed out that the EC 
air-transport unions were part of a global industry, and that international co­
operation was an absolute necessity for their survival. A growing challenge to 
unions was posed by both transnational airline mergers and cross-border 
employment. Cabin-crews alleged that the FDTL and cabin crew licensing 
were key international regulatory issues with a great importance for them.46
When representatives of EC flight-deck and cabin crew unions met in 
Brussels on 20 July 1992 with the Commissioner of DG VII (Transport) Karel 
Van Miert they expressed their total opposition to the draft regulations 
produced by the JAA and due to be formally adopted by the JAA Operations 
Committee in early September. They strongly requested the Commissioner to 
ensure that any EC rules would take full account of both safety and social 
factors, so as to ensure fair competition in a liberalized EC air transport 
market. The Commissioner indicated he was still hoping to achieve a balanced 
solution to the problem, and that he was under no legal obligation to accept 
the work done by the JAA. He would, however, greatly prefer if a joint airlines- 
union opinion could be reached in the JCCA on the changes that were needed
45ITF News of April 1992:18, and May 1992:10-11.
^lTF News. June/July 1992: 20.
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to make the JAA draft acceptable, since this could be used to influence the 
JAA during the consultations set for early 1993.47
Meanwhile, according to the trade unions’ view, the EC's third air­
transport package was proceeding fast in the matter of liberalizing the EC 
air-transport market, but mooring at a snail's pace on social measures, and 
still a very slow (even invisible) track on social measures. Therefore late in 
1992 at the ITF Civil Aviation Section Conference, the unions challenged 
airline deregulation and globalisation. The ITF produced a 90-page report on 
The globalization of the Civil Aviation Industry and its Impact on Aviation 
Workers, and an International Survey of Working Conditions in Civil Aviation. 
One of the main conference features was the decision that unions in different 
countries could organize in the same airline, or airline groupings of 
international union councils, for the purpose of devising (i) common collective 
bargaining strategies, and (ii) minimizing the exposure of unions to legal 
attacks by the airlines. Another point on the conference agenda was the 
unions' urgent need to plan a more effective solidarity. It had at least been 
realized that a globalized industry required a global union response, 
something the EC civil-aviation unions had never sufficiently considered. It 
was underlined that air-transport unions had only two choices: to be either 
spectators or actors. If they were to act, however, they had to forge stronger 
global links with each other.48
At this meeting the Commission issued a White Paper, The Future 
Development of the Common Transport Policy. Its references to the social 
dialogue, collective bargaining, improvement of working conditions, and 
protection and promotion of employment in the transport sector were 
discussed as well. However the social measures the Commission intended to 
take were still to be determined, and there was still no timetable for the
47ITF News. August 1992:11.
^ITF News. Dec. 1992:10-11,14.
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implementation of such measures. R. Valladon, chairing the JCCA for the 
unions, in his speech pointed out that the wide variations in union rights, living 
standards, and labour costs in the EC member-states would not make it easy 
to agree to a bargaining strategy for all of the Community. If it could not be 
achieved, it would mean a new threat for EC airline employees because 
unions in other member-states might react by competing with each other over 
their particular interests as well as for jobs. On the other hand, ITF secretary 
general D. Cockroft emphasized that without strikes, badges, pickets and so 
forth at the EC level, the air-transport unions were themselves signing the 
death warrant for unionism.49
At the beginning of 1993, the issues of FDTL and personnel licensing 
continued to dominate the JCCA, while the licensing of pilots and flight- 
operation officers had been agreed. Work was due to begin on training- 
standards and certification for various categories of ground staff. Notably the 
union side had failed to reach a consensus concerning the changes to the JAA 
draft that had been proposed by some of its members at the JCCA plenary 
meeting on 18 December 1992. The unions expected that the JAA proposals 
would be reviewed in the light of the Commission's proposed Working Time 
Directive.50
In March 1993, however, R. Coleman, the director general of DG VII 
(Transport), wrote to the JAA that the Commission was not obliged to adopt or 
harmonize all JAA rules at EC level. The JAA therefore reduced the number of 
areas to come under harmonized regulations, drawing up a tentative list of 
measures to be harmonized by the JAA and leaving the rest to national 
regulations. The measures it proposed to leave out of JAA harmonization all 
imposed restrictions on airlines covering areas vital to air-transport personnel, 
such as split duty, night duty, and stand-by. Thus, flight deck and cabin crew
49ITF News. Jan./Feb. 1993: 26; ITF Report, 1992: 72, 93-94, 96.
^ITF News. Jan/Feb. 1993: 26.
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unions would certainly prefer to keep their existing national arrangements, 
rather than be forced to accept harmonized EC rules that made them work 
more hours and cut their rest periods. After consulting with airlines, aviation 
authorities, and unions the JAA concluded that it could not reconcile its need 
to produce harmonized safety regulations with the Commission's requirement 
for subsidiarity.51
In fact, although the IFALPA, Europilote and ECA pilot associations had 
participated in the JAA's working group, their endeavours to ensure proper 
aviation safety were entirely ignored. The EC-countries' civil aviation 
authorities simply adopted the JAA rules replacing the existing national ones, 
and accepted that those rules should be proposed in the Commission's 
legislative process and be adopted as binding EC law.52
After a plenary meeting of JCCA, in Brussels on 21 June 1993, the EC 
air-transport unions warned EC member-states and their airlines to stop acting 
against their interests by dumping the social dialogue. They said they would 
not tolerate any more attempts by governments or airlines to impose changes 
without negotiation and consultation with the unions, and criticized the EC for 
lack of progress on social harmonization. However, they declared they were 
committed to continue working with EC institutions and airlines to get through 
the EC air-transport crisis. The Transport and General Workers' Union 
(TGWU) noted that even private airlines, such as BA, had been forced by the 
unions to realize that it was not possible to run an airline without social 
dialogue. The unions reiterated their request to the Commission to set up a 
"social observatory", which would monitor and analyse the social impact of EC 
air-transport market liberalization.53 In fact, at this meeting Jos6 Bras, president 
of the ITF-affiliated Portuguese union National Syndicate of Civil Aviation 
Personnel (SNPVAC) revealed
51 ITF News. July 1993: 21.
52ITF News. July 1993: 21.
53ITF News. July 1993:19-20.
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" In its attempt to arbitrarily push through privatization and restructuring of the 
national carrier TAP, the current Portuguese government has abrogated labour 
agreements which even the old Salazar dictatorship regime of the sixties and 
seventies had been forced to accept."54
In June 1993 DG VII (Transport and Energy) Commissioner A. Matutes 
set up a "committee of wise men" also called comite des Sages (a kind of think- 
tank), to look at the current situation in the EC civil-aviation industry, and to 
make recommendations on its future development. In particular the committee 
was to discuss problems such as the industry's financial difficulties, airport 
infrastructure and congestion, and to propose short-term measures as well as 
a long-term strategy. Among those appointed to serve on it was the unionist R. 
Valladon, who was the employees' chairman in the JCCA. The committee 
appeared to have goals similar to the US National Commission for ensuring a 
strong competitive airline industry, which had seen that US deregulation 
created serious problems in the airline industry and that some strategic 
intervention was required. However, the unions considered that the first report 
of the comity des sages (at the end of 1993) reflected the ultra-liberal views of 
most of its members, and completely ignored all trade-union 
recommendations. They alleged that the report in fact suggested the airlines' 
exploitation of aviation workers, and more or less the loss of at least 100,000 
more jobs by European Union (EU) airlines.55
The 1993 ITF Civil Aviation Section Committee meeting in London (8- 
10 November) sent a message to airlines and the EC that the trade unions 
were fighting back against the tide of aviation liberalism and globalization that 
had affected working conditions and collective-bargaining rights ever since 
1987. Therefore, the ITF, although it had significantly extended its 
collaboration with the airlines in the JCCA and the member-countries in the 
JAA, called on unions to renew their efforts to provide effective solidarity with 
unions engaged in disputes. In fact, in late 1993, the ITF was participating in a
^ ITF News. July 1993: 20.
^ ITF News of July 1993: 23, and JanVFeb. 1994:19.
266
JAA working group for the first time in four years, although consultation with 
and participation of unions was still extremely limited, because usually only 
national aviation authorities were allowed to take part in JAA working groups.56
In parallel to the FDTL debate, and having seen that the EC air­
transport liberalization process only meant massive job losses, worse pay and 
working conditions, and attacks on collective-bargaining rights, the EC air­
transport unions and pilot associations went on massive strikes and protest 
rallies against their airline managements as well as against the Commission 
during the 1991-1993 period. For example, Air Inter pilots and flight engineers 
went on strike on 23 October 1991 as part of a union fight against job cuts. 
The announcement in October 1992 by Belgium's national airline SABENA, of 
up to 1,000 new redundancies, along with the immediate arbitrary dismissal of 
250 workers, brought spontaneous strikes and worker protests at the 
Zaventem Airport of Brussels. On 23 November and 15 and 23 December 
1992 Air France was hit by an unprecedented wave of industrial action, 
including strikes and mass rallies in protest against restructuring-plans which 
would involve the loss of 5,000 jobs and compulsory redundancies. Five 
thousand aviation workers employed by the national LH and other German 
airlines gathered in Bonn on 20 March 1993 for a mass protest against the 
government's failed aviation policies, including a new air-traffic treaty between 
Germany and the USA, which threatened thousands of jobs. On 9 and 10 
October 1993 all Air France unions went on strike to show their opposition to 
its announcement that the airlines’ restructuring plan would bring a loss of 
4,000 jobs. Finally in December 1993 the ITF proposed an "Unfair Flyers" 
campaign which would target anti-union carriers with bad publicity, while 
explaining the link between unionized employees and good and safe 
services.57
“ ITF News. Dec. 1993: 9-10.
57ITF News of Nov. 1991: 30, of Nov. 1992:13, of Jan./Feb. 1993: 27, of April 1993:14, of Aug. 1993: 5, of Nov. 1993:1, 
12-14, and of Dec. 1993:10.
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4. Conclusion
In the early 1990s, in a climate of worldwide economic uncertainties, 
the prevailing politico-economic ideologies of certain EC member-states 
(especially France and Germany) and their affinity with labour policies, as well 
as most of the AEA national airlines, made it possible for the air-transport 
unions and pilot associations to participate more actively at the EC through the 
creation of the JCCA and its tripartite committees. In fact it was the French 
presidency (1 July - 31 Dec. 1989) that heralded the future of the EC air­
transport personnel, and from spectators made them into actors, while the role 
of Germany and its national airline LH, a member of AEA, were determinant 
factors in the creation of the JCCA. EC governments supporting neo-liberal 
(monetarist) policies were no longer predominant and the place of labour in 
the EC was less threatened, yet not as an equal social partner with the 
employer.
At the same period, most of the EC member-states and AEA member 
airlines wished the slow-down of the pace of liberalization, while the 
Commission and certain Commissioners were willing to give EC air-transport a 
"human face". In fact, after the Gulf War, the main objectives of the AEA 
national airlines and the air-transport unions and pilot associations coincided 
into slowing-down the liberalization of the EC air-transport market. This was 
achieved through (i) the JCCA's major conflicts among the airlines, among the 
unions, among pilot associations, and among and between all these groups; 
and (ii) the FDTL regulation which was the most controversial and much 
debated issue in JCCA, the JAA and the Commission.
The JCCA was, however, only a very loose micro-corporatist and 
advisory body which wielded little power, while the JAA body, operating 
outside the EC context but still imposing its proposals on the Commission, was 
against the air-transport unions and partly supported the pilots' demands. This
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to some extent increased the unions' militancy but, having been left without 
alternative channels to seek representation, were ready to compromise as 
long as they did not lose all possibility of action. They, as well as the pilot 
associations, were well aware of their weak position in the EC.
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CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSION
The Spaak Committee deliberating on the Treaty of Rome stressed 
that, if the EC wished to achieve its economic integration it also had to have a 
joint transport policy. The Treaty did not, however, express a specific 
commitment to the formulation of a common EC air-transport policy, and left it 
to the Council of Transport Ministers to decide whether the general 
competition laws should apply to air transport also. In effect, in the first 30 
years of the EC's existence they did not, and no common air-transport policy 
was developed by the EC member-states.
When in 1987 the EC was obliged to apply its overall competition policy 
also to its air-transport market, this was mainly a repercussion of radical 
reforms in the international arena. However, while it had now become 
unavoidable, the so-called liberalization process was still not in the perceived 
best interests of most of the EC members and their national airlines. Since 
drawing up a viable transnational policy depended wholly on the EC countries 
being ready to co-operate wholeheartedly, it is not very surprising that by the 
end of 1993 the process of air-transport liberalisation had not succeeded in 
becoming common EC air-transport policy.
This thesis has explored the reciprocal influences and interactions of 
national and EC air-transport policy communities, to show in detail how and 
why they precluded a jointly agreed liberalization of the Community's air 
transport and the related decision-making.
Two main arguments underlie the major premise of this study. One is 
that, within the EC institutional structures and functions, it was only national 
interests, and especially those of the strongest members that actively 
concerned themselves with the liberalization of the EC air-transport policy 
(either for or against), rather than EC forces collectively. The second is that
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persisting corporatist interests in the member-countries resisted any change in 
the national arrangements. The spectrum of conflicting positions, rivalry, and 
discord that bedeviled relations among members, airlines per se and in their 
capacity as employers, and among and between the trade unions and pilot 
associations as representing the air-transport employees has also been 
displayed. Each of these groups put forward its own point of view, and used it 
to exert the maximum amount of pressure on the others, so as to procure 
solely its own advantage in the EC. The preceding pages have examined how 
those organized vested interests employed various national and Community 
policy networks and strategies to abort liberalization of the EC air-transport 
industry becoming joint Community policy.
The present and final chapter is in three sections: the first is a brief 
summary of relevant events between 1987 and 1993; the second compares 
the pre-1987 and post-1993 air-transport regimes; and the third section 
provides some general conclusions on the success or failure of the EC air­
transport liberalization process as a public policy as well as its definite failure 
to become a common policy.
1. The period 1987-1993
The gradual worldwide spread of the US policy and practice of airline 
deregulation and the growing neo-liberal ideology, at least as regards EC air 
transport, in certain EC member-states (Britain, Ireland, and the Netherlands) 
inevitably had a profound impact on EC air-transport policy and decision­
making and so on all of the EC airline industry. The UK especially, in its 
capacity as an EC member and one of the world's leading air powers, played a 
decisive role in strongly promoting the US deregulation measures.
As a result, the EC members empowered the Commission to legislate 
and implement a joint air-transport competition policy, the so-called
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liberalization policy. In practice, this led to the destabilization of the various 
countries’ politico-economic and social air-transport structures, which for thirty 
years had worked well to the perceived benefit of all producer interests. This in 
turn accentuated existing nationalistic, commercial, and legislative trends in 
the individual countries, and so obviated the EC members making common 
cause with respect to air-transport liberalization.
The EC member-states were obliged by international circumstances to 
engage in what may be called politics of necessity or circumstantial politics: it 
was basically external factors that imposed competition in the EC air-transport 
market, rather than the EC members’ wish to integrate the Community's air­
transport market. In these circumstances the three strongest countries, the 
"troika" (Britain, France, Germany) were engaged in what may be called 
opportunistic politics: ensuring that their own air-transport interests were 
imposed over the heads of their smaller and (in political, economic, and air­
transport terms weaker) EC fellow-members.
In general the EC air-transport policy and decision-making process 
involved fierce competition between the divergent and fragmented EC air­
transport policy interests of major functional elites from the stronger member- 
states, private capital, and EC institutions; and the correlation of their air­
transport interests by the politico-economically strong member-states of the 
troika. This was fully understood and accepted by both the Commission and 
the EC Council of Transport Ministers.
In purely institutional terms, the EC Commissioners, Eurocrats, and
member-states played mutually supportive roles to reach the above result. In
particular, the Commissioners and certain Eurocrats initiated severe conflicts
by continuously interfering in the policy-making process, either to promote
their own country's air-transport interests to the detriment of the EC as a
whole, or by endeavouring to increase their position in the EC. Four cases
have been cited where key air-transport actors in the Commission, engaged in
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questionable machinations and power politics to serve their own countries’ air­
transport interests and the troika's air-transport interests rather than those of 
the Community.
The EC member-states for their part, as the chief actors in negotiating, 
bargaining, and decision-making, set about reaching a joint EC air-transport 
policy by trying to reconcile their divergent interests through reliable coalitions, 
political and economic compromises, pay-offs, string-pulling, tactical 
manoeuvers, as well as plain procrastination. They always gave first and 
foremost priority to their own national air-transport interests. Their 
deliberations, were not a matter of rational decision-making, but of every 
country trying to impose on the others its own purposes and demands. This 
being so, the EC as a whole was forced in the end to modify its air-transport 
liberalization policy to accommodate the conflictual reality of the interests of 
the troika members and those of the countries following them. This resulted in 
a distortion and perversion of EC air-transport policy that obviated any 
prospect of consensus.
The strong EC countries' obstinate refusal to relinquish control of what 
for decades had been important instruments of air-space sovereignty and 
public policy stood fully revealed in 1993. Although the Commission's 
legislative work from 1987 to 1992 had been directed by neo-liberal 
Commissioners for Competition such as Ireland's Peter Sutherland and 
Britain's Sir Leon Brittan, its practical implementation fell to socialist Karel Van 
Miert of Belgium, who took it upon himself to reconsider the whole question of 
liberalization.
Like their governments, the national airlines did not embrace air­
transport liberalization as a policy in its own right, but only because 
international air-transport competition had become inevitable if the threat was 
to be averted of the US and the growing Asian/Pacific mega-airlines
dominating both the international and EC markets. Whether they liked it or not,
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the national airlines in the EC were obliged "by necessity" to follow an air­
transport liberalization strategy the main considerations and tactics of which 
concerned their sheer survival in the EC and internationally.
The national, independent and regional airline employers did not 
comprise a collectively homogeneous policy-community. On the contrary, 
irreconcilable divergences of national and private air-transport interests 
brought them into serious conflict between and among themselves as well as 
their umbrella groups.
The umbrella group of the Association of European Airlines (AEA), 
among whose members were the EC's twelve national airlines, was itself 
internally hit by serious disputes about the pace of the liberalization policy. It 
nevertheless, played a central role in shaping the Community's policy, chiefly 
by forcing a much slower pace on air-transport liberalization. The twelve 
national airlines, and especially those of the troika (AF, BA, and LH), were 
protected not only by their umbrella groups policy-communities, but also by 
alternative policy-networks in their own countries, and by their national 
Commissioners and Eurocrats.
Most of the EC national airlines, whether owned privately or by the state 
(and especially the champions like AF, BA, KLM and LH), decided not to 
compete among themselves but to pursue a strategy of consolidation instead. 
They engaged in both offensive and defensive alliances and mergers with 
other airlines domestically and national and domestic European (non-EC) 
airlines, with a view to preventing rival operations from independent or new 
airlines taking hold. They became increasingly convinced that their EC and 
international survival required not only a dominant position in their own and the 
EC's air-transport systems, but had to be buttressed by mergers and alliances 
with airlines in other blocs (especially US carriers), if their own continued 
access to international routes was to be assured.
As a result of the above practices by the national airlines, most of the
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independent ones, which were strong advocates of liberalization or even 
complete deregulation of the EC air-transport market, collapsed or 
disappeared as separate companies by merging with, or being partly acquired 
by one of the national airlines.
At the same time, certain national airlines with views on EC air transport 
similar to those of the independent airlines (like the UK's privately-owned BA, 
and Ireland's state-owned Aer Lingus), when coming up against out-and-out 
competition in their national air-transport markets ended up facing the other 
way. So for example BA, the national airline of a strong EC member-country, 
also representing private air-transport interests, became an unquestionable 
winner. The company went from strength to strength, although accused of 
predatory and consolidatory practices at national and EC level, of political 
manipulations in concert with the conservative government in London, and 
above all with Britain's EC Commissioners. BA's policy was growth at all costs 
which of course ran exactly counter the EC's liberalization policy, which 
envisaged an air-transport market in which smaller state-owned and 
independent airlines had a chance of expanding. The Irish carrier Aer Lingus, 
on the other hand, was a definite loser. The airline went from fair competition 
on specific air-routes to cut-throat price reductions and a fare-war with other 
airlines, very nearly collapsed, and had to be rescued in an emergency 
package agreed by the Commission.
Between 1987 and 1990, while the EC legislated two basic air-transport
packages to introduce its competition policy, the Community's air-transport
unions and pilot associations were so impeded in their work by the
Commission, their own governments, their airlines, and by problems among
themselves, that they exerted no influence at all on EC air-transport policy.
Quite incapable of organizing themselves transnational^, they were unable to
negotiate at EC level. In their national arenas they were on the defensive,
given that the projected liberalization of the EC air-transport market definitely
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opposed their own interests and resulted in the break-up of their national 
micro-corporatist structures, exchanging consensus-based (strong) 
arrangements for conflictual (weak) ones. Finally, not only were the civil- 
aviation employees in the EC at that time more or less against the 
liberalization project, but they accepted its developments entirely passively 
and considered it irreversible, since the EC had already legislated on it and 
implemented its competition laws. All of the above reduced the role of the 
unions and the air-transport employees to that of mere spectators.
A major reason behind the failure of the Community's air-transport 
unions and pilot associations to oppose and possibly thwart the EC 
liberalization process between 1987 and 1990 was the paradox that, although 
the EC and its member-countries disagreed about the pace and/or benefits of 
EC air-transport liberalization, they had maintained a relatively uniform labour 
policy at both national and EC level. The passivity of the air-transport unions 
and pilot associations came to an end after 1990. In a climate of worldwide 
economic uncertainty caused principally by the Gulf War, and given the 
prevailing politico-economic ideologies of certain EC member-states 
(especially France and Germany) and their affinity with pro-labour policies, the 
creation of the Joint Committee of Civil Aviation (JCCA), and its tripartite 
committees, made possible the unions' and pilot associations' more active 
participation. (In fact at the end of 1989 the French EC presidency heralded a 
more purposive period for EC air-transport personnel, while Germany and its 
national airline LH, a member of the AEA, were decisive factors in the creation 
of the JCCA in 1990). EC governments supporting neo-liberal monetarist 
policies were less predominant and labour in the EC was less threatened, 
although not yet an equal social partner with the employers (member-states 
and/or airlines).
At this point most of the EC member-states and AEA member-airlines
had agreed the slow down the pace of liberalization, and in social terms the
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Commission and certain Commissioners were ready to give EC air-transport a 
"human face". After the Gulf War, the AEA's national airlines', air-transport 
unions', and pilot associations' major objectives coincided in desiring to 
decelerate the EC air-transport liberalization. They achieved their objective as 
a result of major conflicts between the JCCA airlines, the unions, pilot 
associations, and among and between all these groups; and because of the 
Flight and Duty Time Limitations (FDTL) regulation, which was the most 
controversial issue debated in the JCCA, the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA), 
and the Commission.
The JCCA was only a very loose micro-corporatist and advisory body, 
however, and wielded little power; while the JAA, which operated outside the 
EC context but managed to impose its proposals on the Commission, was 
against the air-transport unions and partly supported the pilots' demands. This 
to some extent helped to increase the unions’ militancy but, having been left 
without alternative channels to seek representation, they were ready to 
compromise as long as they retained some possibility of action. Like the pilot 
associations, they were well aware of their continuing weak position in the EC.
2. The Pre-1987 versus the Post-1993 Regime
As mentioned in ch. II, the EC member-states’ air-transport structures 
before 1987 were based on strict and well developed regulatory and micro- 
corporatist practices, with consensus-based (strong) arrangements, and goals 
that were partly functional, partly national, partly-bureaucratic, idealistic, and 
geopolitical. In those national structures the countries played the dual role of 
government and employer since (except for the British Airways) all national 
airlines were state-owned and dominated their country's air-transport system. 
As a result, the unions and pilot associations were monopolizing the industry's 
corporatist arrangements, and enjoyed well-paid and glamorous employment.
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At the EC level, bilateral agreements among member-countries and their 
airlines went hand in hand with national legislation in well-stabilized national 
and EC air-transport systems.
After 1993 the European Union (EU) air-transport environment was still 
administered by bilateral agreements between member-states, but now under 
the auspices of the Commission and in accordance with EU rules and 
regulations. All twelve national airlines remained intact and not only dominated 
but further monopolized their national markets. Air-transport unions and pilot 
associations, although under pressure concerning working conditions and 
subject to considerable lay-offs, had a reduced but still considerable say in 
their airlines' practices and financial arrangements. No national airline went 
private between 1987 and 1993, with the exception of the Netherlands' KLM, 
which sold the majority of its shares to private capital, the state owning the 
rest. BA was privatized in 1986.
Similar to conditions in the US air transport under deregulation, and as 
in the period between 1987 and 1993, the post-1993 air-transport liberalization 
policy of the EU still did not manifest the economic characteristics believed 
necessary for a truly competitive environment. The legislative, economic, and 
infrastructural barriers to market entry for intra-Community services have not 
been removed to ensure that the EU air-transport market is contestable. In 
other words, the implementation of the competition policy in EU air transport 
did not, in fact, result in greater internal competition.
On the contrary, the EU's national airlines, whether state or privately 
owned, still continued to collude instead of competing on intra-EU services, 
and to concentrate and consolidate through mergers and share purchases in 
order to be protected and further prevent EU air-transport market competition. 
The industry became more oligopolistic at the EC level (between member- 
states) than it had ever been before 1987, and totally monopolistic at national
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level. For example, any flight between Britain and France is a duopoly, while in 
the three biggest national air-transport markets - the British, French, and 
German - the national airlines concerned (BA, AF, and LH) operated nearly 
100 per cent (94.7, 97.4 and 99.8 per cent respectively). Finally, at EU level 
the national airlines continued to compete only against smaller airlines and not 
among themselves.
When competition, which was not in the interests of the existing globally 
aligned EU mega-carrier consortia, became minimal, it was difficult for the 
Commission to establish conclusively that the airlines' behaviour was 
predatory and collusive, and in fact contravened the EU air-transport 
liberalization policy and its laws on competition.
Yet during that same time there was a much more competitive 
environment on long-haul extra-EU markets, both because of the greater 
impact of non-EU airlines (especially those of the USA), and because long- 
haul destinations are usually reached via several routes connecting hubs 
between competing EU (especially UK) and US airlines. However, besides the 
airlines with well-established roles in the EU and international markets, there 
were also the others who found ways of obstructing the implementation of the 
air-transport competition policy in the EU market, especially in their own 
domestic environment, where EU-policy implementation was up to them. An 
example of the latter is the Greek national airline Olympic Airways which, with 
the blessing of the Greek government, as late as 1994 and even early 1995, 
refused to relinquish its monopoly of handling services and continued to 
bargain the issue with the Commission.
Despite the apparent and increasing involvement of the Commission 
during this time, individual countries' vested air-transport interests continued to 
be the primary driving force in EU air transport, and in practice dictated,
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delayed, and even prevented liberalization. In these circumstances member- 
states, whether large or small, were unlikely to allow their national carrier to be 
adversely affected by some undesirable aspect of the Community's air­
transport policy. In consequence liberalization was retarded further and now 
proceeds at a snail's pace. Each member-state continues to use the EU air­
transport market for its own national objectives, rather than common EU ones, 
so the climate now is not very different from what it was prior to 1987. In effect, 
by early 1994 the defenses set up by each country to safeguard its national 
air-transport interests were stronger and tougher than ever, in preparation for 
the complete opening-up of the EU air-transport market in 1997.
Delaying tactics are employed whenever an individual member-country 
perceives that its interests are not likely to be served - as in the above 
example of the Greek government refusing to abolish the handling monopoly 
at Greek airports. One of the means by which the EU member-states 
managed to restrain and block air-transport competition is to prolong their 
financial aid to their national airlines for as long as possible before the EC 
applies its open skies policy in 1997. Meanwhile the member-states and their 
airlines hope that by then they will have found some other excuse to protect 
their national air-transport interests and their airlines. The fact that the EU 
member-states have continued to subsidize their national airlines since 1993, 
and with the approval of the Commission, not only demonstrates the failure of 
the EU to implement its liberalization of the air-transport market but, even 
more fundamentally, shows a deplorable lack of collaboration by the twelve EU 
members (not to mention the fifteen EU members in 1995) to reach a common 
EU air-transport policy at least up until 1997. What changes of an ideological 
or geopolitical nature may have come about by 1997 or 2000 within the EU 
and/or global air transport to prevent the open skies policy indefinitely?
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Most of the people interviewed in the course of this study have 
predicted that by 1994 the three champions AF, BA, LH, as well as probably 
KLM, Iberia, and SAS, will be monopolizing the EU market. Other observers 
have estimated that by 1997 the EU air-transport market will be so oligopolistic 
that the top six EU airlines will control close to 85 per cent of the intra-EU 
market, with the vast majority of the busiest routes having become stricter 
duopolies than they were in the pre-1987 period.1
This will mean a de facto cartel by 2000, which according to the EC 
competition laws would be illegal. One of the consequences of searching to 
avoid legal ‘trust-busting’ would be that national airlines would eventually 
disappear as independent units to become parts of conglomerates, especially 
of European and US airlines. These might lead the EU air-transport market to 
be administered by an organization of EU member-states and the USA 
providing air-transport services, or perhaps along the lines of the Organization 
of Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OPEC). In conglomerates of this kind 
nobody knows with whom he is dealing and who is really in charge, and 
different businesses are traded on a day-to-day basis like commodities. As is 
the case for maritime transport, such an organization of conglomerates would 
make more money by speculating and selling individual airlines or their aircraft 
for as much as five years ahead. Conglomerates of this kind are expected to 
be organized primarily by UK and US airlines, either separately or jointly.2
Whatever the exact developments, it seems likely that at the end of this 
millennium the USA and Britain will still be and remain the world's leading air­
transport powers - continuing as they have done throughout the twentieth 
century.
1Doganis, 1994:25.
interview with C. Iddon (30 Oct. 1990).
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3. Air-Transport Liberalization versus Common EC Policy
Prior to 1987, air transport in the European countries was without any 
competition, and totally regulated by each country for itself. It was the US 
airline deregulation, and the consequences of the ensuing international 
competition, that obliged the EC states to apply a competition policy within the 
EC air transport (as also specified by the Treaty of Rome). This whole process 
was called liberalization. In the course of implementing its objectives, however, 
every country was above all concerned with its own advantage, and all interest 
groups -states, airlines, trade unions, pilot associations etc. - were at 
loggerheads with each other and within themselves. Liberalization as such 
could have been a common policy, whether it was a success or a failure, but in 
fact, while it constituted the motive for finding a common policy, it did not 
succeed in bringing about such a policy.
With respect to liberalization itself, this could be considered a success 
or a failure, depending on one's viewpoint. Some might say it was successful 
because it did create the larger EU airlines that are indispensable for 
competing against US/Asiatic carriers. The loosening of strong corporatist 
arrangements that liberalization brought in its wake may, also be considered 
as either a positive outcome (where it applies to the national airlines), or 
negative (for the trade unions). In any case, the strong corporatist structures 
continue to exist, most especially at the national level. The consumers, for 
their part, may well regard liberalization as negative, since the oligopolization 
of air transport meant less competition and therefore higher than ever fares. 
Public interest can not be served in the absence of some regulations that 
eventually dispense with the mechanism of competition as the antithesis of 
consensus. In other words, competition runs counter to a common policy. 
What is required is co-operation among the EC member-states concerned, 
and such co-operation then spells a common policy.
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It must be understood perfectly clearly that the outcome of the air­
transport liberalization measures in the EC is not identical with the 
achievement or otherwise of an overall joint policy for all Community member- 
countries. Liberalization as one aspect of the air-transport sector simply acted 
as the impetus for searching for an answer why there has not been more 
general consensus in this area. In any event, my thesis is not concerned with 
the success or failure of liberalization as such, but whether it has become a 
common EC policy. Whether or not and to what extent liberalization 
succeeded, must remain the topic of further research.
Now the EC/EU as a whole does not have very many successes to 
record in this respect. Perhaps the free market it has created could be counted 
a success, but in fact it really applies to only trivial sectors, and certainly not to 
air transport. Moreover, agricultural policy and monetary union (so far) are not 
notably successful. Since air transport is an area par excellence where 
continental and global considerations apply, it is astonishing that no 
consensus could be arrived at in seven years of continued negotiations. The 
adoption of a common EC policy for civil aviation during the period between 
1987 and 1993 was, however, equally fraught with difficulties as the thirty 
years preceding 1987, given that civil aviation is an area in which powerful 
politico-economic interests were intertwined. Still, failure to achieve real 
agreement in this sector suggests a series of severe limitations to prospects of 
successful European integration.
When the EC was first set up, nobody could have imagined that it would 
so greatly disappoint its founders’ hopes and objectives. Nobody could have 
foreseen that transforming countries' national air-transport systems into a joint 
free air-transport market would be beset with such difficulties, nor that a supra­
national European Community would turn out to be impossible in terms of 
transcending both national sovereignty and chauvinist nationalism on the
European continent. The countries particularly notable in this respect have
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been, Britain, France and Germany, at least as far as the air-transport sector 
is concerned. They insisted on solving their EC and international politico- 
economic air-transport differences and satisfying them individualistically in 
opposition both to the poorer and weaker countries in the North-South conflict, 
and to the Treaty of Rome for a common transport policy. In a European 
Community with centripetal and centrifugal forces among its member-states, 
their machinations to that end have ruthlessly employed factions and alliances 
with the smaller member-countries, political manipulation, back-door 
manoeuverings, and more or less shortlived and purely expedient 
reconciliations among themselves in order to solve their internal 
contradictions, and smoulding discrepancies in the EC. In other words, the EC 
became a vehicle for its three most powerful countries promoting solely their 
own politico-economic interests, totally indifferent to the well-being of other 
members in the EC.
Among the troika states, Britain has all along been the mouthpiece of 
US interests whenever they served its own, either directly, or for one reason or 
another not permitting EC opposition to UK wishes. Although Britain has 
managed to undermine the supranational identity of the EC, it has at the same 
time succeeded in promoting its own interests to the maximum. Being more 
than an equal partner with the other members in the Community, it has 
acquired for itself pivotal and strong roles in some EC arenas, that of air 
transport being a case in point.
By contrast the other two strong EC states, France and Germany, and 
with them the Benelux countries, have attempted to minimalize the inequalities 
and differences between the South-West member-countries (for protectionism) 
and North-East ones (for the globalization of the EC air-transport market), in 
order to avoid the uneven rate of progress. This Franco-German politico- 
economic alliance has been strong enough to offset that of UK-USA interests 
in the EC.
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The above, by supporting my argument about the failure of the EC/EU 
to establish a commonly agreed air-transport policy, also demonstrates that 
national air-transport politics and policies were disguised at a European level 
in straight contravention of the Treaty of Rome.
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APPENDIX 1.1 
THE FREEDOMS OF THE AIR
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There are seven freedoms, which in reality are privileges, 
acknowledged in the scheduled international air transport:
(1) The right of airline A' to overfly (without landing) the country B to get to 
country C.
A'
A--------------- B------------ >C
(2) The right of airline A' to land in B for purely technical reasons, including 
refuelling, while going to country C.
A'
A------------ >B----------- >C
(3) The right of airline A' to set down passengers and/or freight in country B.
A'
A-------------- >B
(4) The right of airline A' to pick up passengers and/or freight from country B.
A'
A<-------------- B
(5) The right of airline A' to drop off or take aboard passengers and/or freight 
between country B and country C as long as the flight originates or 
terminates in its own country of registry.
A'
A--------------->B<------------ >C
Fifth freedom rights are sometimes called "Beyond Rights" or "Fill-up Traffic” .
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(6) The right of airline A' to drop off or take aboard passengers from both 
countries B and C. Thus airline A' can carry traffic from country B to 
country A and then carry it from country A to country C. The traffic taken 
from country B to country C in this manner is referred to as sixth freedom 
traffic.
A1
A<-
A<-
->B<- ->C
>C
(7) The right of airline A' to conduct air-traffic services (dropping off and taking 
aboard passengers) between two points within country B. The prohibition 
of this freedom is called "cabotage".
A'
BX<--------------------- >BY
The first and second freedoms are technical privileges; the third, fourth 
and fifth freedoms concern commercial (traffic) rights. The first four and the 
seventh freedoms are negotiated on a bilateral basis; the fifth and sixth are 
negotiated multilaterally. The third and fourth freedoms are the most important 
commercial traffic rights; the fifth and sixth consist of a combination of 
freedoms three and four.
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Appendix 1.2 
The US Show Cause Order (SCO)
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INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION
P.O. Box 160, 1216 Cointrin, Geneva, Switzerland 
P.O. Box 550, Montreal, Quebec, Canada H3A 2R4
Geneva, March 2, 1979
US CAB ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE ("SCO") - A SITUATION REPORT
On June 9, 1978, the US Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) issued Order 78-6-78  
requiring IATA and other interested parties to show cause why the Board should not 
withdraw its approval of, and consequently the anti-trust exemption for, the Traffic 
Conferences and other related agreements of IATA under Sections 412 and 414  of the US 
Federal Aviation Act.
The IATA agreements referred to under the SCO range from typical fares and cargo 
rates coordination (e.g. establishing integrated public fares and rates patterns in various 
geographic markets) to the essential international trade association type functions (e.g. 
standardized traffic documentation, procedures and systems). The IATA agreements are 
developed by the scheduled airlines within a multi-national Traffic Conference forum, under 
the terms of over 1,000 formal bilateral air transport agreements between the world's 
governments.
As at February 20, 1979 over 4 0  national governments had made protest 
submissions against the CAB proposal through the US Department of State, and 42 
international airlines had made submissions direct to the CAB. In addition, the 35 member 
countries of the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC), the Arab Civil Aviation Council 
(ACAC) indirectly expressed their concern through submissions made by these regional 
organizations.
The member airlines of the Arab Air Carriers Organization (AACO), the Association 
of European Airlines (AEA), the African Airlines Association (AFRAA), the Air Transport 
Association of America (ATA), and the Orient Airlines Association (OAA), have also 
submitted joint responses to the CAB. Over a dozen other "interested parties" have also 
submitted comments for CAB consideration (see Attachment A).
The three US Federal Agencies with the greatest influence on US International 
Aviation Policy have now also taken positions. The Department of Justice - on the basis of 
traditional anti-trust doctrine - strongly supports the CAB's tentative decision. The 
Department of State - largely citing foreign government protests - calls for moderation. The 
Department of Transportation - arguing that no record has been established to support 
confirmation of the tentative findings - urges the CAB not to take action without further 
proceedings, and this position has also now been supported by the Department of State (see 
Attachment B for amplified details).
As at March 2, the CAB was still studying the various submissions and had not 
established any decision or recommendations to resolve this outstanding and important 
question.
GENEVA Telephone (022) 98 33 66 Telex 23 391 MONTREAL Telephone (514) 844-6311 Telex .058 - 5267627
I A T A
Public Relations Departm ent 
Background Information Document
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Attachment A
Page 1
Geneva, March 2, 1979 
SUMMARY OF SHOW CAUSE ORDER SUBMISSIONS AND REPLIES AS AT 20 FEBRUARY 1979
Countries where ministries of Foreign Affairs are known to have made 
formal submissions to the U.S. Dept, of State :
Argentina Ghana Saudi Arabia
Australia Ireland Sudan
Austria Israel Sweden
Belgium Ita ly Switzerland
Benin Ivory Coast Taiwan
Cameroon Japan Tanzania
Canada Kenya Togo
Chile * Mauritania Tunisia
Columbia Mexico United Kingdom
Denmark New Zealand Upper Volta
Ethiopia Norway Yugoslavia
Finland Pakistan Zambia
France Philippines
Germany F.R. Portugal
* Comments supporting CAB's tentative SCO findings.
Note also l is t  of regional government organizations that have made si
Countries where Civil Aviation Authorities have made submissions to t
U.S. Department of State or the CAB directly :
Argentina Kuwait Switzerland
Egypt Lebanon
Iraq Malta
Air Carriers that made submissions to the CAB or have submitted statements 
of support for the IATA submission :
Aer Lingus
Aerolineas Argentinas
Air Afrique
Air Canada
Air India
Air Malta
Air New Zealand
A lita lia
Braniff
British Airways 
British Caledonian 
Cameroon Airlines 
CP Air 
Cruzeiro
Egyptair 
El A1 ,
Ethiopian Airlines
Finnair
Flying Tiger
Ghana Airways
Iberia
Iran Air
Iraqi Airways
JAL
JAT
Kuwait Airways 
LOT
Mexicana
Middle East Airlines
Nigerian Airways
Pan American
Philippine Airlines
Qantas
Sabena
SAS
Saudia
South African Airways 
Swissair
Trans World Airlines 
United Airlines 
UTA 
Varig
Note also l is t  of regional a ir l in e  associations that have made .submissions.
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Page 2
Geneva, March 2 ,  1979
Submissions have also been received from :
Regional Government Organizations
- Arab Civil Aviation Council (14)*
- European Civil Aviation Conference (21)*
Regional Airline Associations
- African Airlines Association (22)*
- Air Transport Association of toierica (26)*
- Arab Air Carriers Organization (18)*
- Association of European Airlines (19)*
- Orient Airlines Association (12)*
Other "Interested Parties"
- Air Freight Forwarders of America
- American Automobile Association
- American Society of Travel Agents
- Association of Bank Travel Bureaux
- Aviation Consumer Action Project (ACAP) * *
- Electronics Shippers * *
- Emery Air Freight Corporation
- International Airforwarder and Agents Association
- National Passenger Traffic Association, Inc. **
*  Number of members.
* *  Comments supporting CAB's tentative SCO findings.
* *
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Attachment B
Page 1
Geneva, March 2 ,  1979
SHOW CAUSE ORDER POSITION OF U.S. FEDERAL AGENCIES
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
While slating its  fu ll support for Board policies that w ill  maximise 
competition in the international aviation system, the DoS questions 
whether United States' objectives w ill best be served by the fu l l  
course of the action contemp^ted in the Order. I t  argues that the 
CAB's proposed acticn against the IATA t r a f f ic  conferences may cause 
foreign governments to be less willing to negotiate bilateral agreements 
that would permit individual a ir line  pricing and free market entry.
For this reason DoS believes that the Board should consider moderating 
steps that would allow the US policy objectives to be achieved, and 
yet a lleviate some of the concerns of foreign governments who perceive 
that the US is acting precipitously or in an unnecessary unilateral 
manner.
The DoS then outlines possible ways of moderating the procedure
for the Board to consider :
1) Delay the effective date of any withdrawal of an ti-trust immunity
so that airlines receive an opportunity to adjust their pricing
practices to the new requirements and so that ample time would
be available for re fil ing  the "legitimate and desirable" fa c il ita t io n  
agreements and avoiding unnecessary disruption or uncertainty 
for the airlines.
2) Limit the scope of the Order so that i t  applies only to US a ir lines ,  
thus alleviating some of the Board's concerns about in ter-carrier  
pricing agreements while reducing foreign government concerns 
regarding implications of US anti-trust law on their carriers.
3) Withdrawal of US anti-trust immunity only in thoee.markets
directly  serving the United States and possible participation
by US carriers in those foreign rate conferences in which they 
have f i f th  freedom rights.
4) Limit the thrust of the Order to IATA's price co-ordination 
function and leave intact the Association's fa c il ita t io n  services.
5) Provide interested foreign governments with an opportunity to 
consult with the United States on any actions which would 
adversely affect the IATA conference mechanism.
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Geneva, March 2, 1979
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
•  DOJ strongly supports the Board's tentative decision 
that IATA should not continue to be immunized from US anti-trust  
laws; carriers should, nonetheless, be given a reasonable time to 
adjust to any changes required by the Board and to re f i le  any 
agreements considered not to be anti-competitive.
•  The DOJ finds that IATA has failed to ju s t i fy  its  an ti­
competitive aspects, has wrongly interpreted the anti-trust laws, 
and has made exagerated claims of the legal and policy consequences 
of withdrawal of anti-trust immunity.
Specifically the DOJ finds that ;
a) Competition has a preferred status in the public interest 
balancing process and that the Board can determine the appropriate 
weighting to be given. The DOJ finds the Local Cartage test necessary 
and appropriate to a fu ll  and careful evaluation, that the burden
of proof lies with proponents of IATA, and that an evidentiary 
hearing is not required by due process of law;
b) The recent bilateral agreements to which the US is a party 
contemplate and guarantee a system in which fares are set individually  
by the airlines in a competitive market. Government intervention
is limited to instances where predation, monopoly or subsidies threaten 
to undercut the free market. The abolition of IATA rate fixing 
is not contrary to US foreign policy obligations in respect of these' 
countries. Indeed, even under the old b ilatera l agreements, the , 
Board may withdraw approval of IATA rate making without adverse 
foreign policy consequences;
c) The applicability of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine to IATA
rate activ ities  is questionable. Whilst IATA have a Noerr-Pennington 
right to petition the CAB, once that petition is denied they have 
exhausted those rights and may not continue to f ix  rates under the 
guise of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine;
d) As an "unregulated industry" the International Air Transport 
Industry does not require special exemption from US anti-trust  
laws, rather, i t  can compete in the same way as other unregulated 
industries. The best way for IATA and its  members to protect themselves 
in a non-immunized environment is "to avoid scrupulously involvement
in any ac tiv it ies  which smack of conspiratory conduct"; and
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e) The Board should not, as the DoS suggests, review each related 
agreement or withdraw its  approval only in respect of US carriers. 
Such a procedure is not necessary, nor consistent with United States' 
national interests.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
The DoT basic position is that the CAB should conduct further 
proceedings before taking a decision on whether or not to confirm its  
tentative findings.
With respect to IATA's role in negotiating fares and rates, the 
DoT states :
1) That the six questions raised in the Order must be answered before 
a final decision can be made.
2) That the record to date is not adequate to remove the uncertainty 
about the impact which confirming the Order would have on the 
achievement of the US's policy objectives.
3) That the Board should conduct a careful analysis of whether or not 
disapproval of a ll  pricing agreements advances US interests in 
establishing a competitive international a ir transportation system.
With respect to "fac il ita t ion" agreements, the DoT suggests that 
the CAB should conduct evidentiary hearings to determine whether 
these agreements meet the public interest standards of section 412 
of the Federal Aviation Act and whether anti-trust immunity is required 
for such agreements. The DoT's use of the term fa c il i ta t io n  refers to 
IATA's trade association function and specifically mentions baggage, 
conditions of service, agency and interline/standardisation resolutions 
as candidates for the hearing process.
In this context, i t  is also worth noting that in a footnote related 
to a comment on IATA's motion for consolidation of the SCO and the 
amended IATA t r a f f ic  conference provisions the DoT stated : "DoT
does believe that the division of IATA on trade association and t a r i f f  
conference lines is desirable".
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Article 1
By this Treaty, the High Contracting Parties establish among themselves 
a European Economic Community.
Article 2
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market 
and progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States, 
to promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of
economic ac tiv itie s , a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in 
s tab ility , an accelerated raising of the standard of liv ing and closer
relations between the states belonging to i t .
Article 3
For the purposes set out in A rtic le  2, the activ ities of the Community 
shall include, as provided in this Treaty and in accordance w ith the 
timetable set out therein:
a. the elim ination, as between Member States, o f customs
duties and of quantitative restrictions on the import and 
export o f goods, and of a ll other measures having 
equivalent e ffec t;
b. the establishment o f a common customs ta r i f f  and o f a
common commercial policy towards th ird countries;
c. the abolition, as between Member States, of obstacles to 
freedom of movement fo r persons, services and capital;
d. the adoption o f a common policy in the sphere of
agriculture;
e. the adoption o f a common policy in the sphere o f
transport;
f .  the institu tion  o f a system ensuring that competition in the 
common market is not distorted;
g. the application o f procedures by which the economic
policies of Member States can be coordinated and 
disequilibria in the ir balances of payments remedied;
h. the approximation o f the laws o f Member States to the 
extent required fo r the proper functioning of the common 
market;
i .  the creation of a European Social Fund in order to improve 
employment opportunities for workers and to contribute to  
the raising of the ir standard of liv ing;
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j .  the establishment o f a European Investment Bank to 
fa c ilita te  the economic expansion of the Community by 
opening up fresh resources;
k . the association o f the overseas countries and te rrito ries  in 
order to increase trade and to  promote jo in tly  economic 
and social development.
RIGHT OF ESTABLISHMENT 
Article 52
Within the framework of the provisions set out below, restrictions on the 
freedom of establishment o f nationals of a Member State in the te rrito ry  
o f another Member State shall be abolished by progressive stages in the 
course of the transitional period. Such progressive abolition shall also 
apply to restrictions on the setting up o f agencies, branches or 
subsidiaries by nationals o f any Member State established in the te rrito ry  
of any Member State.
Freedom o f establishment shall include the righ t to  take up and pursue 
activ ities as self-employed persons and to  set up and manage 
undertakings, in particular companies or firms w ithin the meaning of the 
second paragraph o f A rtic le  58, under the conditions laid down fo r its  
own nationals by the law o f the country where such establishment is 
e ffected, subject to  the provisions of the chapter re lating to cap ita l.
Article 53
Member States shall not introduce any new restrictions on the right o f 
establishment in the ir te rrito ries  of nationals of other Member States, 
save as otherwise provided in this Treaty.
Article 54
1. Before the end o f the f irs t stage, the Council shall, acting 
unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and a fte r consulting the 
Economic and Social Committee and the Assembly, draw up a general 
programme for the abolition o f existing restrictions on freedom of
establishment w ithin the Community. The Commission shall submit its
proposal to the Council during the firs t two years of the firs t stage.
The programme shall set out the general conditions under which freedom 
of establishment is to be attained in the case o f each type o f ac tiv ity
and in particular the stages by which i t  is to be atta ined.
2. In order to implement this general programme o r, in the absence of 
such programme, in order to achieve a stage in atta in ing freedom of 
establishment as regards a particular a c tiv ity , the Council shall, on a 
proposal from the Commission and after consulting the Economic and 
Social Committee and the Assembly, issue d irectives, acting unanimously 
until the end o f the f irs t stage and by a qualified m ajority thereafte r.
3. The Council and the Commission shall carry out the duties devolving 
upon them under the preceding provisions, in particular:
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a. by according, as a general ru le , p rio rity  treatment to 
activ ities  where freedom of establishment makes a 
particu la rly  valuable contribution to the development of 
production and trade;
b . by ensuring close cooperation between the competent 
authorities in the Member States in order to ascertain the 
particu lar situation within the Community o f the various 
activ ities  concerned;
c . by abolishing those administrative procedures and practices, 
whether resulting from national legislation or from 
agreement previously concluded between Member States, the 
maintenance of which would form an obstacle to  freedom of 
establishment;
d. by ensuring that workers of one Member State employed in 
the te rr ito ry  o f another Member State may remain in that 
te rr ito ry  fo r the purpose of taking up activ ities  therein as 
self-employed persons, where they satisfy the conditions 
which they would be required to  satisfy i f  they were 
entering that state at the time when they intended to take 
up such activ ities;
e. by enabling a national o f one Member State to acquire and 
use land and buildings situated in the te rr ito ry  o f another 
Member State, in so far as this does not con flic t with the 
principles laid down in A rtic le  39 (2 );
f .  by e ffecting  the progressive abolition of restrictions on 
freedom of establishment in every branch o f ac tiv ity  under 
consideration, both as regards the conditions of setting up
agencies, branches or subsidiaries in the te rrito ry  o f a
Member State and as regards the conditions governing the 
entry o f personnel belonging to the main establishment into 
managerial or supervisory posts in such agencies, branches 
or subsidiaries;
g. by coordinating to  the necessary extent the safeguards
which, fo r the protection of the interests o f members and 
others, are required by Member States of companies or 
firms w ithin the meaning of the second paragraph of A rtic le  
58 with a view to  making such safeguards equivalent
throughout the Community;
h. by satisfying themselves that the conditions of
establishment are not distorted by aids granted by Member 
States.
Article 55
The provision o f this chapter shall not apply, so fa r as any given
Member State is concerned, to  activ ities which in that state are
connected, even occasionally, with the exercise of o ffic ia l authority .
The Council may, acting by a qualified m ajority on a proposal from the 
Commission, rule that the provisions of this chapter shall not apply to 
certain ac tiv ities .
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Article 56
1. The provisions of this chapter and measures taken in pursuance 
thereof shall not prejudice the applicability  o f provisions laid down by 
law, regulation or administrative action providing fo r special treatment 
fo r foreign nationals on grounds of public po licy, public security or 
public health.
2. Before the end of the transitional period, the Council shall, acting 
unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and a fte r consulting the 
Assembly, issue directives for the coordination of the aforementioned 
provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action. A fte r 
the end o f the second stage, however, the Council shall, acting by a 
qualified m ajority on a proposal from the Commission, issue directives for 
the coordination o f such provisions as, in each Member S tate, are a 
matter fo r regulation or administrative action.
Article 57
1. In order to make i t  easier fo r persons to  take up and pursue 
activ ities as self-employed persons, the Council shall, on a proposal from 
the Commission and a fte r consulting the Assembly, acting unanimously 
during the firs t stage and by a qualified m ajority the rea fte r, issue
directives for the mutual recognition of diplomas, certifica tes and other 
evidence of formal qualifications.
2. For the same purpose, the Council shall, before the end o f the 
transitional period, acting on a proposal from the Commission and a fte r 
consulting the Assembly, issue directives fo r the coordination o f the 
provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in 
Member States concerning the taking up and pursuit o f activ ities as 
self-employed persons. Unanimity shall be required on matters which are 
the subject o f legislation in at least one Member State and measures 
concerned with the protection o f savings, in particular the granting of 
credit and the exercise of the banking profession, and w ith the
conditions governing the exercise o f the medical and a llied , and
pharmaceutical professions in the various Member States. In other cases, 
the Council shall act unanimously during the f irs t stage and by a
qualified m ajority thereafte r.
3. In the case o f the medical and allied and pharmaceutical professions, 
the progressive abolition o f restrictions shall be dependent upon 
coordination of the conditions fo r the ir exercise in the various Member 
States.
Article 58
Companies or firms formed in accordance with the law of a Member State 
and having their registered o ffice , central administration or principal
place of business w ithin the Community shall, fo r the purposes o f this 
chapter, be treated in the same way as natural persons who are nationals 
o f Member States.
"Companies or firms” means companies or firms constituted under c iv il or 
commercial law, including cooperative societies, and other legal persons 
governed by public or private law, save for those which are non-pro fit 
making.
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TRANSPORT
Article 74
The objectives of this Treaty shall, in matters governed by this t i t le ,  be 
pursued by Member States within the framework of a common transport 
policy.
Article 75 Rtvt fcS To  SP^oAL O'C- ^
1. For the purpose of implementing A rtic le  74, and taking into account 
the distinctive features o f transport, the Council shall, acting 
unanimously until the end o f the second stage and by a qualified majority 
thereafte r, lay down, on a proposal from the Commission and a fte r 
consulting the Economic and Social Committee and the Assembly:
a. common rules applicable to international transport to  or
from the te rr ito ry  o f a Member State or passing across the 
te rrito ry  of one or more Member States;
b . the conditions under which non-resident carriers may 
operate transport services within a Member State;
c . any other appropriate provisions.
2. The provisions referred to  in (a) and (b) o f paragraph 1 shall be laid 
down during the transitional period.
3. By way o f derogation from the procedure provided for in paragraph 1, 
where the application o f provisions concerning the principles of the
regulatory system for transport would be liable to have a serious e ffect 
on the standard o f liv ing and on employment in certain areas and on the 
operation of transport fa c ilit ie s , they shall be laid down by the Council
acting unanimously. In so doing, the Council shall take into account the
need for adaptation to  the economic development which w ill result from 
establishing the common market.
Article 76
U ntil the provisions referred to in A rtic le  75 (1) have been laid down, 
no Member State may, w ithout the unanimous approval o f the Council, 
make the various provisions governing the subject when this Treaty enters 
into force less favourable in the ir d irect or indirect e ffec t on carriers o f 
other Member States as compared with carriers who are nationals of that 
state.
Article 77
Aids shall be compatible w ith this Treaty i f  they meet the needs of 
coordination of transport or i f  they represent reimbursement for the 
discharge of certain obligations inherent in the concept of a public 
service.
Article 78
Any measures taken w ith ir the framework o f this Treaty in respect o f
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transport rates and conditions shall take account of the economic 
circumstances of carrie rs.
Article 79
1. In the case o f transport within the Community, discrimination which 
takes the form of carriers charging d iffe ren t rates and imposing d iffe ren t 
conditions for the carriage of the same goods over the same transport 
links on grounds o f the country of orig in or o f destination of the goods 
in question, shall be abolished, at the la tes t, before the end of the 
second stage.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not prevent the Council from adopting other 
measures in pursuance o f A rtic le  75 (1 ) .
3. Within two years o f the entry into force of this Treaty, the Council 
shall, acting by a qualified m ajority on a proposal from the Commission 
and a fte r consulting the Economic and Social Committee, lay down rules 
for implementing the provisions of paragraph 1.
The Council may in particu lar lay down the provisions needed to  enable 
the institutions of the Community to  secure compliance with the rule laid 
down in paragraph 1 and to ensure that users benefit from i t  to the fu ll.
4. The Commission shall, acting on its  own in itia tive  or on application by 
a Member State, investigate any cases o f discrim ination fa lling  within 
paragraph 1 and, a fte r consulting any Member State concerned, shall 
take the necessary decisions w ithin the framework o f the rules laid down 
in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3.
Article 80
1. The imposition by a Member State, in respect o f transport operations 
carried out w ithin the Community, o f rates and conditions involving any 
element of support or protection in the interest o f one or more 
particular undertakings or industries shall be prohibited as from the 
beginning o f the second stage, unless authorised by the Commission.
2. The Commission shall, acting on its  own in itia tive  or on application by 
a Member State, examine the rates and conditions referred to  in 
paragraph 1, taking account in particu lar o f the requirements of an 
appropriate regional economic policy, the needs of underdeveloped areas 
and the problems o f areas seriously affected by po litica l circumstances on 
the one hand, and o f the effects o f such rates and conditions on 
competition between the d iffe ren t modes o f transport on the other.
A fte r consulting each Member State concerned, the Commission shall take 
the necessary decisions.
3. The prohibition provided fo r in paragraph 1 shall not apply to  ta riffs  
fixed to meet competition.
Article 81
Charges or dues in respect o f the crossing o f frontiers which are charged 
by a carrier in addition to the transport rates shall not exceed a 
reasonable level a fte r taking the costs actually incurred thereby into 
account.
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Member States shall endeavour to reduce these costs progressively.
The Commission may make recommendations to Member States fo r the 
application of this a rtic le .
Article 82
The provisions o f this t it le  shall not form an obstacle to the application 
of measures taken in the Federal Republic o f Germany to the extent that 
such measures are required in order to compensate for the economic 
disadvantages caused by the division o f Germany to the economy of 
certain areas of the Federal Republic affected by that division.
Article 83
An Advisory Committee consisting of experts designated by the
governments of Member States, shall be attached to the Commission. The 
Commission, whenever i t  considers i t  desirable, shall consult the
Committee on transport matters without prejudice to  the powers o f the 
transport section of the Economic and Social Committee.
Article 84
1. The provisions of this t it le  shall apply to  transport by ra il,  road and 
inland waterway.
2. The Council may, acting unanimously, decide whether, to  what extent 
and by what procedure appropriate provisions may be laid down for sea 
and a ir transport.
RULES ON COMPETITION 
Article 85
1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible w ith the common
market: a ll agreements between undertakings, decision by associations of 
undertakings and concerted practices which may a ffec t trade between
Member States and which have as the ir object or e ffect the prevention, 
restriction or d istortion o f competition w ithin the common market, and in 
particular those which:
a. d irectly  or ind irectly  fix  purchase or selling prices or any 
other trading conditions;
b. lim it or control production, markets, technical development,
or investment;
c . share markets or sources o f supply;
d. apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with
other trading parties, thereby placing them at a
competitive disadvantage;
e. make the conclusion o f contracts subject to acceptance by 
the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by 
the ir nature or according to  commercial usage, have no
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connection with the subject o f such contracts.
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this a rtic le  shall 
be automatically void.
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable 
in the case of:
o any agreement or category of agreements between
undertakings;
o any decision or category of decisions by associations of
undertakings;
o any concerted practice or category of concerted practices;
which contributes to improving the production or d istribution o f goods or 
to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a 
fa ir share of the resulting bene fit, and which does not:
a. impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are 
not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives;
b . afford such undertakings the possibility o f eliminating 
competition in respect o f a substantial part o f the products 
in question.
A rtic le  86
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the 
common market or in a substantial part of i t  shall be prohibited as 
incompatible with the common market in so far as i t  may a ffec t trade 
between Member States.
Such abuse may, in particu la r, consist in:
a. d irectly  or ind irectly  imposing unfair purchase or selling 
prices or other unfair trading conditions;
b. lim iting production, markets or technical development to 
the prejudice o f consumers;
c . applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with 
other trading parties, thereby placing them at a 
competitive disadvantage;
d. making the conclusion o f contracts subject to  acceptance 
by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by 
their nature or according to commercial usage, have no 
connection with the subject of such contracts.
Article 87
1. Within three years of the entry into force of this Treaty the Council 
shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and a fte r 
consulting the Assembly, adopt any appropriate regulations or directives 
to give e ffec t to the principles set out in Articles 85 and 86.
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I f  such provisions have not been adopted within the period mentioned, 
they shall be laid down by the Council, acting by a qualified majority on 
a proposal from the Commission and a fte r consulting the Assembly.
2. The regulations or directives referred to in paragraph 1 shall be 
designed in particular:
a. to ensure compliance with the prohibitions laid down in 
A rtic le  85 (1) and in A rtic le  86 by making provision for 
fines and periodic penalty payments;
b. to lay down detailed rules for the application o f A rtic le  85 
(3 ), taking into  account the need to  ensure effective 
supervision on the one hand, and to  simplify administration 
to the greatest possible extent on the other;
c. to define, i f  need be, in the various branches of the 
economy, the scope o f the provision of Articles 85 and 86;
d. to define the respective functions of the Commission and
of the Court o f Justice in applying the provisions laid down 
in this paragraph;
e. to determine the relationship between national laws and the 
provisions contained in this section or adopted pursuant to  
this a rtic le .
Article 88
U ntil the entry in to  force of the provisions adopted in pursuance of 
A rtic le  87, the authorities in Member States shall rule on the
admissibility of agreements, decisions and concerted practices and on 
abuse o f a dominant position in the common market in accordance with 
the law of the ir country and with the provisions of A rtic le  85, in
particular paragraph 3, and of A rtic le  86.
Article 89
1. Without prejudice to  A rtic le  88, the Commission shall, as soon as i t  
takes up its  duties, ensure the application o f the principles laid down in 
Articles 85 and 86. On application by a Member State or on its  own 
in it ia tiv e , and in cooperation with the competent authorities in the
Member States, who shall give i t  the ir assistance, the Commission shall 
investigate cases of suspected infringement of these principles. I f  i t  
finds that there has been an infringem ent, i t  shall propose appropriate 
measures to bring i t  to  an end.
2. I f  the infringement is not brought to  an end, the Commission shall 
record such infringement of the principles in a reasoned decision. The 
Commission may publish its  decision and authorise Member States to  take 
the measures, the conditions and details o f which i t  shall determine, 
needed to remedy the s itua tion .
Article 90
1. In the case o f public undertakings and undertakings to  which Member 
States grant special or exclusive righ ts, Member States shall neither 
enact nor maintain in force any measure contrary to the rules contained
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in this Treaty, in particular to those rules provided for in A rtic le  7 and 
Articles 85 to 94.
2. Undertakings entrusted with the operation of services o f general 
economic interest or having the character o f a revenue producing 
monopoly shall be subject to the rules contained in this T reaty, in 
particular to the rules on competition, in so fa r as the application of 
such rules does not obstruct the performance, in law or in fa c t, o f the 
particular tasks assigned to  them. The development o f trade must not be 
affected to such an extent as would be contrary to  the interests of the 
Community.
3. The Commission shall ensure the application o f the provisions o f this 
a rtic le  and shall, where necessary, address appropriate directives or 
decisions to Member States.
DUMPING 
Article 91
1. I f ,  during the transitional period, the Commission, on application by 
a Member State or by any other interested pa rty , finds that dumping is 
being practised within the common m arket, i t  shall address 
recommendations to the person or persons with whom such practices 
originate for the purpose of putting an end to  them.
Should the practices continue, the Commission shall authorise the injured 
Member State to take protective measures, the conditions and details of 
which the Commission shall determine.
2. As soon as this Treaty enters into force, products which originate in 
or are in free circulation in one Member State and which have been 
exported to another Member State shall, on reim portation, be admitted 
into the te rrito ry  of the firs t mentioned state free o f a ll customs duties, 
quantitative restrictions or measures having equivalent e ffe c t. The 
Commission shall lay down appropriate rules fo r the application o f this 
paragraph.
STATE AIDS 
Article 92
1. Save as otherwise provided in this T reaty, any aid granted by a
Member State or through state resources in any form whatsoever which
distorts or threatens to  d is to rt competition by favouring certain
undertakings or the production o f certain goods shall, in so fa r as i t
affects trade between Member States, be incompatible w ith the common
m arket.
2. The following shall be compatible w ith the common market:
a. aid having a social character, granted to  individual
consumers, provided tha t such aid is granted without
discrimination related to  the origin o f the products
concerned;
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b. aid to make good the damage caused by natural disasters 
or exceptional occurrences;
c . aid granted to the economy of certain areas of the Federal 
Republic o f Germany affected by the division of Germany, 
in so fa r as such aid is required in order to compensate 
for the economic disadvantages caused by that division.
3. The following may be considered to be compatible with the common 
market:
a. aid to promote the economic development of areas where 
the standard o f liv ing is abnormally low or where there is 
serious underemployment;
b . aid to promote the execution of an important project of 
common European interest or to remedy a serious 
disturbance in the economy o f a Member State;
c . aid to fa c ilita te  the development o f certain economic 
activ ities or o f certain economic areas, where such aid 
does not adversely a ffec t trading conditions to  an extent 
contrary to the common in te rest. However, the aids 
granted to  shipbuilding as o f January 1, 1957 shall, in so 
fa r as they serve only to compensate for the absence of 
customs protection, be progressively reduced under the 
same conditions as apply to the elimination of customs 
duties, subject to the provisions of this Treaty concerning 
common commercial policy towards th ird countries;
d. such other categories of aid as may be specified by 
decision of the Council acting by a qualified majority on a 
proposal from the Commission.
Article 93
1. The Commission shall, in cooperating with Member States, keep under 
constant review a ll systems of aid existing in those states. I t  shall 
propose to the la tte r any appropriate measures required by the 
progressive development or by the functioning o f the common market.
2. I f ,  a fte r giving notice to the parties concerned to submit the ir 
comments, the Commission finds that aid granted by a state or through 
state resources is not compatible with the common market having regard 
to A rtic le  92, or that such aid is being misused, i t  shall decide that the 
state concerned shall abolish or a lte r such aid within a period of time to 
be determined by the Commission.
I f  the state concerned does not comply with this decision within the 
prescribed tim e, the Commission or any other interested state may, in 
derogation from the provisions of Articles 169 and 170, refer the matter 
to the Court o f Justice d irect.
On application by a Member State, the Council may, acting unanimously, 
decide that aid which that state is granting or intends to  grant shall be 
considered to be compatible with the common market, in derogation from 
the provisions of A rtic le  92 or from the regulations provided fo r in 
A rtic le  94, i f  such a decision is justified  by exceptional circumstances.
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I f ,  as regards the aid in question, the Commission has already initiated 
the procedure provided fo r in the f irs t subparagraph o f this paragraph, 
the fact tha t the state concerned has made its  application to the 
Council shall have the e ffec t of suspending that procedure until the 
Council has made its  a ttitude known.
I f ,  however, the Council has not made its  a ttitude known within three 
months of the said application being made, the Commission shall give its 
decision on the case.
3. The Commission shall be informed, in su ffic ient time to  enable i t  to 
submit its  comments, o f any plans to grant or a lter a id. I f  i t  considers 
that any such plan is not compatible w ith the common market having 
regard to A rtic le  92, i t  shall w ithout delay in itia te  the procedure 
provided for in paragraph 2. The Member State concerned shall not put 
its  proposed measures into e ffec t un til this procedure has resulted in a 
fina l decision.
Article 94
The Council may, acting by a qualified m ajority on a proposal from the 
Commission, make any appropriate regulations for the application of 
Artic les 92 and 93 and may in particular determine the conditions in 
which A rtic le  93 (3) shall apply and the categories o f aid exempted from 
this procedure.
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Three Air-Transport Packages, Council Regulation 
4064/89, and Four Commission Regulations
309
Package One
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31. 12. 87 Official Journal of the European Communities No L 374/1
I
(Acts whose publication is obligatory)
COUNCIL REGULATION (EEC) No 3975/87 
of 14 December 1987
laying down the procedure for the application of the rules on competition to undertakings in
the air transport sector
THE CO U N C IL OF TH E EURO PEAN C O M M U N ITIE S,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community, and in particular Article 87 
thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission (’),
Having regard to the opinions of the European 
Parliament (2),
Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Social 
Committee (3),
Whereas the rules on competition form p an  of the Treaty’s 
general provisions which also apply to air transport; 
whereas the rules for applying these provisions are either 
specified in the Chapter on competition or fall to be 
determined by the procedures laid down therein;
Whereas, according to Council Regulation No 141 (4), 
Council Regulation No 17 (5) does not apply to transport 
services; whereas Council Regulation (EEC) No 
1017/68 (*) applies only to inland transport; whereas 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86  (7) applies only to 
mantime transport; whereas consequently the Commission 
has no means at present of investigating directly cases of 
suspected infringement of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty 
in air transport; whereas moreover the Commission lacks 
such powers of its own to take decisions or impose
(') OJ N o  C 18 2 , 9. 7. 1984 , p. 2.
(J) OJ N o  C 1 8 2 , 19. 7. 19 8 2 , p. 120 and 
OJ N o  C 345  21 . 12. 1987.
(J) OJ N o  C 7 7 , 21 . 3. 1983 , p. 20.
(4) OJ N o  124 , 2 8 . 11. 19 6 2 , p. 2 7 5 1 /6 2 .  
(J) OJ N o  13, 21 . 2. 1962, p. 2 0 4 /6 2 .
(‘ ) OJ N o  L 1 75 , 23 . 7. 1968 , p. 1.
(7) OJ N o  L 3 7 8 , 31. 12. 1986 , p. 4.
penalties as are necessary for it to bring to an end 
infringements established by it;
Whereas air transport is characterized by features which 
are specific to this sector; whereas, furthermore, 
international air transport is regulated by a network of 
bilateral agreements between States which define the 
conditions under which air carriers designated by the 
parties to the agreements may operate routes between their 
territories;
Whereas practices which affect competition relating to air 
transport between Member States may have a substantial 
effect on trade between Member States; whereas it is 
therefore desirable that rules should be laid down under 
which the Commission, acting in close and constant liaison 
with the competent authorities of the Member States, 
may take the requisite measures for the application of 
Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty to international air 
transport between Community airports;
Whereas such a regulation should provide for appropnate 
procedures, decision-making powers and penalties to 
ensure compliance with the prohibitions laid down in 
Articles 85 (1) and 86 of the Treaty; whereas account 
should be taken in this respect of the procedural provisions 
of Regulation (EEC) No 1017/68 applicable to inland 
transport operations, which takes account of certain 
distinctive features of transport operations viewed as a 
whole;
Whereas undertakings concerned must be accorded the 
right to be heard by the Commission, third parties whose 
interests may be affected by a decision must be given the 
opportunity of submitting their comments beforehand and 
it must be ensured that wide publicity is given to decisions 
taken;
Whereas all decisions taken by the Commission under this 
Regulation are subject to review by the Court of Justice 
under the conditions specified in the Treaty; whereas it is 
moreover desirable, pursuant to Article 172 of the Treaty,
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to confer upon the Court of Justice unlimited jurisdiction in 
respect of decisions un<3er which the Commission imposes 
fines or periodic penalty payments;
Whereas it is appropriate to except certain agreements, 
decisions and concerted practices from the prohibition laid 
down in Article 85 (1) of the Treaty, insofar as their sole 
object and effect is to achieve technical improvements or 
cooperation;
Whereas, given the specific features of air transport, it will 
in the first instance be for undertakings themselves to see 
that their agreements, decisions and concerted practices 
conform to the competition rules, and notification to the 
Commission need not be compulsory;
Whereas undertakings may wish to apply to the 
Commission in certain cases for confirmation that their 
agreements, decisions and concerted practices conform to 
the law, and a simplified procedure should be laid down 
for such cases;
Whereas this Regulation does not prejudge the application 
of Article 90 of the Treaty,
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:
Article I 
Scope
1. This Regulation lays down detailed rules for the 
application of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty to air 
transport services.
2. This Regulation shall apply only to international air 
transport between Community airports.
Article 2
Exceptions for certain technical agreements
1. The prohibition laid down in Article 85 (1) of the 
Treaty shall not apply to the agreements, decisions and 
concerted practices listed in the Annex, in so far as their 
sole object and effect is to achieve technical improvements 
or cooperation. This list is not exhaustive.
2. If necessary, the Commission shall submit proposals to 
the Council for the amendment of the list in the Annex.
Article 3
Procedures on complaint or on the Commission’s own 
initiative
1. Acting on receipt of a complaint or on its own 
initiative, the Commission shall initiate procedures 
to terminate any infringement of the provisions of 
Articles 85 (1) or 86 of the Treaty.
Complaints may be submitted by:
(a) Member States;
(b) natural or legal persons who claim a legitimate 
interest.
2. Upon application by the undertakings or associations 
of undertakings concerned, the Commission may certify 
that, on the basis of the facts in its possession, there are no 
grounds under Article 85 (1) or Article 86 of the Treaty for 
action on its part in respect of an agreement, decision or 
concerted practice.
Article 4
Result of procedures on complaint or on the Commission’s 
own initiative
1. Where the Commission finds that there has been an 
infringement of Articles 85 (1) or 86 of the Treaty, it may 
by decision require the undertakings or associations of 
undertakings concerned to bring such an infringement to 
an end.
Without prejudice to the other provisions of this 
Regulation, the Commission may address 
recommendations for termination of the infringement to 
the undertakings or associations of undertakings concerned 
before taking a decision under the preceding 
subparagraph.
2. If the Commission, acting on a complaint received, 
concludes that, on the evidence before it, there are no 
grounds for intervention under Articles 85 (1) or 86 of the 
Treaty in respect of any agreement, decision or concerted 
practice, it shall take a decision rejecting the complaint as 
unfounded.
A
3. If the Commission, whether acting on a complaint 
received or on its own initiative, concludes that an 
agreement, decision or concerted practice satisfies the 
provisions of both Article 85 (1) and 85 (3) of the Treaty, it 
shall take a decision applying paragraph 3 of the said 
Article. Such a decision shall indicate the date from which 
it is to take effect. This date may be prior to that of the 
decision.
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Article 5
Application of Article 85 (3) of the Treaty 
Objections
1. Undertakings and associations of undertakings which 
wish to seek application of Article 85 (3) of the Treaty in 
respect of agreements, decisions and concerted practices 
falling within the provisions of paragraph 1 of the said 
Article to which they are parties shall submit applications 
to the Commission.
2. If the Commission judges an application admissible and 
is in possession of all the available evidence and no action 
under article 3 has been taken against the agreement, 
decision or concerted practice in question, then it shall 
publish as soon as possible in the Official Journal o f the 
European Communities a summary of the application and 
invite all interested third parties and the Member States to 
submit their comments to the Commission within 30 days. 
Such publications shall have regard to the legitimate 
interest of undertakings in the protection of their business 
secrets.
3. Unless the Commission notifies applicants, within 
90 days of the date of such publication in the Official 
Journal o f  the European Communities, that there are 
serious doubts as to the applicability of Article 85 (3) of the 
Treaty, the agreement, decision or concerted practice shall 
be deemed exempt, in so far as it conforms with the 
description given in the application, from the prohibition 
for the time already elapsed and for a maximum of six 
years from the date of publication in the Official Journal o f  
the European Communities.
If the Commission finds, after expiry of the 90-day time 
limit, but before expiry of the six-year period, that the 
conditions for applying Article 85 (3) of the Treaty are not 
satisfied, it shall issue a decision declaring that the 
prohibition in Article 85 (1) applies. Such decision may be 
retroactive where the parties concerned have given 
inaccurate information or where they abuse an exemption 
from the provisions of Article 85 (1) or have contravened 
Article 86.
4. The Commission may notify applicants as referred to 
in the first subparagraph of paragraph 3; it shall do so if 
requested by a Member State within 45 days of the 
forwarding to the Member State of the application in 
accordance with Article 8 (2). This request must be 
justified on the basis of considerations relating to the 
competition rules of the Treaty.
If it finds that the conditions of Article 85 (1) and (3) of the 
Treaty are satisfied, the Commission shall issue a decision 
applying Article 85 (3). The decision shall indicate the date 
from which it is to take effect. This date may be prior to 
that of the application.
Article 6
Duration and revocation of decisions applying 
Article 85 (3)
1. Any decision applying Article 85 (3) of the Treaty 
adopted under Articles 4 or 5 of this Regulation shall 
indicate the period for which it is to be valid; normally 
such period shall not be less than six years. Conditions and 
obligations may be attached to the decision.
2. The decision may be renewed if the conditions for 
applying Article 85 (3) of the Treaty continue to be 
satisfied.
3. The Commission may revoke or amend its decision or 
prohibit specific acts by the parties:
(a) where there has been a change in any of the facts which 
were basic to the making of the decision; or
(b) where the parties commit a breach of any obligation 
attached to the decision; or
(c) where the decision is based on incorrect information or 
was induced by deceit; or
(d) where the parties abuse the exemption from the 
provisions of Article 85 (1) of the Treaty granted to 
them by the decision.
In cases falling under subparagraphs (b), (c) or (d), the 
decision may be revoked with retroactive effect.
Article 7 
Powers
Subject to review of its decision by the C ourt of Justice, the 
Commission shall have sole power to issue decisions 
pursuant to Article 85 (3) of the Treaty.
The authorities of the Member States shall retain the power 
to decide whether any case falls under the provisions of 
Article 85 (1) or Article 86 of the Treaty, until such time as 
the Commission has initiated a procedure with a view to 
formulating a decision on the case in question or has 
sent notification as provided by the first subparagraph of 
Article 5 (3) of this Regulation.
Article 8
Liaison with the authorities of the Member States
1. The Commission shall carry out the procedures 
provided for in this Regulation in close and constant liaison 
with the competent authorities of the Member States; these
n
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authorities shall havfe the right to express their views on 
such procedures.
2. The Commission shall immediately forward to the 
competent authorities of the Member States copies of the 
complaints and applications and of the most important 
documents sent to it or which it sends out in the course of 
such procedures.
3. An Advisory Committee on Agreements and Dominant 
Positions in Air Transport shall be consulted prior to the 
taking of any decision following upon a procedure under 
Article 3 or of any decision under the second subparagraph 
of Article 5 (3), or under the second subparagraph of 
paragraph 4 of the same Article or under Article 6. The 
Advisory Committee shall also be consulted prior to 
adoption of the implementing provisions provided for in 
Article 19.
4. The Advisory Committee shall be composed of officials 
competent in the sphere of air transport and agreements 
and dominant positions. Each Member State shall 
nominate two officials to represent it, each of whom may 
be replaced, in the event of his being prevented from 
attending, by another official.
5. Consultation shall take place at a joint meeting 
convened by the Commission; such a meeting shall be held 
not earlier than 14 days after dispatch of the notice 
convening it. In respect of each case to be examined, this 
notice shall be accompanied by a summary of the case, 
together with an indication of the most important 
documents, and a preliminary draft decision.
6. The advisory Committee may deliver an opinion 
notwithstanding that some of its members or their 
alternates are not present. A report of the outcome of the 
consultative proceedings shall be annexed to the draft 
decision. It shall not be made public.
Article 9 
Requests for information
1. In carrying out the duties assigned to it by this 
Regulation, the Commission may obtain all necessary 
information from the governments and competent 
authorities of the Member States and from undertakings 
and associations of undertakings.
2. When sending a request for information to an 
undertaking or association of undertakings, the 
Commission shall forward a copy of the request at the 
same time to the competent authority of the Member State 
in whose territory the head office of the undertaking or 
association of undertakings is situated.
3. In its request, the Commission shall state the legal basis 
and purpose of the request and also the penalties 
for supplying incorrect information provided for in 
Article 12 (1) (b).
4. The owners of the undertakings or their representative 
and, in the case of legal persons or of companies, firms 
associations having no legal personality, the person 
authorized to represent them by law or by their rules sh;iji 
be bound to supply the information requested.
5. When an undertaking or association of undertakim 
does not supply the information requested within the tim<l 
limit fixed by the Commission, or supplies incomple:^ 
information, the Commission shall by decision require th>2- 
information to be supplied. The decision shall specify w hcL- 
information is required, fix an appropriate time limit 
within which it is to be supplied and indicate the penaltu- 
provided for in Article 12 (1 ) (b) and Article 13 (1) (c), 
well as the right to have the decision reviewed by the Cou^. 
of Justice.
6. At the same time the Commission shall send a copy 
its decision to the competent authority of the Member Stat^. 
in whose territory the head office of the undertaking t> t 
association of undertakings is situated.
Article 10
Investigations by the authorities of the Member State'
1. At the request of the Commission, the compete 
authorities of the Member States shall undertake rK. 
investigations which the Commission considers to 
necessary under Article 11 (1) or which it has ordered f 
decision adopted pursuant to Article 11 (3). The officials Cj_ 
the competent authorities of the Member States responsii' t  
for conducting these investigations shall exercise the.' 
powers upon production of an authorization in writi^i 
issued by the competent authority of the Member State 
whose territory the investigation is to be made. Such t>.«. 
authorization shall specify the subject matter and purpyv. 
of the investigation.
2. If so requested by the Commission or by the compett’4: 
authority of the Member State in whose territory t'ik 
investigation is to be made, Commission officials of ik  
competent authority in carrying out their duties.
Article 11 
Investigating powers of the Commission
1. In carrying out the duties assigned to it by tW, 
Regulation, the Commission may undertake all necesso>-v 
investigations into undertakings and associations cL
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undertakings. To this end the officials authorized by the 
Commission shall be empowered:
(a) to examine the books and other business records:
(b) to take copies of, or extracts from, the books and 
business records;
(c) to ask for oral explanations on the spot;
(d) to enter any premises, land and vehicles used by 
undertakings or associations of undertakings.
2. The authorized officials of the Commission shall 
exercise their powers upon production of an authorization 
in writing specifying the subject matter and purpose of the 
investigation and the penalties provided for in Article 12
(1) (c) in cases where production of the required books or 
other business records is incomplete. In good time, before 
the investigation, the Commission shall inform the 
competent authority of the Member State, in whose 
territory the same is to be made, of the investigation and 
the identity of the authorized officials.
3. Undertakings and associations of undertakings shall 
submit to investigations ordered by decision of the 
Commission. The decision shall specify the subject m atter 
and purpose of the investigation, appoint the date bn which 
it is to begin and indicate the penalties provided for in 
Articles 12 (1) (c) and 13 (1) (d) and the right to have the 
decision reviewed by the Court of Justice.
4. The Commission shall take the decisions mentioned in 
paragraph 3 after consultation with the competent 
authority of the Member State in whose territory the 
investigation is to be made. ,
5. Officials of the competent authority of the Member 
State in whose territory the investigation is to be made may 
assist the Commission officials in carrying out rheir duties, 
at the request of such authority or of the Commission.
6. Where an undertaking opposes an investigation 
ordered pursuant to this Article, the Member State 
concerned shall afford the necessary assistance to the 
officials authorized by the Commission to enable them to 
make their investigation. To this end, Member States shall 
take the necessary measures after consultation of the 
Commission by 31 July 1989.
Article 12 
Fines
1. The Commission may, by decision, impose fines on 
undertakings or associations of undertakings of from 100 
to 5 000 ECU where, intentionally or negligently:
(a) they supply incorrect or misleading information in 
connection wich an application pursuant to Article 3 
(2) or Article 5; or
(b) they supply incorrect information in response to a 
request made pursuant to Article 9 (3) or (5), or do not 
supply information within the time limit fixed by a 
decision adopted under Article 9 (5); or
(c) they produce the required books o r other business 
records in complete form during investigations under 
Article 10 or Article 11, or refuse to submit to an 
investigation ordered by decision taken pursuant to 
Article 11 (3).
2. The Commission may, by decision, impose fines on 
undertakings or associations of undertakings of from 1 000 
to 1 000 000 ECU, or a sum in excess thereof but not 
exceeding 10 % of the turnover in the preceding business 
year of the undertakings participating in the infringement, 
where either intentionally or negligently they:
(a) infringe Article 85 (1) or Article 86 of the Treaty; or
(b) commit a breach of any obligation imposed pursuant to 
Article 6 (1) of this Regulation.
In fixing the amount of the fine, regard shall be had both to 
the gravity and to the duration of the infringement.
3. Article 8 shall apply.
4. Decisions taken pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2 shall 
not be of a penal nature.
5. The fines provided for in paragraph 2 (a) shall not be 
imposed in respected of acts taking place after notification 
to the Commission and before its decision in application of 
Article 85 (3) of the Treaty, provided they fall within the 
limits of the activity described in the notification.
However, this provision shall not have effect where the 
Commission has informed the undertakings or associations 
of undertakings concerned that, after preliminary 
examination, it is of the opinion that Article 85 (1) of the 
Treaty applies and that application of Article 85 (3) is not 
justified.
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Article 13 
Periodic penalty payments
1. By decision, the Commission may impose periodic 
penalry payments on undertakings or associations of 
undertakings of from 50 ECU to 1 000 ECU per day, 
calculated from the date appointed by the decision, in order 
to compel them:
(a) to put an end to an infringement of Article 85 (1) or 
Article 86 of the Treaty, the termination of which has 
been ordered pursuant to Article 4 of this Regulation;
(b) to refrain from any act prohibited under Article 6 (3);
(c) to supply complete and correct information which 
has been requested by derision, taken pursuant to 
Article 9 (5);
(d) to submit to an investigation which has been ordered by 
decision taken pursuant to Article 11 (3).
2. When the undertakings or associations of undertakings 
have satisfied the obligation which it was the purpose of 
the periodic penalty payment to enforce, the Commission 
may fix the total amount of the periodic penalty payment 
at a lower figure than that which would result from the 
original derision.
3. Article 8 shall apply.
Article 14 
Review by the Court of Justice
The Court of Justice shall have unlimited jurisdiction 
within the meaning of Article 172 of the Treaty to review 
derisions whereby the Commission has fixed a fine or 
periodic penalty payment; it may cancel, reduce or increase 
the fine or periodic penalty payment imposed.
Article IS  
Unit of account
For the purpose of applying Articles 12 to 14, the ECU 
shall be adopted in drawing up the budget of the 
Community in accordance with Articles 207 and 209 of the 
Treaty.
Article 16
Hearing of the parties and of third persons
1. Before refusing the certificate mentioned in Article 3 
(2), or taking decisions as provided for in Articles 4, 5 (3)
second subparagraph and 5 (4), 6 (3), 12 and 13, ifcR. 
Commission shall give the undertakings or associations©^, 
undertakings concerned the opportunity of being heard 
the matters to which the Commission takes, or has take 
objection.
2. If the Commission or the competent authorities of tl|<- 
Member States consider it necessary, they may also he»o. 
other natural or legal persons. Applications by sucl) 
persons to be heard shall be granted when they show 
sufficient interest.
3. When the Commission intends to take a decision 
pursuant to Article 85 (3) of the Treaty, it shall publish 
summary of the relevant agreement, decision or concerttJL 
practice in the Official Journal o f  the Europe*q 
Communities and invite all interested third parties tp  
submit their observations within a period, not being lej$ 
than one month, which it shall fix. Publication shall ha%<L 
regard to the legitimate interest of undertakings in thQ. 
protection of their business secrets.
Article 17 
Professional secrecy
1. Information acquired as a result of the application *4- 
Articles 9 to 11 shall be used only for the purpose of the. 
relevant request or investigation.
2. Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 16 
and 18, the Commission and the competent authorities 
the Member States, their officials and other servants sha|( 
not disclose information of a kind covered by th e  
obligation of professional secrecy and which has been 
acquired by them as a result of the application of thij 
Regulation.
3. The provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 shall nob 
prevent publication of general information or of surveys 
which do not contain information relating to particula: 
undertakings or associatios of undertakings.
Article 18 
Publication of derisions
1. The Commission shall publish the decisions which it 
adopts pursuant to Articles 3 (2), 4, 5 (3) second 
subparagraph, 5 (4) and 6 (3).
2. The publication shall state the names of the parties and 
the main contents of the decision; it shall have regard to the
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legitimate interest of undertakings in the protection of their 
business secrets.
Article 19 
Implementing provisions
The Commission shall have the power to adopt 
implementing provisions concerning the form, content and
other details of complaints pursuant to Article 3, 
applications pursuant to Articles 3 (2) and 5 and the 
hearings provided for in Article 16 (1) and (2).
Article 20 
Entry into force 
This Regulation shall enter into force on 1 January 1988.
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member 
States.
Done at Brussels, 14 December 1987.
For the Council 
The President 
U. E LL EM ANN-JENSEN
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A N N E X
List referred to in Article 2
(a) The introduction or uniform application o f mandatory or recommended technical standards for aircraft, 
aircraft parts, equipment and aircraft supplies, where such standards are set by an organisation normally 
accorded intem anonal recognition, or by an aircraft or equipment manufacturer;
(b) the introduction or uniform application o f  technical standards for fixed installations for aircraft, where such 
standards are set by an organisation normally accorded international recognition;
(c) the exchange, leasing, pooling, or maintenance o f aircraft, aircraft parts, equipment or fixed installations 
for the purpose o f operating air services and the joint purchase o f aircraft p a n s, provided that such 
arrangements are made on a non-discriminatory basis;
(d) the introduction, operation and maintenance o f technical communication networks, provided that such 
arrangements are made on a non-discriminatory basis;
(e) the exchange, pooling or training o f personnel for technical or operational purposes;
(f) the organisation and execution o f substitute transport operations for passengers, mail and baggage, in the 
event of breakdow n/delay of aircraft, either under charter or by provision o f substitute aircraft under 
contractual arrangements;
(g) the organisation and execution of successive or supplementary air transport operations, and the fixing and 
application o f  inclusive rates and conditions for such operations;
(h) the consolidation o f  individual consignments;
(i) the establishm ent or application o f uniform rules concerning the structure and the conditions governing the 
application o f transport tariffs, provided that such rules do not directly or indirectly fix transport fares and 
conditions;
(j) arrangements as to the sale, endorsement and acceptance o f tickets between air carriers (interlining) as well 
as the refund, pro-rating and accounting schemes established for such purposes;
(k) the clearing and settling o f accounts between air earners by means o f a clearing house, including such 
services as may be necessary or incidental thereto; the clearing and settling o f accounts between air carriers 
and their appointed agents by means o f a centralised and automated settlement plan or system , including 
such services as may be necessary or incidental thereto.
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COUNCIL REGULATION (EEC) No 3976/87  
of 14 December 1987
on the application of Article 85 (3) of the Treaty to certain categories of agreements and 
concerted practices in the air transport sector
THE C O U N C IL  OF THE EURO PEAN C O M M U N IT IE S/
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community and in particular Article 87 
thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission (*),
Having regard to the opinions of the European 
Parliament (2),
Having regard to the opinions of the Economic and Social 
Committee (3),
Whereas Council Regulation (EEC) No 3975 /87  (4) lays 
down the procedure for the application of the rules on 
competition to undertakings in the air transport sector; 
whereas Regulation No 17 of the Council (s) lays down the 
procedure for the application of these rules to agreements, 
decisions and concerted practices other than those directly 
relating to the provision of air transport services;
Whereas Article 85 (1) of the Treaty may bq declared 
inapplicable to certain categories of agreements, decisions 
and concerted practices which fulfil the conditions 
contained in Article 85 (3);
Whereas common provisions for the application of 
Article 85 (3) should be adopted by way of Regulation 
pursuant to Article 87; whereas, according to Article 
87 (2) (b), such a Regulation must lay down detailed rules 
for the application of Article 85 (3), taking into account the 
need to ensure effective supervision, on the one hand, and 
to simplify administration to the greatest possible extent, 
on the other; whereas, according to Article 87 (2) (d), such 
a Regulation is required to define the respective functions 
of the Comission and of the Court of Justice;
Whereas the air transport sector has to date been governed 
by a network of international agreements, bilateral 
agreement between States and bilateral and multilateral
(*) OJ N o  C 1 82 , 9 . 7. 1984, p. 3.
(*) OJ N o  C 2 6 2 , 14. 10. 1985, p. 44;
OJ N o  C 1 9 0 , 20. 7. 1987 , p. 182 and OJ N o  C 3 4 5 , 
21. 12. 1987.
(J) OJ N o  C 3 0 3 , 25 . 11. 1985, p. 31 and 
OJ N o  C 3 3 3 , 29 . 12. 1986, p. 27.
[*) See page 1 o f  this Official Journal.
(J) OJ N o  13, 21 . 2. 1962, p. 2 0 4 /6 2 .
agreements between air carriers; whereas the changes 
required to this international regulatory system to ensure 
increased competition should be effected gradually so as to 
provide time for the air-transport sector to adapt;
Whereas the Commission should be enabled for this reason 
to declare by way of Regulation that the provisions of 
Article 85(1) do not apply to certain categories of 
agreements between undertakings, decisions by 
associations of undertakings and concerted practices;
Whereas it should be laid down under what specific 
conditions and in what circumstances the Commission may 
exercise such powers in close and constant liaison with the 
competent authorities of the Member States;
Whereas it is desirable, in particular, that block 
exemptions be granted for certain categories of agreements, 
decisions and concerted practices; whereas these 
exemptions should be granted for a limited period during 
which air carriers can adapt to a more competitive 
environment; whereas the Commission, in close liaison 
with the Member States, should be able to define precisely 
the scope of these exemptions and the conditions attached to 
them;
Whereas there can be no exemption if the conditions set 
out in Article 85 (3) are not satisfied; whereas the 
Commission should therefore have power to take the 
appropriate measures where an agreement proves to have 
effects incompatible with Article 85 (3); whereas the 
Commission should consequently be able first to address 
recommendations to the parties and then to take 
decisions;
Whereas this Regulation does not prejudge the application 
of Article 90 of the Treaty;
Whereas the Heads of State and Government, at their 
meeting in June 1986, agreed that the internal market in air 
transport should be completed by 1992 in pursuance of 
Community actions leading to the strengthening of its 
economic and social cohesion; whereas the provisions of 
this Regulation, together with those of Council Directive 
8 7 /6 0 1 /E E C  of 14 December 1987 on fares for 
scheduled air services between Member States (‘ ) and those 
of Council Decision 87 /602 /E E C  of 14 December 1987
(*) See p. 12 of this Official Journal.
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on the sharing of passenger capacity between air carriers on 
scheduled air services between Member States and on 
access for air carriers to scheduled air service routes 
between Member States ( '), are a first step in this direction 
and the Council will therefore, in order to meet the 
objective set by the Heads of State and Government, adopt 
further measures of liberalization at the end of a three year 
initial period,
— consultations for common preparation of proposals o*\ 
tariffs, fares and conditions for the carriage 
passengers and baggage on scheduled services, ovj 
condition that consultations on this matter arc  
voluntary, that air carriers will not be bound by thtiL  
results and that the Commission and the Member Statf 
whose air earners are concerned may participate o  
observers in any such consultations,
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATIO N:
Article I
This Regulation shall apply to international air transport 
between Community airports.
Article 2
1. Without prejudice to the application of Regulation 
(EEC) No 3975/87 and in accordance with Article 85 (3) 
of the Treaty, the Commission may by regulation declare 
that Article 85 (1) shall not apply to certain categories of 
agreements between undertakings, decisions of associations 
of undertakings and concerted practices.
— slot allocation at airports and airport scheduling, ov\ 
condition that the air carriers concerned shall b{. 
entitled to participate in such arrangements, that tb{. 
national and multilateral procedures for sudj 
arrangements are transparent and that they take into 
account any constraints and distribution rules define 
by national or international authorities and any rig h t 
which air carriers may have historically acquired,
— common purchase, development and operation 
computer reservation systems relating to timetabling 
reservations and ticketing by air transport 
undertakings, on condition that air carriers of Membet 
States have access to such systems on equal terms, tho*. 
participating carriers have their services listed on 
non-discriminatory basis and also that any participate 
may withdraw from the system on giving reasonably 
notice,
— technical and operational ground handling at airpoiY. 
such as aircraft push back, refuelling, cleaning av  ^
security,
— handling of passengers, mail, freight and baggage 
airports,
2. The Commission may, in particular adopt such 
regulations in respect of agreements, decisions or concerted
practices which have as their object any of the following: — services for the provision of in-flight catering.
— joint planning and coordination of the capacity to be 
provided on scheduled air services, insofar as it helps to 
ensure a spread of services at the less busy times of the 
day or during less busy periods or on less busy routes, 
so long as any partner may w ithdraw w ithout penalty 
from such agreements, decisions or concerted practices, 
and is not required to give more than three months’ 
notice of its intention not to participate in such joint 
planning and coordination for future seasons,
— sharing of revenue from scheduled air services, so long 
as the transfer does not exceed 1 % of the poolable 
revenue earned on a particular route by the transferring 
partner, no cost are shared or accepted by the 
transferring partner and the transfer is made in 
compensation for the loss incurred by the receiving 
partner in scheduling flights at less busy times of the 
day or during less busy periods,
(‘) See p. 19 of this Official Journal..
3. Without prejudice to paragraph 2, such Commission 
regulations shall define the categories of agreem ent 
decisions or concerted practices to which they apply 
shall specify in particular:
(a) the restrictions or clauses which may, or may nC 
appear in the agreements, decisions and concert^- 
practices;
(b) the clauses which must be contained in the agreement 
decisions and concerted practices, or any otlfc  ^
conditions which must be satisfied.
A
Article 3
Any regulation adopted by the Commission pursuant 
Article 2 shall expire on 31 January 1991.
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Article 4 .
Regulations adopted pursuant to Article 2 shall include a 
provision that they apply with retroactive effect to 
agreements, decisions and concerted practices which were 
in existence at the date of the entry into force of such 
Regulations.
Article 5
Before adopting a regulation, the Commission shall publish 
a draft thereof and invite all persons and organizations 
concerned to submit their comments within such 
reasonable time limit, being not less than one month, as the 
Commission shall fix.
Article 6
The Commission shall consult the Advisory Committee on 
Agreements and Dominant Positions in Air Transport 
established by Article 8 (3) of Regulation (EEC) No 
3 975 /87  before publishing a draft Regulation and before 
adopting a Regulation.
Article 7
1. Where the persons concerned are in breach of a 
condition or obligation which attaches to an exemption 
granted by a Regulation adopted pursuant to Article 2, the 
Commission may, in order to put an end to such a 
breach:
— address recommendations to the persons concerned, 
and
— in the event of failure by such persons to observe those 
recommendations, and depending on the gravity of the
breach concerned, adopt a decision that either prohibits 
them from carrying out, or requires them to perform, 
specific acts or, while withdrawing the benefit of the 
block exemption which they enjoyed, grants them an 
individual exemption in accordance with Article 4 (2) 
of Regulation (EEC) No 3975/87 or withdraws the 
benefit of the block exemption which they enjoyed.
2. Where the Commission, either on its own initiative or 
at the request of a Member State or of natural or legal 
persons claiming a legitimate interest, finds that in any 
particular case an agreement, decision or concerted practice 
to which a block exemption granted by a regulation 
adopted pursuant to Article 2 (2) applies, nevertheless has 
effects which are incompatible with Article 85 (3) or are 
prohibited by Article 86, it may withdraw the benefit of the 
block exemption from those agreements, decisions or 
concerted practices and take, pursuant to Article 13 of 
Regulation (EEC) No 3975/87 , all appropriate measures 
for the purpose of bringing these infringements to an end.
3. Before raking a decision under paragraph 2, the 
Commission may address recommendations for 
termination of the infringement to the persons concerned.
Article 8
The Council shall decide on the revision of this Regulation 
by 30 June 1990 on the basis of a Commission proposal to 
be submitted by 1 November 1989.
Article 9
This Regulation shall enter into force on 1 January 1988.
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member 
States.
Done at Brussels, 14 December 1987
For the Council 
The President 
U. ELLEM ANN-JENSEN
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II
(Acts whose publication is not obligatory)
COUNCIL
COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 
of 14 December 1987 
on fares for scheduled air services between Member States
(87 /601 /87)
THE CO UNCIL OF THE EU RO PEA N  CO M M U N ITIES,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community, and in particular Articles 84 (2) 
and 227 (2) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission (*),
Having regard to the opinions of the European 
Parliament (2),
Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Social 
Committee (3),
Whereas more flexible procedures for approving scheduled 
passenger air fares for air services between Member States 
will give air earners greater scope to develop markets and 
better meet consumer needs;
Whereas air carriers should be encouraged to control their 
costs, increase productivity and provide efficient and 
attractively priced air services;
Whereas common rules should be established laying down 
criteria for the approval of air fares;
H  OJ N o  C 78 , 30 . 3 . 1982, p. 6.
(2) OJ N o  C 322 , 28. 11. 1983 , p. 10 and OJ N o  C 3 4 5 ,  
21. 12. 1987. 
n  OJ N o  C 77 , 2 1 .3 .  1983, p. 26 .
Whereas, by virtue of Article 189 o f the Treaty, Member 
States may choose the most appropriate means of 
implementing the provisions of the Directive, and in 
particular may apply the criteria Jaid down in Article 3 
more precisely;
Whereas procedures should be established for the 
submission by air carriers of proposed air fares and their 
express of automatic approval by the Member States 
concerned; whereas air carriers should be free to propose 
air fares individually or after consultation with other air 
carriers for the purpose, in particular, of fixing the terms of 
interlining agreements, given the important benefits which 
they confer;
Whereas provision should be made for rapid consultation 
between Member States in the case of any disagreement 
and for procedures for settling such disagreements 
regarding approval of fares as are not resolved by 
consultations;
Whereas provision should be made for the regular 
consultation of consumer groups on matters relating to air 
fares;
Whereas the Heads of State and Government, at their 
meeting in June 1986, agreed that the internal market in air 
transport should be completed by 1992 in pursuance of 
Community actions leading to the strengthening of its 
economic and social cohesion; whereas the provisions of 
this Directive on fares are a first step in this direction and 
the Council will therefore, in order to meet the objective set 
by the Heads of State and Government, adopt further 
measures of liberalization in respect of air fares at the end 
of a three year initial period,
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HAS AD O PTED  THIS DIRECTIVE:
Scope and definitions
Article 1
This Directive shall apply to criteria and procedures to be 
applied with respect to the establishment of scheduled air 
fares charged on any route between an airport in one 
Member State and an airport in another Member State.
This Directive shall not apply to the overseas departments 
referred to in Article 227 (2) of the Treaty.
Article 2
For the purposes of this Directive:
(a) scheduled air fares means the prices to be paid in the 
applicable national currency for the carriage of 
passengers and baggage on scheduled air services and 
the conditions under which those prices apply, 
including remuneration and conditions offered to 
agency and other auxiliary services;
(b) zone of flexibility means a pricing zone as referred to in 
Article 5, within which air fares meeting the conditions 
in Annex II qualify for automatic approval by the 
aeronautical authorities of the Member States. The 
limits of a zone are expressed as percentages of the 
reference fare;
(c) reference fare means the normal economy air fare 
charged by a third- or fourth-freedom air carrier on the 
routes in question; if more than one such fare exists, 
the average level shall be taken unless otherwise 
bilaterally agreed; where there is no normal economy 
fare, the lowest fully flexible fare shall be taken;
(d) air carrier means an air transport enterprise with a valid 
operating licence to operate scheduled air services;
(e) a third freedom air carrier means an air carrier having 
the right to put down, in the territory of another State, 
passengers, freight and mail taken up in the State in 
which it is registered;
a fourth-freedom air carrier means an air carrier having 
the right to take on, in another State, passengers, 
freight and mail for off-loading in its State of 
registration;
a fifth-freedom air carrier means an air carrier having 
the right to undertake the commercial air transport of 
passengers, freight and mail between two States other 
than its State of registration;
(f) Community air carrier means:
(i) an air carrier which has its central administration 
and principal place of business in the Community,
the majority of whose shares are owned by 
nationals of Member States and /or Member States 
and which is effectively controlled by such persons 
or States, or
(ii) an air carrier which, although it does not meet the 
definition set out in (i), at the time of adoption of 
this Directive:
A. either has its central administration and 
principal place of business in the Community 
and has been providing scheduled or 
non-scheduled air services in the Community 
during the 12 months prior to adoption of this 
Directive.
B. or has been providing scheduled services 
between Member States on the basis of the 
third- and fourth-freedoms of the air during the 
12 months prior to adoption of this Directive.
The enterprises which meet the above criteria are listed 
in Annex I;
(g) States concerned mean the Member States between 
which the scheduled air service in question is 
operated;
(h) scheduled air service means a series of flights each 
possessing all the following characteristics:
(i) it passes through the air space over the territory of 
more than one Member State;
(ii) it is performed by aircraft for the transport of 
passengers or passengers and cargo an d /o r mail 
for remuneration, in such a manner that on each 
flight seats are available for purchase by members 
of the public (either directly from the air carrier or 
from its authorized agents);
(iii) it is operated so as to serve traffic between the 
same two or more points, either:
(1) according to a published timetable, or
(2) with flights so regular of frequent that they 
constitute a recognisably systematic series;
(i) flight means a departure from a specified airport 
towards a specified destination.
Criteria A
Article 3
Without prejudice to Article 5 (2), Member States shall 
approve air fares if they are reasonably related to the 
long-term fully allocated costs of the applicant air carrier, 
while taking into account other relevant factors. In this 
connection, they shall consider the needs of consumers, the
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need for a satisfactory return on capital, the competitive 
market situation, including the fares of the other air 
carriers operating on the route, and the need to prevent 
dumping. However, the fact that a proposed air fare is 
lower than that offered by another air carrier operating on 
the route shall not be sufficient reason for withholding 
approval.
Procedures
Article 4
1. Air fares shall be subject to approval by the 
aeronautical authorities of the States concerned. To this 
end, an air carrier shall submit its fares in the forms 
prescribed by those authorities.
This shall be done either:
(a) individually, 
or
(b) following consultations with other air carriers, 
provided that such consultations comply with the 
requirements of regulations issued pursuant to Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 3976/87 of 14 December 1987 
on the application of Article 85 (3) of the Treaty to 
certain categories of agreements and concerted practices 
in the air transport sector. (*)
Aeronautical authorities shall not require air carriers to 
submit their fares for approval more than 60 days before 
they come into effect.
2. Subject to Article 5, and without prejudice to Article 6, 
fares shall require approval by both the States concerned. If 
neither of the aeronautical authorities has expressed 
disapproval within 30 days of the date of submission of a 
fare, it shall be considered as approved.
3. An air fare, once approved, shall remain in force until 
it expires or is replaced. It may however be prolonged after 
its original date of expiry for a period not exceeding 
12 months.
4. A Member State shall permit an air carrier of another 
Member State operating a direct or indirect scheduled air 
service, on giving due notice, to match an air fare already 
approved between the same city pairs. This provision shall 
not apply to indirect services which exceed the length of the 
shortest direct service by more than 20 %.
(') See p. 9 of this Official Journal.
5. Only third- and fourth-freedom air carriers shall be 
permitted to act as price leaders.
Article S
1. There shall be two zones of flexibility on any scheduled 
air service as follows:
— a discount zone which shall extend from 90 % to more 
than 65 % of the reference fare;
— a deep-discount zone which shall extend from 65 % to 
45 % of the reference fare.
2. Within zones of flexibility, the States concerned shall 
permit third- or fourth-freedom air earners to charge 
discount and deep-discount air fares of their own choice 
subject to the respective conditions set out in Annex II and 
provided those air fares have been filed with the States 
concerned at least 21 days prior to the proposed date for 
their entry into force.
3. If a fare which has been, or is, approved under the 
bilateral approval regime and which, as far as its conditions 
are concerned, qualifies for automatic approval in the 
deep-discount zone, is below the floor of that zone, there 
shall be additional flexibility as to the level of that fare. 
Such additional flexibility shall extend from 10%  below 
the bilaterally approved level of that fare to the ceiling of 
the deep-discount zone.
A fare which is entitled to additional flexibility in 
accordance with this paragraph shall be renewed in 
successive fare seasons at the request of the air carrier 
concerned at a level not lower than the percentage of the 
reference fare at which it stood at the end of the previous 
fare season, any change in level of the reference fare being 
duly taken into account. For the purpose of this paragraph, 
summer and winter fare seasons shall be treated 
separately.
Article 6
This Directive shall not prevent Member States from 
concluding arrangements which are more flexible than the 
provisions of Articles 4 and 5 or from maintaining such 
arrangements in force.
Article 7
1. When a State concerned (the first State) decides, in 
conformity with the above Articles, not to approve a 
scheduled air fare, it shall inform the other State concerned 
(the second State) in writing within 21 days of the fare 
being filed, stating its reasons.
2. If the second State disagrees with the decision of the 
first State, it shall so notify the first State within seven days
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of being informed, providing the information on which its 
decision is based, and request consultations. Each State 
shall supply all relevant information requested by the 
other. Either of the States concerned may request that the 
Commission be represented at the consultations.
3. If the first State has insufficient information to reach a 
decision on the fare, it may request the second State to 
enter into consultations before the expiry of the 21-day 
period prescribed in paragraph 1.
the Directive or the award does not comply 
Community law in other respects.
In the absence of any decision within this period, the awaf- 
shall be regarded as confirmed by the Commission. A 
award confirmed by the Commission shall become bindny 
on the States concerned.
9. During the consultation and arbitration procedure, tl 
relevant existing air fares shall be continued in force uni 
the procedure has expired and any new fare has enteri 
into force.
4. Consultations shall be completed within 21 days of 
being requested. If disagreement still persists at the end of 
this period, the matter shall be put to arbitration at the 
request of either of the States concerned. The two States 
concerned may agree to prolong the consultations or to 
proceed directly to arbitration w ithout consultations.
5. Arbitration shall be carried out by a panel of three 
arbitrators unless the States concerned agree on a single 
arbitrator. The States concerned shall each nominate one 
member of the panel and seek to agree on the third member 
(who shall be a national of a third Member State and act as 
panel chairman). Alternatively they may nominate a single 
arbitrator. The appointm ent of the panel shall be 
completed within seven days. A panel’s decisions shall be 
reached by a majority of votes.
General provisions
Article 8
At least once a year, the Commission shall consult on 
fares and related matters with representatives ev\ 
air-transport user organizations in the Community, f t l  
which purpose the Commission shall supply appropriati 
information to the participants.
Article 9
1. By 1 November 1989, the Commission shall p u b li^  
a report on the application of this Directive, whic^ 
shall include statistical information on the cases in whit^ 
Article 7 has been invoked.
6. In the event of failure by„ either State concerned to 
nominate a member of the panel or to agree on the 
appointment of a third member, the Council shall be 
informed forthwith and its President shall complete the 
panel within three days. In the event of the Presidency 
being held by a Member State which is party to the dispute, 
the President of the Council shall invite the Government of 
the next Member State due to hold the presidency and not 
party to the dispute to complete the panel.
7. The arbitration shall be completed within a period of 
21 days of completion of the panel or nomination of the 
single arbitrator. The States concerned may, however, 
agree to extend this period. The Commission shall have the 
right to attend as an observer. The arbitrators shall make 
clear the extent to which the award is based on the criteria 
in Article 3.
8. The arbitration award shall be notified immediately to 
the Commission.
Within a period of 10 days, the Commission shall confirm 
the award, unless the arbitrators have not respected the 
criteria set out in Article 3 or the procedure laid down by
2. Member States and the Commission shall cooperate tu  
the application of this Directive, particularly as regards thA. 
collection of the information referred to in paragraph 1.
3. Confidential information obtained in application 
this Directive shall be covered by professional secrecy.
Article 10
Where a Member State has concluded an agreement witt) 
one or more non-member countries which give$ 
fifth-freedom rights for a route between Member States t*> 
an air carrier of a non-member country, and in this respect 
contains provisions which are incompatible with thiy 
Directive, the Member State shall, at the first opportunin 
take all appropriate steps to eliminate suer 
incompatibilities. Until such time as the incompatibilitie' 
have been eliminated, this Directive shall not affect tin 
rights and obligations vis-a-vis non-member countrie' 
arising from such an agreement. *
Article 11
1. After consultation with the Commission, the Member 
States shall take the necessary steps to comply with thh 
Directive by 31 December 1987.
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2. Member States shall communicate to the Commission Article 13
all the laws, regulations and administrative provisions
which they adopt for the application of this Directive. This Directive is addressed to the Member States.
Done at Brussels, 14 December 1987
Article 12
The Council shall decide on the revision of this Directive by 
30 June 1990, on the basis of a Commission proposal to be 
submitted by 1 November 1989.
A N N E X  1
Airlines referred to in Article 2 (f) (ii)
The following airlines meet the criteria referred to in Article 2 (f) (ii) as long as they are recognized as a national 
earner by the Member State which so recognizes them at the time of the adoption o f this Directive:
— Scandinavian Airlines System,
— Britannia Airways,
— M onarch Airlines.
For the Council 
The President 
U. ELLEM ANN-JENSEN
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A N N E X  II
Conditions for discount and deep-discount fares
D ISCO UNT ZO NE
1. T o qualify for the discount zone ail o f the following conditions must be met:
(a) round or circle trip;
(b) maximum stay o f six months; 
and either
(c) minimum stay o f  not less than Saturday night or six nights
(d) if off-peak (as defined in the Appendix) advance purchase o f  not fewer than 14 days; reservation for the 
entire trip, ticketing and payment to be made at the same time; cancellation or change of reservation 
only available prior to departure o f outbound travel and at a fee of at least 2 0  % o f the price o f the 
ticket.
D EEP-DISCO UNT Z O N E
2. T o qualify for the deep-discount zone, a fare must meet:
— either conditions 1 (a), (b) and (c) and one o f the following conditions:
(a) reservation for the entire trip, ticketing and payment to be made at the same time; cancellation or 
change o f reservation only available prior to departure o f outbound travel and at a fee o f at least 
20 % o f the price o f the ticket;
(b) mandatory advance purchase o f not fewer than 14 days; reservation for the entire trip, ticketing and 
payment to be made at the same time; cancellation or change o f reservation only available prior to 
departure o f outbound travel and at a fee o f at least 20  % o f the price of the ticket;
(c) purchase o f the ticket only permitted on the day prior to departure o f outbound travel; reservation 
to be made separately for both the outbound and inbound journeys and only in the country o f 
departure on the day pnor to travel on the respective journeys;
(d) passenger to be aged not more than 25 years or not less than 60 years;
— or, if  off-peak (as defined in the Appendix), conditions 1 (a) and (b) together with:
— either condition 2 (b) and one o f the following conditions:
(e) passenger to be aged not more than 25 years or not less than 6 0  years;
(f) father a n d /or  mother with children aged not more than 25 years travelling together (minimum  
three persons);
(g) six or m ore persons travelling together with cross-referenced tickets; 
or
(h) mandatory advance purchase o f not fewer than 28 days; reservation for the entire trip, ticketing 
and paym ent to be made at the same time; cancellation or change o f reservation only
available:
— if more than 28 days before outbound travel, 
ticket, or
— if fewer than 28 days before outbound travel, 
ticket.
at a fee o f at least 20  % o f the price o f the 
at a fee o f at least 50  % o f the price o f the
327
No L 374/18 Official Journal of the European Communities 31. 12. 87
Appendix  
Definition of ‘off-peak’
An air carrier may designate certain flights as ‘off-peak’ on the basis o f  commercial considerations.
When an air carrier wishes to use condition 1 (d) or any o f conditions 2 (e) to  (h), identification o f  the off-peak  
flights for each route shall be agreed between the aeronautical authorities o f the Member States concerned on 
the basis o f the proposal made by that air carrier.
On each route where the total activity of third- and fourth-freedom air carriers reaches a weekly average of
18 rerum flights, the air carrier concerned shall be allowed as a minimum to apply conditions 1 (d) or 2 (e) to
(h) on up to 50  % o f its total daily flights, provided that the flights to which these conditions may be applied
depart between 10 .0 0  and 16 .00  or between 21 .00  and 0 6 .00 .
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COUNCIL DECISION 
of 14 December 1987
on the sharing of passenger capacity between air carriers on scheduled air services between 
Member States and on access for air carriers to scheduled air-service routes between Member
States
(87 /6 0 2 /8 7 )
THE C O UNCIL OF THE EURO PEAN C O M M U N ITIE S,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community, and in particular Articles 84 (2) 
and 227 (2) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission (’),
Having regard to the opinions of the European 
Parliament (2),
Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Social 
Committee (J),
Whereas flexibility and competition in the Community 
air-transport system should be increased;
Whereas the artificial constraints imposed on the capacity 
which air carriers may provide and on their access to the 
market should therefore be relaxed;
\
Whereas, taking into account the competitive market 
situation, provision should be made to prevent unjustifiable 
economic effects on air carriers; whereas Member States 
should accordingly be able to intervene if the capacity share 
of their carriers in a bilateral relationship would otherwise 
fall below a given percentage;
Whereas increased market access will stimulate the 
development of the Community air transport sector and 
give rise to improved services for users; whereas, however, 
in order to prevent undue disturbance of existing air traffic 
systems and to allow time for adaptation, it is appropriate 
to provide for some limitations on market access;
(») OJ N o C 182 , 9 . 7 . 1984, p. 1.
(2) OJ N o C 2 6 2 , 14. 10. 1 985 , p. 44 and OJ N o  C 3 45 , 
21. 12. 1987.
(J) OJ No C 303, 25. 11. 1985, p. 31.
Whereas it is necessary to ensure that such limitations do 
not give an unfair advantage to any one air carrier;
Whereas it is necessary, in order to achieve a balanced set 
of opportunities, and taking account of the provisions of 
the measures as a whole, to redress the economic 
disadvantages of air carriers established in the peripheral 
Member States of the Community;
Whereas it is necessary, in particular, not to apply the 
opening of routes between hub airports of one State and 
regional airports of another State to a certain number of 
airports for reasons relating to airport infrastructure and in 
order to secure a gradual development of the Community 
policy of liberalization avoiding negative effects on the 
Community air transport system;
Whereas arrangements for greater cooperation over the use 
of Gibraltar airport were agreed in London on 2 December 
1987 by the Kingdom of Spain and the United Kingdom in 
a joint declaration by the ministers of Foreign Affairs of the 
two countries, and such arrangements have yet to come 
into operation;
Whereas air carriers should be free from any State 
obligation to enter into agreements with other air carriers 
in respects of capacity and market access;
Whereas the Heads of State and Government, at their 
meeting in June 1986, agreed that the internal market in air 
transport should be completed by 1992 pursuant to 
Community actions leading to the strengthening of its 
economic and social cohesion; whereas the provisions of 
this Decision on capacity sharing and market access are a 
first step in this direction and the Council will therefore, in 
order to meet the objective set by the Heads of State and 
Government, adopt further measures of liberalization in 
respect of capacity sharing and market access including 
new fifth-freedom traffic rights between Community 
airports at the end of a three-year initial penod,
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HAS A D O PTE D  THIS DECISION:
Scope and definitions
A rticle 1
1. This Decision concerns:
(a) the sharing of passenger capacity between the air 
carrier(s) of one Member State and the air carriers) of 
another Member State on scheduled air services 
between these States;
(b) access for Community air carrier(s) to certain routes 
between Member States which they do not already 
operate.
2. This Decision shall not affect the relationship between 
a Member State and its own air carriers respecting capacity 
sharing and market access.
3. This Decision shall not apply to the overseas 
departments referred to in Article 227 (2) of the Treaty.
4. Articles 3 and 4 shall not apply to those services subject 
to Council Directive 83 /416 /E E C  of 25 July 1983 
concerning the authorization of scheduled inter-regional air 
services for the transport of passengers, mail and cargo 
between Member States (*), as amended by Directive 
8 6 /2 1 6 /E E C  (2).
5. The application of this Decision to the airport of 
G ibraltar is understood to be w ithout prejudice to the 
respective legal positions of the Kingdom of Spain and the 
United Kingdom with regard to the dispute over 
sovereignty over the territory in which the airport is 
situated.
6. Application of the provisions of this Decision to 
G ibraltar airport shall be suspended until the arrangements 
in the joint declaration made by the Foreign Ministers of 
the Kingdom of Spain and the United Kingdom on 2 
December 1987 have come into operation. The 
Governments of Spain and the United Kingdom will so 
inform the Counil on that date.
Article 2
For the purpose of this Decision:
(a) capacity shall be expressed as the number of seats 
offered to the general public on a scheduled air service 
over a given period;
(b) capacity share means the share of the air carrier(s) of a 
Member State expressed as a percentage of the total 
capacity in a bilateral relationship with another 
Member State, excluding any capacity provided under 
the provisions of Article 6 (3) or under the terms of 
Directive 83 /416 /E E C  and also any capacity provided 
by a fifth-freedom air carrier;
(c) air carrier means an air transport enterprise with a valid 
operating licence to operate scheduled air services;
(d) a third-freedom air carrier means an air carrier having 
the right to put down, in the territory of another State, 
passengers, freight and mail taken up in the State in 
which it is registered;
a fourth-freedom air carrier means an air carrier having 
the right to take on, in another State, passengers, 
freight and mail, for off-loading in its State of 
registration;
a fifth-freedom air carrier means an air carrier having 
the right to undertake the commercial air transport of 
passengers, freight and mail between two States other 
than its State of registration;
(e) States concerned mean the Member States between 
which the scheduled air service in question is 
operated;
(f) Community air carrier means:
(i) an air carrier which has its central administration 
and principal place of business in the Community, 
the majority of whose shares are owned by 
nationals of Member States and /o r Member States 
and which is effectively controlled by such persons 
or States, or
(ii) an air carrier which, although it does not meet the 
definition set out in (i) at the time of adoption of 
this Decision:
A. either has its central administration and 
principal place of business in the Community 
and has been providing scheduled or 
non-scheduled air services in the Community 
during the 12 months prior to adoption of this 
Decision,
B. or has been providing scheduled services 
between Member States on the basis of the third- 
and fourth - freedoms of the air during the 12 
months prior to adoption of this Decision.
The enterprises which meet the above criteria 
are listed in Annex I.
(g) scheduled air service means a series of flights each 
possessing all the following characteristics:
(*) OJ N o  L 2 3 7 , 26 . 8. 1983 , p. 19.
(2) OJ N o  L 15 2 , 6. 6. 1986 , p. 47.
(i) it passes through the air space over the territory ot 
more than one Member State;
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(ii) it is performed by aircraft for the transport of 
passengers or passengers and cargo and/or mail 
for remuneration, in such a manner that on each 
flight seats are available for purchase by members 
of the public (either directly from the air carrier or 
from its authorized agents);
(iii) it is operated so as to serve traffic between the 
same two or more points, either:
(1) according to a published timetable, or
(2) with flights so regular or frequent that they 
constitute a recognizably systematic series;
(h) flight means a departure from a specified airport 
towards a specified destination;
(i) multiple designation on a country-pair basis means the 
designation by one Member State of two or more of its 
air carriers to operate scheduled air services between its 
territory and that of another Member State;
(j) multiple designation on a city-pair basis means the 
designation by one Member State of two or more of its 
air carriers to operate a scheduled air service between 
an airport or airport system in its territory and an 
airport or airport system in the territory of another 
Member State;
(k) hub airport means an airport included in the list in 
Annex II as a category 1 airport;
regional airport means a category 2 or 3 airport as 
listed in Annex II;
(1) airport system means two or more airports grouped 
together as serving the same city.
Shares of capacity
Article 3
1. In the period between 1 January 1988 and 30 
September 1989, a Member State shall allow any third- and 
fourth-freedom air carrier(s) authorized by the States 
concerned under the arrangements in force between them 
to operate routes between their territories to adjust 
capacity provided that the resulting capacity shares are not 
Dutside the range 55 % : 45 %.
1. Unless a different decision is taken under Article 4, the 
ange within which a Member State shall allow the air
carrier(s) of another Member State to increase its (their) 
capacity share shall be extended to 60 % : 40 % from 
1 October 1989.
3. In applying the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2, 
unilateral cut-backs in capacity shall not be taken into 
account. In such cases, the basis for the calculation of 
capacity shares shall be the capacity offered in the 
previous corresponding seasons by the air carrier(s) of the 
Member State which has (have) reduced its (their) 
capacity.
4. Adjustments within the 5 5 % : 4 5 %  range or the
60 % :40  % range, as appropriate, shall be permissible in
any given season, under the following conditions:
(a) after the first autom atic approval, the air carrier(s) of 
the Member State offering less capacity shall be 
authorized to increase its (their) own capacity up to the 
limit of the capacity approved for the air carrier(s) of 
the Member State offering the larger capacity;
(b) if the larter air carrier(s) choose(s) to react to the above 
mentioned increase, it (they) shall receive autom atic 
approval for one further increase, up the level of its 
(their) first capacity filing(s) for that season, within the 
applicable range;
(c) the camer(s) of the Member State offering less capacity 
will then receive automatic approval for one increase up 
to the matching level;
(d) any further increases during that season shall be subject 
to the applicable bilateral provisions between the two 
Member States concerned.
Article 4
1. At the request of any Member State for which the 
application of Article 3 (1) has led to serious financial 
damage for its air carrier(s), the Commission will carry out 
a review before 1 August 1989 and, on the basis of all 
relevant factors, including the market situation, the 
financial position of the carrier(s) and the capacity 
utilisation achieved, will take a decision on whether the 
provisions of Article 3 (2) should be applied in full or 
not.
2. The Commission shall communicate its decision to the 
Council which, acting by unanimity, may take a different 
decision within a period of two months of this 
communication.
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Multiple designation
Article 5
1. A Member State shall accept multiple designation on a 
country-pair basis by another Member State but, subject to 
paragraph 2, shall not be obliged to accept the designation 
of more than one air carrier on any one route.
2. A Member State shall also accept multiple designation 
on a city-pair basis by another Member State:
— in the first year after the notification of this Decision, 
on routes on which more than 250 000 passengers were 
carried in the preceding year,
— in the second year, on routes on which more than 
200 000 passengers were carried in the preceding year 
or on which there are more than 1 200 return flights 
per annum,
— in the third year, on routes on which more than 
180 000 passengers were earned in the preceding year 
or on which there are more than 1 000 return flights 
per annum.
3. The provisions of this Article are subject to those in 
Articles 3 and 4.
— the following airports or airport system* 
which at the time of the notification 
this Decision meet the criteria set out ir 
Article 9:
Barcelona,
Malaga,
Milan — Linate/M alpensa.
(ii) In addition, in order to prevent m ajor disturbance 
of existing air traffic systems and to allow time for 
adaptation, the following airports shall also be 
excluded from the provisions of paragraph 1 for the 
duration of this Decision:
Alicante, Salonica — Micra,
Athens, Turin,
Bilbao, Valencia,
Genoa, Venice.
3. Article 3 and 4 shall not apply to services between an 
airport in category 1 and a regional airport which are 
provided by aircraft with not more than 70 passenger 
seats.
4. Where an air carrier of one Member State has been 
authorized in accordance with this Article to operate a 
scheduled air service, the State of registration of that air 
carrier shall raise no objection to an application for the 
introduction of a scheduled air service on the same route by 
an air carrier of the other State concerned.
Routes between hub and regional airports
Article 6
1. Subject to the provisions of Articles 3, 4 and 5, 
Community air carriers shall be permitted to introduce 
third- or fourth-freedom scheduled air services between 
category 1 airports or airport systems in the territory of one 
Member State and regional airports in the territory of 
another Member State; Airport categories are listed in 
Annex II.
2. (i) The provisions of paragraph 1 shall not apply:
(a) to regional airports exempted from the 
provisions of Directive 83 /416 /E E C ;
(b) for the duration of this Decision to:
— the following airports which, at the time of 
notification of this Direction, handle fewer 
than 100 000 passengers per annum on 
international scheduled air services:
Aalborg, Seville,
Bergamo, Skrydstrup,
Billund, Sonderborg,
Bologna, Stauning,
Esbjerg, Thisted,
Karup, Tirstrup,
Odense,
5. The provisions of this Article shall not affect a Member 
State’s right to regulate the distribution of traffic between 
the airports within an airport system.
Combination of points
Article 7
1. In operating scheduled air services to or from two or 
more points in another Member State or States, a third- or 
fourth-freedom Communiry air carrier shall, subject to the 
provisions of Articles 3, 4 and 5, be permitted to combine 
scheduled air services, provided that no traffic rights are 
exercised between the combined points.
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 shall not apply within 
Spanish territory during the period of validity of this 
Decision. Similarly, air carriers registered in Spain may not 
avail themselves of those provisions during that period.
Fifth-freedom rights
Article 8
1. Without prejudice to Article 6 (2), a Community air 
carrier shall be permitted to operate a fifth-freedom
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scheduled air service where third- or fourth-freedom traffic 
rights exist, provided that the service meets the following 
conditions:
(a) it is authorized by the State of registration of the 
Community air carrier concerned;
(b) it is operated as an extension of a service from, or as a 
preliminary of a service to, its State of registration;
(c) without prejudice to paragraph 2 it is operated between 
two airports at least one of which is not a category 1 
airport;
and
(d) not more than 30 % of the carrier’s annual capacity on 
the route concerned may be used for the carriage of 
fifth-freedom passengers.
2. Subject to paragraphs 1 (a), (b) and (d), Ireland and 
Portugal may each select one category 1, airport in each of 
the other Member States and may each designate an air 
carrier to carry fifth-freedom traffic on services between 
those airports, provided that neither of the air carriers so 
designated may exercise such rights at any one airport on 
more than one such route. The Member States concerned 
need not designate the same carrier for all routes but may 
for this purpose designate only one carrier to each other 
Member State.
3. This Article shall not apply during the period of 
validity of this Decision to routes to or from Spanish 
territory. Similarly, during the same period air carriers 
registered in Spain may not claim fifth-freedom rights on 
the basis of the provisions in this Article.
General provisions
Article 9
Notwithstanding Articles 5 to 8, a Member State shall not 
be obliged to authorize a scheduled air service in cases 
where:
(a) the airport concerned in that State has insufficient 
facilities to accommodate the service;
(b) navigational aids are insufficient to accommodate the 
service.
Article 10
1. This Decision shall not prevent Member States from 
concluding arrangements which are more flexible than the 
provisions of this Decision or from maintaining such 
arrangements in force.
2. The provisions of this Decision shall not be used to 
make existing capacity or market access arrangements 
more restrictive.
Article 11
Member States shall not require air carriers to enter into 
agreements or arrangements with other air carriers relating 
to any of the provisions of this Decision, nor shall they 
forbid them to do so.
Article 12
1. After consultation with the Commission, Member 
States shall take the necessary steps to comply with this 
Decision not later than 31 December 1987.
2. Member States shall communicate to the Commission 
all the Jaws, regulations and administrative provisions 
which they adopt for the application of this Decision.
Article 13
1. Before 1 November 1989, and every two years 
thereafter, the Commission shall publish a report on the 
implementation of this Decision.
2. Member States and the Commission shall cooperate in 
implementing this Decision, particularly as regards 
collection of information for the report referred to in 
paragraph 1.
3. Confidential information obtained within the 
framework of the implementation of this Decision shall be 
covered by professional secrecy.
Article 14
The Council shall decide on the revision of this Decision by 
30 June 1990 at the latest, on the basis of a Commission 
proposal to be submitted by 1 November 1989.
Article IS
This Decision is addressed to the Member States.
Done at Brussels, 14 December 1987
For the Council 
The President 
U. ELLEM ANN-JENSEN
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(Acts w hose publication is obligatory)
C O U N C IL  R E G U LA T IO N  (EEC) N o 2 3 4 2 /9 0  
of 24 July 1990 
on fares for scheduled air services
T H E  C O U N C IL  O F T H E  E U R O P E A N  C O M M U N IT IE S ,
H aving regard to  the T reaty  establishing the European 
Econom ic Com m unity, and in particu lar Article 84 (2) 
thereo f,
H aving regard to the proposal from the C om m ission ( ’),
H av ing  regard to the opinion o f the European 
Parliam ent {2)%
H aving  regard to  the opinion o f  the Econom ic and Social 
C om m ittee (3),
W hereas it is im portant to adopt m easures w ith  the aim of 
progressively establishing the internal m arket over a period 
expiring  on  31 December 1992 as provided for in Article 8a 
o f the T reaty ; w hereas the internal m arket shall com prise an 
area w ithout internal frontiers in w hich the free m ovem ent of 
goods, persons, services and capital is ensured;
W hereas Council Directive 8 7 /6 0 1  /E E C  of 14 D ecember 
1987 on fares for scheduled air services betw een M em ber 
States (4) made a first step tow ards the liberalization  in 
respect of air fares, necessary' to  achieve the internal m arket 
in air transport; w hereas the Council agreed to  take further 
m easures o f liberalization;
W hereas it is appropriate to  establish clear criteria according 
to  w hich the M em ber States’ authorities have to  evaluate 
p roposed  air fares;
W hereas a system o f double disapproval o f air fares rem ains 
an objecnve to be achieved by 1 January  1993 w hereas an 
im portan t element in achieving further liberalization  consists 
in gaining experience o f this system during the interim  
p eriod ;
W hereas it is desirable to introduce a m ore flexible, simpler 
and  m ore efficient system of zones w ithin w hich air fares 
m eeting  particular conditions qualify for au tom atic  approval 
by the aeronautical authorities o f the States concerned;
(')• OJ N o  C 2 3 8 . 11. 10. 1 9 8 9 , p. 3;
and OJ N o  C 1 6 4 , 5 . 7 . 1 9 9 0 , p. 7 .
(*) OJ N o  C 96 , 17. 4 . 1 9 9 0 , p. 59 .
( J) OJ N o  C 1 1 2 .7 .  5 . 1 9 9 0 , p.  17.
(4 ) OJ N o  L 3 7 4 , 31 . 12. 1 9 8 7 , p. 12.
W hereas, in the case of double  approval and double 
disapproval of air fares, it is app rop ria te  to provide for a 
procedure according to  which M em ber States may ask the 
Commission to  exam ine and decide on w hether a proposed 
air fare conform s w ith the cn teria  laid dow n; w hereas in case 
o f excessively high or low  air fares, the C om m ission m ust be 
able to  suspend the application  o f an air fare during us 
exam ination;
W hereas, in the case of double approval o f air fares, 
provision should be m ade for rapid consultation  between 
M ember States in the case of any disagreem ent and for 
procedures for settling such disagreem ents tha t are not 
resolved by consu lta tions,
Whereas this R egulation replaces D irective 8 7 /6 0 1 /E E C ; 
whereas it is therefore necessary' to  revoke tha t Directive;
W hereas it is desirable that the Council adopts further 
measures of liberalization in respect of air fares by 30 June 
1992,
HAS A D O P T E D  TH IS R E G U L A T IO N :
SCOPE A N D  D E F IN IT IO N S
A r t i c le  1
This Regulation shall apply to criteria and procedures to be 
applied w ith respect to  the establishm ent o f scheduled air 
fares charged on routes between M em ber States.
Article 2
For the purposes o f this Regulation:
(a) scheduled air fares means the prices to  be paid in the 
applicable national currency for the carnage of 
passengers and baggage on scheduled air services and 
the conditions under which those prices apply, including 
rem uneration and conditions offered to  agency and 
other auxiliary services;
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(b) scheduled air service means a series of flights each 
possessing all the following characteristics:
(i) it passes through the air space over the territory of 
m ore than one M em ber State;
(ii) it is performed by aircraft for the transport of 
passengers or passengers and cargo and /o r mail 
for rem uneration, in such a m anner that on each 
flight seats are available for individual purchase by 
m em bers of the public (either directly from the air 
ea rner or from its authorized agents);
(iii) it is operated so as to serve traffic between the same 
tw o or more points, either:
1. according to a published timetable; or
2. w ith flights so regular or frequent that they 
constitute a recognizably systematic senes;
(c) flight m eans a departure from a specified airport 
tow ards a specified destination airport;
(d) air ea rner means an air transport enterpnse with a valid 
operating licence from a M em ber State to operate 
scheduled air services;
of another State, passengers, freight and mail for 
off-loading in the State in which it is licensed;
a fifth-freedom  traffic ngh t means the nght of an air 
earner to undertake the air tran spon  of passengers, 
freight and mail between rwo States o ther that the State 
in which it is licensed;
(g) States concerned means the M em ber States between 
which a scheduled air service is operated;
(h) zone of flexibility m eans a pneing zone as referred to in 
Article 4 , w ithin which air fares meeting the conditions 
m  Annex II qualify for autom atic approval by the 
aeronautical au thorities of the States concerned. The 
limits of a zone are expressed as percentages of the 
reference fare;
(i) reference fare m eans the norm al one way or return, as 
appropria te , econom y air fare charged by a third- or 
fourth-freedom  air earner on the route in question; \ '  
m ore than one such fare exists, the arithm etic average or 
all suc£ fares shall be taken unless otherw ise bilaterally 
agreed; where there is no norm al econom y fare, the 
lowest fully flexible fare shall be taken.
(e) C om m unity air carrier means:
(i) an air carrier which has and continues to have 
its central adm inistration and principal place of 
business in the C om m unity , the majority of whose 
shares are and continue to  be ow ned by Member 
States a n d /o r  nationals of M em ber States and 
which is and continues to be effectively controlled 
by such States or persons: or
(ii) an air earner which, at the time of adoption of this 
R egulation, although it does not meet the 
definition set out in (i):
1. either has its central adm inistration and 
p n n a p a l place of business in the Community 
and has been providing scheduled or 
non-scheduled air services in the Community 
during  the 12 m onths prior to adoption of this 
Regulation;
2. o r has been providing scheduled air services 
betw een M em ber States on the basis of third- 
and fourth-freedom  traffic rights during the 12 
m onths prior to adoption of this Regulanon.
The air earners which meet the cn tena  set out in 
this poin t (ii) are listed in Annex 1;
(f) a third-freedom  traffic right means the right of an air 
carrier licensed in one State to  put dow n, in the territory 
of another State, passengers, freight and mail taken up 
in the State in which it is licensed;
a fourth-freedom  traffic nght means the right of an air 
carrier licensed in one State to  take on, in the tem tory
CRITERIA
A r t i c le  3
1. M em ber States shall approve scheduled air fares of 
C om m unity air earners if they are reasonably related to the 
applicant air e a rn e r’s long-term  fully-allocated relevant 
costs, while taking into account the need for a satisfactory 
re tu rn  on capital and for an adequate cost m argin to ensure a 
satisfactory safety standard .
2. In approving air fares pursuant to  paragraph 1, 
M em ber States shall also take into account o ther relevant 
factors, the needs of consum ers and the com petitive market 
situa tion , including the fares of the other air carriers 
operating  on the route and the need to prevent dum ping.
3. N otw ithstand ing  A rticle 4 (4) and (5), M em ber States 
shall disapprove any fare tha t does not meet the terms of 
Article 4 (3) and tha t is, in relation to the criteria defined in 
Article 3 (1), excessively high to the disadvantage of users 
or unjustifiably low in view of the com petitive market 
situation .
4. The fact that a proposed air fare is low er than that 
offered by another air ea rner operating on the route shall not 
be sufficient reason for w ithholding approval.
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5. A M em ber State shall perm it a C om m unity air earner 
o f another M em ber State operating a direct or indirect 
scheduled air service within the C om m unity, having given 
due notice to  the States concerned, to match an air fare 
already approved for scheduled services between the same 
d ty -pa irs  on the basis that this provision shall not apply to 
mdirect air services which exceed the length of the shortest 
direct service by more than 2 0 % . M em ber States may also 
perm it a C om m unity air carrier of another M em ber State 
operating  a direct scheduled air service to  m atch prices 
already accepted or published for a non-scheduled air service 
operated on the same route provided that both products are 
equivalent in terms of quality and conditions.
6. O nly Com m unity air earners shall be enritlcd to 
introduce lower fares than the existing ones when they 
operate on the basis of third- and fourth-freedom  traffic 
ngh ts and , in the case of fifth-freedom traffic rights to 
in troduce such lower fares only where they comply with 
Article 4 (3).
PR O C E D U R E S
A r t i c le  4
1. Scheduled air fares shall be subject to approval by the 
M em ber States concerned. T o  this end, an air carrier shall 
subm it its proposed air fares in the form prescribed by the 
aeronautical au thonries o f such M em ber States.
2. A eronautical authorities shall not require air carriers to 
subm it their fares in respect of routes w ithin the C om m unity 
m ore than 45 days before they come into effect.
3. (a) Until 31 December 1992, M em ber States shall,
w ithin zones of flexibility, perm it third- a n d /o r  
fourth-freedom  a n d /o r  fifth-freedom  air carriers to 
charge air fares o f their ow n choice, subject to the 
respective conditions set out in Annex II and 
provided those air fares have been filed with the 
States concerned at least 21 days prior to the 
proposed date for their entry into force.
(b) T here shall be three zones of flexibility on any 
scheduled air services as follows:
— a norm al econom y fare zone which shall extend 
from  95 to 105 % o f the reference fare,
— a discount zone w hich shall extend from 94 to 
8 0 %  of the reference fare,
— a deep-discount zone which shall extend from 
79 to  30%  of the reference fare.
4. A fully flexible fare above 105 % of the reference fare 
for a route w ithin the C om m unity shall be considered as
approved unless, w ithin 30 days of the date o f its subm ission, 
both M em ber States have notified in w riting their 
disapproval to the applicant air earner, stating their reasons. 
The M em ber States shah also inform each other. At the 
request of either M em ber State, consultations shall take place 
berw ecn the States concerned w ithin the 30-day period.
5. U ntil 31 D ecember 1992, fares not com plying w ith the 
term s of paragraphs 3 and 4 shall require approval by both  
States concerned. If neither of the M em ber States has 
expressed disapproval w ithin 21 days o f the date of 
subm ission of a fare, it shall be considered as approved.
6. A fare for a route w ithin the C om m unity , once 
app roved , shall rem ain in force until it expires o r is replaced. 
It m ay , how ever, be prolonged after its ong inal date of expiry 
for a period not exceeding 12 m onths.
A r t i c le  5
1. A M em ber State which claims a legitim ate interest in 
the rou te  concerned may request the C om m ission to  exam ine 
w hether an air fare w hich does not meet the term s o f Article 4
(3) com plies with Article 3 (1) or w hether a M em ber State has 
fulfilled its obligations under Article 3 (3). T he C om m ission 
shall fo rthw ith  inform  the o ther M em ber State(s) involved 
and the air earner concerned and give them  the apportun iry  
to  subm it their observations.
2. T he Com m ission shall, within 14 days of receipt o f a 
request under paragraph  1, decide w hether the air fare shall 
rem ain  in force during its exam ination.
3. T he C om m ission shall give a decision on w hether the 
air fare complies w ith Article 3 (1) as soon as possible and  in 
any event not later than  tw o m onths after having received the 
request. T his period may be prolonged to  the extent 
necessary in order to  obtain  sufficient fu rther in form ation  
from  the M em ber State concerned.
4. The C om m ission shall com m unicate its derision  to  the 
M em ber States and to  the air carrier concerned.
5. Any M em ber State may refer the C om m ission’s 
decision to the Council w ithin a tim e limit o f one m on th . The 
C ouncil, acting by a qualified m ajority , m ay take a different 
decision within a period of one m onth .
C O N S U L T A T IO N  A N D  A R B IT R A T IO N  S C H E M E
A r t i c le  6
1. W hen a State concerned (the first State) decides, in 
accordance with Article 4 (5), not to  approve a scheduled air 
fare, it shall inform  the o ther State concerned (the second
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State) in writing within 21 days of the fare being filed, stating 
its reasons.
2. If the second State disagrees with the decision of the 
first State, it shall so notify the first State w ithin seven days of 
being inform ed, providing the inform ation on which its 
decision is based, and request consultations. Each State shall 
supply all relevant inform ation requested by the other. Either 
o f the States concerned may request that the Comm ission be 
represented at the consultations.
3. Lf the first State has insufficient inform ation to reach a 
decision on the fare, it may request the second State to enter 
in to  consultations before the expiry of the 21-day period 
prescribed in paragraph 1.
4 . C onsultations shall be com pleted w ithin 21 days of 
being requested. If disagreem ent still persists at the end of this 
period , the m atter shall be pu t to  arbitra tion  at the request of 
e ither o f the States concerned. T he tw o States concerned may 
agree to  prolong the consultations or to proceed directly to 
a rb itra tion  w ithout consultations.
5. A rbitration shall be carried out by a panel of three 
a rb itra to rs  unless the States concerned agree on a single 
a rb itra to r. The States concerned shall each nom inate one 
m em ber of the panel and seek to  agree on the th ird  member 
(w ho shall be a national o f a th ird  M em ber State and act as 
panel chairm an). A lternatively they may nom inate a single 
a rb itra to r. The appointm ent o f the panel shall be completed 
w ith in  seven days. A panel’s decisions shall be reached by a 
m ajority  o f votes.
6 . In the event o f failure by either State concerned to 
nom ina te  a m em ber of the panel or to agree on the 
appo in tm en t o f a third m em ber, the Council shall be 
inform ed forthw ith and its President shall complete the panel 
w ith in  three days. In the event of the Presidency being held by 
a M em ber State w hich is party  to  the dispute, the President of 
the C ouncil shall invite the G overnm ent o f the next M ember 
S tate due to  hold the presidency and not parry to  the dispute 
to  com plete the panel.
7 . T he arb itra tion  shall be com pleted within a period of 
21 days o f com pletion of the panel o r nom ination of the 
single arb itra to r. T he States concerned m ay, how ever, agree 
to  extend this period. The C om m ission shall have the nght to 
a tten d  as an observer. The arb itra to rs shall m ake clear 
the  ex ten t to  which the aw ard is based on the criteria in 
A rticle 3.
8. T he arb itra tion  aw ard shall be notified immediately to 
the C om m ission.
W ith in  a p e n o d o f  10 days, the C om m ission shall confirm the 
aw ard , unless the a rb itra to rs have not respected the cn tena  
set ou t tn Article 3 o r the procedure laid dow n by the
Regulation or the award does not com ply w ith C om m uin 
law in other respects.
In the absence of any decision w ithin this p en o d , the awar 
shall be regarded as confirmed by the C om m ission. An aw ar 
confirmed by the Comm ission shall becom e binding on th 
States concerned.
9. During the consultation and arb itra tion  procedure, th 
relevant existing air fares shall be continued in force until th 
procedure has expired and any new fare has entered intc 
force.
GENERAL PROVISIONS
A rticle 7
This Regulanon shall not p revent M em ber States from 
concluding arrangements w hich are m ore flexible than 
the provisions of Article 4 o r from  m aintaining such 
arrangem ents in force.
Article 8
At least once a year, the C om m ission shall consult on 
scheduled air fares and related m atters w ith representatives 
of air transport user organizations in the C om m unity , for 
which purpose the Com m ission shall supply appropriate 
inform ation to  the participants.
A rticle  9
In carrying ou t the duties assigned to  it under this R egulation, 
the Commission may obtain all necessary inform ation from 
the M em ber States and air carriers concerned.
Article 10
1. T he Commission shall publish  a report on the 
application o f this Regulation by  31 M ay 1992 and every 
second year thereafter.
2. M em ber States and the C om m ission shall cooperate in 
implementing this Regulation, particularly  as regards 
collection o f inform ation for th e  report referred to in 
paragraph 1.
3. Confidential inform ation ob ta ined  in application of 
this Regulation shall be covered by professional secrecy.
Article 11
W here a M em ber State has concluded an agreem ent w ith one 
or more non-m ember countries w hich gives fifth-freedom  
rights for a route between M em ber States to  an air ea rner o f a
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non-m em ber country, and  in this respect contains provisions 
w hich are incom patible w ith this R egulation, the M ember 
State shall, at the first o p p o rtu n ity , take all appropriate steps 
to  elim inate such incom patibilities. Until such time as the- 
incom patibilities have been elim inated , this Regulation shall 
no t affect the rights and obligations vis-J-iris non-m ember 
countries arising from such an agreem ent.
shall decide on the revision of this R egulation  by 30 June 
1992 at the latest, on the basis o f a C om m ission  proposal to 
be subm itted by 31 M ay 1991.
A rticle 13
Directive 8 7 /6 0 1 /E E C  is hereby revoked .
Article 12 A rtic le  14
W ith a view to  achieving the objective o f a double­
d isapproval system for fares by 1 January  1993, the Council
T his R egulation shall en ter in to  force on 1 Novem ber 
1990.
This R egulation  shall be binding in its en tirety  and directly applicable in all M em ber 
States.
Done at Brussels, 24 July 1990.
«. For the C ouncil
The President 
C. MANN IN O
A N N E X  I
Air carriers referred to in Article 2 (e) (ii)
The following air carriers meet the criteria referred to in Article 2 (e) (ii) as long as they are recognized as a national 
earner by the Member State which so recognizes them at the time of the adoption of this Regulation:
— Scandinavian Airlines System,
— Britannia Airways,
— Monarch Airlines.
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ANNEX II
Coadidonf for discount and deep-discount fares
Discount tone
1. To qualify for the discount rone, a fare must meet the two following conditions:
— round or circle trip travel, 
and
— reservation for the entire trip, ticketing and payment to be made at the same time, except that reservation 
for the return trip may be made at a later time; cancellation only permissible pnor to departure of outbound 
travel and at a fee of at lean 20% of the price of the ncket; change of reservation only permissible at a fee 
equal to the difference between the fare paid and the next higher applicable fare.
Deep-discount zone *
2. To qualify for the deep-discount zone, fares must meet the following condinons:
1. round or circle trip travel; and
2. any rwo of the following:
(a) minimum stay of not less than the *Sunday rule' or six days;
(b) (i) reservation for the entire tnp, ticketing and payment to be made at the same time; cancellation or
change of reservation only permissible prior to departure of outbound travel and at a fee of at 
least 20%  of the price of the ticket;
or
(ii) mandatory advance purchase of not less than 14 days; reservation for the entire trip, ticketing 
and payment to be made at the same time; cancellation or change of reservation only permissible 
prior to departure of outbound travel and at a fee of at least 20%  of the price of the 
ticket;
or
(iii) purchase of the ticket only permitted on the day prior to departure of outbound travel; 
reservation to be made separately for both the outbound and inbound journeys and only in the 
country of departure on the day prior to travel on the respective journeys;
(c) passenger to be aged not more than 25 years or not less than 60 years or father and /o r mother with
children aged not more than 25 years travelling together (m in im u m  three persons);
(d) off-peak; 
provided than
1. the condition at (c) may not be combined with the condition at (d) alone; and
2. where the condition at (b) (i) is combined only with the conditions at (c) or (d), the zone of
flexibility shall not extend below 40 % of the reference fare.
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Appendix to Annex II
1. Notes on the zonal scheme referred to in Article 4 (3) (b) and (4)
(i) Reference fare for 1990/91
the reference fare referred to in Artide 2 (i) applicable on 1 September 1990.
(ii) Reference fart fo r 1991/92
the reference fare referred to in Ardde 2 (i) applicable on 1 September 1991.
2. Definition of 'off-peak"
An air carrier may designate certain flights as ‘off-peak’ on the basis of commeraal considerations.
When an air carrier wishes to use condition 2 (2) (d), identification of the off-peak flights for each route shall be 
agreed between the aeronautical authorities of the Member States concerned on the basis of the proposal made 
by that air carrier.
On each route where the total activity of third- and fourth-freedom air carriers reaches a weekly average of 18 
return flights, the air carrier concerned shall be allowed as a minimum to apply condition 2 (2) (d) of annex II 
on up to SO % of its total daily flights, provided that the flights to which these conditions may be applied depart 
between 10.00 and 16.00 or between 21.00 and 06.00.
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C O U N C IL  REG U LA TIO N  (EEC) N o 2 3 4 3 /9 0  
of 24 JuJy 1990
on access for air carriers to  scheduled in tr a -Co mm unity air service routes and on the sharing of 
passenger capacity between air carriers on scheduled air services betw een M em ber States
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,
H aving regard to the T reaty  establishing the European 
Economic C om m unity, and m particu lar Article 84 (2) 
thereof,
H aving regard to  the proposal from the C om m ission ( ') ,
H aving regard to  the opinion o f the European 
Parliam ent (2),
H aving regard to  the opinion of the Econom ic and Social 
Com m ittee (3),
W hereas it is im portan t to  adopt measures w ith the aim of 
progressively establishing the internal m arket over a period 
expiring on 31 December 1992 as provided for in Article 8a 
o f the Treaty; whereas the internal m arket shall com prise an 
area w ithout internal frontiers m which the free m ovem ent of 
goods, persons, services and capital is ensured;
W hereas Decision 8 7 /6 0 2 /E E C  (4) made a first step tow ards 
the liberalization in respect of sharing of passenger capacity 
and access to  the m arket, necessary to  achieve the internal 
m arket in air tran spo rt; w hereas the Council agreed to  take 
further measures o f liberalization at the end o f a three-year 
initial period;
W hereas it is necessary to implement principles governing 
relations between States o f registration and air earners 
licensed in their te m to ry  by 1 July 1992 on the basis of 
com m on specifications and criteria;
W hereas arrangem ents for greater cooperation over the use 
o f G ibraltar airport were agreed in London on 2 December 
1987 by the Kingdom of Spain and the U nited K ingdom  in a 
joint declaration by the M inisters of Foreign Affairs o f the 
tw o countries, and such arrangem ents have yet to  come into 
operation;
W hereas the developm ent of the air traffic system in the 
G reek Islands and in the A tlantic Islands com prising the 
autonom ous region o f the Azores is at present inadequate 
and  for this reason airports situated on these islands should 
be tem porarily exem pted from  the application  o f this 
R egulation;
(>) OJ N o  C 2 5 8 , 11. 10 . 1 9 8 9 , p . 6; and
OJ N o  C 1 64 , 5 . 7 . 1 9 9 0 , p. 11 .
(*) OJ N o  C 9 6 , 17. 4 . 1 9 9 0 , p. 65 .
( J) OJ N o  C 1 1 2 , 7 . 5 . 1 9 9 0 , p. 17 .
(4) OJ N o  L 3 7 4 , 31 . 12. 1 9 8 7 , p. 19.
W hereas the in frastructure at Porto airport is still being 
expanded to enable it to  cope w ith the grow th in scheduled 
services; w hereas, consequently , that airport should be 
exem pted tem porarily  from the application of this 
Regulation until the expansion of this infrastructure is 
com pleted;
W hereas it is necessary to  m ake special provision, under 
lim ited circum stances, for air services on new routes between 
regional airports and for public service obligations necessary 
for the m aintenance of services to  certain regional 
a irpo rts ; *
W hereas increased m arket access will stimulate the 
developm ent of the C om m unity  air transport sector and give 
rise to  improved services for users; w hereas as a consequence 
it is necessary to  in troduce more liberal provisions 
concerning m ultiple designation , th ird -, fourth- and 
fifth-freedom  traffic rights;
W hereas, taking into account problem s relating to airport 
infrastructure , navigational aids and availability of slots, it is 
necessary to  include certain lim itations concerning the use of 
traffic rights;
W hereas the exerdse of traffic rights has to be consistent w ith 
rules relating to  safety , pro tection  o f the environm ent, 
allocation  of slots and conditions concerning airport access 
and  has to  be treated w ithout discrim ination on grounds of 
nationality ;
W hereas bilateral rules concerning capacity shares are not 
com patib le with the principles o f the internal m arket which 
should be com pleted by 1993 in the air transport sector; 
w hereas therefore the bilateral restrictions must be 
dim inished gradually;
W hereas it is especially im portant to  encourage the 
developm ent of inter-regional services in o rder to  develop the 
C om m unity  netw ork and  to  contribute to  a solution of the 
problem  of congestion at certain  large airports; w hereas, 
therefore , it is appropriate  to  have more liberal rules w ith 
respect to  capacity sharing  these services;
W hereas in view of the relative im portance for some M em ber 
States of non-scheduled traffic iris-d-vis scheduled traffic, it is 
necessary to take m easures to  alleviate its im pact on the 
opportun ities of carriers of M em ber States receiving such 
traffic; w hereas the m easures to  be taken should not be aimed 
at lim iting non-scheduled traffic or subjecting it to 
regulation;
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W hereas, taking into account the com petitive market 
situation , provision should be m ade to  prevent unjustifiable 
econom ic effects on air carriers;
W hereas this Regulation replaces Directive 8 3 /4 1 6 / 
E EC  ( ') , as last amended by Directive 8 9 /4 6 3 /E E C  (J), 
and Decision 87 /6 0 2 /E E C ; w hereas it is therefore necessary 
to  revoke that Directive and tha t Decision;
W hereas it is desirable tha t the Council adopt further 
measures of liberalization including cobotage in respect of 
m arket access and capacity sharing by 30 June 1992,
H A S A D O PT E D  TH IS R E G U L A T IO N :
Scope and definitions
A rticle 1
1. This Regulation concerns:
(a) access to the m arket for C om m unity air carriers;
(b) the sharing o f passenger capacity bcrween the air 
carrierfs) licensed in one M em ber State and the air 
carrierfs) licensed in ano ther M em ber State on 
scheduled a ir services betw een these States.
2 . The application of th is R egulation to  the airport of 
G ib ra ltar is understood to  be w ithout prejudice to  the 
respective legal positions o f  the K ingdom o f Spain and the 
U nited Kingdom with regard  to  the dispute over sovereignty 
over the territory in which the a irpo rt is situated.
3 . Application of the provisions o f this Regulation to  
G ibraltar airport shall be suspended until the arrangem ents 
in the joint declaration m ade by the Foreign M inisters of the 
Kingdom of Spain and the U nited K ingdom on 2 December 
1987 have come into o p era tion . T he G overnm ents o f Spain 
and  the United Kingdom •will so inform  the Council on that 
date .
4 . Airports in the Greek islands and in the A tlantic islands 
comprising the au tonom ous region of the Azores shall be 
exem pted from the application  of this Regulation until 30 
June  1993. Unless otherw ise decided by the C ouncil, on a 
proposal of the Com m ission, th is exem ption shall apply for a 
further period o f five years and  may be continued for five 
years thereafter.
T he airport of Porto shall be exem pted from the application 
o f this Regulation until 31 D ecem ber 1992. This derogation 
shall be rescinded as soon as the Portuguese Republic judges 
th a t the economic conditions o f the airport have improved.
(>) OJ N o  L 2 3 7 , 26 . 8. 1 9 8 3 , p. 19.
(*) OJ N o  L 2 2 6 , 3 . 8. 1 9 8 9 , p. 14 .
T o this end, the Portuguese R epublic shall inform  the 
Com m ission. The Com m ission shall com m unicate this 
inform ation to the o ther M em ber States.
Article 2
For the purposes of this R egulation:
(a) air carrier means an air tran spo rt enterprise with a valid 
operating licence from a M em ber State to operate  
scheduled air services;
(b) a third-freedom traffic right m eans the right of an air 
earner licensed in one State to  put do w n , in the territo ry  
o f another State, passengers, freight and mail taken up 
in the State in which it is licensed;
a fourfh-freedom traffic right means the right of an air 
carrier licensed in one State to  take on , in the territory 
o f  another State, passengers, freight and mail for 
off-loading in the State in w hich it is licensed;
a fifth-freedom traffic right m eans the right of an air 
carrier to  undertake the air tran sp o rt o f passengers, 
freight and mail between tw o States o ther than the State 
in which it is licensed;
(c) States concerned m eans the M em ber States between 
which a scheduled air service is opera ted ;
(d) State of registration m eans the M em ber State in which 
the licence mentioned in parag raph  (a) is issued;
(e) Com m unity air earner m eans:
(i) an air carrier which has and continues to have its 
central adm inistration  and principal place of 
business in the C om m unity , the m ajority  of w hose 
shares are and continue to  be ow ned by M em ber 
States a n d /o r  na tionals o f M em ber States and 
which is and continues to  be effectively controlled 
by such States or persons, o r
(ii) an air carrier w hich, at the tim e of adoption of 
' this Regulation, a lthough  it does not meet the 
definition set out in (i):
1. either has its central adm inistration  and 
principal place o f business in the C om m unity 
and has been prov id ing  scheduled or 
non-scheduled air services in the C om m unity 
during the 12 m onths p rio r to  adoption  o f this 
Regulation;
2. o r has been providing scheduled air services 
between M em ber States on the basis of th ird- 
and fourth-freedom  traffic righ ts during the 12 
m onths p n o r to ad o p tion  o f this R egulation.
The air carriers w hich m eet the c n te n a  set ou t in 
this point (ii) are listed in A nnex I;
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(f) scheduled air service means a series of flights each 
possessing all the following characteristics:
(i) it passes through the air space over the territory  of 
more than  one M ember State;
(ii) it is perform ed by aircraft for the transport of 
passengers o r passengers and cargo a n d /o r  mail 
for rem uneration , in such a m anner tha t on each 
flight seats are available for individual purchase by 
mem bers of the public (either directly from  the air 
carrier o r ho rn  its authorized agents);
(iii) it is operated  so as to serve traffic betw een the same 
tw o o r m ore points, either:
1. according to  a published tim etable; or
2. w ith flights so regular o r frequent that they 
constitu te a recognizably system atic series;
(g) flight m eans a departure from  a specified airport 
towards a specified destination a irpo rt;
(h) multiple designation on a country-pair basis m eans the 
designation by a State of registration  o f tw o o r more of 
the air carriers licensed by it to  operate  scheduled air 
services bctw en its territory and tha t o f ano ther M em ber 
State;
(i) multiple designation on a d ry -p a ir basis m eans the 
designation by a State of registration of tw o o r m ore of 
the air carriers licensed by it to  opera te  a scheduled air 
service betw een an airport o r a irport system in its 
territory and an airport or a irpo rt system in the territory  
of another M em ber State;
(j) regional a irpo rt m eans any a irpo rt o ther than  one listed 
in Annex II as a category 1 a irp o rt;
(k) airport system m eans two o r m ore a irpo rts grouped 
together as serving the sam e d ry , as indicated in 
Annex II;
(1) capadry shall be expressed as the num ber o f seats 
offered to  the general public on a scheduled air service 
over a given period ;
(m) capadry share means the share o f a M em ber State 
expressed as a percentage of the to ta l capacity calculated 
according to  A rticle 11 in a b ilateral relationship  w ith 
another M em ber State exdud ing  any cap ad ry  provided 
by fifth-freedom services;
(n) public service obligation m eans any obligation  im posed 
upon an air carrier to  take, in respect o f any rou te  which 
it is licensed to operate by a M em ber State, all necessary 
measures to ensure the provision o f a service satisfying 
fixed standards of continuity, regularity  and capacity 
which standards the earner w ould  not assum e if it were 
solely considering its com m erdal interest.
R elations between the States of registration and their air 
carriers
Article 3
1. T his R egulation shall not affea  the relationship 
betw een a M em ber State and air earners licensed by that 
State regarding m arket access and capad ty  sharing.
2. The Council shall ad o p t, for im plem entation not later 
than  1 July 1992 on the basis of a Comm ission proposal 
concerning com m on specifications and criteria, to  be 
subm itted  not later than  31 M ay 1991, rules governing the 
licensing of air carriers and route licensing.
T hird- and fourth-freedom  traffic rights
A rticle 4
Subject to  this R egulation, C om m unity air carriers shall be 
perm itted  to exercise th ird- and fourth-freedom  air services 
betw een airports or a irpo rt systems in one M em ber State and 
a irpo rts  or airport systems in another M em ber State when 
these a irports or a irpo rt systems are open for traffic between 
M em ber States or for in ternational services.
R elations between a M em ber State and a ir carriers of other 
M em ber States
A rticle S
1. Subject to  Article 6 , a M em ber State shall au thorize air 
carriers licensed in ano ther M em ber State, which have been 
au thorized  by their State o f registration , to
— exercise third- and fourth-freedom  traffic rights as 
provided for in Article 4 ,
— use, w ithin the C om m unity , the same flight num ber for 
com bined third- and fourth-freedom  services.
2 . W here an air carrier o f  one M em ber State has been 
licensed in accordance w ith  this Article to  operate  a 
scheduled air service, the State o f registration o f tha t air 
carrier shall raise no objection  to  an application for the 
in troduction  of a scheduled air service on the same route by 
an air carrier of the o ther State concerned.
3. (a) A M em ber State, follow ing consultations w ith other
States concerned, may impose a public service 
obligation in respect of air services to a regional
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airport in its territory on a route which is considered 
vital for the economic development of the region in 
w hich the airport is located, to the extent necessary 
to  ensure on that route the adequate provision of air 
services satisfying fixed standards o f continuity, 
regularity , capacity and p n d n g  which standards 
carriers w ould not assume if they were solely 
considering their commercial interest.
(b) The adequacy of air transport services shall be 
assessed having regard to:
(i) the public interest;
(ii) the possibility of having recourse to other 
form s of transport and the ability of such 
form s to meet the transport needs under 
consideration;
(iii) the air fares and conditions which can be 
quo ted  to  users.
(c) N o tw ithstand ing  paragraph 2, a M em ber State is 
not obliged to  authorize more than one earner to 
serve a rou te  to which a public service obligation 
applies, provided the right to operate that service is 
offered by public tender for a period of up to three 
years to  any air carrier w ith an operating licence 
issued in the States concerned and to any 
C om m unity  air carrier which, in accordance with 
Article 8, is entitled to  exercise fifth-freedom traffic 
rights on  the route. The submissions made by air 
carriers shall be comm unicated to the other States 
concerned and to  the Commission.
(d) Subparagraph (c) shall not apply in any case in 
. which the o ther M em ber State concerned proposes a 
satisfactory alternative means of fulfilling the same 
public service obligation.
(e) This parag raph  shall not apply to routes with 
capacity  o f m ore than 30 000 seats per year.
4 . N o tw ithstanding  paragraph 2, a M ember State, which 
has authorized one o f the air carriers licensed by it to operate 
a passenger service on a new route between regional airports 
w ith aircraft o f no  m ore than 80 seats, is not obliged to  
au thorize a reciprocal air service for a period of two years, 
unless it is operated  w ith aircraft of no more than 80 seats, or 
it is part o f a service operated under the terms o f Arncle 7 in 
w hich not m ore than  80 seats are available for sale between 
the tw o regional airports in question, on each flight.
5 . At the request of any M em ber State which considers 
th a t the developm ent of a route is being unduly restricted by
BHr
the term s of paragraph 3 o r 4 , or on its ow n in itiative o r 
w here disagreem ent arises regarding the app lication  of 
paragraph 3, the Com m ission shall carry o u t an investigation  
and, on the basis of all relevant factors, shall take a decision 
w ithin tw o m onths of com m encing its investigation  on 
w hether paragraph 3 or 4 should  con tinue to  apply in respect 
o f the route concerned.
6. T he Commission shall com m unicate  its decision to  the 
Council and to the M em ber S tates. Any M em ber State m ay 
refer the Comm ission's decision to  the C ouncil w ithin a tim e 
limit of one m onth. T he C ouncil, aenng  by a qualified  
m ajonry , may take a different decision w ith in  a period o f one 
m onth .
M ultiple designation
A rticle 6
I
1. A M em ber State shall accept m ultip le  designation  on  a 
country-pair basis by ano ther M em ber State.
2. It shall also accept m ultip le designation  on a city -pair 
basis:
— from 1 January 1991, on rou tes on  w hich m ore th an  
140 000 passengers w ere ea rn ed  in the preceding year, o r 
on which there are m ore th an  800  re tu rn  flights per
annum ,
— from 1 January 1992, on rou tes on  w hich m ore th an  
100 000 passengers w ere carried  in the preceding year or 
on which there are m ore th an  600  re tu rn  flights per 
annum .
C om bination  o f po in ts
A rticle  7
In operating scheduled air services to  o r from  tw o o r m ore 
points in another M em ber State o r States o th e r than  its State 
of registration, a C om m unity air e a rn e r  shall be p erm itted  by 
the States concerned to com bine scheduled air services and 
use the same flight num ber. T raffic n g h ts  betw een the 
com bined points may be exercised accord ing  to A rticle 8.
Fifth-freedom  rights
A rticle 8
1. C om m unity air earners shall, in accordance  wnth this 
Article, be perm itted to exercise fifth -freedom  traffic righ ts 
between combined points in tw o d ifferen t M em ber States on 
the following conditions:
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(a) the traffic rights are exercised on a service which 
constitutes and is scheduled as an extension of a service 
from , or as a prelim inary o f a service to, their State of 
registration;
(b) the air carrier cannot use, for the fifth-freedom service 
m ore than 50 % of its seasonal seat capacity on the same 
third- and fourth-freedom  service of which the 
fifth-freedom  service constitutes the extension or the 
prelim inary.
2. (a) The air carrier m ay, for a fifth-freedom service, use
an aircraft which is different to  but not larger than 
the aircraft which it uses for the third- and 
fourth-freedom  service o f which the fifth-fieedom 
service is an extension o r a preliminary.
(b) W hen m ore than  one fifth-freedom service is 
operated as an extension of or as a preliminary to a 
third- or fourth-freedom  service, the capacity 
provision in paragraph  1 (b) shall represent the 
aggregate seat cap ad ry  available for the carnage of 
fifth-freedom  passengers on those fifth-freedom 
services.
3. An air carrier operating  a fifth-freedom service in 
accordance with th is A rride shall furnish on request to 
the M em ber States involved all relevant inform anon 
concerning:
(a) the seasonal seat cap ad ry  on the third- and 
fourth-freedom  service of which the fifth-freedom 
service constitu tes the extension or the preliminary; 
and
(b) in the case of fifth-freedom  services to  which A m d e  8 (2)
(b) applies, the seasonal capadry  utilized on each 
service.
C onditions for the excrdse  of traffic rights
(a) the airport or airport system concerned m ust have 
sufficient facilities to accom m odate the service;
(b) navigational aids must be sufficient to  accom m odate the 
service.
2. When the conditions in paragraph 1 are not met, a 
M em ber State may, w ithout discrim ination on grounds of 
nationality, impose conditions on, limit or refuse the exercise 
o f those traffic rights. Before taking such a m easure, a 
M ember State shall inform the C om m ission and provide it 
w-ith all the necessary elements of inform ation .
3. W ithout prejudice to A rtide 9 and except w ith the 
agreement of the other Member State(s) concerned, a 
M em ber State shall not authorize an air earner:
(a) to establish a new service; or
(b) to increase the frequency of an existing service
between a specific airport in its territory and another 
M em ber State for such time as an air carrier licensed by that 
other M ember State is not perm ined, on the basis of 
paragraphs 1 and 2, to establish a new service or to  increase 
frequencies on an existing service to the a irpo rt in question, 
pending the adoption by the Council and the com ing into 
force of a Regulation on a code of conduct on slot allocation 
based on the general principle of non-d iscnm ination  on the 
grounds of nationality.
4. At the request of any M ember State, the C om m ission 
shall examine the application of paragraph  2 and or 
paragraph 3 in any particular case and w ith in  one m onth 
decide whether the M ember State may continue to apply the 
measure.
5. The Commission shall com m unicate its decision to the 
Council and to the M ember States. Any M em ber State may 
refer the Comm ission’s decision to the Council w ithin a time 
limit of one m onth. The Council, acting by a qualified 
m ajority, may take a different decision w ithin a period of one 
m onth.
Article 9
T his Regulation shall not affect a M em ber States’ nght to 
regulate w ithout d iscrim ination  on grounds of nationality, 
the d istribu tion  o f traffic betw een the airports within an 
a irpo rt system.
Article 10
1. N o tw ithstand ing  Article 5 (2), the exerase of traffic 
n g h ts  is subject to published C om m unity , national, regional 
o r local rules relating  to  safety, the p ro tea ion  of the 
environm ent and the allocation of slots, and to the following 
conditions:
Shares of capacity
A r t ic le  11
1. From 1 November 1990, a M em ber State shall perm it 
another M ember State to increase its capaciry share for any 
season by 7,5 percentage points com pared to  the situation 
d u n n g  the previous corresponding season, it being 
understood that each M ember State may in any event claim a 
c ap aa ty  share of 60 %.
2. The Council shall adopt, for im plem entation not later 
than 1 January 1993, on the basis of a Com m ission proposal
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to be subm ined by 31 D ecem ber 1991, provisions to abolish 
capadry sharing restrictions between M em ber States.
3. C apad ry  sharing lim itations shall not apply to a service 
between regional a irpo rts  irrespective of aircraft capadry.
4. In applying parag raph  1, unilateral cut-backs in 
capadry  shall not be taken  into account. In such cases, the 
basis for the calculation  o f capadry  shares shall be the 
capacity offered in the previous corresponding seasons by the 
air cam erfs) of the M em ber State which has (have ) reduced 
its (their) capadry .
General provisions
Article 13
1. This Regulation shall not preven t M em ber States from 
concluding berween them arrangem ents w hich are more 
flexible than the provisions of A rticles 6 , 8 and 11 or from 
m aintaining such arrangem ents in force.
2. The provisions of this R egulation  shall no t be used to 
make existing m arket access o r capacity  arrangem ents more 
restrictive.
Article 12
1. At the request o f any M em ber State for which the 
application o f A rtid e  11 has led to serious finandal damage 
for the air carrierfs) licensed by that M em ber State, the 
Com m ission shall carry  o u t a review and , on the basis of all 
relevant factors, in d u d in g  the m arket situation, the finandal 
position of the air carrierfs) concerned and the capadry 
utilization achieved, shall take a dedsion on whether the 
capadry  sharing on the routes to  or from that State should be 
stabilized for a lim ited period.
2. At the  request o f a M em ber State w hose scheduled air 
services are exposed to  substantial competition from 
non-scheduled services and  w here a situation exists whereby 
the opportun ities o f  carriers o f tha t M em ber State to 
effecrivdy com pete in  the m arket are unduly affected, the 
Com m ission, hav ing  exam ined all rdevan t factors, induding 
the m arket situa tion  and the capadry  utilization achieved, 
and having consulted  the o ther M em ber States concerned 
shall, w ith in  tw o  m on ths o f having received the request, 
deade  w hether the 7 ,5  percentage points referred to in 
A rtide 11 (1) shall be reduced for tha t bilateral 
rda tionsh ip .
3. T he C om m ission shall com m unicate its dedsion to the 
Council and to  th e  M em ber States. Any M em ber State may 
refer the C om m ission’s decision to  the Council within a time 
limit o f one m o n th . T he C ouncil, acting by qualified 
m ajority, m ay take  a different decision within a period of one 
month.
Article 14
1. The Com m ission shall publish  a report on the 
im plem entation of this R egulation every tw o  years and for 
the first time not later than  31 M ay 1992.
2. M em ber States and the C om m ission shall cooperate 
in im plem enting this R egulation , particu larly  as regards 
collection o f inform ation for the rep o rt referred to in 
paragraph 1.
3. Confidential inform ation o b ta ined  in application of 
this Regulation shall be covered by professional secrecy.
A rticle IS
The Council shall dedde on the  revision o f th is  Regulation by 
30 June 1992 at the latest, on  th e  basis o f  a Com m ission 
proposal to be subm ined by 31 M ay  1991 .
A rticle 16
Decision 8 7 /6 0 2 /E E C  and D irective 8 3 /4 1 6 /E E C  are 
hereby revoked.
Article 17
This Regulation shall enter in to  force on  1 N ovem ber 
1990.
T h is R egulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all M em ber 
States.
D one a t Brussels, 24 July 1990.
For the C ouncil 
The President 
C. MANNINO
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A N N E X  1
Air carriers referred to in Article 2 (e) (ii)
The following air earner* meet the criteria referred to in Arnde 2 (e) (ii) a* long as they are recognized at national 
earners by the Member State which *o recognizes them at the tune of the adopnon of this Regulation:
— Scandinavian Airlines System,
— Britannia Airways,
— Monarch Airlines.
ANNEX U
List of category 1 airports
BELGIUM:
DENMARK:
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF 
GERMANY:
SPAIN:
GREECE:
FRANCE:
IRELAND:
ITALY:
NETHERLANDS:
PORTUGAL:
UNITED KINGDOM:
Brussels-Zaventem
Copenhagen-Kastrup / Roskilde
Frankfurt-Rhein-Main, 
Dusseldorf-Lohausen,
Munich-Ricm
Palma-Mallorca,
Madrid-Barajas,
Malaga,
Las Palmas
Athens-Hell inikon,
Salonica-Micra
Paris-Charles De Gaulle/Orly 
Dublin
Rome-Fiumidno / Ciampino, 
Milan-Linate / Malpensa
Amsterd am - Schiph ol
Lisbon,
Faro
London-Heathrow/Garwick/Stansred, 
Luton
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C O U N C IL  R EG U L A T IO N  (EEC) N o 2 3 4 4 /9 0  
of 24 July 1990
am ending Regulation (EEC) N o  3 9 7 6 /8 7  on the application  of Article 85 (3) of the T reaty  to 
certain categories of agreem ents and concerted  practices in the air tran spo rt sector
T H E  C O U N C IL  OF T H E  E U R O P E A N  C O M M U N IT IE S ,
H aving regard to the T reaty  establishing the European 
Econom ic C om m unity, and in particular Article 87 
thereof,
H aving regard to the proposal from the C om m ission (1),
H aving regard to  the opinion of the E uropean 
Parliam ent (2),
H aving regard to  the opinion of the Econom ic and Social 
C om m ittee (3),
W hereas Regulation (EEC) N o 3 9 7 6 /8 7  (4) em pow ers the 
C om m ission to declare by way of regulation that the 
provisions of Article 85 (1) do not apply to  certain categories 
o f  agreem ents betw een undertakings, decisions by 
associations of undertakings and concerted practices;
W hereas these block exem ptions were granted for a limited 
period , expiring on 31 January  1991, during w hich air 
carriers could adapt to  the m ore competitive environm ent 
in troduced  by changes in the regulatory system applicable to 
in tra-C om m unity  in ternational air transport;
W hereas after tha t date there will still be a need for block 
exem ptions for a further transitional period ,
H A S A D O P T E D  THIS R E G U L A T IO N :
Article 1
R egulation (EEC) N o 3 9 7 6 /8 7  is hereby am ended as 
follows:
1. in Article 2 (2 )  a new indent is added reading as 
follow^:
*— consultations on cargo ra te s /;
2 . in Article 3, ‘31 January  1991’ is replaced by 
*31 D ecember 1992’;
3. in Article 8, ‘30 June 1990’ and ‘1 N ovem ber 1989’ are 
replaced by ‘31 D ecem ber 1992’ and  ‘1 July 1992’ 
respectively.
A rticle 2
T his R egulation shall enter in to  force on  the day follow ing 
its publication  in the O fficia l Journal o f  the E uropean  
C om m unities.
This R egulation shall be binding in its entirety  and directly applicable in ail M em ber 
States.
D one at Brussels, 24 July 1990.
For the C ouncil 
The President
C . M A N N E N O
( 1) OJ N o  C 2 5 8 , 11 . 10. 1 9 8 9 , p. 3.
(2) OJ N o  C 1 4 9 , 18. 6. 1 9 9 0 .
( J) OJ N o  C 1 1 2 , 7 . 5 . 1 9 9 0 ,  p. 17.
( 4) OJ N o  L 3 7 4 , 31 . 12. 1 9 8 7 , p. 9.
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Comm unication from the Government of the Federal R epublic o f G erm any
The Council has received the following comm unication from the G overnm ent o f  the Federal R epublic 
of Germany:
When depositing its instrum ents o f  ratification of the T reaties establish ing  the E uropean  
C om m unities, the Federal Republic of Germany declared that these T reaties applied equally to L and 
Berlin. It declared at the same time that the rights and responsibilities o f  F rance, the U nited K ingdom  
and the United States in respect of Berlin were unaffected. In view of the fact th a t civil av iation  is one o f 
the areas in which the said States have specifically reserved pow ers for them selves in Berlin, and 
following consultations with the G overnm ents of these States, the Federal R epublic o f G erm any states 
that the following Regulations are not applicable in Land Berlin:
— Council Regulation on fares for scheduled air services,
— Council Regulation on access for air carriers to scheduled in tra-C om m uniry  air service routes and 
on the sharing of passenger capacity between air carriers on scheduled air services betw een 
M em ber States,
fr
— Council Regulation am ending Regulation (EEC) N o 3 9 7 6 /8 7  on the app lication  of Article 85 (3) 
of the Treaty to certain categories of agreements and concerted p ractices in the a ir tran sp o rt 
sector.
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(Acts whose publica tion  is obligatory)
C O U N C IL R EG U LA T IO N  (EEC) N o 2 4 0 7 /9 2  
of 23 Ju ly  1992 
on licensing of air carriers
THE C O U N C IL  OF T H E  E U R O P E A N  C O M M U N IT IE S ,
Having regard  ro the T reaty  establishing the European 
Economic C om m unity , and in particular Article 84 (2) 
thereof,
Having regard  to  the p roposal from  the Comm ission (*},
Having regard  to the op in ion  of the E uropean 
Parliam ent (-),
Having regard  to the opinion o f the Economic and Social 
C om m ittee (3),
W hereas it is im portan t to establish an air transport policy 
for the in te rna l m arket over a period expiring on 31 
December 1992 as provided for in Article 8a of the
Treaty;
W hereas the internal m arket shall comprise an area 
w ithout in ternal frontiers in w hich the free m ovem ent of 
goods, persons, services and cap ita l is ensured;
W hereas the app lication  in the air transport sector of the 
principle o f the freedom  to provide services needs to take 
into account the specific characteristics of that se a o r ;
Whereas in C ouncil R egulation (EEC) N o 2 3 4 3 /9 0  of 24 
July 1990 on  access for air carriers to scheduled 
in tra-C om m unity  air service rou tes and on the sharing of 
passenger capacity  betw een air carriers on scheduled air 
services betw een M em ber States (A) the Council decided to 
adopt for im plem entation  no t later than 1 July 1992 
comm on rules governing the licensing o f air carriers;
i ' j  OJ N o  C  2 5 8 ,  4 . 10. 1 9 9 1 , p. 2 .
■: ) OJ N o  C 1 2 5 , 18. 5. 1 9 9 2 , p. 140
■3: OJ N o  C  1 6 9 , 6 . 7 . 1 9 9 2 , p. 15.
:41)OJ N o  L 2 1 7 ,  1 1. 8. 1 9 9 0 , p. 8.
W hereas, how ever, it is necessarv to allow  M em ber States a 
reasonable period, until 1 January  1993, for the 
application of this Regulation;
W hereas it is im portant to define non-descrim inatory 
requirem ents in relation to the location and  control of an 
undertaking applying for a licence; \
W hereas in order to ensure dependable and adequate 
service it is necessary to ensure that an air carrier is at all 
times operating  at sound economic and high safety levels;
W hereas for the protection of users and  other parties 
concerned it is im portant to ensure th a t air carriers are 
sufficiently insured in respect of liability risks;
W hereas w ithin the internal m arket air carriers should be 
able to use aircraft owned anyw here in the Com m unity, 
w ithout prejudice to the responsibilities o f the licensing 
M em ber State with respect to the technical fitness of the 
carrier;
W hereas it should also be possible to  lease aircraft 
registered outside the Com m unity for a sh o rt term or in 
exceptional circum stances, providing safety standards are 
equivalent to those applicable within the Comm unity';
W hereas procedures for the granting o f licences to air 
carriers should be transparent and non-discrim inatory ,
H AS A D O P T E D  TH IS R E G U L A T IO N :
Article 1
1. This Regulation concerns requirem ents for the granting 
and m aintenance o f operating licences by M em ber States in 
relation to air carriers established in the C om m unity .
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2. The carnage by air of passengers, mail a n d /o r  cargo, 
perform ed by non-pow er driven aircraft a n d /o r  ultra-light 
pow er driven aircraft, as well as local flights not involving 
carriage betw een different airports, are not subject to this 
R egulation. In respect of these operations, national law 
concerning operating licences, if any, and Com m uniry and 
national law  concerning the air operator’s certificate 'A D C ) 
shall apply.
Article 2
For the purposes of this Regulation:
' a j ‘undertak ing’ means any natural person, any legal 
person, w hether profit-making or not, or any official 
body w hether having its own legal personality or not;
,b) ‘air ca rrie r’ means an air transport undertaking with a 
valid operating  licence;
(c) ‘operating  licence’ means an authorization granted by 
the M em ber State responsible to an undertaking, 
perm itting  it to carry out carnage by air of passengers, 
mail a n d /o r  cargo, as stated in the operating licence, 
for rem uneration and or hire;
(d) ‘air opera to r's  certificate (AOC)’ means a docum ent 
issued to an undertaking or a group of undertakings by 
the com petent authorities of the M em ber States which 
affirm s tha t the operator in question has the 
professional ability and organization to  secure the safe 
operation  o f aircraft for the aviation activities specified 
in the certificate;
(e) ‘business p lan ’ rrieans a detailed description o f the air 
carrier’s intended commercial activities for the period in 
question , in particular in relation to  the m arket 
developm ent and investments to be carried ou t. 
including the financial and economic im plications of 
these activities;
(f) ‘m anagem ent account’ means a detailed statem ent of 
incom e and costs for the period in question including a 
breakdow n between air-transport-related and other 
activities as well as between pecuniary and 
non-pecuniary  elements;
(g) ‘effective contro l’ means a relationship constituted by 
rights, contracts o r any other means w hich, either 
separately or jointly and having regard to the 
considerations of fact or law involved, confer the 
possibility o f directly or indirectly exercising a decisive 
influence on an undertaking, in particular by:
(a) the right to use all or p an  of the assets of an 
undenak ing ;
(b) rights or contracts which confer a decisive influence 
on the com position, voting or decisions of the 
bodies of an undenaking or otherw ise confer a 
decisive influence on the running of the business of 
the undenaking .
Article 3
1. W ithout preiudice to  Article 5 (5), M em ber States shall 
not grant operating  licences o r m ain tain  them in force 
where the requirem ents of this R egulation  are not complied
w i t h .
2. An undertak ing  m eeting the requirem ents o f this 
R egulation shall be entitled to  receive an operating  licence. 
Such licence does not confer in itself any rights of access to 
specific rou tes or m arkets.
3. W ithout prejudice to  Article 1 (2), no undenaking 
established in the C om m uniry shall be perm itted  w'ithin the 
territo ry  of the C om m uniry to carry  by air passengers, mail 
a n d /o r  cargo for rem uneration  a n d /o r  hire unless the 
undertak ing  has been gran ted  the app rop ria te  operating 
licence.
O p e r a t in g  l ic e n c e
Article 4
1. N o undertak ing  shall be g ran ted  an operating  licence 
by a M em ber State unless:
;a) its principal place of business an d , if any, its registered 
office are located in th a t M em ber S taie; and
(b) its m ain occupation  is air tran sp o rt in isolation or 
com bined with any o ther com m ercial operation  of 
a ircraft or repair and  m ain tenance o f aircraft.
2. W ithou t prejudice to  agreem ents and  conventions to 
which the C om m unity  is a con trac ting  parry , the 
undertak ing  shall be ow ned and continue to be owned 
directly or th rough  m ajority  ow nersh ip  by M em ber States 
a n d /o r  na tiona ls of M em ber States. It shall at all times be 
effectively contro lled  by such States o r such nationals.
3. (a) N o tw ith s tand ing  parag raphs 2 and 4, air carriers
w hich have already been recognized in Annex I to 
C ouncil R egulation (EEC) N o  2 3 4 3 /9 0  and 
C ouncil R egulation (EEC) N o  2 9 4 /9 1  of 4 
February  1991 on the o p era tion  of air cargo 
services between M em ber States ( J) shall retain  their 
rights under this and associated R egulations as long 
as they meet the o th e r obligations in this Regulation 
and they continue to  be con tro lled  directly or 
indirectly  by the sam e th ird  countries a n d /o r  by 
nationals of the sam e th ird  country  as those 
exercising such con tro l at the tim e o f adoption of 
this R egulation. Such contro l m ay , how ever, be 
transferred  to M em ber States a n d /o r  to M ember 
State nationals at any tim e.
(») OJ N o  L 3 6 ,  8. 2. 1 9 9 1 , p . 1.
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(b) The possibility of buying and selling shares under 
subparagraph (a) does not cover nationals who have 
a significant interest in an air carrier of a third 
country.
plan rwo m onths in advance of the period to which it refers 
shall constirute sufficient notice under this paragraph for 
the purpose of changes to curren t operations a n d /o r  
circum stances which are included in that business plan.
4. Any undertaking which directly o r indirectly 
participates in a controlling shareholding in an air earner 
shall meet the requirem ents o f paragraph 2.
5. An air carrier shall at all times be able on request to 
dem onstrate to the M em ber State responsible for the 
operating licence that it meets the requirem ents o f this 
Article. The Comm ission acting at the request of a M em ber 
State shall exam ine com pliance with the requirem ents of 
this Article and take a decision if necessary.
Article 5
4. If the licensing au tho rity  deems the changes notified 
under paragraph 3 to  have a significant bearing on the 
finances of the air carrier, it shall require the submission of 
a revised business p lan incorporating  the changes in 
question and covering, at least, a period of 12 months from 
its date of im plem entation , as well as all the relevant 
inform ation , including the da ta  referred to in part B of the 
A nnex, to assess w hether the air carrier can meet its 
existing and potential ob liga tions during that period of 12 
m onths. The licensing au tho rity  shall take a decision on the 
revised business plan not later than  three months after all 
the necessary inform ation has been subm ined to it.
1. An applicant air transport undenak ing  to which an 
operating licence is granted for the first time m ust be able 
to dem onstrate  to the reasonable satisfaction of the 
com petent authorities of the licensing M em ber State that:
fa) it can meet at any time its actual and potential 
obligations, established under realistic assum ptions, for 
a period of 24 m onths from the start of operations; 
and
(b) it can meet its fixed and operational costs incurred from 
operations according to its business plan and 
established under realistic assum ptions, for a period of 
three m onths from the start of opera tions, w ithout 
taking into account any income from its operations.
2. For the purpose of paragraph 1, each applicant shall 
submit a business plan for, at least, the first rw o years of 
operation. The business plan shall also detail the 
applicant’s financial links with any o ther comm ercial 
activities in w hich the applicant is engaged either directly or 
through related undertakings. The applicant shall also 
provide all relevant inform ation, in particu lar the data 
referred to in part A of the Annex.
3. An air carrier shall notify in advance to  its licensing 
authority  plans for: operation of a new scheduled service or 
a non-scheduled service to a continent or w orld  region not 
previously served, changes in the type o r num ber of aircraft 
used or a substantial change in the scale of its activities. It 
shall also notify in advance any intended mergers or 
acquisitions and shall notify its licensing authoriry within 
fourteen days o f any change in the ow nership o f any single 
shareholding which represents 10 % or more of the total 
shareholding of the air carrier or of its paren t o r ultimate 
holding com pany. The subm ission of a 12*month business
5. Licensing authorities m ay, at any time and in any event 
whenever there are clear indications tha t financial problem s 
exist w ith an air carrier licensed by them, assess its 
financial perform ance and may suspend or revoke the 
licence if they are no longer satisfied that the air carrier can 
meet its actual and po ten tia l obligations for a 12-m onth 
period. Licensing au thorities may also grant a tem porary 
licence pending financial reorgan ization  of the air carrier 
provided safety is not at risk.
6. An air carrier shall provide to  its licensing authority  
eveiy financial year w ithou t undue delay the audited 
accounts relating to the previous financial year. At any time 
upon request o f the licensing au thority  an air carrier shall 
provide the inform ation relevant for the purposes of 
paragraph 5 and, in particu la r, the data  referred to in p a n  
C of the Annex.
7. (a) Paragraphs 1, 2, 3 , 4 and 6 o f this Article shall not 
apply to air carriers exclusively engaged in 
operations with a ircraft of less than  10 tonnes m to w 
(m axim um  take off w eight) a n d /o r  less than 20 
seats. Such air carriers shall at all times be able to 
dem onstrate that their net capital is at least ECU 
80 000 or to provide when required by the licensing 
authority  the in form ation  relevant for the purposes 
of paragraph 5. A M em ber State may nevenheless 
apply paragraphs 1 , 2 ,  3, 4 and 6 to air carriers 
licensed by it th a t operate scheduled services or 
whose turnover exceeds ECU 3 million per year.
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b The C o m m is s io n  m a y , after consulting the M ember 
States, increase as appropriate the values referred to 
in subparagraph (a) if econom ic developm ents 
indicate the necessity of such a decision. Such 
change shall be published in the O fficial Journal o f  
the European Comm unities.
(c) Any M ember State may refer the C om m ission’s 
decision to  the Council within a time limit of one 
m onth. The Council, acting by a qualified m ajority, 
may in exceptional circumstances take a different 
decision within a period of one m onth.
Article 6
1. W here the competent authorities o f a M em ber State 
require, for the purpose of issuing an operating licence, 
p roof that the persons who will continuously and 
effectively manage the operations of the undenak ing  are of 
good repute or that they have not been declared bankrup t, 
or suspend or revoke the licence in the event of serious 
professional misconduct or a criminal offence, that 
M em ber State shall accept as sufficient evidence in respect 
of nationals of other Member States the production of 
docum ents issued by competent authorities in the M em ber 
State of origin or the M ember State from  which the foreign 
national comes showing that those requirem ents are met.
W here the competent authorities of the M em ber State of 
origin or of the M em ber State from which the foreign 
national comes do not issue the docum ents referred to in 
the first subparagraph, such docum ents shall be replaced 
by a declaration on oath — or, in M em ber States where 
there is no provision for declaration on o a th , by a solemn 
declaration — made by the person concerned before a 
com petent judicial or administrative authority  or, where 
appropriate , a notary or qualified professional body o f the 
M em ber State of origin or the M em ber State from which 
the person comes; such authority or notary  shall issue a 
certificate attesting the authenticity of the declaration on 
oath or solemn declaration.
2. The com petent authorities of M em ber States may 
require that the documents and certificates referred to  in 
paragraph 1 be presented no more than three m onths after 
their date of issue.
Article 7
An air carrier shall be insured to  cover liability' in case of 
accidents, in particular in respect o f passengers, luggage, 
cargo, mail and third parties.
Article 8
1. O w nership of aircraft shall not be a condition for 
granting  or m aintaining an operating licence but a M em ber 
State shall require, in relation to  air carriers licensed by it 
tha t they habe one or more aircraft at their disposal, 
through ow nership or any form of lease agreem ent.
2. a W ithout prejudice to paragraph  3, aircraft used by
an air carrier shall be registered, at the option of the 
M em ber State issuing the operating licence, in its 
national register or w ithin the Comm uniry.
(b) If a lease agreem ent for an aircraft registered within
the C om m unity has been deem ed acceptable under
Article 10, a M em ber State shall not require the 
registration of tha t aircraft on its own register if this 
w ould require structural changes to the aircraft.
3. In the case of short-term  lease agreements to meet 
tem porary  needs of the air carrier or otherwise in 
exceptional circum stances, a M em ber State may grant 
w aivers to  the requirem ent of parag raph  2 (a).
4. W hen applying paragraph  2 (a) a M ember State shall,
subject to  applicable laws and regulations, including those
relating to  airw orthiness certification , accept on its 
national register, w ithou t any discrim inatory fee and 
w ithout delay, aircraft ow ned by nationals of other 
M em ber States and transfers from aircraft registers o f other 
M em ber States. N o fee shall be applied to transfer of 
a ircraft in addition  to  the norm al registration fee.
Air o p e ra to r’s certificates (AOC)
Article  9
1. The granting  and validity at any time of an operating  
licence shall be dependent upon the possession of a valid 
A O C  specifying the activities covered by the operating  
licence and com plying w ith the criteria established in the 
relevant Council R egulation.
2. U ntil such time as the Council R egulation referred to  in 
parag raph  1 is applicable, na tional regulations concerning 
the A O C , or equivalent title concerning the certification of 
air tran sp o rt opera to rs, shall apply.
Article 10
1. For the purposes of ensuring safety and liability 
standards an air carrier using an aircraft from ano ther 
u n d en ak in g  or providing it to ano ther undenaking  shall 
ob ta in  p rio r approval for the operation  from the 
ap p rop ria te  licensing au thority . T he conditions o f the 
approval shall be p a n  of the lease agreem ent betw een the 
pan ies .
2. A M em ber State shall no t approve agreem ents leasing 
aircraft w ith crew to  an air carrier to  which it has granted 
an operating  licence unless safety standards equivalent to 
those im posed under A n id e  9 are met.
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G eneral provisions
Article 11
1. An operating licence shall be valid as long as the air 
carrier meets the obligations o f this R egulation. H owever, 
a M em ber State may m ake provision for a review one year 
after a new operating licence has been granted and every 
five years thereafter.
2. When an air carrier has ceased operations for six 
m onths or has not started opera tions for six m onths after 
the granting of an operating licence, the M em ber State 
responsible shall decide w hether the operating  licence shall 
be resubm iaed for approval.
3. In relation to air carriers licensed by them , M ember 
S tates shall decide w hether the operating  licence shall be 
resubm ined for approval in case of change in one or more 
elem ents affecting the legal situation  of the undertaking 
an d , in particular, in the case of m ergers o r takeovers. The 
air carrier(s) in question may con tinue its (their) operations 
unless the licensing authority  decides tha t safety is at risk, 
sta ting  the reasons.
Article 12
An air carrier against which insolvency or similar 
proceedings are opened shall not be perm itted by a 
M em ber State to retain  its opera ting  licence if the 
com petent body in tha t M em ber S tate is convinced that 
there  is no realistic prospect o f a satisfactory financial 
reconstruction within a reasonable tim e.
Article 13
1. Procedures for the gran ting  o f opera ting  licences shall 
be m ade public by the M em ber State concerned and the 
C om m ission shall be inform ed.
2. T he Member State concerned shall take a decision on 
an application as soon as possible, and no t later than three 
m on ths after all the necessary inform ation  has been 
subm itted , taking into account all available evidence. The 
decision  shall be com m unicated  to  the applicant air 
tran sp o rt undenaking. A refusal shall indicate the reasons 
therefo r.
3. An undenaking w hose app lication  for an operating 
licence has been refused may refer the question to the 
C om m ission. If the C om m ission finds that the 
requirem ents o f this R egulation have not been fulfilled it 
shall state its view's on the correct in terpretation  of the 
R egulation w ithout prejudice to  Article 169 of the 
T  rea ry .
4. Decisions by M em ber States to grant o r revoke 
operating licences shall be published in the O fficial Journal 
o f  the European C om m unities.
A rticle 14
1. In order to carry ou t its duties under Article 4 the 
Com m ission may obtain all necessary inform ation from the 
M em ber States concerned, w'hich shall also ensure the 
provision of inform ation by air carriers licensed by them .
2. W hen the inform ation requested is not supplied w ithin 
the tim e limit fixed by the C om m ission, or is supplied in 
incom plete form , the C om m ission shall by decision 
addressed to the M em ber State concerned require the 
inform ation to be supplied. The decision shall specify w hat 
inform ation is required and fix an appropriate  time limit 
within which it is to be supplied.
3. If the inform ation required under paragraph 2 is not 
provided by the time limit set o r the air carrier has not 
otherw ise dem onstrated that it meets the requirem ents of 
Article 4, the Comm ission shall, except where special 
circum stances exist, forthw ith  inform  all M em ber States of 
the situation. M ember States m ay, until notified by the 
Com m ission that docum entation  has been provided to 
dem onstrate the fulfilment of the requirem ents in question, 
suspend any m arket access rights to which the air carrier is 
entitled under Council R egulation (EEC) N o 2 4 0 8 /9 2  of 
23 July 1992 on access for C om m unity  air carriers to 
intra-C om uniry air routes (M.
.4 rticle 1 5
In addition to the rules of this R egulation the air carrier 
shall also respect the requirem ents of national law 
com patible with C om m unity law .
A rticle 16
N otw ithstanding Article 3 (1), opera ting  licences in force in 
a M em ber State at the date o f entry into force of the 
Regulation shall remain valid, subject to  the laws on the 
basis o f which they were gran ted , for a m axim um  period of 
one year except in the case of A rticle 4 (1) (b) for w hich a 
m axim um  period of three years shall apply, during which 
periods the air earners holding such licences shall make the 
necessary arrangem ents to conform  with all the 
requirem ents of this R egulation. For the purposes of this 
Article, carriers holding operating  licences shall be deemed
356
C) See page 8 of this Official Journal.
N o  L 2-10 6 Of f i c i . i l  J o u r n a l  o f  t h e  E u r o p e a n  C o m m u n i t i e s 2 4 .  3.  9 2
to include carriers legitimately operating with a valid AOC 
at the date of entry  into force of this Regulation but 
w ithout holding such licences.
This Article shall be w ithout prejudice to Article 4 (2) (3)
(4) and (5) and A rticle 9, except that air carriers which 
operated bv virtue o f exem ptions prior to the entrv into 
force of this R egulation mav continue to do so, for a period 
not exceeding the m axim um  periods specified above, 
pending enquiries by M em ber States as to their compliance 
with Article 4.
Art i c l e  1 7
M em ber States shall consult the Commission before 
adopting law s, regulations or adm inistrative provisions in 
im plem entation of this Regulation. They shall
com m unicate any such m easures to the C om m ission when 
adopted.
Article 18
1. M em ber States and the C om m ission shall cooperate in 
im plem enting this Regulation.
2. C onfidential inform ation ob ta ined  in application  of 
this R egulation shall be covered by professional secrecy.
Article 19
This Regulation shall enter into force on 1 January  1993.
T his Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all M em ber
States.
Done at Brussels, 23 July 1992
For the C ouncil 
The President 
J. COPE
357
2 4 .  8.  9 2 • O f f i c i a l  J o u r n a l  o f  t h e  E u r o p e a n  C o m m u n i t i e s N o  L
ANNEX
Inform ation  for use in association with A p ic le  5 o f  financial fitness of air carriers
A Information to be provided by a first-time applicant from a financial fitness point o f  view
1 The most recent internal management accounts and, if available, audited accounts for the previous
financial year.
2. A projected balance  sheet, including profit and loss  account,  for the following tw o years.
3. The basis for projecred expenditure and income figures on such items as fuel, fares and rates, salaries, 
maintenance, depreciation, exchange rate fluctuations, airport charges, insurance, etc. Traffic/revenue 
forecasts.
4 Deta ils  o f  the start-up costs incurred in the period from submission o f  application to c om m e n c em en t  o f
op e ra t ion s  and an explanation o f  h o w  it is proposes  to  finance these costs.
5. Deta ils  o f  ex ist ing  and projected sources  o f  finance.
6. Details of shareholders, including nationality and type of shares to be held, and the Articles of 
Association. If part of a group of undertakings, information on the relationship between them.
7. Projected ca sh - f lo w  statements and liquidity  plans for the first tw o  years o f  operation.
8. Details of the financing of aircraft purchase/leasing including, in the t^se of leasing, the terms and 
conditions of contract.
B. Information to be provided for assessment o f  the continuing financial fitness of exist ing licence holders
planning a change  in their structures or in their  activit ies  with a significant bearing on their finances
1. If necessary ,  the m ost  recent internal m an agem en t  balance sheer and audited accounts for the previous  
financial year.
2. Precise details  o f  all proposed changes  e .g .  change o f  type o f  service, proposed takeover or merger,  
m od if ica t ion s  in share capital, changes  in shareholders ,  etc.
3. A projecred balance  sheet, with a profit and loss account,  for the current financial year, inclu ding all
p r oposed  changes  in structure or activit ies  with a significant bearing on finances.
4. Past and projected expenditure and inc om e  figures on such items as fuel, fares and rates, salaries,
m a in tenance ,  depreciation,  exchange  rate fluctuations,  airport charges, insurance, etc. T ra f f ic /r even u e
forecasts .
5. C a s h - f lo w  statements  and liquidity plans for the fo l low ing  year, including all proposed  changes  in
structure or activ it ies with a significant bearing on finances.
6. Derails  o f  the financing o f  aircraft p u rch a se / le a s in g  including, in the case of  leasing, the terms and 
c o n d it io n s  o f  contract.
C. Inform ation  to  be provided for assessment o f  the cont in uing  financial fitness of existing licence holders
. 1. Audited  accou n ts  no t  later than six m on th s  after the end of  the relevant period and,  if necessary,  the 
m ost recent internal management balance sheet.
2. A projecred balance sheet, including profit and loss account, for the forthcoming year.
3. Past an d  projected expenditure and incom e  figures on such items as fuel, fares and rates, salaries,
m a in ten a n c e ,  depreciation,  exchange rate f lu ctuations,  airport charges, insurance, etc. T ra f f ic /reven u e
forecasts .
4.  C a s h - f lo w  statements  and liquidity plans for the fo l low ing  year.
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C O U N C IL  R E G U L A T IO N  (EEC) N o  24 0 8 /9 2  
of 23 July 1992
on access for Comm uniry  air carriers to intra-Community air routes
T H E  C O U N C IL  O F T H E  E U R O P E A N  C O M M U N I T I E S .
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community, and in particular Article 84 (2) 
thereof.
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission (*)t
Having regard to the opinion of the European 
Parliament (-),
Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Social 
Commirtee (^),
Whereas it is important to establish an air transport policy 
for the internal market over a period expir ing on 31 
December 1992 as provided for in .Article 8a of the 
Treaty':
Whereas the internal market shall comprise an area 
w ithout internal frontiers in which the free movement of 
goods, persons, services and capital is ensured;
Whereas Council Decision 8 7 /6 0 2 /E E C  of 14 December 
1987 on the sharing of passenger capacity between air 
carriers on scheduled air services between M em ber States 
and on access for air carriers to scheduled air service routes 
between Member States (4) and Council Regulation (EEC) 
N o  2 3 4 3 /9 0  of 24 July 1990 on access for air carriers to 
scheduled intra-Community air service routes and on the 
sharing of passenger capacity between air carriers on 
scheduled air services between M em ber States (5) constitute  
the first steps towards achieving the internal m arket in 
respect of access for Community air carriers to  schedules 
in tra-Com munity air routes;
Whereas Regulation (EEC) N o 2 3 4 3 /9 0  provides that the 
Council shall decide on the revision of that Regulation by 
30 June 1992 at the latest;
Whereas in Regulation (EEC) N o 2 3 4 3 /9 0  the Council 
decided to adopt rules governing route licensing for 
implementation not later than 1 July 1992;
(>) OJ N o  C 2 5 8 .  4. 10. 1991,  p. 2.
(2) OJ N o  C 125 ,  18 . 5. 1992 ,  p. 146  
(J) OJ N o  C 169 ,  6 . 7. 1992 ,  p. 15. 
' / )  OJ N o  L 3 7 4 ,  3 1 .  12. 1987 ,  p. 19.
(5) OJ N o  L 2 1 7 ,  11 . 8. 1990 ,  p. 8.
Whereas in Regulation (EEC) N o  2343 /9 0  the Council 
decided to abolish capaciry restrictions between Member 
States by 1 January 1993;
Whereas in Regulation (EEC) N o  2 34 3 /9 0  the Council 
confirmed that cabotage traffic rights are an integral pan  of 
the internal market;
Whereas arrangements for greater cooperation over the use 
of  G ibraltar airport were agreed in London on 2 December 
1987 by the Kingdom o f  Spain ana  the United Kingdom in 
a joint declaration by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of 
the rwo countries, and such arrangements have yet to come 
into operation;
Whereas the development of the air traffic system in the 
Greek islands and in the Atlantic islands comprising the 
au tonom ous region of the Azores is at present inadequate 
and for this reason airports  situated on these islands should 
be temporarily exempted from the application of this 
Regulation;
Whereas it is necessary to  abolish restrictions concerning 
multiple designation and fifth-freedom traffic rights and 
phase in cabotage rights in order to stimulate the 
development of the C om m unity  air transport sector and 
improve services for users;
Whereas it is necessary to  make special provision, under 
limited circumstances, for public service obligations 
necessary for the maintenance of adequate air services to 
national regions;
W hereas it is necessary to  make special provision for new 
air services between regional airports;
Whereas for air transport  planning purposes it is necessary 
to give Member States the right to establish non- 
discriminatory rules for the distribution of air traffic 
between airports within the same airport system;
W hereas the exercise of traffic rights has to be consistent 
with operational rules relating to safety, protection of the 
environment and conditions concerning airport access and 
has to be treated w ithout discrimination;
Whereas, taking into account problems of congestion or 
environmental problems, it is necessary to include the 
possibility of imposing certain limitations on the exercise of 
traffic rights;
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Whereas, taking into account the competit ive m arket 
situation, provision should be made to prevent unjustifiable 
economic effects on air carriers;
Whereas it is necessary to specify the duties o f  M em b er  
States and air carriers for the purposes o f  providing 
necessary information;
Whereas it is appropriate  to ensure identical assessment 
and evaluation of market access for the same rypes of air
services;
Whereas it is appropriate  to deal with all m atte rs  of m arke t 
access in the same Regulation;
Whereas this Regulation partially replaces Regulation 
(EEC) No 2 3 4 3 /9 0  and Council Regulation (E E C ) N o  
294/91 of 4 February 1991 on the opera t ion  o f  air cargo 
services between M em ber States / 1),
HAS A D O P T E D  THIS R E G U L A T IO N :
A rticle I
1. This Regulation concerns access to rou tes  within the 
Community for scheduled and non-scheduled air services.
2. The application of this Regulation to the a irport  of 
Gibraltar is understood to be w ithout prejudice to the 
respective legal positions of the Kingdom of  Spain and  the 
United Kingdom with regard to the d ispu te  over 
sovereignty over the territory in which the a irport  is 
situated.
3. Application of the provisions of  this Regulation  to 
Gibraltar airport shall be suspended until the a rrangem en ts  
in the joint declaration made by the Foreign M inisters of 
the Kingdom of Spain and the United K ingdom  on  2 
December 1987 have come into ope ra t io n .  T h e  
Governments o f  Spain and the United K ingdom  will so 
inform the Council on tha t date.
4. Airports in the Greek islands and in the AJtantic islands 
comprising the au tonom ous region of the Azores shall be 
exempted from the application of this R egulation  until 30 
June 1993. Unless otherwise decided by the C ouncil ,  on a 
proposal from the Commission, this exem ption  shall apply 
for a further period of five years and may be con tinued  for 
five years thereafter.
Article 2
For the purposes of this Regulation:
;ai ‘Jir carrier’ means an air transport under tak ing  with a 
valid operating licence;
(b) ‘Communiry air carrier’ means an air carrier with a 
valid operating licence granted by a Member State in 
accordance with Council Regulation (EEC) No 
2 4 0 7 /9 2  of 23 July 1992 of licensing of air 
carriers (2);
(c) ‘air service' means a flight or a series of flights carrying 
passengers, cargo a n d /o r  mail for remuneration an d /o r  
hire;
( d ) ‘scheduled air service’ means a series of flights 
possessing all the following characteristics:
(i) it is performed by aircraft for the transport of 
passengers, cargo a n d /o r  mail for remuneration, in 
such a manner that on each flight seats are available 
for individual purchase by members of the public 
(either directly from the air carrier of from its 
authorized agents);
(ii: it is operated so as to serve traffic between the same 
two or more airports, either:
1. according to a published timetable; or
2. with flights so regular or frequent that they 
constitute a recognizably systematic series;
(e) ‘flight’ means a departure  from a specified airport 
tow ards a specified destination airport;
(f) ‘traffic right’ means the right of an air carrier to carry 
passengers, cargo a n d /o r  mail on an air service 
between tow  Communiry airports;
(g) ‘seat-only sales’ means the sale of seats, without any 
other service bundled, such as accommodation, directly 
to the public by the air carrier or its authorized agent or 
a charterer;
(h) ‘M em ber State(s) concerned’ means the Member 
State(s) between or within w-hich an air service is 
operated;
(i) ‘Member State(s) involved’ means the Member State(s) 
concerned and the M em ber State(s) where the air 
carrier(s) operating the air service is (are; licensed;
(j) ‘State of registration’ means the Member State in which 
the licence referred to in ;b) is granted;
(k) ‘a irport’ means any area in a Member State which is 
open for commercial air transport  operations;
(1) ‘regional a irport’ means any airport other than one 
listed in Annex I as a category 1 airport;
(m )‘airport system’ means two or more airports grouped 
together as serving the same city or conurbation, as 
indicated in Annex II;
•■') OJ No L 36, 8. 2. 1991. p. 1 (2) See page 1 of this Official Journal.
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(n) capacity' means the number of seats offered to the 
general public on a scheduled air service over a given 
period;
(o) ‘public service obligation* means any obligation 
imposed upon an air carrier to take, in respect of any 
route which it is licensed to operate by a Member 
State, all necessary measures to ensure the provision of 
a service satisfying fixed standards of continuity, 
regularity, capacity and pricing, which standards the 
air carrier would not assume if it were solely 
considering its commercial interest.
Article J
1. Subject to this Regulation, Community air carriers 
shall be permitted by the Member State s; concerned to 
exercise traflic rights on routes within the Communiry.
2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1, before 1 April 199~ a 
Member State shall not be required to authorize cabotage 
traffic rights within its territory by Communiry air carriers 
licensed by another Member State, unless:
(i) the traffic rights are exercised on a service which 
constitutes and is scheduled as an extension of a service 
from, or as a preliminary of a service to, the State or 
registration of the carrier;
(ii) the air carrier does not use, for the cabotage service, 
more than 50 % of its seasonal capacity' on the same 
service of which the cabotage service constitutes the 
extension or the preliminary.
3. An air carrier ' operating cabotage services in 
accordance with paragraph-2 shall furnish on request to the 
Member State(s) involved all information necessary for the 
implementation of the provisions of that paragraph.
4. Notwithstanding paragraph 1, before 1 April 1997 a 
M em ber State may, without discrimination on grounds of 
nationality of ownership and air carrier identity, whether 
incumbent or applicant on the routes concerned, regulate 
access to routes within its territory for air carriers licensed 
by it in accordance with Regulation t E E C  N o 2 4 0 7 /9 2  
while otherwise not prejudging Communiry law and, in 
particular, competition rules.
Article 4
1. (a) A Member State, following consultations with the 
other Member Stares concerned and after having 
informed the Commission and air carriers operating 
on the route, may impose a public service obligation 
in respect of scheduled air services to an airport 
serving a peripheral or development region in its 
territory or on  a thin route to anv regional airport
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in its territory, any such route being considered vital 
for the economic development of the region in 
which the airport is located, to  the extent necessary 
to  ensure on that route the adequate provision of 
scheduled air services satisfying fixed standards of 
continuity ,  regularity, capacity and pricing, which 
s tandards air carr iers would not assume if they were 
solely considering their commercial interest. The 
Comm ission shall publish the existence of this 
public service obligation in the O fficial Journal o f  
the European C om m unities.
;b; The adequacy o f  scheduled air services shall be
assessed by the M em ber States having regard to:
(i) the public interest;
ii) the possibility, in particular for island regions, 
of  having recourse to o ther forms of transport 
and the ability of such forms to meet the 
transport  needs under consideration;
iii) the air fares and conditions which can be 
quoted  to  users;
<iv) the combined effect of all air carriers operating 
or  intending to  operate on the route.
(c) In instances where o ther forms of transport cannot 
ensure an adequate  and uninterrupted service, the 
M em ber States concerned may include in the public 
service obligation the requirement that any air 
carrier intending to operate  the route gives a 
guarantee tha t  it will operate  the route for a certain 
period , to be specified, in accordance with the other 
terms of the public service obligation.
(d) If no air carrier has commenced or is about the 
comm epce scheduled air services on a route in 
accordance with the public service obligation which 
has been imposed on that route, then the Member 
State m ay limit access to that route to only one air 
carrier for a period of  up to  three years, after which 
the si tuation shall be reviewed. The right to  operate 
such services shall be offered by public tender either 
singly or  for a group  of  such routes to any 
C om m uniry  air carrier entitled to operate such air 
services. The invitation to tender shall be published 
in the O fficia l Journal o f  the European  
C om m unities  and the deadline for submission of 
tenders not be earlier than one month  after the day 
of publication. The submissions made by air 
carriers shall forthw-ith be communicated to the 
other M em ber States concerned and to the 
Comm iss ion.
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(e) The invitation to tender and subsequent contract 
shall cover, inter alia , the following points:
(i) the s tandards required by the public service 
obligation;
( 11} rules concerning amendment and termination 
of the contract, in particular to take account 
of unforeseeable changes;
(iii) the period of validity of the contract;
iv) penalties in the event of failure to comply with 
the contract.
(f; The selection among the submissions shall be made 
as soon as possible taking into consideration the 
adequacy of the service, including the prices and 
conditions which can be quoted to users, and the 
cost of the compensation required from the Member 
State(s) concerned, if any.
'g Notwithstanding subparagraph (f), a period of two 
months shall elapse after the deadline for 
submission of tenders before any selection is made, 
in order to permit other Member States to submit 
comments.
Commission shall carry out an investigation and within 
tw o months of receipt o f  the request shall take a decision 
on the basis of all relevant factors on whether paragraph 1 
shall continue to apply in respect of the route concerned.
4. The Commission shall communicate its decision to the 
Council and to the Member States. Any M em ber State may 
refer the Commission’s decision to  the Council withm a 
time limit of one month. The Council,  acting by a qualified 
majority, may take a different decision within a period of 
one month.
Article S
O n domestic routes for which at the time of entry into 
force of this Regulation an exclusive concession has been 
granted by law or contract,  and where other forms of 
transport cannot ensure an adequate and uninterrupted 
service, such a concession may continue until its expiry 
date  or for three yeare, whichever deadline comes first.
Article 6
(h A M em ber State may reimburse an air carrier, 
which has been selected under subparagraph (f), for 
satisfying s tandards required by a public service 
obligation imposed under this paragraph; such 
reimbursement shall take into account the costs and 
revenue generated by the service.
(i) Member States shall take the measures necessary to 
ensure that any decision taken under this Article can 
be reviewed effectively and, in particular, as soon as 
possible on the grounds that such decisions have 
infringed C om m unity  law or national rules 
implementing tha t  law.
\j) When a public service obligation has been imposed 
in accordance with subparagraphs (a) and (c) then 
air carriers shall be able to offer seat-only sales only 
if the air service in question meets all the 
requirements of the public service obligation. 
Consequently tha t air service shall be considered as 
a scheduled air service.
'k ;  Subparagraph (d) shall not apply in any case in 
which another M em ber State concerned proposes a 
satisfactory alternative means of fulfilling the same 
public service obligation.
1. Notwithstanding .Article 3, a M em ber State may, 
where one of the air carriers licensed by it has started to 
operate  a scheduled passenger air service with aircraft o f  no 
more than 80 seats on a new route between regional 
a irports where the capacity does not exceed 30 000 seats 
per year, refuse a scheduled air service by another air 
carrier for a period of tw o  years, unless it is operated with 
aircraft of not more than 80 seats, or it is operated in such 
a way that not more than  80 seats are available for sale 
between the rwo airports in question on each flight.
2. Article 4 (3) and (4) shall apply in relation to 
paragraph  1 of this Article.
Article 7
In operating air services, a C om m unity  air carrier shall be 
permitted by ghe M em ber State(s) concerned to combine air 
services and use the same flight number.
A rticle 8
2. Paragraph 1 (d) shall not apply to routes where other 
forms of transport can ensure an adequate and 
uninterrupted service when the capacity offered exceeds 
30 000 seats per year.
3. At the request of a M em ber State which considers that 
the development of a route is being unduly restricted by the 
terms of paragraph 1, or on its own initiative, the
1. This Regulation shall not affect a M em ber State’s right 
to  regulate without discrimination on grounds of 
nationali ty  or identity of the air carrier,  the distribution of 
traffic between the airports within an airport system.
2. T he  exercise of traffic rights shall be subject to 
published Communiry, national, regional or local 
operational rules relating to safety, the protection of  the 
environment and the allocation of slots.
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3. At the request of a Member State or on its own 
initiative the Commision shall examine the application of 
paragraphs 1 and 2 and, within one month of receipt of a 
request and after consulting the Committee referred to in 
Article 11, decide whether the Member State may continue 
to apply the measure. The Commission shall communicate 
its decision to the Council and to the Member States.
4. Any Member State may refer the Commission’s 
decision to the Council within a time limit of one month. 
The Council , acting by a qualified majority, may in 
exceptional circumstances take a different decision within a 
period of one month.
whether the action may be implemented, wholly or 
partially, during  the examination taking into account in 
particular the possibility of irreversible effects. After 
consulting the C om m ittee  referred to in .Article 11 the 
Commission shall, one month after having received all 
necessary inform ation , decide whether the action is 
appropriate  3nd in conformity’ with this Regulation and not 
in any o ther  way contrary to Community law. The 
Commission shall comm unicate  its decision to  the Council 
and the M em b er  States. Pending such decision the 
Commission may decide on interim measures including the 
suspension, in whole or in p a n ,  of the action, taking into 
account in particular the possibility of irreversible effects.
5. When a Member State decides to constitute a new 
airport system or modify an existing one it shall inform the 
other M ember States and the Commission. After having 
verified that the airports are grouped together as serving 
the same city or conurbation the Commission shall publish 
a revised Annex II in the Official Journal o f  the European  
Com m unities.
Article 9
1. When serious congestion a n d /o r  environmental 
problems exist the Member State responsible may, subject 
to this Article, impose conditions on, limit or refuse the 
exercise of traffic rights, in particular when other modes of 
transport can provide satisfactory levels of service.
2. Action taken by a Member State in accordance with 
paragraph 1 shall:
— be non-discrirmnatory on grounds of nationality or 
identity of air carriers,
v •- 1
— have a limited period of validity , not exceeding three 
years, after which it shall be reviewed,
— not unduly affect the objectives of this Regulation,
— not unduly distort competition between air carriers,
— not be more restrictive than necessary in order to relieve 
the problems.
3. When a Member State considers that action under 
paragraph 1 is necessary it shall, at least three months 
before the entry into force of the action, inform the other 
Member States and the Commission, providing adequate 
justification for the action. The action may be implemented 
unless within one month or receipt of the information a 
Member State concerned contests the action or the 
Commission, in accordance with paragraph 4, takes it up 
for further examination.
4. At the request of a Member State or on its own 
initiative the Commission shall examine action referred to 
in paragraph 1. When the Commission, within one month 
of having been informed under paragraph 3, takes the 
action up for examination it shall at the same time indicate
5. N o tw iths tand ing  paragraphs 3 and 4, a Member State 
may take the necessary action to deal with sudden 
problems of short dura t ion  provided that such action is 
consistent with paragraph  2. The Commission and the 
M ember State(s) shall be informed without delay of such 
action with its adequate  justification. If the problems 
necessitating such action continue to  exist for more than 14 
days the M em ber State shall inform the Commission and 
the o ther M em ber States accordingly and may, w'ith the 
agreement o f  the Comm ission, prolong the action for 
further periods of up to 14 days. At the request of the 
M em ber State(s) involved or on its own initiative the 
Commission may suspend this action if it does not meet the 
requirements of paragraphs  1 and 2 or is otherwise 
contrary to C om m unity  law.
6. Any M em ber State may refer the Commission’s 
decision under  paragraph  4 or 5 to  the Council within a 
time limit o f  one m onth . The Council , acting by a qualified 
majority, may in exceptional circumstances take a different 
decision within a period of  one month.
7. When a decision taken by a M em ber State in 
accordance with this Article limits the activity of a 
Comm unity  air carrier on  an in tra-Com munity route, the 
same conditions or limitation shall apply to all Communiry 
air carriers on  the same route. W hen the decision involves 
the refusal o f  new or  additional services, the same 
treatment shall be given to  all requests by Comm uniry air 
carriers fpr new or additional services on that route.
8. W ithout prejudice to Article 8 (1) and except with the 
agreement o f  the M em ber State(s) involved, a Member 
State shall no t authorize an air carrier:
(a) to establish a new service, or
(b) to increase the frequency of an existing service,
between a specific airport in its territory and another 
Mem ber State for such time as an air carrier licensed by 
that o ther M em ber  State is not permitted, on the basis of 
slot-allocation rules as provided for in Article 8 (2), to 
establish a new service or to increase frequencies on an
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existing service to the airport in question, pending the 
adoption by the Council and the coming into force of a 
Regulation on a code of conduct on slot allocation based 
on the general principle of non-discnmination on the 
grounds of nationality.
Article 10
1. Capacity limitations shall not apply to air services 
covered by this Regulation except as set out in Articles 8 
and 9 and in this Article.
2. W here the application of paragraph 1 has led to serious 
financial damage for the scheduled air carrier's; licensed by 
a M em ber State, the Commission shall carry out a review 
at the request of that Mem ber Stare and, on the basis of all 
relevant factors, including the market situation and in 
particular whether a situation exists whereby the 
opportunities of air carriers of that Member State to 
effectively compete in the market are unduly affected, the 
financial posistion of the air carrier(s) concerned and the 
capacity utilization achieved, shall take a decision on 
whether the capacity for scheduled air services to and from 
that State should be stabilized for a limited period.
3. The Commission shall communicate its decision to the 
Council and to the Member States. Any Member State may 
refer the Comm ission’s decision to the Council within a 
time limit of one m onth . The Council, acnng by a qualified 
majority, may in exceptional circumstances take a different 
decision within a period of one month.
Article 11
1. The Commission shall be assisted by an Advisory 
Committee  composed of the representatives of the M em ber 
States and chaired by the representative of the 
Commission.
2. T he  Comm ittee  shall advise the Commission on the 
application of Articles 9 and 10.
3. Furthermore, the Committee may be consulted by the 
Comm ission on any other question concerning the 
application of this Regulation.
4. The Committee shall draw up its rules of procedure.
A rticle 12
1. In order to carry out its duties under this Regulation 
the Commission may obtain all necessary information from 
the M em ber States concerned, which shall also ensure the 
provision of information by air carriers licensed by them.
2. When the information requested is not supplied within 
the time limit fixed by the Commission, or is supplied in 
incomplete form, the Commission shall by decision 
addressed to the M em ber State concerned require the 
information  to be applied. The decision shall specify what 
information is required and fix an appropria te  time limit 
whithin which it is to be supplied.
I
Art i c le .  1 3
The  Commission shall publish a repor t  on the application 
of this Regulation by 1 April 1994 and periodically 
thereafter.
Article 14
1. M em ber Stares and the Commission shall cooperate in 
implementing this Regulation.
2. Confidential information obtained in application of 
this Regulation shall be covered by professional secrecy.
Article 15
Regulation (EEC) N o  2 3 4 3 /9 0  and 2 9 4 /9 1  are hereby 
replaced with the exceptions of Article 2 (e) (ii) and of 
Annex I to Regulation (EEC) N o 2 3 4 3 /9 0 ,  as interpreted 
by Annex II to this Regulation, and Article 2 (b) of and the 
Annex to Regulation (EEC) N o 2 9 4 /9 1 .
Article 16
This Regulation shall enter into force on 1 January  1993.
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member 
States.
Done at Brussels, 23 July 1992
For the Council 
The President 
J. COPE
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A S X E X  I 
List o f  category 1 airports
BELGIUM:
D E N M A R K
G E R M A N Y :
SPAIN:
GREECE:
FRANCE:
IRELAND:
ITALY:
N E T H E R L A N D S :
PO RT UG AL:
U N IT E D  K I N G D O M .
Brussels-Zaventem
Copenhagen airport system
Frankfurt-Rhcin/ Main
Dusseldorf-Lohausen
Munich
Berlin airport system
Palma-Mailorca 
Madrid-Baraias  
Malaga  
Las Palmas
Athens-Hellinikon  
Thessaiomka-M acedonia
Paris airport system
Dublin
Rome airport system 
Milan airport system
Amsterdam-Schiphol
Lisbon
Faro
London airport system 
Luton
A N N E X  11 
List o f  airport systems
D E N M A R K :
G E R M A N Y :
FRANCE:
ITALY:
U N I T E D  K I N G D O M :
Copenhagen-Kastrup/R osktlde
B er l in -T ege l /S ch onefe ld /T em pelhof
Paris-Charles De G a u l le /O r ly / L e  Bourget  
Lyon-Bron-Satolas
Rom e-Fium icino/Ciam pino
M ilan-L in ate /M alpensa /Bergam o (Orio  al Serio) 
V enice-Tessera/Treviso
London -H eathrow /G arw ick /S tansted
A N N E X  III 
Interpretation referred to in Article IS
Under the terms o f  Annex I to  Regulat ion (EEC) N q , 2 3 4 3 / 9 0  the air carrier Scanair, which ts structured and 
organized  exact ly  as Scandinavian Airlines System, is to be considered in the sam e way as the air carrier 
Scandinavian  Airlines System.
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C O U N C IL  R EG U LA TION  (EEC) No 2 40 9 /92  
of 23 July, 1992 
on fares and rates for air services
THE C O U N C IL  OF THE E U R O P E A N  C O M M U N I T I E S ,
Having regard to the Treaty  establishing the European 
Economic Communiry, and in particular Article 84 (2) 
thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission ( ]),
Having regard to the opinion of the European 
Parliament (2),
Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Social 
Committee (3),
Whereas it is important to establish an air transport policy 
for the internal market over a period expiring on 31 
December 1992 as provided for in Article 8a of the 
Treaty;
Whereas the internal m arket shall comprise an area 
without internal frontiers in which the free movement of 
goods, persons, services and capital is ensured,
Whereas Council Decision 8 7 / 6 0 1 /E E C  of 14 December 
1987 on fares for scheduled air services between Member 
States (4) and Council Regulation (EEC) N o  2 3 4 2 /9 0  of 24 
July 1990 on fares for scheduled air services (5) constitute 
the first steps towards achieving the internal market in 
respect of air fares;
Whereas air fares should normally be determined freely by 
marker forces;
Whereas it is appropriate to  complement price freedom 
with adequate safeguards for the interests o f consumers 
and industry;
Whereas it is appropriate to deal with all matters of pricing 
in the same Regulation;
Whereas this Regulation replaces Regulation (EEC) No 
2342 /90  and partially replaces Council Regulation (EEC) 
No 294/91  o f  4 February 1991 on the operation of air 
cargo services between M em ber States (6),
(>) OJ N o  C 2 5 8 ,  4. 10. 1 9 9 1 ,  p. 2.
(2) OJ N o  C 125 ,  18. 5. 1 9 9 2 ,  p. 150.
(3) OJ N o  C 16 9 ,  6. 7 . 1 9 9 2 ,  p. 15.
(4) OJ N o  L 3 7 4 ,  31.  12. 1 9 8 7 ,  p. 12.  
( s ) OJ N o  L 2 1 7 ,  11. 8. 1 9 9 0 ,  p. 1.
(6) OJ N o  L 3 6 ,  8. 2. 1 991 ,  p. 1.
HAS A D O P T E D  THIS R E G U L A T I O N :
Article 1
1. This Regulation concerns the criteria and procedures to 
be applied for the establishment of fares and rates on air 
services for carriage wholly within the Communiry.
2. Without prejudice to paragraph  3, this Regulation shall 
not apply:
(a) to fares and rates charged by air carriers other than 
Community air carriers;fc
(b) to fares and rates established by public service 
obligation, in accordance witjh Council Regulation 
(EEC) N o 2 4 0 8 /9 2  of 23 July, 1992 on access for 
Community air carriers to intra-Community air 
routes (T).
3. Only Community air carriers shall be entitled to 
introduce new products or lower fares than the ones 
existing for identical products.
A rticle 2
For the purposes of this Regulation:
(a) ‘air fares’ means the prices expressed in ecus or in local 
currency to be paid by passengers to  air carriers or their 
agents for the carriage of them and for the carnage of 
their baggage on air services and any conditions under 
which those prices apply, including remuneration and 
conditions offered to agency and other auxiliary 
services;
(b) ‘seat rates’ means the prices expressed in ecus or in local 
currency to be paid by charterers to air carriers for the 
,carriage on air services of the charterer or its customers 
and their baggage and any conditions under which 
those prices apply, including remuneration and 
conditions offered to agency and other auxiliary 
services;
(c) ‘charter fares’ means the prices expressed in ecus or in 
local currency to be paid by passengers to  charterers for 
services which constitute or include their carriage and 
the carriage of their baggage on air services and any 
conditions under which those prices apply, including 
remuneration and conditions offered to  agency or other 
auxiliary services;
(7) See page 8 of this Official Journal.
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(d) ‘cargo rates' means the prices expressed in ecus or in 
local currency to be paid for the carnage  of  cargo and 
the conditions under which those prices apply, 
including remuneration and conditions offered to 
agency and other auxiliary services;
• e' ‘standard cargo rates' means the rates which the air 
carrier would normally quote including the availability 
of normal discounts:
(0  ‘air service' means a flight or a series of flights carrying 
passengers, cargo a n d /o r  mail for remuneration  
an d /o r  hire;
(g) ‘air carrier’ means an air transport undertak ing  with a 
valid operating licence.
(h) ‘Community air carrier' means an air carrier with a 
valid operating licence issued by a M em ber State in 
accordance with Council Regulation (EEC) N o 
2 4 0 / /  92 of 23 July 1992 on licensing of air 
carriers {');
(i) ‘Member State s concerned" means the M em ber 
State;s) between or within which the fare or rate is 
applied;
(j) ‘Member State(s) involved’ means the M em ber State(s) 
concerned and the Member State(s) where the air 
carrier(s) operating the air service is fare) licensed;
(k) ‘basic fare’ means the lowest fully flexible fare, 
available on a one way and return basis, which is 
offered for sale at least to the same extent as that of 
any other fully flexible fare offered on the same air 
service.
Article 3
C h an e r  fares and st~t and cargo rates charged by 
Community air carriers- 'shall be set by free agreement 
between the parties to the contract of carriage.
Article 4
Air carriers operating within the Communiry shall inform 
the general public, on request, of all air fares and standard  
cargo rates.
Article S
1. Without prejudice to this Regulation, C om m unity  air 
carriers shall freely set air fares.
2. Member State(s) concerned may, w ithou t 
discrimination on grounds of nationality or identity o f  air 
carriers, require air fares to be filed with them in the form 
prescribed by them. Such filing shall not be required to  be 
submined more than 24 hours (including a working day)
( 1) See page 1 of this Official Journal.
before the air fares come into effect, except in the case oi 
matching of an existent fare for which no more than prior 
notification is required.
3. Before 1 April 1997, a Member State may require that 
air fares on domestic routes where no more than one 
carrier licensed by it, or rwo carriers licensed by it under a 
loint operation, operate have to be filed more than one 
working day but no more than one month before the air 
fares come into effect.
4. An air fare may be available for sale and carriage as 
long as it is not w ithdrawn in accordance with Article 6 or 
Article 7.
Article b
1. Subject to the procedures of this .Article, a Member
State concerned may decide, at any moment:
a) to withdraw a basic fare which, taking into account the 
whole fare structure for the route in question and other 
relevant factors including the competitive market 
situation, is excessively high to the disadvantage of 
users in relation to the long term fully-allocated 
relevant costs of the air carrier including a satisfactory 
return on capital;
(b) to  stop, in a non-discriminatory way, further fare 
decreases in a m arket,  whether on a route or a group of 
routes, when m arket forces have led to sustained 
dow nw ard  development of air fares deviating 
significantly from ordinary seasonal pricing movements 
and resulting in widespread losses among all air carriers 
concerned for the air services concerned, taking into 
account the long term fully-allocated relevant costs of 
the air carriers.
2. A decision taken pursuant to paragraph 1 shall be 
notified with reasons to the Commission and to all other 
M ember State(s) involved, as well as to the air carrier(s) 
concerned.'
3. If within fourteen days of the date of receiving 
notification no other M em ber State concerned or the 
Commission has notified disagreement stating its reasons 
on the basis or paragraph 1, the Member State which has 
taken the decision pursuant to paragraph 1 may instruct 
the air carrier(s) concerned to withdraw the basic fare or to 
abstain from further fare decreases, as appropriate.
4. In the case of disagreement, any Member State 
involved may require consultations to review the situation. 
The consultations shall take place within 14 days of being 
requested, unless otherwise agreed.
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Article 7
1. At the request of a Member State involved the 
Commission shall examine whether a decision to act or not 
to act pursuant to Article 6 complies with the criteria of 
Article 6 (1). The Member State shall at the same time 
inform the other Member State(s) concerned and the air 
carrier(s) concerned. The Commission shall forthwith 
publish in the O fficial Journal o f  the European  
Com m unities that the air fare(s) have been submitted for 
examination.
2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1, the Commission may, 
on the basis of a complaint made by a parry with a 
legitimate interest, investigate whether air fares comply 
with the criteria of Article 6 (1). The Commission shall 
forthwith publish in the O fficial Journal o f  the European  
C om m unities  that the air fare(s) have been submitted for 
examination.
3. An air fare in force at the time of its submission for 
examination in accordance with paragraph 1 shall remain 
in force during the examination. However, where the 
Commission, or the Council in accordance with paragraph 
8, has decided within the previous six months that a similar 
or lower level of the basic fare on the city-pair concerned 
does not comply with the criteria of Article 6 {1) (a), the air 
fare shall not remain in force during the examination.
Furthermore, where paragraph 6 has been applied, the air 
carrier concerned may no t,  during the examination by the 
Commission, apply a higher basic fare than the one which 
was applicable immediately before the basic fare under 
examination.
4. Following consultations with the M em ber States 
concerned, the Commission shall take a decision as soon as 
possible and in any event not later than twenty' working 
days after having received sufficient information from the 
air carrier(s) concerned. The Commission shall take into 
account all information received from interested parties.
5. When an air carrier does not supply the information 
requested within the time limit fixed by the Commission, or 
supplies it in incomplete form, the Commission shall be 
decision require the information to  be supplied. The 
decision shall specify w hat information is required and fix 
an appropriate time limit within which it is to be 
supplied.
6. The Commission may, by decision, decide that an air 
fare in force shall be w ithdrawn pending its final
determination where an air carrier supplies incorrect 
in formation or produces it in incomplete form or does not 
supply it within the time limit fixed by decision under 
^ p a ra g r a p h  5.
7. The Commission shall without delay communicate its 
reasoned decision under paragraphs 4 and 6 to the Member 
State!s) concerned and to the air carrier(s) concerned
8. A Member State concerned may refer the Commission’s 
decision under paragraph 4 to the Council within a time 
limit o f  one month. The Council, acting by a qualified 
m a j o r i t y ,  m a y  take a different decision within a period of 
one month.
9. The Member States concerned shall ensure that the 
Com m iss ion’s decision is enforced, unless the decision is 
under examination by the Council or the Council has taken 
a different decision in accordance with paragraph 8.
Article 8
At least orlte a year the Commission shail consult on air 
fares and related matters with representatives of air 
t ransport  user organizations in the Communiry, for which 
purpose the Commission shall S u p p ly  appropriate 
information to participants.
Article 9
The Commission shall publish a report on the application 
of  this Regulation by 1 April 1994 and periodically 
thereafter.
Article 10
1. M em ber States and the Commission shall cooperate in 
implementing this Regulation, particularly as regards 
collection of information for the report referred to in 
Article 9.
2. Confidential information obtained in application of 
this Regulation shall be covered by professional secrecy.
A rticle 11
Regulation 'EEC ) No 2 3 4 2 /9 0  is hereby repealed.
Article 12
This Regulation shall enter into force on 1 January  1993.
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member 
States.
Done at Brussels, 23 July 1992
For the Council 
The President 
J. COPE
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C O U N C IL  R E G U LA T IO N  (EEC) N o 2410 /92  
of 23 July 1992
amending Regulation (EEC) N o  3 9 7 5 /8 7  laying down the procedure for the application of 
the rules on competition to undertakings in the air transport sector
TH E  C O U N C I L  OF TH E E U R O P E A N  C O M M U N I T I E S .
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community, and in particular Article 87 
thereof.
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission {*),
Having regard to the opinion of the European 
Parliament - ,
Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Social 
Committee T .
Whereas Regulation ;EEC) No 3 9 7 5 /8 7  i4) formed part of 
a package of interrelated measures adopted by the Council 
as a first step towards completing the internal m arket in 
transport;  whereas its scope was accordingly limited to 
international air transport between Community airports;
Whereas, therefore, the Commission has no means at 
present of investigating directly cases of suspected 
infringement of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty and lacks 
the powers to take decisions or impose such penalties as are 
necessary for it to authorize agreements under Article 85
(3) and to bring to an end infringements established by it in 
relation to transport within a Member Stare;
Whereas air transport entirely within a M em ber State is 
now' also subject to Community’ liberalization measures; 
whereas it is therefore desirable for rules to be laid down 
under which the Commission, action in close and constant 
liaison with the competent authorit ies o f  the Member 
States, may take the requisite measures for the application 
of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty to this area of air 
transport ,  in situations where trade between Member 
States may be affected;
Whereas there is a need to establish a secure and clear legal 
framework for air transport within a M em ber State, while 
ensuring consistent application of the competition rules; 
whereas, therefore, the scope of Regulation (EEC) No 
2 9 7 5 /8 7  shodld be extended to this area of air transport,
HAS A D O P T E D  THIS R E G U LA T IO N :
Article 1
The word ‘international’ is hereby deleted from Article 1
(2) of Regulation (EEC) No 3 9 7 5 /8 7 .
Article 2
This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following 
that of its publication in the O fficia l Journal o f  the 
E uropean Comm unities.
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all M em ber
States.
Done at Brussels, 23 July 1992
' For the Council
The President 
J. COPE
(■) OJ N o  C 2 5 5 ,  30. 8. 1 9 9 1 ,  p. 9.
( 2) OJ N o  C 125 ,  18. 5. 1 9 9 2 ,  p. 130.
(3) OJ N o  C 169 ,  6. 7. 1 9 9 2 .  p. 13.
(4) OJ N o  L 3 7 4 ,  31.  12. 1987 ,  p. 1.
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C O U N C IL R E G U L A T IO N  (EEC) N o 2 4 1 1 /9 2  
of 23 July 1992
amending Regulation (EEC) No 3 9 7 6 /8 7  on the application of Article 85 (3) of the Treaty 
to certain categories of agreements and concerted practices in the air transport  sector
THE COU N C IL OF THE E U R O P E A N  C O M M U N I T I E S ,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community, and in particular Article 87 
thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission ( ’),
Having regard to the opinion of the European 
Parliament
Having regard to the opinion of  the Economic and Social 
Committee (3),
Whereas, in accordance with Council Regulation (EEC) 
No 3975 /8 7  of 14 December 1987 laying down the 
procedure for the application of the rules of competit ion to 
undertakings in the air transport sector (■*}, the 
Commission now has power to implement the competit ion 
rules in respect of air t ransport  within a Member State; 
whereas it is therefore desirable to provide for the 
possibility of adopting block exemptions applicable to that 
area of transport;
Whereas Regulation (EEC) N o  3 9 7 6 /8 7  (5) empowers the 
Commission to declare by way of Regulation that the 
provisions of Article 85 (1) do  not apply to certain 
categories of agreements between undertakings, decisions 
by associations of undertakings and concerted practices;
Whereas the power to adopt these block exemptions was 
granted for a limited period, expiring on 31 December 
1992, to allow- air carriers to adap t to the more competitive 
environment resulting from changes in the regulatory 
systems applicable to intra-Community international air 
transport;
Whereas a continuation of  block exemptions after that date 
is justified by the further measures to liberalize the air 
transport sector adopted by the Community; whereas the
(>) OJ N o  C 2 5 5 ,  30.  8. 1 9 9 1 ,  p. 10.
(*) Opinion  delivered on 10 July 1992  'not yet published in the 
Official Journal).
(3) OJ N o  C 169,  6. 7. 1 992 ,  p. 13.
(4) OJ N o  L 374 ,  31.  12. 1 9 8 7 ,  p. 1. Last amended bv Regulation
• EEC) N o  2 4 1 0 / 9 2  (See page  18 o f  this Official Journal)
( 5) OJ N o  L 374 ,  31 .  12. 1 9 8 7 .  p.  9. Amended bv Regulat ion  
(EEC) N o  2 3 4 4 / 9 0  'OJ N o  L 2 1 “ . 11. 8. 199 0 .  p. 15
scope of these block exemptions and the conditio 
attached to them should be defined by the Commission, 
close liaison w'lth the M em ber States, taking into accou 
changes to the competitive environment achieved since t 
entry into force of Regulation T E C )  N o  3 9 7 6 /8 7 ,
HAS A D O P T E D  THIS R E G U L A T I O N .
A rtic ie .l
Regulation (EEC) N o 3 9 7 6 / 8 “ is hereby amended
follows:
1. T he  word ‘in ternational’ shall be deleted in Article 1
2. Article 2 (2) shall be replaced by the following:
‘2. The Commission may, in particular, adopt sue 
Regulations in respect of agreements, decisions < 
concerted practices which have as their object any < 
the following:
— joint planning and coordination  of airlir 
schedules,
— consultations on tariffs for the carriage 
passengers and baggage and of freight on schedule 
air services,
— joint operations on new' less busy scheduled a 
services,
' — slot allocation at airports and airport scheduling 
the Commision shall take care to ensure consistenc 
with the C ode  of Conduct adopted by th 
Council ,
— comm on purchase, development and operation c 
computer reservation systems relating t 
rimetabling, reservations and ticketing by a 
transport undertakings; the Commission shall tak 
care to ensure consistency with the Code c 
Conduct adopted  by the C ouncil .’
3. Article 3 shall be replaced by the following:
'A rticle 3
.Any Regulation adopted  pursuant to Article 2 shall b 
for a specified period.
/N o L 2 4 0 / 2 0  Official Journal  o f  the E u r o p e a n  C o m m u n i t ie s  24. 8. 9 2
It may be repealed or amended where circumstances 
have changed with respect to any of the factors which 
prom pted its adop tion ; in such case, a period shall be 
fixed for am endm ent of the agreements and concerted 
practices to which the earlier Regulation applied before 
repeal or am end m en t.’
4. Article 8 shall be deleted.
Article 2
This Regulation shall enter into force on the third day 
following that of its publication in the O fficia l Journal o f  
the European C om m unities.
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all M em ber 
States.
Done at Brussels, 23 July 1992.
For the C ouncil 
The President 
J. COPE
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C O U N C I L  R E G U L A T IO N  (EEC) N o  4064/89 
of 21 D e c e m b e r  1989 
on  the c o n t r o l  of c o n c e n t r a t i o n s  be tw een  u n d e r ta k in g s
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES.
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European
Economic Community, and in particular Articles 87 and
235 thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission ('),
Having regard to the opinion of the European
Parliament (J),
aving regard to the opinion of the Economic and Social
^Committee (3),
(1) Whereas, for the achievement of the aims of the 
Treaty establishing the European Economic 
Community, Article 3 (f) gives the Community the 
objective of instituting ‘a system ensuring that 
competit ion in the common market is not 
distorted’ ;
(2) Whereas this system is essential for the achieve­
ment of the internal market by 1992 and its further 
d eve lopm en t;
(3) Whereas the dismantling of internal frontiers is
resulting and will continue to result in major
corporate reorganizations in the Community, parti­
cularly in the form of concentrations ;
Whereas such a development must be welcomed as 
being in line with the requirements of dynamic
) competition and capable of increasing the competi­
tiveness of European industry, improving the 
conditions of growth and raising the standard of 
living in the C om m unity ;
(5) Whereas, however, it must be ensured that the
process of reorganization does not result in lasting 
damage to competition ; whereas Community law 
must therefore include provisions governing those 
concentrations which may significantly impede 
effective competition in the comm on market or in 
a substantial part of i t ;
6) Whereas Articles 85 and 86, while applicable,
according to the case-law of the Court of Justice, to 
certain concentrations, are not, however, sufficient 
to control all operations which may prove to be
') OJ No C 130, 19. 5. 1988, p. 4.
•’) OJ No C 309, 5. 12. 1988, p. 55.
') OJ No C 208, 8. 8. 1988, p. 11.
incompatible with the system of undistorted 
competition envisaged in the Treaty ;
(7) Whereas a new legal instrument should therefore 
be created in the form of a Regulation to permit 
effective control of all concentrations from the 
point of view of their effect on the structure of 
competition in the Community and to be the only 
instrument applicable to such concentrations ;
(8) Whereas this Regulation should therefore be based 
not only on Article 87 but, principally, on Article 
235 of the Treaty, under which the Community 
may give itself the additional powers of action 
necessary for the attainment of its objectives, in ­
cluding with regard to concentrations on the 
markets for agricultural products listed in Annex II 
to the Treaty ;
(9) Whereas the provisions to be adopted in this Regu­
lation should apply to significant structural changes 
the impact of which on the market goes beyond 
the national borders of any one Member State ;
(10) Whereas the scope of application of this Regulation 
should therefore be defined according to the 
geographical area of activity of the undertakings 
concerned and be limited by quantitative thres­
holds in order to cover those concentrations which 
have a Community dimension ; whereas, at the end 
of an initial phase of the application of this Regula­
tion, these thresholds should be reviewed in the 
light of the experience gained ;
(11) Whereas a concentration with a Community 
dimension exists where the combined aggregate 
turnover of the undertakings concerned exceeds 
given levels worldwide and within the Community 
and where at least two of the undertakings 
concerned have their sole or main fields of activi­
ties in different Member States or where, although 
the undertakings in question act mainly in one and 
the same Member State, at least one of them has 
substantial operations in at least one other Member 
State ; whereas that is also the case where the 
concentrations are effected by undertakings which 
do not have their principal fields of activities in the 
Community but which have substantial operations 
th e r e ;
(12) Whereas the arrangements to be  ir.trodo'-ed for the 
control of concentrations should, without prejudice 
to Article 90 (2) of the Treaty, respect the principle 
of non-discrimination between the public and the
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private sectors ; whereas, in the public sector, calcu­
lation of the turnover of an undertaking concerned 
in a concentration needs, therefore, to take account 
of undertakings making up an economic unit with 
an independent power of decision, irrespective of 
the way in which their capital is held or of the 
rules of administrative supervision applicable to 
them ;
(13) Whereas it is necessary to establish whether 
concentrations with a C om m unity  dimension are 
compatible or not with the co m m o n  market from 
the point of view of the need to maintain and 
develop effective competition in the comm on 
m a rk e t ; whereas, in so doing, the Commission 
must place its appraisal within the general frame­
work of the achievement of the fundamental objec­
tives referred to in Article 2 of the Treaty, includ­
ing that of strengthening the Com m unity’s 
economic and social cohesion, referred to in Article 
130a;
(14) Whereas this Regulation should establish the prin­
ciple that a concentration with a Community 
dimension which creates or strengthens a position 
as a result of which effective competit ion in the 
comm on market or in a substantial part of it is 
significantly impeded is to be declared incom­
patible with the comm on m a r k e t ;
(15) Whereas concentrations which, by reason of the 
limited market share of the undertakings 
concerned, are not liable to impede effective 
competition may be presumed to be compatible 
with the comm on m a rk e t ; whereas, without preju­
dice to Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty, an indica­
tion to this effect exists, in particular, where the 
market share of the undertakings concerned does 
not exceed 25 % either in the com m on market or 
in a substantial part of i t ;
(16) Whereas the Commission should have the task of 
taking all the decisions necessary to establish 
whether or not concentrations with a Community 
dimension are compatible with the common 
market, as well as decisions designed to restore 
effective competition ;
(17) Whereas to ensure effective control undertakings
should be obliged to give prior notification of
concentrations with a Comm unity  dimension and
provision should be made for the suspension of 
concentrations for a limited period, and for the 
possibility of extending or waiving a suspension 
where necessary ; whereas in the interests of legal
certainty the validity of transactions must neverthe­
less' be protected as much as necessary ;
(18) Whereas a period within which the Commission
must initiate proceedings in respect of a notified
concentration and periods within which it must 
give a final decision on the compatibility or incom ­
patibility with the common market of a notified 
concentration should be laid down ;
(19) Whereas the undertakings concerned must be 
afforded the right to be heard by the Commission 
when proceedings have been initiated ; whereas the 
members of the management and supervisory 
bodies and the recognized representatives of the 
employees of the undertakings concerned, and 
third parties showing a legitimate interest, must 
also be given the opportunity to be heard ;
(20) Whereas the Commission should act in close and
constant liaison with the competent authorities of 
the Member States from which it obtains 
comments and information ;
(21) Whereas, for the purposes of this Regulation, and 
in accordance with the case-law of the Court of 
Justice, the Commission must be afforded the 
assistance of the Member States and must also be 
empowered to require information to be given and 
to carry out the necessary investigations in order to 
appraise concentrations ;
(22) Whereas compliance with this Regulation must be 
enforceable by means of fines and periodic penalty 
payments ; whereas the Court of Justice should be 
given unlimited jurisdiction in that regard pursuant 
to Article 172 of the Treaty;
(23) Whereas it is appropriate to define the concept of
concentration in such a manner as to cover only
operations bringing about a lasting change in the 
structure of the undertakings concerned ; whereas it 
is therefore necessary to exclude from the scope of 
this Regulation those operations which have as 
their object or effect the coordination of the 
competitive behaviour of undertakings which 
remain independent, since such operations fall to 
be examined under the appropriate provisions of 
the Regulations implementing Articles 85 and 86 
of the Treaty; whereas it is appropriate to make 
this distinction specifically in the case of the 
creation of joint ventures ;
(24) Whereas there is no coordination of competitive
behaviour within the meaning of this Regulation
where two or more undertakings agree to acquire 
jointly control of one or more other undertakings 
with the object and effect of sharing amongst 
themselves such undertakings or their assets ;
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(25) Whereas this Regulation should still apply where 
the undertakings concerned accept restrictions 
directly related and necessary to the implementa­
tion of the concentration ;
(26) Whereas the Commission should be given exclus­
ive competence to apply this Regulation, subject to 
review by the Court of Justice ;
(27) Whereas the Member States may not apply their 
national legislation on competit ion to concentra­
tions with a Community dimension, unless this 
Regulation makes provision th e re fo r ; whereas the 
relevant powers of national authorities should be 
limited to cases where, failing intervention by the 
Commission, effective competition is likely to be 
significantly impeded within the territory of a 
Member State and where the competition interests 
of that Member State cannot be sufficiently 
) protected otherwise by this Regulation ; whereas 
the Member States concerned must act promptly in 
such cases; whereas this Regulation cannot, 
because of the diversity of national law, fix a single 
deadline for the adoption of remedies ;
(28) Whereas, furthermore, the exclusive application of 
this Regulation to concentrations with a C om m u­
nity dimension is without prejudice to Article 223 
of the Treaty, and does not prevent the Member 
States from taking appropriate measures to protect 
legitimate interests other than those pursued by 
this Regulation, provided that such measures are 
compatible with the general principles and other 
provisions of Community law ;
(29) Whereas concentrations not covered by this Regu- 
•. lation come, in principle, within the jurisdiction of
the Member States; whereas, however, the 
Commission should have the power to act, at the 
request of a Member State concerned, in cases 
where effective competition could be significantly 
impeded within that Member State’s territory;
(30) Whereas the conditions in which concentrations 
involving Community undertakings are carried out 
in non-member countries should be observed, and 
provision should be made for the possibility of the 
Council giving the Commission an appropriate 
mandate for negotiation with a view to obtaining 
non-discriminatory treatment for Community 
undertakings ;
(31) Whereas this Regulation in no way detracts from 
the collective rights of employees as recognized in 
the undertakings concerned,
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION :
A rticle  1 
Scope
1. Without prejudice to Article 22 this Regulation shall 
apply to all concentrations with a Comm unity  dimension 
as defined in paragraph 2.
2. For the purposes of this Regulation, a concentration 
has a Community dimension where :
(a) the combined aggregate worldwide turnover of all the 
undertakings concerned is more than ECU 5 000 
million ; and
(b) the aggregate Community-wide turnover of each of at 
least two of the undertakings concerned is more than 
ECU 250 million,
unless each of the undertakings concerned achieves more 
than two-thirds of its aggregate Community-wide turnover 
within one and the same Member State.
3. The thresholds laid down in paragraph 2 will be 
reviewed before the end of the fourth year following that 
of the adoption of this Regulation by the Council acting 
by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Comm is­
sion.
A rticle  2
A p p ra isa l  o f  c o n c e n t r a t i o n s
1. Concentrations within the scope of this Regulation 
shall be appraised in accordance with the following provi­
sions with a view to establishing whether or not they are 
compatible with the common market.
In making this appraisal, the Commission shall take into 
acco un t:
(a) the need to maintain and develop effective competi­
tion within the common market in view of, among 
other things, the structure of all the markets 
concerned and the actual or potential competition 
from undertakings located either within or outwith 
the C om m unity ;
(b) the market position of the undertakings concerned 
and their economic and financial power, the alterna­
tives available to suppliers and users, their access to 
supplies or markets, any legal or other barriers to 
entry, supply and demand trends for the relevant 
goods and services, the interests of the intermediate 
and ultimate consumers, and the development of 
technical and economic progress provided that it is to 
consumers’ advantage and does not form an obstacle 
to competition.
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7 A concentration which does not create or strengthen 
a dominant position as a result of which effective com pe­
tition would be significantly impeded in the common 
market or in a substantial part of it shall be declared 
compatible with the com m on market.
3. A concentration which creates or strengthens a 
dominant position as a result of which effective competi­
tion would be significantly impeded in the common 
market or in a substantial part of it shall be declared 
incompatible with the com m on market.
A rticle  3 
D e f in i t io n  of c o n c e n t ra t io n
1. A concentration shall be deemed to arise where:
(a) two or more previously independent undertakings 
merge, or
(b) — one or more persons already controlling at least
one undertaking, or
— one or more undertakings
acquire, whether by purchase of securities, or assets, by 
contract or by any other means, direct or indirect control 
of the whole or parts of one or more other undertakings.
2. An operation, including the creation of a joint 
venture, which has as its object or effect the coordination 
of the competitive behaviour of undertakings which 
remain independent shall not constitute a concentration 
within the meaning of paragraph 1 (b).
The creation of a joint venture performing on a lasting 
basis all the functions of an autonomous economic entity, 
which does not give rise to coordination of the competi­
tive behaviour of the parties amongst themselves or 
\ between them and the joint venture, shall constitute a 
concentration within the meaning of paragraph 1 (b).
3. For the purposes of this Regulation, control shall be 
constituted by rights, contracts or any other means which, 
either separately or in combination and having regard to 
the considerations of fact or law involved, confer the 
possibility of exercising decisive influence on an underta­
king, in particular by :
(a) ownership or the right to use all or part of the assets 
of an undertaking ;
(b) rights or contracts which confer decisive influence on 
the composition, voting or decisions of the organs of 
an undertaking.
4. Control is acquired by persons or undertakings
which :
(b) while not being holders of such rights or entitled to 
rights under such contracts, have the power to exercise 
the rights deriving therefrom.
5. A concentration shall not be deemed to arise where :
(a) credit institutions or other financial institutions or 
insurance companies, the normal activities of which 
include transactions and dealing in securities for their 
own account or for the account of others, hold on a 
temporary basis securities which they have acquired in 
an undertaking with a view to reselling them, 
provided that they do not exercise voting rights in 
respect of those securities with a view to determining 
the competitive behaviour of that undertaking or 
provided that they exercise such voting rights only 
with a view to preparing the disposal of all or part of 
that undertaking or of its assets or the disposal of 
those securities and that any such disposal takes place 
within one year of the date of acquisition ; that period 
may be extended by the Commission on request 
where such institutions or companies can show that 
the disposal was not reasonably possible within the 
period s e t ;
(b) control is acquired by an office-holder according to 
the law of a Member State relating to liquidation, 
winding up, insolvency, cessation of payments, 
compositions or analogous proceedings ;
(c) the operations referred to in paragraph 1 (b) are carried 
out by the financial holding companies referred to in 
Article 5 (3) of the Fourth Council Directive 
78/660/EEC of 25 July 1978 on the annual accounts 
of certain types of companies ('), as last amended by 
Directive 84/569/EEC (*), provided however that the 
voting rights in respect of the holding are exercised, 
in particular in relation to the appointment of 
members of the management and supervisory bodies 
of the undertakings in which they have holdings, only 
to maintain the full value of those investments and 
not to determine directly or indirectly the competitive 
conduct of those undertakings.
A rticle  4
P r io r  n o t i f ic a t io n  of c o n c e n t ra t io n s
1. Concentrations with a Community dimension 
defined in this Regulation shall be notified to the 
Commission not more than one week after the conclu­
sion of the agreement, or the announcement of the public 
bid, or the acquisition of a controlling interest. That week 
shall begin when the first of those events occurs.
2. A concentration which consists of a merger within 
the meaning of Article 3 (1) (a) or in the acquisition of 
joint control within the meaning of Article 3 (1) (b) shall 
be notified jointly by the parties to the merger or by those 
acquiring joint control as the case may be. In all other 
cases, the notification shall be effected by the person or 
undertaking acquiring control of the whole or parts of 
one or more undertakings.
(a) are holders of the rights or entitled to rights under the 
contracts concerned ; or
(') 0 |  N o  L 222. 14. H. 1V7R. p 11. 
(') OJ N o  L 314. 4. 12. 19X4, p 2X.
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3. Who* the Commission finds that a notified 
concentraiw falls within the scope of this Regulation, it 
shall pubfifrthe fact of the notification, at the same time 
indicating rite names of the parties, the nature of the 
concentrator and the economic sectors involved. The 
Commission shall take account of the legitimate interest 
of undertlfags in the protection of their business secrets.
Article 5
C alcu la tion  of tu rn o v e r
1 • Aggaqptf turnover within the meaning of Article 1
(2) shall oanprise the amounts derived by the  under­
takings CQRcrned in the preceding financial year from 
the sale of products and the provision of services falling 
within the undertakings’ ordinary activities after deduc­
tion of safes rebates and of value added tax and other 
taxes direc% related to turnover. The aggregate turnover 
of an u n d en ting  concerned shall not include the  sale of 
products or the provision of services between any of the 
undertaking referred to in paragraph 4.
Turnover, i t t h e  Community or in a Member State, shall 
comprise pwducts sold and services provided to under­
takings or consumers, in the Community or in that 
Member Stxe  as the case may be.
2. By way of derogation from paragraph I, where the 
concentration consists in the acquisition of parts, whether 
or not constituted as legal entities, of one or more under­
takings, only the turnover relating to the parts which are
the subject of the transaction shall be taken into account 
with regard to the seller or sellers.
However, two or more transactions within the m eaning  of 
the first subparagraph which take place within a two-year 
period between the same persons or undertakings shall be 
treated as one and the same concentration arising on the 
date of the last transaction.
3. In place of turnover the following shall be used :
(a) for credit institutions and other financial institutions, 
as regards Article 1 (2) (a), one-tenth of their total
assets.
As regards Article 1 (2) (b) and the final part of Article 
1 (2), total Community-wide turnover shall be
replaced by one-tenth of total assets multiplied by the 
ratio between loans and advances to credit institutions 
and customers in transactions with Community resi­
dents and the total sum of those loans and advances.
As regards the final part of Article 1 (2), total turnover 
within one Member State shall be replaced by one- 
tenth of total assets multiplied by the ratio between 
loans and advances to credit institutions and custo­
mers in transactions with residents of that Member 
State and the total sum of those loans and advances ;
(b) for insurance undertakings, the value of gross 
premiums written which shall comprise all amounts 
received and receivable in respect, of insurance 
contracts issued by or on behalf of the insurance 
undertakings, including also outgoing reinsurance 
premiums, and after deduction of taxes and parafiscal 
contributions or levies charged by reference to the 
amounts of individual premiums or the total volume 
of p rem ium s; as regards Article 1 (2) (b) and the final 
part of Article 1 (2), gross premiums received from 
Community residents and from residents of one 
Member State respectively shall be taken into account.
4. Without prejudice to paragraph 2, the aggregate 
turnover of an undertaking concerned within the 
meaning of Article 1 (2) shall be calculated by adding 
together the respective turnovers of the following :
(a) the undertaking concerned ;
(b) those undertakings in which the undertaking 
concerned, directly or indirectly :
—  owns more than half the capital or business assets, 
or
— has the power to exercise more than half the 
voting rights, or
— has the power to appoint more than half the 
members of the supervisory board, the administra­
tive board or bodies legally representing the 
undertakings, or
— has the right to manage the undertakings’ affairs ;
(c) those undertakings which have in the undertaking 
concerned the rights or powers listed in (b );
(d) those undertakings in which an undertaking as 
referred to in (c) has the rights or powers listed in (b);
(e) those undertakings in which two or more underta­
kings as referred to in (a) to (d) jointly have the rights 
or powers listed in (b).
5. Where undertakings concerned by the concentration 
jointly have the rights or powers listed in paragraph 4 (b), 
in calculating the aggregate turnover of the undertakings 
concerned for the purposes of Article 1 (2):
(a) no account shall be taken of the turnover resulting 
from the sale of products or the provision of services 
between the joint undertaking and each of the under­
takings concerned or any other undertaking 
connected with any one of them, as set out in para­
graph 4 (b) to (e);
(b) account shall be taken of the turnover resulting from 
the sale of products and the provision of services 
between the joint undertaking and any third under­
takings. Tliis turnover shall be apportioned equally 
amongst the undertakings concerned.
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Article 6
E x a m i n a t i o n  o f  th e  n o t i f ic a t io n  a n d  in i t ia t io n  o f
j - >p ro c e e d in g s
1. The Commission shall examine the notification as 
soon as it is received.
(a) W here it concludes that the concentration notified 
does not fall within the scope of this Regulation, it 
shall record that finding by means of a decision.
(b) W here it finds that the concentration notified, 
although falling within the scope of this Regulation, 
does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility 
with the com m on market, it shall decide not to 
oppose it and shall declare that it is compatible with 
the com m on m arke t
c) If, on the other hand, it finds that the concentration 
notified falls within the scope of this Regulation and 
raises serious doubts as to its compatibility with the 
co m m o n  market, it shall decide to initiate procee­
dings.
2. The Commission shall notify its decision to the 
undertakings concerned and the competent authorities of 
the M em ber States without delay.
A  rticle 7 
S u s p e n s io n  of  c o n c e n t r a t i o n s
1. For the purposes of paragraph 2 a concentration as 
defined in Article 1 shall not be put into effect either 
before its notification or within the first three weeks follo­
wing its notification.
2. W here  the Commission, following a preliminary 
examination of the notification within the period 
provided for in paragraph 1, finds it necessary in order to 
ensure the full effectiveness of any decision taken later 
pursuant to Article 8 (3) and (4), it may decide on its own 
initiative to continue the suspension of a concentration in 
whole or in pan  until it takes a final decision, or to take 
other interim measures to that effect.
3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not prevent the im plem en­
tation of a public bid which has been notified to the 
Com m iss ion in accordance with Article 4 (1), provided 
that the acquirer does not exercise the voting rights 
attached to the securities in question or does so only to 
maintain the full value of those investments and on the 
basis of a derogation granted by the Commission under 
paragraph 4.
4. T he  Commission may, on request, grant a deroga­
tion from the obligations imposed in paragraphs 1, 2 or 3
in order to prevent serious damage to one or more under­
takings concerned by a concentration or to a third parry. 
That derogation may be made subject to conditions and 
obligations in order to ensure conditions of effective 
competition. A derogation may be applied for and granted 
at any time, even before notification or after the transac­
tion.
5. The validity of any transaction carried out in contra­
vention of paragraph 1 or 2 shall be dependent on a deci­
sion pursuant to Article 6(1) (b) or Article 8 (2) or (3) or 
on a presumption pursuant to Article 10 (6).
This Article shall, however, have no effect on the validity 
of transactions in securities including those convertible 
into other securities admitted to trading on a market 
which is regulated and supervised by authorities recog­
nized by public bodies, operates regularly and is acces­
sible directly or indirectly to the public, unless the buyer 
i and seller knew or ought to have known that the transac­
tion was carried out in contravention of paragraph 1 or 2.
Article 8
Powers o f  decis ion  of the C o m m is s io n
1. Without prejudice to Article 9, all proceedings 
initiated pursuant to Article 6 (1) (c) shall be closed by 
means of a decision as provided for in paragraphs 2 to 5.
2. Where the Commission finds that, following modifi­
cation by the undertakings concerned if necessary, a noti­
fied concentration fulfils the criterion laid down in 
Article 2 (2), it shall issue a decision declaring the 
concentration compatible with the common market.
It may attach to its decision conditions and obligations 
intended to ensure that the undertakings concerned 
comply with the commitments they have entered into 
vis-a-vis the Commission with a view to modifying the 
original concentration plan. The decision declaring the 
concentration compatible shall also cover restrictions 
directly related and necessary to the implementation of 
the concentration.
3. Where the Commission finds that a concentration 
fulfils the criterion laid down in Article 2 (3), it shall issue 
a decision declaring that the concentration is incom pa­
tible with the common market.
4. Where a concentration has already been im ple­
mented. the Commission may, in a decision pursuant to 
paragraph 3 or by separate decision, require the underta­
kings or assets brought together to be separated or the 
cessation of joint control or anv other action that may be 
appropriate in order to restore conditions of effective 
competition.
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5. The Commission may revoke the decision it has 
taken pursuant to paragraph 2 where :
(a) the declaration of compatibili ty is based on incorrect 
information for which one of the undertakings is 
responsible or where it has been obtained by deceit; 
or
(b) the undertakings concerned com m it a breach of an 
obligation attached to the decision.
6. In the cases referred to in paragraph 5, the Commis­
sion may take a decision under paragraph 3, without 
being bound by the deadline referred to in Article 10 (3).
A rtic le  9
Referra l  to the  c o m p e t e n t  a u th o r i t ie s  of the 
M e m b e r  S tates
1. The Commission may, by means of a decision noti­
fied without delay to the undertakings concerned and the 
com petent authorities of the other Member States, refer a 
notified concentration to the competent authorities of the 
Member State concerned in the following circumstances.
2. W ithin three weeks of the date of receipt of the 
copy of the notification a Member State may inform the 
Commission, which shall inform the undertakings 
concerned, that a concentration threatens to create or to 
strengthen a dom inant position as a result of which effec­
tive competition would be significantly impeded on a 
market, within that Member State, which presents all the 
characteristics of a destinct market, be it a substantial part 
of the co m m on market or not.
3. If the Commission considers that, having re*31* to 
the market for the products or services in question and 
the geographical reference market within the meaning of 
paragraph 7, there is such a distinct market and that such 
a threat exists, e i t h e r :
(a) it shall itself deal with the case in order to maintain or 
restore effective competition on the market 
concerned ; or
(b) it shall refer the case to the competent authorities of 
the Member Sfate concerned with a view to the appli­
cation of that State’s national competition law.
If, however, the Commission considers that such a 
distinct market or threat does not exist it shall adopt a 
decision to that effect which it shall address to the 
Member State concerned.
4. A decision to refer or not to refer pursuant to para­
graph 3 shall be taken :
(a) as a general rule within the six-week period provided 
for in Article 10 (I), second subparagraph, where the 
Commission, pursuant to Article 6 (I) (b), has not 
initiated proceedings ; or
(b) within three months at most of the notification of the 
concentration concerned where the Commission has 
initiated proceedings under Article 6 (1) (c), without
taking the preparatory steps in order to adopt the 
necessary measures under Article 8 (2), second subpa­
ragraph, (3) or (4) to maintain or restore effective 
competition on the market concerned.
5 If within the three months referred to in paragraph 
4 (b) the Commission, despite a reminder from the 
Member State concerned, has not taken a decision on 
referral in accordance with paragraph 3 nor has taken the 
preparatory steps referred to in paragraph 4 (b), it shall be 
deemed to have taken a decision to refer the case to the 
Member State concerned in accordance with paragraph 3
(b).
6. The publication of any report or the announcement 
of the findings of the examination of the concentration 
by the competent authority of the Member State 
concerned shall be effected not more than four m onths 
after the Commission’s referral.
7. The geographical reference market shall consist of 
the area in which the undertakings concerned are 
involved in the supply and demand of products or 
services, in which the conditions of competition are suffi­
ciently homogeneous and which can be distinguished 
from neighbouring areas because, in particular, conditions 
of competition are appreciably different in those areas. 
This assessment should take account in particular oh  the 
nature and characteristics of the products or services 
concerned, of the existence of entry barriers of of 
consumer preferences, of appreciable differences of the 
undertakings’ market shares between the area concerned 
and neighbouring areas or of substantial price differences.
8. In applying the provisions of this Article, the 
Member State concerned may take only the measures 
strictly necessary to safeguard or restore effective com pet i­
tion on the market concerned.
9. In accordance with the relevant provisions of the 
Treaty, any Member State may appeal to the Court of 
Justice, and in particular request the application of Article 
186, for the purpose of applying its national competition 
law.
10. This Article will be reviewed before the end of the 
fourth year following that of the adoption of this Regula­
tion.
A rtic le  10
T im e  l im i ts  for in i t i a t i n g  p ro ceed in gs  a n d  for  
d e c is io n s
1. The decisions referred to in Article 6 (1) must be 
taken within one month  at most. That period shall begin 
on the day following that of the receipt of a notification 
or, if the information to be supplied with the notification 
is incomplete, on the day following that of the receipt of 
the complete information.
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That period shall be increased to six weeks if the 
Commission receives a request from a Member State in 
accordance with Article 9 (2).
2. Decisions taken pursuant to Article 8 (2) concerning 
notifiedi concentrations must be taken as soon as it 
appears that the serious doubts referred to in Article 6 (1)
(c) have been removed, particularly as a result of modifica­
tions made by the undertakings concerned, and at the 
latest by the deadline laid down in paragraph 3.
3. Without prejudice to Article 8 (6), decisions taken 
pursuant to Article 8 (3) concerning notified concentra­
tions must be taken within not more than four months of 
the date on which proceedings are initiated.
4. The period set by paragraph 3 shall exceptionally be 
suspended where, owing to circumstances for which one 
of the undertakings involved in the concentration is 
responsible, the Com m iss ion  has had to request informa­
tion by decision pursuant to Article II or to order an 
v nvestigaiion by decision pursuant to Article 13.
5. Where the Court of Justice gives a Judgement 
which annuls the whole or part of a Commission decision 
taken under this Regulation, the periods laid down in this 
Regulation shall start again from the date of the Judge­
ment.
6. Where the Com m iss ion  has not taken a decision in 
accordance with Article 6 (1) (To) or (c) or Article 8 (2) or
(3) within the deadlines set in paragraphs 1 and 3 respec­
tively, the concentration  shall be deemed to have been 
declared compatible with the com m on market, without 
prejudice to Article 9.
Article 11
R e q u e s t s  fo r  i n f o r m a t io n
t. In carrying out the duties assigned to it by this 
.egulation, the Com m iss ion  may obtain all necessary 
information from the G overnm ents  and comptent autho­
rities of the M em ber States, from the persons referred to 
in Article 3 (1) (b), and from undertakings and associa­
tions of undertakings.
2. When sending a request for information to a person, 
an undertaking or an association of undertakings, the 
Commission shall at the same time send a copy of the 
request to the co m p e ten t  authority of the Member State 
within the territory of which the residence of the person 
or the seat of the undertak ing  or association of underta­
kings is situated.
3. In its request the Commission shall state the legal 
basis and the purpose of the request and also the penalties 
provided for in Article M (I) (c) for supplying incorrect 
information.
4 The information requested shall be provided, in the 
case of undertakings, by their owners or their representa­
tives and. m the case of legal persons, companies or firms.
or of associations having no legal personality, by the 
persons authorized to represent them by law or by their 
statutes.
5. Where a person, an undertaking or an association of 
undertakings does not provide the information requested 
within the period fixed by the Commission or provides 
incomplete information, the Commission shall by deci­
sion require the information to be provided. The decision 
shall specify what information is required, fix an appro­
priate period within which it is to be supplied and state 
the penalties provided for in Articles M (1) (c) and 15 (1)
(a) and the right to have the decision reviewed by the 
Court of Justice.
6. The Commission shall at the same time send a copy 
of its decision to the competent authority of the Member 
State within the territory of which the residence of the 
person or the seat of the undertaking or association of 
undertakings is situated.
Article 12
In ves tiga t ions  by the au thor it ies  of the M e m b e r  
States
1. At the request of the Commission, the competent 
authorities of the Member States shall undertake the 
investigations which the Commission considers to be 
necessary under Article 13 (1), or which it has ordered by 
decision pursuant to Article 13 (3). The officials of the 
competent authorities of the Member States responsible 
for conducting those investigations shall exercise their 
powers upon production of an authorization in writing 
issued by the competent authority of the Member State 
within the territory of which the investigation is to be 
carried out. Such authorization shall specify the subject 
matter and purpose of the investigation.
2. If so requested by the Commission or by the 
competent authority of the Member State within the terri­
tory of which the investigation is to be carried out, offi­
cials of the Commission may assist the officials of that 
authority in carrying out their duties.
Article 13
Investigative  pow ers of the C om m iss ion
I. In carrying out the duties assigned to it by this 
Regulation, the Commission may undertake all necessary 
investigations into undertakings and associations of
undertakings.
To that end the officials authorized by the Commission 
shall be empowered :
(a) to examine the books and other business records ;
(b) to take or demand copies of or extracts from the
books and business records ;
3%n
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(c) to ask for oral explanations on the s p o t ;
(d) to enter any premises, land and means of transport of 
undertakings.
2. The officials of the Commission authorized to carry 
out the investigations shall exercise their powers on 
production of an authorization in writing specifying the 
subject matter and purpose of the investigation and the 
penalties provided for in Article 14 (1) (d) in cases where 
production of the required books or other business 
records is incomplete. In good time before the investiga­
tion, the Commission shall inform, in writing, the com pe­
tent authority of the Member State within the territory of 
which the investigation is to be carried out of the investi­
gation and of the identities of the authorized officials.
3. Undertakings and associations of undertakings shall 
submit to investigations ordered by decision of the 
Commission. The decision shall specify the subject matter 
and purpose of the investigation, appoint the date on 
which it shall begin and state the penalties provided for 
in Articles 14 (1) (d) and 15 (1) (b) and the right to have 
the decision reviewed by the Court of Justice.
4. The Commission shall in good time and in writing 
inform the competent authority of the Member State 
within the territory of which the investigation is to be 
carried out of its intention of taking a decision pursuant 
to paragraph 3. It shall hear the competent authority 
before taking its decision.
5. Officials of the competent authority of the Member 
State within the territory of which the investigation is to 
be carried out may, at the request of that authority or of 
the Commission, assist the officials of the Commission in 
carrying out their duties.
6. Where an undertaking or association of under­
takings opposes an investigation ordered pursuant to this 
Article, the Member State concerned shall afford the 
necessary assistance to the officials authorized by the 
Commission to enable them to carry out their investiga­
tion. To this end the Member States shall, after consulting 
the Commission, take the necessary measures within one 
year of the entry into force of this Regulation.
A rticle  14
Fines
1. The Commission may by decision impose on the 
persons referred to in Article 3 (1) (b), undertakings or 
associations of undertakings fines of from ECU 1 000 to 
50 000 where intentionally or negligently:
(a) they fail to notify a concentration in accordance with 
Article 4 ;
(b) they supply incorrect or misleading information in a 
notification pursuant to Article 4 ;
(c) they supply incorrect information in response to a 
request made pursuant to Article 11 or fail to supply j 
information within the period fixed by a decision 
taken pursuant to Article 11 ;
(d) they produce the required books or other business 
records in incomplete form during investigations 
under Article 12 or 13, or refuse to submit to an 
investigation ordered by decision taken pursuant to 
Article 13.
2. The Commission may by decision impose fines not 
exceeding 10 % of the aggregate turnover of the under­
takings concerned within the meaning of Article 5 on the 
persons or undertakings concerned where, either inten­
tionally or negligently, they :
(a) fail to comply with an obligation imposed by decision 
pursuant to Article 7 (4) or 8 (2), second subpara­
graph ;
(b) put into effect a concentration in breach of Article 7
(1) or disregard a decision taken pursuant to Article 7
(2);
(c) put into effect a concentration declared incompatible 
with the common market by decision pursuant to 
Article 8 (3) or do not take the measures ordered by 
decision pursuant to Article 8 (4).
3. In setting the amount of a fine, regard shall be had 
to the nature and gravity of the infringement.
4. Decisions taken pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2 
shall not be of criminal law nature.
A rticle 15
P er io d ic  p ena l ty  p a y m e n t s
1. The Commission may by decision impose on the 
persons referred to in Article 3 (1) (b), undertakings or 
associations of undertakings concerned periodic penalty 
payments of up to ECU 25 000 for each day of delay 
calculated from the date set in the decision, in order to 
compel them :
(a) to supply complete and correct information which it 
has requested by decision pursuant to Article 11 ;
(b) to submit to an investigation which it has ordered b' 
decision pursuant to Article 13.
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2. The Commission may. be decision impose on the 
persons referred to in Article 3 (1) (b) or on undertakings 
periodic penalty payments of up to ECU 100 000 for each 
day of delay calculated from the date set in the decision, 
in order to compel them :
(a) to comply with an obligation imposed by decision 
pursuant to Article 7 (4) or Article 8 (2), second sub- 
paragraph, or
(b) to apply the measures ordered by decision pursuant to 
Article 8 (4).
3. Where the persons referred to in Article 3 (I) (b), 
undertakings or associations of undertakings have satisfied 
the obligation which it was the purpose of the periodic 
penalty payment to enforce, the Commission may set the 
total amount of the periodic penalty payments at a lower 
figure than that which would arise under the original 
decision.
A rticle 16
Review by the  C o u r t  of Ju s t ic e
The Court of Justice shall have unlimited jurisdiction 
within the meaning of Article 172 of the Treaty to review 
decisions whereby the Commission has fixed a fine or 
periodic penalty paym ents ; it may cancel, reduce or 
increase the fine or periodic penalty payments imposed.
A rticle  17 
P ro fess ion a l  secrecy
1. Information acquired as a result of the application of 
Article 11, 12, 13 and 18 shall be used only for the 
purposes of the relevant request, investigation or hearing.
2. Without prejudice to Articles 4 (3), 18 and 20, the 
I Commission and the competent authorities of the
Member States, their officials and other servants shall not 
disclose information they have acquired through the 
application of this Regulation of the kind covered by the 
obligation of professional secrecy.
3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not prevent publication of 
general information or of surveys which do not contain 
information relating to particular undertakings or associa­
tions of undertakings.
A rticle  18
H earin g  o f  the  p a r t ie s  a n d  of th i rd  pe rso n s
I. Before taking any decision provided for in Articles 7
(2) and (4), Article 8 (2), second subparagraph, and (3) to
(5) and Articles 14 and 15, the Commission shall give the 
persons, undertakings and associations of undertakings 
concerned the opportunity, at every stage of the procedure 
up to the consultation of the Advisory Committee, of
making known their views on the objections against 
them.
2. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, a decision 
to continue the suspension of a concentration or to grant 
a derogation from suspension as referred to in Article 7 
{2) or (4) may be taken provisionally, without the persons, 
undertakings or associations of undertakings concerned 
being given the opportunity to make known their views 
beforehand, provided that the Commission gives them 
that opportunity as soon as possible after having taken its 
decision.
3. The Commission shall base its decision only on 
objections on which the parties have been able to submit 
their observations. The rights of the defence shall be fully 
respected in the proceedings. Access to the file shall be 
open at least to the parties directly involved, subject to the 
legitimate interest of undertakings in the protection of 
their business secrets.
4. In so far as the Commission or the competent 
authorities of the Member States deem it necessary, they 
may also hear other natural or legal persons. Natural or 
legal persons showing a sufficient interest and especially 
members of the administrative or management bodies of 
the undertakings concerned or the recognized representa­
tives of their employees shall be entitled, upon applica­
tion, to be heard.
Article 19
L ia ison  w ith  the  au tho r i t ie s  o f  th e  M e m b e r  S ta tes
1. The Commission shall transmit to the competent 
authorities of the Member States copies of notifications 
within three working days and, as soon as possible, copies 
of the most important documents lodged with or issued 
by the Commission pursuant to this Regulation.
2. The Commission shall carry out the procedures set 
out in this Regulation in close and constant liaison with 
the competent authorities of the Member States, which 
may express their views upon those procedures. For the 
purposes of Article 9 it shall obtain information from the 
competent authority of the Member State as referred to in 
paragraph 2 of that Article and give it the opportunity to 
make known its views at every stage of the procedure up 
to the adoption of a decision pursuant to paragraph 3 of 
that Article ; to that end it shall give it access to the file.
3. An Advisory Committee on concentrations shall be 
consulted before any decision is taken pursuant to Article 
8 (2) to (5), 14 or 15, or any provisions are adopted 
pursuant to Article 23.
4. The Advisory Committee shall consist of representa­
tives of the authorities of the Member States. Each 
Member State shall appoint one or two representatives ; if 
unable to attend, they may be replaced by other represen­
tatives. At least one of the representatives of a Member 
State shall be competent in matters of restrictive practices 
and dominant positions.
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5. Consultation shall take place at a joint meeting 
convened at the invitation of and chaired by the Commis­
sion. A summary of the case, together with an indication 
of the most important documents and a preliminary draft 
of the decision to be taken for each case considered, shall 
be sent with the invitation. The meeting shall take place 
not less than 14 days after the invitation has been se n t  
The Commission may in exceptional cases shorten that 
period as appropriate in order to avoid serious harm to 
one or more of the undertakings concerned by a concen­
tration.
6. The Advisory Committee shall deliver an opinion 
on the Commission’s draft decision, if necessary by taking 
a vote. The Advisory Committee may deliver an opinion 
even if some members are absent and unrepresented. The 
opinion shall "be delivered in writing and appended to the 
draft decision. The Commission shall take the utmost 
account of the opinion delivered by the Committee. It 
shall inform the Committee of the manner in which its 
opinion has been taken into account.
7. The  Advisory Committee may recommend publica­
tion of the opinion. The Commission may carry out such 
publication. The decision to publish shall take due 
account of the legitimate interest of undertakings in the 
protection of their business secrets and of the interest of 
the undertakings concerned in such publication’s taking 
place.
A rticle 20 
P u b l ic a t io n  of d ec is io n s
1. The Commission shall publish the decisions which 
it takes pursuant to Article 8 (2) to (5) in the O fficial 
J o u rn a l o f  the European Communities.
2. T he  publication shall state the names of the parties 
and the main content of the decision ; it shall have regard 
to the legitimate interest of undertakings in the protec­
tion of their business secrets.
A rticle 21 
J u r isd ic t io n
1. Subject to review by the Court of Justice, the 
Commission shall have sole jurisdiction to take the deci­
sions provided for in this Regulation.
2. N o Member State shall apply its national legislation 
on competition to any consideration that has a C om m u­
nity dimension.
The first subparagraph shall be without prejudice to any 
Member State’s power to carry out any enquiries necessary 
for the application of Article 9 (2) or after referral, 
pursuant to Article 9 (3), first subparagraph, indent (b), or
(5), to take the measures strictly necessary for the applica­
tion of Article 9 (8).
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3. Notwithstanding paragraphs 1 and 2, Member States 
may take appropriate measures to protect legitimate inte­
rests other than those taken into consideration by this 
Regulation and compatible with the general principles 
and other provisions of Community law.
Public security, plurality of the media and prudential rules 
shall be regarded as legitimate interests within the 
meaning of the first subparagraph.
Any other public interest must be communicated to the 
Commission by the Member State concerned and shall be 
recognized by the Commission after an assessment of its 
compatibility with the general principles and other provi­
sions of Community law before the measures referred to 
above may be taken. The Commission shall inform the 
Member State concerned of its decision within one month 
of that communication.
Article 22 
A p p lica t io n  of  the R egu la t ion
1. This Regulation alone shall apply to concentrations 
as defined in Article 3.
2. Regulations No 170), (EEC) No 1017/68 (*), (EEC) 
No 4056/86 0) and (EEC) No 3975/87 0  shall not apply 
to concentrations as defined in Article 3.
3. If the Commission finds, at the request of a Member 
State, that a concentration as defined in Article 3 that has 
no Community dimension within the meaning of Article 
1 creates or strengthens a dominant position as a result of 
which effective competition would be significantly 
impeded within the territory of the Member State 
concerned it may, in so far as the concentration affects 
trade between Member States, adopt the decisions 
provided for in Article 8 (2), second subparagraph, (3) and 
(<)•
4. Articles 2 (1) (a) and (b), 5. 6, 8 and 10 to 20 shall
apply. The period within which proceedings may be
initiated pursuant to Article 10 (1) shall begin on the date 
of the receipt of the request from the Member State. The 
request must be made within one month at most of the 
date on which the concentration was made known to the 
Member State or effected. This period shall begin on the 
date of the first of those events.
5. Pursuant to paragraph 3 the Commission shall take
only the measures strictly necessary to maintain or store 
effective competition within the territory of the Member 
State at the request of which it intervenes.
6. Paragraphs 3 to 5 shall continue to apply until the 
thresholds referred to in Article 1 (2) have been reviewed.
(') OJ No 13. 21. 2. 1962, p. 204/62.
O OJ No L 175, 23. 7. 1968, p. 1.
O OJ No L 378. 31. 12. 1986, p. 4.
O OJ No L 374, 31. 12. 1987, p. I.
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A rticle  23
Im p lem en tin g  provisions
The Commission shall have the power to adopt imple­
menting provisions concerning the form, content and 
other details of notifications pursuant to Article 4, time 
limits pursuant to Article 10, and hearings pursuant to 
Article 18.
A rticle  24
R elations w ith n o n -m em b er  countries
1. The Member States shall inform the Commission of 
any general difficulties encountered by their undertakings 
with concentrations as defined in Article 3 in a no n ­
mem ber country.
2. Initially not more than one year after the entry into 
force of this Regulation and thereafter periodically the
.ommission shall draw up a report examining the treat­
ment accorded to Comm unity  undertakings, in the terms 
referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4, as regards concentra­
tions in non-member countries. The Commission shall 
submit those reports to the Council, together with any 
recommendations.
3. Whenever it appears to the Commission, either on 
the basis of the reports referred to in paragraph 2 or on
the basis of other information, that a non-member 
country does not grant Community undertakings treat­
ment comparable to that granted by the Community to 
undertakings from that non-member country, the 
Commission may submit proposals to the Council for an 
appropriate mandate for negotiation with a view to 
obtaining comparable treatment for Community underta­
kings.
4. Measures taken under this Article shall comply with 
the obligations of the Community or of the Member 
States, without prejudice to Article 234 of the Treaty, 
under international agreements, whether bilateral or 
multilateral.
A rticle  25 
Entry into force
1. This Regulation shall enter into force on 21 
September 1990.
2. This Regulation shall not apply to any concentration 
which was the subject of an agreement or announcement 
or where control was acquired within the meaning of 
Article 4 (1) before the date of this Regulation's entry into 
force and it shall not in any circumstances apply to any 
concentration in respect of which proceedings were 
initiated before that date by a Member State’s authority 
with responsibility for competition.
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member
States.
Done at Brussels, 21 December 1989.
For the Council 
The President 
E. CRESSON
3 8 * 7
Commission Regulations 
(2671-2672-2673/88 and 3652/93)
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C O M M ISSIO N  R E G U L A T IO N  (EEC) N o  2571/M  
o f 26 July 1988
on  the a p p lica tion  o f A rtic le  85 (3) o f the T reaty to certain  ca teg o r ies  o f  
a g reem en ts  betw een  u nd ertak in gs, d ec is io n s  o f  a sso c ia tio n s o f u n d ertak in gs and  
co n cer ted  p ractices c o n c e r n in g  jo in t p la n n in g  and coord in a tion  o f  cap acity , 
sh a r in g  o f  revenue and co n su lta tio n s  o n  tariffs on  sch ed u led  air serv ices and  slo t
a llo ca tio n  at a irports
THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Com m unity,
‘Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) N o  3976/87 
of 14 December 1987 on the application of Article 85 (3) 
of the Treaty to certain categories of agreements and 
concerted practices in the air transport sector ('), and in 
particular Article 2 thereof,
Having published a draft of this Regulation (*),
Having consulted the Advisory Committee on  
Agreements and D om inant Positions in Air Transport,
Whereas :
(l) Regulation (EEC) N o  3976/87 empowers the 
Commission to apply Article 85 (3) of the Treaty 
by regulation to certain categories of agreements, 
decisions or concerted practices relating directly or 
indirectly to the provision of air transport services.
(2) Agreements, decisions or concerted practices 
concerning joint planning and coordination of 
capacity, sharing of revenue, consultations on tariffs 
and slot allocation at airports are liable to restrict 
com petition and affect trade between Member 
States. '
D) Agreements concerning joint planning and coordi­
nation of capacity can help ensure the maintenance 
of services at less busy times of the day, during less 
busy periods or on less busy routes, thus benefiting 
air transport users. However, no air carrier should 
be bound by each agreement or concerted practices 
but must be free to change its planned services 
unilaterally. Nor must they prevent carriers 
deploying extra capacity. Any clauses concerning
extra flights must not require prior approval in the 
event of deviation or involve financial penalties. 
Agreements must also allow parties to withdraw 
from them at reasonably short notice.
«.
(4) Agreements on the sharing of revenue may 
encourage airlines to provide a service on a route 
during less busy periods, thereby improving the 
service to air transport users. To be eligible for 
exemption under Article 85 (3), however, revenue 
shanng must be kept within limits such that it does 
not affect the competitiveness of more efficient 
carriers. It must also be clearly related —  route by 
route, and not merely in aggregate, because each 
route has its specific features —  to improvements 
in the services covered by the agreem ent
(5) Council Directive 87 /601 /EEC of 14 December 
1987 on fares for scheduled air services between 
Member States (*) has laid down a new procedure 
for the establishment of air fares, which is a step 
towards an increase in price competition in air 
transport The procedure restricts the possibility of 
innovative and competitive fare proposals by air 
carriers being blocked. Hence, competition may 
not be eliminated under these arrangements and 
consumers will benefit from them. Consultations 
on tariffs between air carriers may therefore be 
permitted, provided that participation in such 
consultations is optional, that they do not lead to 
an agreement in respect of tariffs or related 
conditions and that in the interests of transparency 
the Commission and the Member States concerned  
can send observers to them.
(6) Agreements on slot allocation at airports and 
airport scheduling can improve the utilization of 
airport capacity and airspace, facilitate air traffic 
control and help spread out the supply of air 
transport services from the airport However, to 
provide a satisfactory degree of security and
J ! OJ N o  L 374 .  31 .  12. 1987.  p. 9.
1 ° J  N o  C 138. 28.  5. 1988.  p. 3. O  O J  N o  L 374. 31. 12. 1987. p. 1 1
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transparency, such arrangements can only be 
accepted if all the air carriers concerned can 
participate in the negotiations, and if the allocation  
is made on a n on-discriminatory and transparent 
basis.
(7) In accordance with Article 4 o f Regulation (EEC) 
No 3976/87, this Regulation should apply with 
retroactive effect to agreements, decisions and 
concerted practices in existence on the date of 
entry into force of this Regulation, provided that 
they meet the conditions for exem ption set out in 
this Regulation.,
(8) Under Article 7 of Regulation (EEC) N o  3976/87,
this Regulation should also specify the circum ­
stances in which the Com m ission may withdraw 
the block exemption in individual cases.
(9) No applications under Articles 3 or 5 of Council
Regulation (EEC) N o 3975/87 (*) need be made in 
respect of agreements automatically exem pted by 
this Regulation. However, when real doubt exists, 
undertakings may request the C om m ission to 
declare whether their agreements com ply with this 
Regulation.
(10) The Regulation is without prejudice to the
application of Article 86 of the Treaty,
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION :
TITLE I
EXEMPTIONS
Article 1
Pursuant to Article 85 (3) of the Treaty and subject to the 
provisions of this Regulation, it is hereby declared that 
Article 85 (1) of the Treaty shall not apply to agreements 
between undertakings in the air transport sector, decisions 
by associations of such undertakings and concerted 
practices between such undertakings w hich have as their 
purpose one or more of the fo llo w in g :
—  joint planning and coordination o f the capacity to be 
provided on scheduled international air services 
between C om m unity airports,
—  sharing of revenue from scheduled international air 
services between C om m unity airports,
—  the holding of consultations for the joint preparation 
of proposals on tariffs for the carriage of passengers 
and baggage on scheduled in ternational air services 
between C om m u nity  airports.
(') OJ No L 374, 31. 12. 1987. p. 1.
—  slot allocation and airport scheduling in so far as they 
concern scheduled international air services between 
airports in Community.
TITLE II 
SPECIAL PROVISIONS 
A rtic le  2
Sp ecia l p ro v is io n s  for a g reem en ts  o n  jo in t p lan n in g  
and  c o o rd in a tio n  o f  cap acity
H ie exem ption concerning joint planning and coordi­
nation of the capacity to be provided on scheduled air
services shall apply only i f :
(a) the agreements, decisions and concerted practices do 
not bind air earners to the results of the planning and 
coordination ;
(b) the planning and coordination are intended to ensure 
a satisfactory supply of services at less busy times of 
the day, during less busy periods or on less busy 
routes ;
(c) the agreements, decisions and concerted practices do 
not include arrangements such as to limit in advance, 
directly or indirectly, the capacity to be provided by 
the participants or to share capacity;
(d) the agreements, decisions and concerted practices do 
not prevent carriers taking part in the planning and 
coordination from changing their planned services, 
both with respect to capacity and schedules, witnout 
incurring penalties and without being required to 
obtain the prior approval o f the other participants ;
(e) the arrangements, decisions and concerted p ctices 
do not prevent carriers from withdrawing ' * the
planning and coordination for future seasons without 
penalty, on giving notice of not more than three 
m onths to that e f fe d ;
(f) the agreements, decisions and concerted practices do 
not seek to influei. je the capacity provided or 
schedules adopted by carriers not participating in 
them.
Article J
Sp ec ia l p r o v is io n s  for a g reem en ts  for th e  sh arin g  o f
revenue from scheduled air services
• --- - . *  •
1. The exem ption concerning the sharing of revenu
from scheduled air services shall apply only if :
(a) the transfer of revenue is made in compensation for 
the loss incurred by the receiving partner in 
scheduling flights at less busy times of the day, or 
during less busy periods in a particular traffic season ;
(b) the transfer can be made in only one direction, which 
is to be determined in advance when the agreement is 
concluded for the season in question ;
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(c) the transfer does not exceed 1 % of the revenue 
earned by the transferring partner on the route 
concerned, after deducting 20 */• of that revenue as a 
contributiori^to co stt;
(d) neither partner bears any of the costs incurred by the 
other partner;
(e) the agreement contains no provision which would 
impede either carrier from providing additional 
capacity, whether such im pediment is financial or 
through a procedure for allocating such capacity.
2. Where the agreement covers several routes, the 
transfer of revenue shall be determined route by route and 
all the conditions referred to in paragraph 1 shall be 
satisfied individually for each route (city pair or, where 
points are com bined, group of cities).
Airports serving the same city shall be considered as the 
same point.
Article 4
S p ecia l p ro v is io n s for a g reem en ts  on  con su lta tion s  
on  tariffs
1. The exem ption concerning the holding of consul­
tations on tariffs shall apply only if:
(a) the consultations are solely intended to prepare jointly 
tariff proposals covering scheduled air fares to be paid 
by members of the public directly to a participating 
air carrier or to its authorized agents for carriage as 
passengers with their accompanying baggage on a 
scheduled service and the conditions under which 
those fares apply, in application of Article 4 of 
Directive 87 /601 /EEC;
(b) the consultations only concern tariffs subject to 
approval by the aeronautical authorities of the 
Member States concerned, and do not extend to the 
capacity for which such tariffs are to be available ;
(c) the tariffs which are the subject of the consultations 
are applied by participating air carriers without discri­
mination on grounds of passengers’ nationality or 
place of residence within the Community;
(d) participation in the consultations is voluntary and 
open to any air carrier w ho operates or has applied to 
operate on the route con cerned;
(e) any draft tariff proposals which may result from the 
consultations are not binding on participants, that is 
to say, following the consultations the participants 
retain the righ t to act independently, both in putting 
forward tariff proposals for approval independently of 
the o ther participants and in freely applying such 
tariffs after they have been approved ;
(f) the consultations do not entail agreement on agents’ 
remuneration or other elem ents of the tariffs 
discussed ;
(g) in respect of each tariff which was the subject of the 
consultations, each participant informs • the 
Com m ission without delay of its submission to the 
aeronautical authorities of the Member States 
concerned.
2. (a) The C om m ission and the Member States concerned 
shall be entitled to send observers to tariff consul­
tations, whether bilateral or multilateral. For this 
purpose, air carriers shall give the Member States 
concerned and the C om m ission the same notice as 
is given to participants, but not less than 10 days’ 
notice, of the date, venue and subject-matter of the 
consultations.
(b) Such notice shall be given :
(i) to the Member States concerned according to • 
procedures to be established by the competent 
auhorities of those Member States;
(ii) to the C om m ission according to procedures to 
be published from tim e to time in the Official 
Journal o f the European Communities.
(c) A full report on the consultations shall be 
submitted to the C om m ission by or on behalf of 
the air carriers involved at the same time as it is 
submitted to participants, but not later than six 
weeks after the consultations were held.
Article 5
Sp ecia l p ro v is io n s  for  a g r e e m e n ts  o n  slo t a llo ca tio n  
a n d  a irp ort s c h e d u lin g
1. The exem ption concerning slot allocation and
airport scheduling shall apply only i f :
(a) The consultations on slot allocation and airport 
scheduling are open to all air carriers having 
expressed an interest in the slots which are the subject
, of the consu ltation s;
(b) Any rules of priority established are neither directly 
nor indirectly related to carrier identity or nationality 
or category of service and take into account 
constraints or air traffic distribution rules laid down by 
com petent national or international authorities. Such 
rules of priority may take account of rights acquired 
by air carriers through the use of particular slots in the 
previous corresponding season ;
(c) The rules of priority established shall be made 
available on request to any interested party ;
(d) The rules of priority shall be applied without discrimi­
nation, that is to say that the rules shall not prevent 
each carrier having an equal right to slots for its 
services.
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2. (a) The Commission and the Member States concerned  
shall be_entided to send observers to consultations 
on Hot allocation and airport scheduling held ih '= 
the context of a multilateral m eeting in advance of 
each season. For this purpose, air carriers shall give 
the Member States concerned and the Com m ission  
the same notice as is given to participants, but not 
less than 10 days’ notice, of the date, venue and 
subject-matter of the consultations.
(b) Such notice shall be given
(i) to the Member States concerned according to 
procedures to be established by the com petent 
authorities of those Member States;
(ii) to the Commission according to procedures to 
be published from time to time in the Official 
Journal o f the European Communities.
Article 6
A ny air carrier claiming the benefit of this Regulation 
must be able at all times to demonstrate to the 
C om m ission, on request, that the conditions of Articles 2 
to 5 are fulfilled.
TITLE III 
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
Article 7
T he Commission may withdraw the benefit of th 
Regulation, pursuant to Article 7 of Regulation (EEC) N  
3976/87 , where it finds in a particular case that a 
agreement, decision or concerted practice exempte 
under this Regulation nevertheless has certain effec 
w hich are incompatible with the conditions laid down t 
Article 85 (3) or are prohibited by Article 86 of the Treat
Article 8
T his Regulation shall enter into force on the dr 
following its publication in the Official Journal o f t , 
European Communities.
It %hall apply with retroactive effect to agreement 
decisions and concerted practices which were in existent 
at the date of it’s entry into force, from the time when tf 
conditions of application of this Regulation were fulfille
It shall expire on 31 January 1991.
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member 
States.
D one at Brussels, 26 July 1988.
For the Commission 
Peter SUTHERLAND 
Member o f the Commission
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COMMISSION REGULATION (EEC) No 2672/81 
of 26 July 1988
on the application of Article 85 (3) of the Treaty to certain categories of 
agreements between undertakings relating to computer reservation systems for
air transport services
THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European 
Econom ic Com m unity,
Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) N o 3976/87  
of 14 D ecem ber 1987 on the application of Article 85 (3) 
of the Treaty to certain categories of agreements and 
concerted practices in the air transport sector ('), and in 
particular to Article 2 thereof.
Having published a draft of this Regulation (*),
Having consulted the Advisory Committee on 
Agreem ents and Dom inant Position in Air Transport,
W hereas :
(1) Regulation (EEC) N o 3976/87 empowers the 
C om m ission to apply Article 85 (3) of the Treaty 
by regulation to certain categories of agreements, 
decisions and concerned practices relating directly 
or indirecdy to the provision of air transport 
services.
(2) Agreem ents for the comm on purchase, 
developm ent and operation of computer reservation 
systems relating to time-tabling, reservations and 
ticketing are liable to restrict competition and 
affect trade between Member States.
(3) Computer reservation systems can render useful 
services to air carriers, travel agents and air 
travellers alike by giving ready access to up-to-date 
and detailed information in particular about flight 
possibilities, fare options and seat availability. They  
can also be used to make reservatons and in som e  
cases to print tickets and issue boarding passes. 
They thus help the air traveller to exercise choice  
on the basis of fuller information in order to meet 
his travel needs in the optimal manner. However, 
in order for these benefits to be obtained, flight
shedules and fare displays must be as complete and 
unbiased as possible.
(4) The CRS market is such that few individual 
European undertakings could on their own make 
the investment and achieve the econom ies of scale 
required to compete with the more advanced 
existing systems. Cooperation in this field should 
therefore be permitted. A block exemption should 
therefore be granted for such cooperation.
(5) The cooperation should not allow the parent 
carriers to create undue advantages for themselves 
and thereby distort com petition. It is therefore 
necessary to ensure that no discrimination exists 
between parent carriers and participating carriers 
with regard in particular to access and neutrality of 
display. The block exemption should be subject to 
conditions which will ensure that all air carriers 
can participate in the systems on a non-discrimi- 
natory basis as regards access, display, information 
loading and fees. Moreover, in order to maintain  
competition in an oligopolistic market subscribers 
must be able to switch from one system to another 
at short notice and without penalty, and system  
vendors and air carriers must not act in ways which  
would restrict competition between systems.
(6) In accordance with Article 4 of Regulation (EEC) 
No 3976/87 this Regulation should apply with  
retroactive effect to agreements in existsence on the 
date of entry into force of this Regulation provided 
that they meet the conditions for exemption set out 
in this Regulation.
(7) Under Article 7 of Regulation (EEC) N o 3976/87, 
this Regulation should also specify the circum ­
stances in which the C om m issiogf'm ay withdraw  
the block exemption in individual cases.
(8) Agreements which are exempted automatically by 
this Regulation need not be notified under C ouncil 
Regulation No 17 (*). However, when real doubt 
exists, undertakings may request the Com m ission  
to declare whether their agreements com ply with 
this Regulation.
(') OJ No L 374, 31. 12. 1987. p. 9.
f2) OJ N o C 138, 28. 5. 1988, p. 6. (*) OJ No 13, 21. 2. 1962, p. 204/62.
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(9) This Regulation is without prejudice to the 
•~«lic*tion of Article Rf Treaty.
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION :
Article 1 
E xem ptions
Pursuant to Article 85 (3) of the Treaty and subject to the 
conditions set out in Articles 3 to 10 of this Regulation, it 
is hereby declared that Article 85 (1) of the Treaty shall 
not apply to agreements between undertakings the 
purpose of which is one or more of the following :
(a) to purchase or develop a CRS in com m on :
(b) to create a system vendor to market and operate the
C R S ;
(c) to regulate the provision of distribution facilities by 
the system vendor or by distributors.
The exem ption shall apply only to the following 
obligations :
(i) an obligation not to engage directly or indirectly in 
the developm ent, marketing or operation of another 
C R S;
(ii) an obligation on the system vendor to appoint parent 
carriers or participating carriers as distributors in 
respect of all or certain subscribers in a defined area 
o f the com m on market;
(iii) an obligation on the system vendor to grant a 
distributor exclusive rights to solicit all or certain 
subscribers in a defined area o f the com m on m arket; 
or
(iv) an obligation on the system vendor not to allow  
distributors to sell distribution facilities provided by 
other system vendors.
Article 2 
D efin itio n s
For the purposes of this R egulation:
—  ‘Com puter reservation system’ or ‘CRS* means a 
computerized system containing information about air 
carrier schedules, fares, seat availability and related 
services, through which reservations can be made or 
tickets issued or both.
—  ‘D istribution  facilities’ means facilities provided by a 
system  vendor for the display of inform ation to 
subscribers about air carrier schedules, fares, seat
availability, for making reservations or issuing tickets 
or both and for providing any other relaf-d services.
—  ‘Distributor’ means i c  - unciertacm g which is 
authorized by the system vendor to provide distri­
bution facilities to subscribers.
—  ‘Parent carrier' means an air carrier which is a system 
vendor or which directly or directly, alone or jointly 
with others owns or controls a system vendor.
—  ‘Participating carrier’ means an air carrier which has 
an agreement with a system vendor for the display of 
its flight schedules, farer or seat availability or for 
reservations to be made or tickets to be issued through 
the CRS for the sale o f air transport services to 
members of the public. T o the extent that a parent 
carrier uses its own CRS distribution facilities it is 
considered a participating carrier.
»
—  ‘Subscriber’ means an undertaking other than a 
participating carrier, using a CRS within the 
Community under contract or other arrangement with 
a system vendor or a distributor for the sale of air 
transport services to m em bers of the public.
—  ‘System vendor’ means an undertaking which operates 
a CRS.
Article 3 
A c c e ss
1. The system vendor shall, within the available 
capacity, offer any air carrier the opportunity to become a 
participating carrier. The system  vendor shall not require 
acceptance of supplementary obbgations which, by their 
nature or according to com m ercial usage, have no 
connection with participation in the CRS.
2. Distribution facilities provided by the system vendor 
shall be offered to all participating carriers without discri­
mination.
3. A participating carrier shall have the right to 
terminate his contract with the system vendor without 
penalty on giving notice w hich shall not exceed six 
months to expire no earlier than the end of the first year.
Article 4 
D isp la y
1. Participating carriers shall be entitled to have their 
schedules, fares and availability displayed in a neutral 
display identified as such. This display shall be without 
discrimination, in particular as regards the order in which 
information is presented, which shall not be based on any 
factor directly or indirectly relating to carrier identity.
2. T he system vendor shall no t in ten tionally  or 
negligently display inaccurate o r m islead ing  inform ation.
yn
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3 The methodologies used for the ranking and presen­
tation of information displayed by the CRS shall be made 
available to interested parties on request.
ArticU  5
Information loading
T he system vendor shall not discriminate between partici­
pating carriers in the care and timeliness of information 
loading.
ArticU 6 
F ees
A n y fee charged by the system vendor shall be non-discri- 
inatory and reasonably related to the cost of the service 
provided and shall in particular be the same for the same 
level of service.
ArticU 7 
R ecip roc ity
1. The conditions laid down in Articles 3 to 6 shall not 
apply to a system vendor in respect of an air carrier that is 
a parent carrier ow ning or controlling another CRS, to the 
extent that su ch ' other CRS does not offer equivalent 
treatment to parent carriers owning or controlling the 
CRS subject to this Regulation.
2. T he system vendor proposing to avail itself of the 
provisions of paragraph 1 must notify the Com m ission of 
its intentions and the reasons therefore at least 14 days in 
advance of such action.
ArticU 8 
C on tra cts  w ith  subscribers
1. A subscriber shall have a right to terminate his 
contract with the system vendor or distributor without 
penalty on giving notice which shall not exceed three 
m onths to expire no earlier than the end of the first year.
2. The system vendor or distributor shall not require a 
subscriber to sign an exclusive contract, nor directly or 
indirectly prevent a subscriber from subscribing to or 
using another CRS.
ArticU 9
O b lig a t io n s  o f  parent carriers
A parent carrier shall no t link com m issions or o ther 
incen tives to subscribers for the sale of tickets on its air 
transport services to the utilization by the subscribers of 
th e  CRS of w hich it is a parent carrier.
ArticU 10
C om p etition  betw een  sv stem  vendors
The system vendor shall not enter into any agreement or 
engage in a concerted practice with other system vendors' 
with the object or effect or partitioning the market
ArticU 11
The Commission may withdraw the benefit of this 
Regulation, pursuant to Article 7 of Regulation (EEC) No  
3976/87, where is finds in a particular case that an 
agreement exempted by this Regulation nevertheless has 
certain effects which are incompatible with the conditions 
laid down by Article 85 (3) or which are prohibited by 
Article 86  ^ of the Treaty, and in particular where ;
(i) the agreement hinders the maintenance of effective 
competition in the market for computer reservation 
system s;
(ii) the agreement has the effect of restricting competition  
in the air transport or travel-related markets;
(iii) the system vendor directly or indirectly imposes 
unfair prices, fees or charges on subscribers or on 
participating carriers ;
(iv) the system vendor or distributor refuses to enter into 
a contract with a subscriber for the use of a CRS 
without an objective and legitimate reason of a 
technical or commercial nature ;
(v) a parent carrier who holds a dom inant position within 
the comm on market or in a substantial part of it 
refuses to participate in the distribution facilities 
provided by a competing CRS without an objective 
and legitimate reason of a technical or commercial 
nature.
ArticU 12
This Regulation shall enter into force on the day of its 
publication in the Official Journal o f the European 
Communities.
It shall apply with retroactive effect to agreements which 
were in existence at the date of its entry into force, from 
the time when the conditions of application of this 
Regulation were fulfilled.
It shall expire on 31 January 1991
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T his R egulation shall be b inding in its entirety  and directly  applicable in all M em ber 
S taf^t.
L>one at Brussels, 26 July 1988.
For the Commission 
Peter SUTHERLAND 
Member of the Commission
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C O M M IS S IO N  R E G U L A T IO N  (EEC) N o  2673/88  
o f  26 Ju ly  1988
o n  the a p p lica tio n  o f  A rtic le  85 (3) o f d ie  Treaty to certa in  ca tegories o f  
a g reem en ts  b etw een  u n d erta k in g s  d e c is io n s  o f a sso c ia tio n s o f u n d ertak in gs and  
c o n c e r n e d  p ra ctices  co n c e r n in g  grou n d  h an d lin g  services
THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES.
Having regard to the Treaty establish ing the European 
Econom ic C om m un ity ,
Having regard to C ouncil R egulation (EEC) N o  3976/87 
of 14 D ecem ber 1987 on the application  of A rticle 85 (3) 
of the Treaty to certain  categories of agreem ents and 
concerted practices in the air transport sector ('), and in 
particular A rticle 2 thereof,
Having pub lished  a draft of th is R egulation (*),
consu lted  the Advisory C om m ittee  on 
A greem ents and  D o m in an t Positions in A ir T ransport,
W hereas :
(1) R egulation (EEC) N o 3976/87 em pow ers the
C om m ission  to apply A rticle 85 (3) of the T hreaty 
by regulation to certain  categories of agreem ents,
decisions and concerted  practices relating  directly
or ind ireedy  to the provision of air transport 
services.
(2) A greem ents, decisions o r concerted  practices
concern ing  g round  hand ling  services provided 
either by air carriers or specialized undertakings, 
such as techn ica l and operational g round  handling, 
hand ling  of passengers, m ail, freight and  baggage, 
and services for the  provision of in -fligh t catering, 
are liable in certa in  c ircum stances to restrict 
com petition  and  effect trade betw een M em ber 
States. It is appropriate, in the  interests of legal 
certainty for the undertakings concerned , to define 
a category of agreem ents w hich , a lthough not 
generally restrictive of com petition , m ay benefit 
from an exem p tio n  in  the  event that, because of 
particular econom ic  or legal circum stances, they 
should fall w ith in  the scope of A rticle 85 (1).
(3) Such agreem ents, decisions o r concerted  practices 
may produce  econom ic  benefits, in so far as they 
help to  ensure tha t services of a h igh standard  are 
provided w ith con tinu ity  and at reasonable cost, 
and bo th  air carriers and air transport users share in 
those benefits.
(4) However, it is necessary to attach cond itions to the 
exem ption of such agreem ents, decisions and 
concerted practices to ensure that they  do not 
contain restrictions that arc not indispensable for
the optim al provision of the services, and that they 
do not lead to the elim ination of com petition with 
respect fo those services.
(5) The exem ption granted by the Regulation m ust 
therefore be subject to the condition that the 
agreem ents do no t oblige air carriers to obtain 
services exclusively from a particular supplier, that 
the supply of the services is not tie* tp the 
conclusion of contracts for o ther goods
that each airline is free to choose from th . r^i^gp a f  
services offered to it those which best rr ts 
needs, that the rates charged are reasonable for the 
services actually provided and that air carriers are 
free to withdraw from the agreem ents w ithout 
penalty upon sim ple notice of not more than three 
m onths to that effect.
(6) In accordance with Article 4 of Regulation (EEC) 
N o .3976/87, this Regulation should apply w ith 
retroactive effect to agreem ents, decisions and 
concerted practices in existence on the date of 
entry in to  force of this Regulation provided tha t 
they m eet the conditions for exem ption set out in  
this Regulation.
(7). U nder A rticle 7 of Regulation (EEC) N o 3976/87, 
this R egulation should also specify the circum ­
stances in  w hich the C om m ission may withdraw 
the block exem ption in individual cases.
(8) A greem ents, decisions and concerted practices th a t 
are exem pted automatically by this Regulation 
need not be notified under Council Regulation N o  
17 f1). However, when real doubt exists, 
undertakings may request the C om m ission to 
declare w hether their agreem ents com ply with th is 
Regulation.
(9) T his Regulation is w ithout prejudice to the  
application of Article 86 of the Treaty,
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:
ArticU 1
Pursuant to Article 85 (3) of the Treaty and subject to the 
provisions of Article 3 of this Regulation, it is hereby 
declared that Article 85 (1) of the Treaty shall not apply to 
agreem ents, decisions or concerted practices to w hich
(’ ) OJ No L 374, 31. 12. 1987, p. 9.
(0 OJ No C 138, 28. 5. 1988. p. 9. H OJ No 13. 21. 2. 1962, p. 204/62.
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only two undertakings are party and which deal only with 
the supply by one party of services referred to in Article 2 
to an air carrier at an airport in the C om m unity open to 
international air traffic.
ArticU 2
The exemption granted under Article 85 (3) of the Treaty 
shall apply to the following services:
1. all technical and operational services generally 
provided on the ground at airports, such as the 
provision of the necessary flight docum ents and 
information to crews, apron services, including loading 
and unloading, safety, aircraft servicing and refueilling, 
and operations before take-off;
2. all services connected with the handling of passengers, 
mail, freight and mail in conjunction with the postal 
services;
3. all services for the provision of in-flight catering, 
including the preparation, storage and delivery of 
meals and supplies to aircraft and the m aintenance of 
catering equ ip m en t
A rticle 3
The exemption shall apply only i f :
1. the agreements, decisions or concerted practices do not 
oblige an air carrier to obtain any or all of the ground 
handling services referred to in Article 2 exclusively 
from a particular su p p lie r;
2. the supply of the ground handling services referred to 
in Article 2 is not tied to the conclusion of contracts 
for or acceptance of other goods or services which, by 
their nature or according to commercial usage, have no 
connection with the services referred to in Article 2 or 
to the conclusion of a similar contract for the supply 
of services at another a irp o rt;
3. the agreements, decisions or concerted practices do no t 
prevent an air carrier from choosing from the range of 
ground handling services offered by a particular 
supplier those it wants to take from that supplier and  
do not denx it the right to procure sim ilar or o ther 
services from another supplier or to provide them  
itse lf; '
4. the supplier of the ground handling services does not 
impose, directly of indirectly, prices or o ther 
conditions which are unreasonable and which, in 
particular, bear no reasonable relation to the cost of 
the services provided ;
5. the supplier of the ground handling services does not 
apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions 
w ith different custom ers;
6. any air carrier is able to withdraw from the agreem ent 
with the supplier w ithout penalty, on giving notice of 
not more then three m onths to that effect.
A rticU  4 '
T he Comm ission may withdraw the benefit of this 
Regulation, pursuant to Article 7 of Regulation (EEC) N o 
3976/87, where it finds in a particular case that an 
agreem ent, decision or concerted practice exem pted 
under this Regulation nevertheless has certain effects 
w hich are incom patible with the conditions laid down by 
Article 85 (3) or are prohibited by Article 86 Qf the Treaty.
A rticU  5
T his Regulation shall enter into force on the day 
following its publication in the O fficial J o u rn a l o f  the  
European Communities.
It shall apply with retroactive effect to agreem ents, 
decisions and concerted practices which were in existence 
at the date of its entry into force, from the time when the 
conditions of application of this Regulation were fulfilled.
It shall expire on 31 January 1991.
This Regulation shall be b inding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member 
States.
D one at Brussels, 26 July  1988.
For the Commission 
Peter SUTHERLAND 
M em ber o f  the Commission
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C O M M ISSIO N  R E G U L A T IO N  (EC) N o  3652/93
o f 22 D ecem b er 1993
on  the a p p lica tion  o f A rticle  85 (3) o f ther T reaty to certain  ca tegories o f 
agreem en ts betw een  u n dertak in gs relating to com p u terized  reservation system s
for air transport services
THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European 
Com m unity,
Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) N o 3976/87 
of 14 D ecem ber 1987 on the application of Article 85 (3) 
of the Treaty to certain categories of agreem ents and 
concerted practices in the air transport sector ('), as lasta 
am ended by Regulation (EEC) N o 2411/92 (2), and in 
particular A rticle 2 thereof,
Having published a draft of this Regulation (3),
Having consulted the Advisory Com m ittee on Agree­
m ents and D om inant Positions in Air Transport,
W hereas :
(1) Regulation (EEC) N o 3976/87 empowers the 
Com m ission to apply A rticle 85 (3) of the Treaty 
by regulation to certain categories of agreements, 
decisions and concerted practices relating directly 
or indirectly to the provision of air transport 
services.
(2) Com m ission Regulation (EEC) N o 83/91 (4), as last 
am ended by Regulation (EEC) No 1618/93 (*), 
grants a block exem ption to certain agreem ents 
establishing com puterized reservation systems, 
providing they satisfy the conditions im posed by 
that Regulation. T he block exem ption expires on 
31 D ecem ber 1993.
(3) Agreements for the com m on purchase, develop­
m ent and operation of com puterized reservation 
systems relating to tim etabling, reservations and
(') OJ No L 374, 31. 12. 1987, p. 9.
(2) OJ No L 240, 24. 8. 1992, p. 19.
(3) OJ No C 253, 30. 9. 1992, p. 11.
O OJ No L 10, 15. 1. 1991, p. 9.
0  OJ No L 155, 26. 6. 1993, p. 23.
ticketing are liable to restrict com petition and 
affect trade between M em ber States.
(4) Computerized reservation systems (CRS) can render 
useful services to air carriers, travel agents and air 
travellers alike by giving ready access to up-to-date 
and detailed inform ation in particular about flight 
possibilities, fare options and seat availability. They 
can also be used to make reservations and in some 
cases to print tickets and issue boarding passes. 
They thus help the air traveller to exercise choice 
on the basis of fuller inform ation in order to meet 
his travel needs in the optim al manner. However, 
in order for these benefits^to be obtained, flight 
schedules and fares displays m ust be as com plete 
and unbiased as possible. \
(5) T he CRS market is such that few individual Euro­
pean undertakings could on their own m ake the 
investm ent and achieve the economies of scale 
required to com pete with the more advanced exis­
ting systems.
Cooperation in this field should therefore be 
perm itted. A block exem ption should therefore be 
granted for such cooperation.
(6) In accordance with Council Regulation (EEC) No 
2299/89 (6), as am ended by Regulation (EEC) No 
3089/93 (J, concerning the code of conduct for 
computerized reservation systems, the cooperation 
should not allow the parent carriers to create undue 
advantages for themselves and thereby distort 
com petition. It is therefore necessary to ensure that 
no discrim ination exists between parent carriers 
and participating carriers with regard in particular 
to access and neutrality of display. T he block 
exemption should be subject to conditions w hich 
will ensure that all air carriers can participate in the 
systems on a non-discrim inatory basis as regards 
access, display, inform ation loading and fees. More­
over, in order to m aintain com petition in an oligo­
polistic market subscribers m ust be able to switch 
from one system to another at short notice and
(6) O J N o  L 220, 29. 7. 1989, p. 1. 
O  O J N o  L 278, 11. 1 1. 1993, p. 1.
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without penalty, and system vendors and air HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION :
carriers must not act in ways which would restrict 
competition between systems.
A rticle  1
(7) In order to maintain effective competition between 
CRSs, it is necessary to ensure that system vendors 
do not refrain from competing with each other.
(8) Refusal on the part of parent carriers to provide the 
same inform ation on schedules, fares and availabi­
lity to com peting CRSs and to accept bookings 
made by those systems can seriously distort com pe­
tition between CRSs. Parent carriers should not be 
obliged to incur costs in this connection except for 
reproduction of the inform ation to be provided and 
for accepted bookings ; parent carriers m ust not 
seek reim bursem ent of costs that cannot be fully 
justified.
(9) Billing inform ation should be sufficiently detailed 
to allow participating carriers and subscribers to 
control their costs. A parent carrier should accept 
or reject any bookings/transactions made through a 
competing CRS on the same terms or conditions as 
it applies for bookings/transactions m ade through 
its own CRS.
(10) In accordance with A rticle 4 of Regulation (EEC) 
No 3976/87, this Regulation should apply with 
retroactive effect to agreem ents in existence on the 
date of entry into force of this Regulation provided 
that they m eet the conditions for exem ption set out 
in this Regulation.
(11) For the purposes of A rticle 7 of Regulation (EEC) 
No 3976/87, this Regulation should also specify 
the circumstances in w hich the C om m ission may 
withdraw the block exem ption in individual cases.
E xem ption s
Pursuant to Article 82 (3) of the Treaty and subject to the 
conditions set out in Articles 2 to 14 of this Regulation, it 
is hereby declared that Article 85 (1) of the Treaty shall 
not apply to agreements between undertakings the 
purpose of which is one or more of the following :
(a) to purchase or develop a CRS in com m on ;
(b) to create a system vendor to m arket and operate the 
CRS;
or
(c) to regulate the provision of distribution facilities by 
the system vendor or by distributors.
The exemption shall apply only to the following obliga­
tions :
(i) an obligation not to engage directly or indirectly in 
the developm ent, m arketing or operation of another 
CRS;
(ii) an obligation on the system vendor to appoint parent 
carriers or participating carriers as distributors in 
respect of all or certain subscribers in a defined area 
of the com m on m ark e t;
(iii) an obligation on the system vendor to grant a distri­
butor exclusive rights to solicit all or certain subscri­
bers in a defined area of the com m on m ark e t;
or
(iv) an obligation on the system vendor not to allow 
distributors to sell distribution facilities provided by 
other system vendors.
A rticle 2
(12) The agreements w hich are exem pted autom atically 
by this Regulation need not be notified under 
Council Regulation N o 17 (') as last am ended by 
the Act of Accession of Spain and Portugal. 
However when real doubt exists, undertakings may 
request the Com m ission to declare w hether their 
agreements com ply with this Regulation,
(') OJ No 13, 21. 2. 1962, p. 204/62.
D efin itio n s
For the purpose of this Regulation :
(a) ‘air transport product’ means the carriage by air of a 
passenger between two airports, including any related 
ancillary services and additional benefits offered for 
sale and/or sold as an integral part of that p ro d u c t;
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(b) ‘scheduled air service’ m eans a series of flights each 
possessing all the following characteristics :
—  it is perform ed by aircraft for the transport of 
passengers or passengers and cargo and /o r mail for 
rem uneration, in such a m anner that on each 
flight seats are available for individual purchase by 
consum ers (either directly from the air carrier or 
from its authorized agents),
—  it is operated so as to serve traffic between the 
same two or more points, e ither :
1. according to a published tim etab le ; or
2. with flights so regular or frequent that they 
constitute a recognizably systematic series ;
(c) ‘fare’ means the price to be paid for air transport 
products and the conditions under which this priced 
applies ;
-) ‘computerized reservation system ’ (CRS) means a 
computerized system containing inform ation about, 
inter alia, air carriers’ :
— schedules,
— availability,
— fares, and
— related services,
with or w ithout facilities through which
— reservations can be m ade or
— tickets may be issued,
to the extent that som e or all of these services are 
made available to subscribers ;
.•) ‘distribution facilities’ m eans facilities provided by a 
system vendor for the provision of inform ation about 
air carriers’ schedules, availability, fares and related 
services and for m aking reservations and /o r issuing 
tickets, and for any other related services ;
(f) ‘system vendor’ means any entity and its affiliated 
which is or are responsible for the operation or 
marketing of a CRS ;
(g) ‘parent carrier’ means any air carrier which directly or 
indirectly, jointly with others, owns or effectively 
controls a system vendor, as well as any air carrier 
which it owns or effectively controls ;
(h) ‘effective control’ means a relationship constituted by 
rights, contracts or any o ther means which, either 
separately or jointly and having regard to the conside­
rations of fact or law involved, confer the possibility of 
directly or indirectly exercising a decisive influence 
on an undertaking, in particular by :
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—  the right to use all or part of the assets of an 
undertaking,
—  rights or contracts which confer a decisive influ- 
ence on the com position, voting or decisions of 
the bodies of an undertaking or otherwise confer a 
decisive influence on the running  of the business 
of the undertaking ;
(i) ‘participating carrier’ m eans an air carrier which has 
an agreem ent with a system vendor for the distribu­
tion of air transport products through a CRS. To the 
extent that a parent carrier uses the facilities of its 
own CRS w hich are covered by this Regulation it 
shall be considered a participating ca rr ie r;
(j) ‘subscriber’ m eans a person or an undertaking, other 
than a participating carrier, using the distribution faci­
lities for air transport products of a CRS under 
contract or o ther arrangem ent with a system vendo r;
(k) ‘consum er’ m eans any person seeking information 
about and /or in tending to purchase an air transport 
p roduct;
• \
(1) ‘principal display’ means a com prehensive neutral 
display of data concerning air services between city- 
pairs, w ithin a specified time period ;
(m) ‘elapsed journey tim e’ means the tim e difference 
between scheduled departure and arrival time ;
(n) ‘service enhancem en t’ means any product or service 
offered by a system vendor on its own behalf to 
subscribers in conjunction with a CRS, other than 
distribution facilities ;
(o) ‘distributor’ m eans an undertaking which is 
authorized by the system vendor to provide distribu­
tion facilities to subscribers.
A rtic le  3
A ccess
1. A system vendor shall allow any air carrier the 
opportunity  to participate, on an equal and non-discrimi- 
natory basis, in its distribution facilities within the 
available capacity of the system concerned and subject to 
any technical constraints outside the control of the system 
vendor.
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2. (a) A system vendor shall n o t :
—  attach unreasonable conditions to any contract 
with a participating carrier,
—  require the acceptance of supplem entary condi­
tions which, by their nature or according to 
com m ercial usage, have no connection with 
participation in its CRS and shall apply the 
same conditions for the same level of service.
(b) A system vendor shall not make it a condition of 
participation in its CRS that a participating carrier 
may not at the same time be a participant in 
another system.
(c) A participating carrier may term inate its contract 
with a system vendor on giving notice w hich need 
not exceed six m onths, to expire no earlier than 
the end of the first year.
In such a case a system vendor shall not be entitled 
to recover more than the costs directly related to 
the term ination of the contract.
3. If a system vendor has decided to add any im prove­
m en t to the distribution facilities provided or the equ ip ­
m en t used in the provision of the facilities, it shall 
provide inform ation on these im provem ents and offer 
them  to all participating carriers, including parent 
carriers, with equal tim eliness and on the same terms and 
conditions, subject to any technical constraints outside 
the control of the system vendor and in such a way that 
there will be no difference in leadtim e for the im plem en­
tation of the new im provem ents between parent and 
participating carriers.
A rtic le  4
P a r t ic ip a tio n
1. (a) A parent carrier may not discrim inate against a 
com peting CRS by refusing to provide the latter, 
on request and with equal timeliness, the same 
inform ation on schedules, fares and availability 
relating to its own air services as that w hich it 
provides to its own CRS or to distribute its air 
transport products through another CRS, or by 
refusing to accept or to confirm  with equal tim eli­
ness a reservation made through a com peting CRS 
or any of its air transport products which are distri­
buted through its own CRS. The parent carrier 
shall be obliged to accept and to confirm  only 
those bookings w hich are in conform ity with its 
fares and conditions.
(b) The parent carrier shall not be obliged to accept 
any costs in this connection  except for reproduc­
tion of the inform ation to be provided and for 
accepted bookings.
(c) The parent carrier shall be entitled to carry out 
checks to ensure that Article 7 (1) is com plied with 
by the com peting CRS.
2. The obligation im posed by paragraph 1 shall not 
apply in favour of a com peting CRS when, in accordance 
with the procedures of Article 6 (5), Article 7 (3) or Article 
7 (4) of Regulation (EEC) N o 2299/89, it has been decided 
that the CRS is in breach of Article 4a of that Regulation 
or that a system vendor cannot give sufficient guarantees 
that obligations under A rticle 6 of that Regulation concer­
ning unauthorized access of parent carriers to inform ation 
are com plied with.
. \
A rtic le  5
In f o rm a t io n  lo a d in g
1. Participating carriers and other providers of air 
transport products shall ensure that the data they decide 
to subm it to a CRS are accurate, nonm isleading, transpa­
rent and no less com prehensive than for any other CRS.
The data shall, in ter  alia, enable a system vendor to m eet 
the requirem ents of the ranking criteria as set out in the 
A nnex to Regulation (EEC) N o 2299/89.
Data subm itted via interm ediaries shall not be m an ipu­
lated by them  in a m anner that would lead to inaccurate, 
misleading or discrim inatory inform ation.
2. A system vendor shall not m anipulate the material 
referred to in paragraph 1 in a m anner that would lead to 
the provision of inaccurate, m isleading or discrim inatory 
inform ation.
3. A system vendor shall load and process data 
provided by participating carriers with equal care and 
timeliness, subject only to the constraints of the loading 
m ethod selected by individual participating carriers and to 
the standard formats used by the said vendor.
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A rtic le  6
L oading, processing  and d istrib ution
1. Loading and/or processing facilities provided by a 
system vendor shall be offered to all parent and participa­
ting carriers w ithout discrim ination. W here relevant and 
generally accepted air transport industry standards are 
available, system vendors shall offer facilities com patible 
with them.
2. A system vendor shall not reserve any specific 
loading and/or processing procedure or any o ther d istri­
bution facility for one or m ore of its parent carriers).
A system vendor shall ensure that its distribution 
facilities are separated, in a clear and verifiable m anner, 
from any carrier’s private inventory and m anagem ent and 
marketing facilities. Separation may be established either 
logically by means of software or physically in such a way 
that any connection between the distribution facilities and 
the private facilities may be achieved only by m eans of an 
application-to-application interface. Irrespective of the 
method of separation adopted, any such interface shall be 
made available to all parent and participating carriers on a 
non-discriminatory basis and shall provide equality of 
treatm ent in respect of procedures, protocols, inputs and 
outputs. Where relevant and generally accepted air trans­
port industry standards are available, system vendors shall 
offer interfaces compatible w ith them .
particular as regards the order in w hich inform ation 
is presented.
^o ) A  consum er shall be entitled to have, on request, a 
principal display limited to scheduled or non-sche- 
duled services only.
(c) N o discrim ination on the basis of airports serving 
the same city shall be exercised in constructing 
and selecting flights for a given citypair for inclu­
sion in a principal display.
(d) R anking of flight options in a principal display 
shall be as set out in the A nnex to Regulation 
(EEC) No 2299/89.
(e) T he criteria to be used for ranking shall not be 
based on any factor directly or indirectly relating to 
carrier identity and shall be applied on a non-d is­
crim inatory basis to all participating carriers.
3. W here a system vendor provides inform ation on 
fares the display shall be neutral and non-discrim inatory 
and shall contain at least the fares provided for all flights 
of participating carriers shown in the principal display. 
T he source of such inform ation shall be acceptable to the 
participating carriers) concerned and the system vendor 
concerned.
4. A CRS shall not be considered in breach of this to 
the extent that it changes a display in order to m eet the 
specific request/s) of a consumer.
A rtic le  7
A rticle 8
P ro v is io n  o f in fo rm a t io n
D isp lay s
1. (a) Displays generated by a CRS shall be clear and 
non-discriminatory.
(b) A system vendor shall not intentionally or negli­
gently display in its CRS inaccurate or misleading 
information.
1. The following provisions shall govern the availability 
of inform ation, statistical or otherwise, from a system 
vendor’s CRS :
(a) inform ation concerning individual bookings shall be 
provided on an equal basis and only to the air 
carriers) participating in the service covered by the 
booking and to the subscribers) involved in the 
b o o k in g ;
2. (a) A vendor shall provide through its CRS a principal 
display or displays for each individual transaction 
and shall include therein the data provided by parti­
cipating carriers on flight schedules, fare types and 
seat availability in a clear and com prehensive 
manner and without discrim ination or bias, in
(b) any m arketing, booking and sales data made available 
shall be on the basis th a t :
(i) such data are offered with equal tim eliness and on 
a non-discrim inatory basis to all participating 
carriers, including parent carriers ;
Moo
N o L 333/42 Official Journal of the European Com m unities 31. 12. 93
(ii) such data may, and, on request, shall cover all 
participating carriers and/or subscribers, but shall 
not include any identification or personal infor­
m ation on a passenger or a corporate user-
(iii) all requests for such data are treated w ith equal 
care and timeliness subject to the transm ission 
m ethod selected by the individual carrier.
2. A system vendor shall not make available personal 
information concerning a passenger to others not 
involved in the transaction w ithout the consent of the 
passenger.
3. A system vendor shall ensure that the provisions in 
paragraphs 1 and 2 are com plied with, by technical m eans 
and/or appropriate safeguards regarding at least software, 
in such a way that inform ation provided by or created for 
air carriers cannot be accessed by any means by one or 
more of the parent carriers except as perm itted by para­
graphs 1 and 2.
A rticle  9
R ec ip ro c ity
1. The obligations of a system vendor under Articles 3 
and 5 to 8 shall not apply in respect of an air carrier of a 
third country, which controls a CRS either alone or 
jointly, to the extent that its CRS outside the territory of 
the C om m unity does not offer C om m unity air carriers 
equivalent treatm ent to that provided under this Regula­
tion and under Regulation (EEC) N o 2299/89.
2. The obligations of parent or participating carriers 
under Articles 4, 5 and 10 shall not apply in respect of a 
CRS controlled by (an) air carriers) of one or more th ird  
country (countries) to the extent that the parent or partici­
pating carriers) is (are) not accorded equivalent treatm ent 
outside the territory of the C om m unity to that provided 
under this Regulation and under Regulation (EEC) N o 
2299/89.
3. A system vendor or an air carrier proposing to avail 
itself of the provisions of paragraphs 1 or 2 m ust notify 
the Commission of its intentions and the reasons therefor 
at least 14 days in advance of such action. In exceptional 
circumstances, the Com m ission may, at the request of the
vendor or the air carrier concerned, grant a waiver from 
the 14-day rule.
4. Upon receipt of a notification, the C om m ission shall 
w ithout delay determ ine w hether discrim ination within 
the meaning of paragraphs 1 and 2 exists. If th is is found 
to be the case, the Com m ission shall so inform  all 
systems vendors or the air carriers concerned in the 
Com m unity as well as M em ber States. If discrim ination 
within the m eaning of paragraph 1 or 2 does not exist, 
the Commission shall so inform  the system vendor or air 
carriers concerned.
A rticle  10
R ela tio n s  w ith  s u b s c r ib e rs
I. A parent carrier shall not, directly or indirectly, link 
the use of any specific-CRS by a subscriber with the 
receipt of any com m ission or o ther incentive or d isincen­
tive for the sale of air transport products available on its 
flights.
2. A parent carrier shall not, directly or indirectly, 
require use of any specific CRS by a subscriber for any 
sale or issue of tickets for any air transport products 
provided either directly or indirectly by itself.
3. Any condition which an air carrier may require of a 
travel agent when authorizing it to sell and issue tickets 
for its air transport products shall be w ithout prejudice to 
paragraphs 1 and 2.
A rticle  11
C o n tra c ts  w ith  s u b s c r ib e rs
1. A system vendor shall make any of the distribution 
facilities of a CRS available to any subscriber on a non- 
discrim inatory basis.
2. A system vendor shall not require a subscriber to 
sign an exclusive contract, nor directly or indirectly 
prevent a subscriber from subscribing to, or using, any 
other system or systems.
3. A service enhancem ent offered to any other 
subscriber shall be offered by the system vendor to all 
subscribers on a non-discrim inatory basis.
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4. (a) A system vendor shall not attach unreasonable
conditions to any subscriber contract allowing for 
the use of its CRS and, in particular, a subscriber 
may term inate its contract w ith a system vendor by 
giving notice which need not exceed three m onths 
to expire no earlier than the end of the first year.
In such a case a system vendor shall not be entitled 
to recover more than the costs directly related to 
the term ination of the contract.
(b) Subject to paragraph 2, the supply of technical 
equ ipm ent is not subject to the conditions set out 
in (a).
5. A system vendor shall provide in each subscriber 
contract t h a t :
(a) the principal display, conform ing to Article 7, is 
accessed for each individual transaction except where 
a consum er requests inform ation for only one air 
c a rr ie r ;
(b) the subscriber does not m anipulate material supplied 
by CRSs in a m anner that would lead to inaccurate, 
m isleading or discrim inatory presentation of inform a­
tion to consumers.
6. A system vendor shall not impose any obligation on 
a subscriber to accept an offer of technical equ ipm ent or 
software, but may require that equipm ent and software 
used are com patible with its own system.
A rticle 12 
Fees
1. Any fee charged by a system vendor shall be non- 
discrim inatory, reasonably structured and reasonably 
lated to the cost of the service provided and used, and 
shall, in particular, be the same for the same level of 
service.
The billing for the services of a CRS shall be sufficiently 
detailed to allow the participating carriers and subscribers 
to see exactly which services have been used and the fees 
therefor.
As a m inim um , booking fee bills m ust include the 
following inform ation for each seg m en t:
—  type of CRS booking,
—  passenger name,
—  country,
—  IATA/ARC agency identification code,
—  city code,
—  city pair or segment,
—  booking date (transaction date),
—  flight date,
—^ flig h t num ber,
—  status code (booking status),
—  service type (class of service),
—  PN R  record locator,
—  booking/cancellation indicator.
T he billing inform ation shall be offered on magnetic 
media.
A participating air carrier shall be offered the facility of 
being informed at the time that any booking/transaction 
is made for which a booking fee will be charged. W here a 
carrier elects to be so inform ed it shall be offered the 
option to disallow such bookings/transactions, unless the 
booking/transaction has already been accepted.
2. A system vendor shall, on request, provide to in te­
rested parties details of current procedures, fees and 
system facilities, including interfaces, editing and display 
criteria used. However, this provision does not oblige a 
system vendor to disclose proprietary inform ation such as 
software programmes.
3. Any changes to fee levels, conditions or facilities 
offered and the basis therefor shall be com m unicated to 
all participating carriers and subscribers on a non-discri­
m inatory basis.
A rticle 13
C o m p e tit io n  b e tw een  sy s tem  ven d o rs
T he system vendor shall not en ter into any agreement or 
engage in a concerted practice with o ther system vendors 
w ith the object or effect of partitioning the market.
A rticle  14
Pursuant to Article 7 of Regulation (EEC) No 3976/87, 
the benefit of this Regulation may be withdrawn where it 
is found in a particular case that an agreem ent exempted 
by this Regulation nevertheless has certain effects which 
are incom patible with the conditions laid down by Article 
85 (3) or which are prohibited by Article 86 of the Treaty, 
and in particular where :
(i) the agreem ent hinders the m aintenance of effective 
com petition in the m arket for CRSs ;
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(ii) the agreem ent has the effect of restricting com peti­
tion in the air transport or travel related markets ;
(iii) the system vendor directly or indirectly impose^ 
unfair prices, fees or charges on subscribers or on 
participating carriers ;
(iv) the system vendor refuses to enter into a contract for 
the use of a CRS w ithout an objective and non-discri­
m inatory reason of a technical or com m ercial nature ;
(v) the system vendor denies participating carriers access 
to any facilities o ther than distribution facilities
w ithout an objective and non-discrim inatory reason 
of a technical or com m ercial nature.
Article
This Regulation shall enter into force on 1 January 1994 
and expire on 30 Ju n e  1998.
It shall apply with retroactive effect to agreem ents which 
were in existence at the date of its entry into force, from 
the tim e when the conditions of application of this Regu­
lation where fulfilled.
This Regulation shall be b inding in its entirety and directly applicable in all M ember 
States.
D one at Brussels, 22 D ecem ber 1993.
For the Commission 
Karel V A N  MIERT  
M em ber o f  the Commission
Appendix III. 2
EC Air-Transport Legislation Adopted 
Between the Period 1987-1993
40i;
Number
1. 359/87-22
2. 3975/87
3. 3976/87
4. 601/87
5. 602/87
Date
June 1987
14 Dec. 1987
14 Dec. 1987
14 Dec. 1987 
14 Dec. 1987
Title and Description of Community Instrument OJ Reference
COMMISSION DECISION concerning reductions L 194, 15 July 1987: 28.
in air and sea transport fares available only to 
Spanish nationals resident in the Canary Islands and 
the Balearic Islands.
COUNCIL REGULATION laying down the l 374, 31 Dec. 1987: 1-8
procedure for the application of the rules on 
competition to undertakings in the air-transport 
sector.
COUNCIL REGULATION on the application of L 374, 31 Dec. 1987: 9-11
Article 85 (3) of the Treaty to certain categories of 
agreements and concerted practices in the air­
transport sector.
COUNCIL DIRECTIVE on fares for scheduled L 374, 31 Dec. 1987: 12-18
air services between Member States.
COUNCIL DECISION on the sharing of l 374, 31 Dec. 1987: 19-23.
passenger capacity between air carriers on
scheduled air services between Member States and
on access for air carriers to scheduled air-service
routes between Member States.
4 os
6. 2671/88
7. 2672/88
8. 2673/88
9. 4261/88
10. 2299/89
26 July 1988 COMMISSION REGULATION on the application L 239, 30 Aug. 1988: 9-12
of Article 85 (3) excemptions of the Treaty to certain 
categories of agreements between undertakings, 
decisions of associations of undertakings and 
concerted practices concerning joint planning and 
coordination of capacity, sharing of revenue and 
consultations on tafiffs on scheduled air services and 
slot allocation at airports.
26 July 1988 COMISSION REGULATION on the application L 239, 30 Aug. 1988: 10-16
of Article 85 (3) exemptions of the Treaty to certain 
categories of agreements between undertakings 
relating to computer reservation systems (CRS) for 
air-transport services.
26 July 1988 COMMISSION REGULATION on the application L 239, 30 Aug. 1988: 17-18.
of Article 85 (3) exemptions of the Treaty to certain 
categories of agreements between undertakings, 
decisions of associations of and concerted practices 
concerning ground handling services.
16 Dec. 1988 COMMISSION REGULATION on the complaints, L 376, 31 Dec. 1988: 10.
applications and hearings provided for in Council 
Regulation No. 3975/87 laying down the procedure 
for the application of the rules on competition to 
undertakings in the air-transport sector.
24 July 1989 COUNCIL REGULATION introducing a Code of L 220, 29 July 1989: 1
Coduct for the use of computer reservation systems 
(CRS).
11. 4064/89 21 Dec. 1989 COUNCIL REGULATION on the control of L 257,21 Sept. 1990: 14-25
concentrations between undertakings (Including air 
carriers).
12. 2342/90
13. 2343/90
14. 449/90
15. 83/91
24 July 1990 COUNCIL REGULATION on fares for scheduled air L 217, 11 Aug. 1990: 1-7
services. (Replaces Council Directive 601/87 above).
24 July 1990 COUNCIL REGULATION on access for air carriers to L 217, 11 Aug. 1990: 8-16.
scheduled intra- air service routes and on the sharing 
of passenger capacity between air carriers on 
scheduled air services between Member States.
(Repalces Council Directives 416/83, 216/86 and 
463/9 - concerning the authorisation of scheduled 
inter-regional air services for the transport 
passengers, mail and cargo between Member States- 
and Council Directive 602/87 above).
30 July 1990 COMMISSION DECISION seting up a Joint l 230, 24 Aug. 1990: 22-24.
Committee on Civil Aviation (JCCA).
5 Dec. 1990 COMMISSION REGULATION on the application of L 010, 15 Jan. 1991: 9-13.
Article 85 (3) exemptions of the Treaty to certain 
categories of agreements between undertakings 
relating to computer reservation systems (CRS) for 
air-transport services.
MoT
16. 84/91
17. 294/91
18. 295/91
19. 8/92
20. 3922/91
21. 670/91
5 Dec. 1990 COMMISSION REGULATION on the application of
Article 85 (3) exemptions of the Treaty to certain 
categories of agreements, decisions and concerted 
practices concerning joint planning and cordination of 
capacity, consultations on passenger and cargo tariff 
rates on scheduled air services and slot allocation at 
airports.
4 Feb. 1991 COUNCIL REGULATION on the operation of air
cargo services between Member States.
4 Feb. 1991 COUNCIL REGULATION establishing common
rules for a denied-boarding compensation system in 
scheduled air transport.
27 Nov. 1991 COMMISSION DECISION on the compliance of
certain air fares with the requirements of Article 3 (1) 
of Council Regulation No. 2342/90.
16 Dec. 1991 COUNCIL REGULATION on the harmonization of
technical requirements and administrative procedures 
in the field of civil aviation.
16 Dec. 1991 COUNCIL DIRECTIVE on mutual acceptance of
personnel licences for the exercise of functions in civil 
aviation.
Mo?
L 010, 15 Jan. 1991: 14.
L 036, 8 Feb. 1991: 1-4
L 036, 8 Feb. 1991: 5.
L 005, 10 Jan. 1992: 26.
L 373, 31 Dec. 1991:4
L 373, 31 Dec. 1991:21.
22. 3925/91
23. 1823/92
24. 2407/92
25. 2408/92
26. 2409/92
27. 2410/92
19 Dec. 1991 COUNCIL REGULATION concerning the elimination l 374, 31 Dec. 1991: 4.
of controls and formalities applicable to the cabin and 
hold baggage of persons taking an intra-Community 
flight and the baggage of persons making an intra- 
Community sea crossing.
3 July 1992 COMMISSION REGULATION laying down detailed L 185, 4 July 1992: 8
rules for the application of Council Regulation No.
3925/91 concerning the elimination of controls and 
formalities applicable to the cabin and hold baggage 
of persons taking an intra-Community flight and the 
baggage of persons making an intra- Community sea 
crossing.
23 July 1992 COUNCIL REGULATION on licensing of air carriers. l 240, 24 Aug. 1992: 1-7.
23 July 1992 COUNCIL REGULATION on access for Community l 240, 24 Aug. 1992: 8-14
air carriers to intra-Community air routes.
23 July 1992 COUNCIL REGULATION on fares and rates for air l 240, 24 Aug. 1992: 15-17
services.
23 July 1992 COUNCIL REGULATION amending Council l 240, 24 Aug. 1992: 18
Regulation No. 3975/87 laying down the procedure 
for the application of the rules on competition to 
undertakings in the air-transport sector.
uoq
28. 2411/92
29. 552/92
30. 95/93
31. 245/93
32. 3652/93
23 July 1992 COUNCIL REGULATION amending Council
Regulation No. 3976/87 on the application of Article 
85 (3) of the Treaty to certain categories of 
agreements and concerted practices in the air­
transport sector.
21 Oct. 1992 COMMISSION DECISION examining by virtue of
Article 10 (4) of Council Regulation No. 2343/90, the 
application of Article 10 (3) of the same Regulation to 
the increase of frequencies on existing services on 
the route London (Heathrow)- Brussels.
18 Jan. 1993 COUNCIL REGULATION on common rules for the 
allocation of slots at Community airports.
26 April 1993 COMMISSION OPINION concerning the application
of Article 4 (2) of Council Directive No. 670/91 on 
mutual acceptance of personnel licences for the 
exercise of functions in civil aviation Equivalence of 
French, Irish and Portuguese pilot licences.
22 Dec. 1993 COMMISSION REGULATION on the application of 
Article 85 (3) exemptions of the Treaty to certain 
categories of agreements between undertakings 
relating to computerized reservation systems (CRS) 
for air-transport services.
MlO
L 240, 24 Aug. 1992: 19-20.
L 353, 3 Dec. 1992: 32
L 014, 22 Jan. 1993: 1.
L 111, 5 May 1993: 25
L 333, 31 Dec. 1993: 37-44.
Appendix IV. 1
A Commission Press Report on Action Against 
Anti-Competitive Airline Agreement
411
I P ( 8 7 )  3 4 3
PRESSE MED DEI ELSE • M 1 J T E I L U N B  AN DIE PRESSE • PR E S S  RELEASE • I N F O R M A T I O N  A I A  P R E S S !  
ANAKOINOIH HA TON TYIIO • I N F Q R M A 2 I O N E  ALLA S T A M P A  • MEDEDELING AAN DE PERS
B r u s s e l s ,  31 J u l y  1 9 8 7
C OMMI SSI ON REI NFORCES I TS ACTI ON AGA I NST  
A N T I - C O M P E T I T I V E  A I R L I N E  AGREEMENTS
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  h a s  r e i n f o r c e d  t h e  a c t i o n  w h i c h  I t  b e g a n  l a s t  y e a r  
t o  b r i n g  t o  an end t h e  r e s t r i c t i v e  p r a c t i c e s  e n g a g e d  I n  by  t e n  
a i r l i n e s  ( A e r  L l n g u s ,  A i r  F r a n c e ,  A l i t a l i a ,  B r i t i s h  A i r w a y s ,  
B r i t i s h  C a l e d o n i a n ,  KLM, .  L u f t h a n s a ,  O l y m p i c  A i r w a y s ,  S a b e n a  and  
S A S ) .
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  h a s  now w r i t t e n  t o  t h e s e  a i r l i n e s  t o  I n f o r m  t hem  
t h a t ,  u n t i l  t h e  C o u n c i l  f o r m a l l y  a d o p t s  t h e  p a c k a g e  o f  c i v i l  
a v l a t o n  m e a s u r e s  on w h i c h  I t  r e a c h e d  a g r e e m e n t  I n  J u n e  1 9 8 7 ,  t h e  
C o m m i s s i o n  I s  o b i  I g e d  t o  p u r s u e  I t s  p r o c e e d i n g s  u n d e r  A r t i c l e  89  
o f  t h e  EEC T r e a t y  t o  t h e  a d o p t i o n  o f  r e a s o n e d  d e c i s i o n s  r e c o r d i n g  
t h e  v a r i o u s  I n f r i n g e m e n t s  w h i c h  h av e  b e e n  c o m m i t t e d .  I t  h as  
g i v e n  t h e  a l r l  I n e s  u n t I  I 14 S e p t e m b e r  t o  s u p p l y  a n y  f u r t h e r  
I n f o r m a t i o n ,  I n c l u d i n g  c h a n g e s  made t o  I n t e r a l r I I n e  a g r e e m e n t s  
a n d  p r a c t i c e s ,  w h i c h  t h e y  may w i s h  I t  t o  t a k e  I n t o  a c c o u n t  I n  t h e  
r e a s o n e d  d e c i s i o n s  w h i c h  I t  I n t e n d s  t o  a d o p t .
T h e  d i a l o g u e  w i t h  t h e s e  t e n  a i r l i n e s  b e g a n  w i t h  t h e  I n i t i a t i o n  by  
t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  o f  A r t i c l e  89  p r o c e e d i n g s  In J u l y  and  N o v e m b e r  
1 9 8 6 .  T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  l a u n c h e d  t h i s  d i a l o g u e  w i t h  a v i e w  t o  
d e f i n i n g  t h e  c h a n g e s  r e q u i r e d  In o r d e r  t o  b r i n g  a i r l i n e  
a g r e e m e n t s  and p r a c t i c e s  I n  t h e  a r e a  o f  r e v e n u e  p o o l i n g ,  c a p a c i t y  
s h a r i n g  and t a r i f f  c o n s u l t a t i o n s  I n t o  c o n f o r m i t y  w i t h  C o m m u n i t y  
l a w.  T h e s e  c h a n g e s  h a v e  b e e n  c l e a r l y  s p e l t  o u t  I n a s e r i e s  o f  
m e e t i n g s  w i t h  and l e t t e r s  t o  e a c h  a i r l i n e .
Th e  C o m m i s s i o n  h as  a t  t h e  same t i m e  e x t e n d e d  t h e  s c o p e  o f  I t s  
a c t i o n  by I n i t i a t i n g  p r o c e e d i n g s  u n d e r  A r t i c l e  8 9  I n  r e s p e c t  o f  
t h e  r e s t r i c t i v e  p r a c t i c e s  e n g a g e d  In by t h r e e  o t h e r  a i r l i n e s  
( I b e r i a ,  L u x a l r  and T A P ) .  T h i s  b r i n g s  a l l  t h e  m a j o r  C o m m u n i t y  
a i r l i n e s  w i t h i n  t h e  s c o p e  o f  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n ’ s a c t i o n  t o  e l i m i n a t e  
a n t I - c o m p e t I t I v e  p r a c t i c e s  I n t h e  a i r  t r a n s p o r t  s e c t o r .
KOMMISSIONEN FOR C€ EUROP^lSKE F^LLSSSKABER -  KOMMSSON DER EUROPAlSCHEN GEMEINSCHAFTEN
COMMSSON OF th e  EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES - COMMISSION DES CCMMUNAUTES EUROPEENNES -  ErHTPOTH TON EVPOOAKCN KO*sOT> 
CCMMiSSOJE OELLE COMUNTTA EUROPEE -  COMMSSlE VAN DE EUROPE Sc GEMEENSC HAPPEN
412
Appendix IV. 2
Example of Formal Communication Between 
the Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan 
and the EP Rapporteur (MEP) B. Visser
413
SIR LEON BRITT AN. oc
v ic e - p r e s id e n t  o f  t h e  c o m m i s s io n
OF the  EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES RUE OE LA lO 1. 200 
>048 BRUSSELS - TEL. 23S 25 14 
23S 26 tO
2  7  - 0 3 -  1 93 0
I am s o r r y  not  t o  have hart a chance to sneak wi t h  you about  the a i r
t r a n s p o r t  b l o c k  exempt i on p r o p o s a l ,  on which you .are r a p p o r t e u r ,  and which 
P a r l f a m e n t  has r e f e r r e d  back t o  Commi t tee.  I have been away in the Un i t ed
S t a t e s ,  a r r i v i n g  back on l y  t h i s  mor n i ng ,  and -  as my O f f i c e  has e x p l a i n e d  t o  
you -  I have to l ead a complex and c o n t r o v e r s i a l  d eba t e  i n  Commission
t omor r o w,  on e l e c t r i c i t y  p r i v a t i s a t i o n .
I  have however d i s cus se d  at  some l engt h  w i t h  Mr EHLERMANN,
D i r e c t o r - G e n e r a l  f o r  c o m p e t i t i o n  m a t t e r s ,  the  issues r a i s e d  by your  r e p o r t ,  
and t he  p r i o r i t i e s  you o u t l i n e d  to him l a s t  week.
I am o p t i m i s t i c  t h a t  we s h a l l  be a b l e  to make pr ogr ess  on t h i s  m a t t e r ,  
but  i t  does m e r i t  c a r e f u l  a t t e n t i o n ,  and cannot  i n  my view be s e t t l e d  r a p i d l y  
b e f o r e  y our  meet i no  w i t h  t he  p r e s i d e n c y  o f  Counc i l  on Wednesday a f t e r n o o n .
I t  i s  u n l i k e l y  t h a t  Counc i l  w i l l  t a k e  a f i n a l  d e c i s i o n  t h i s  week,  and 
t h a t  P e r m i t s  us to nave a f u l l R r  and more cons i der ed  d i s c u s s i o n  in St r asbour c  
on A Anr i  I ,  as a r r a n c e c .
I n  t he  meant i me ,  you may be i n t e r e s t e d  i n the a t t a c h e d  n o n - p a p e r ,  which 
o u t l i n e s  t h e  Commission' s  t h i n k i n g  on what  c o n d i t i o n s  would appl y  t o  f u t u r e  
b l ock  e x e m p t i o n s .  You w i l l  u n d e r s t a n d ,  I  am s u r e ,  t h a t  I  am pass i ng  on t h i s  
document  in a s o i r i t  of  c o o p e r a t i o n  between Commission and Pa r l i ame n t  
r a p p o r t e u r s ;  i t  i s  f o r  your  p e r s o n a l  i n f o r m a t i o n  o n l y .
You w i l l  see t h a t  the paper  suggests r e l a t i v e l y  l i m i t e d  changes to the  
c o n d i t i o n s  t h a t  a pp l y  a t  p r e s e n t ,  and t h a t  shoul d remove any d i s q u i e t  you may 
h ave .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  the changes a r e  w o r t h w h i l e  improvements over  a 
c o n t i n u a t i o n  of  t he  s t a t u s  quo.  In a d d i t i o n ,  i t  i s  u s e f u l  f o r  t he  Commission 
t o  have t he  f l e x i b i l i t v  to resoond t o  chanoi no c i r cumst ances  and the  
i n d u s t r y ' s  chanoi no needs r a t h e r  than oe c o n s t r a i n e d  in a f i x e d  f ramework.
Mo doubt  we s h a l l  d i scuss  t hese  and o t h e r  ma t t e r s  when we meet aga i n  in 
St r a s b o u r g  next  week,  and I look f or war d  to t h a t .
r Pen VI SSER,  MEP
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T
/C ond itions fo r  the g ran t o f group exemptions 
in  a i r  tra n sp o rt
t
In tro d u c t io n
1. In  i t s  conclusions o f 4 - 5 December 1989, the Council requested
the Commission to  s p e c ify  the co n d itio n s  on which i t  proposes to  
g ra n t group exemptions in  the a i r  tra n s p o rt in d u s try  fo r  the pe riod  
from 1 February 1991 to  31 December 1992.
2. A t the presen t time the competent Commission se rv ices  are in  the
process o f  e va lu a tin g  the experience under the group exemptions 
adopted in  Ju ly  1988 and o f c o lle c t in g  comments by various 
in te re s te d  p a r t ie s . W hile in  some areas the th ru s t o f fu tu re  
p roposa ls is  c le a r , in  o th e r areas there  is  s t i l l  considerable  
scope fo r  fu r th e r  fa c t - f in d in g  and r e f le c t io n .  The Commission 
however expects to  be in  a p o s it io n  to  submit proposals to_ the 
A d v iso ry  Committee on R e s tr ic t iv e  P ra c tice s  and Dominant P os itions  
in  A ir  T ransport in  J u ly  o f th is  year, th a t is  as soon as poss ib le
a f te r  the Council has adopted the enab ling  R egu la tion . The
Commission intends to  take the next steps re q u ire d  by the enabling 
R egu la tion  (p u b lis h in g  the d r a f t  fo r  comments by in d u s try , and 
another c o n s u lta t io n  o f  the Advisory Committee) in  s u f f ic ie n t  time 
to adopt the group exemption Regulations by the end o f th is  year, 
thus a vo id ing  any lega l vacuum.
3. As in d ic a te d  in  the Exp lanatory Memorandum in  COM (373) f in a l ,  the 
Commission does not in tend to  modify the s tru c tu re  o f the cu rren t 
group exemptions.
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R egula t ion  No. 2671/88
4. The exemption concern ing jo in t  p lanning and c o o rd in a tin g  o f
ca p a c ity  can e s s e n t ia l ly  be reenacted w ithou t major changes. I t  is  
envisaged to extend the exemption to  schedule c o o rd in a tin g .
5. There do not appear to  be la rge  number o f  revenue sha rin g
agreements in  respect o f  intra-Com m unity tra n s p o rt, w hich would 
re q u ire  a group exem ption. Consequently i t  is  contem plated to
d e le te  th is  p o s s ib i l i t y  from the empowering re g u la tio n . Revenue 
sharing  agreements can be d e a lt  w ith  on an in d iv id u a l b as is  in  the
i same manner as jo in t  ven tu re  agreements: the Commission has been 
p a r t ic u la r ly  re c e p tiv e  to  agreements which are necessary to  enable 
sm all new e n tra n ts  to  take up new serv ices in  economical 
condi t io n s .
6. N otw ithstand ing  the f l e x i b i l i t y  in  respect o f fa res  in tro du ce d  by 
the 1987 l ib e r a l is a t io n  measures, a ir l in e  fa res have remained 
remarkably un ifo rm . The’ p o s s ib i l i t y  o f con tinued  t a r i f f  
co n su lta tio n s  has been c r i t i c is e d  as one o f the main causes fo r  the
. apparent lack o f  p r ic e  co m p e tit io n  in  the a ir l in e  in d u s try .
i
The Commission b e lie v e s , however, th a t fare co n su lta tio n s  can serve 
a u se fu l purpose which need not necessa rily  c o n f l ic t  w ith -  the 
ex is tence  o f p r ic e  co m p e tit io n . Fare c o n s u lta t io n s  have 
t r a d i t io n a l ly  been p a r t o f the in te r l in e  mechanism. Even though i t  
is  conceivab le  to  con tinue  th a t system w ithou t fa re  c o n s u lta t io n s , 
there  is*, no doubt th a t these consu lta tio n s  g re a t ly  f a c i l i t a t e  the 
a d m in is tra tio n  o f in te r l in e  agreements. On the o th e r hand, some 
a ir l in e s  have re fused to  in te r l in e  w ith  c e rta in  o th e r c a r r ie rs  even 
a t th e ir  own fa re s , thus p u tt in g  in to  question the j u s t i f i c a t io n  
fo r  the c o n s u lta t io n s .
Consequently i t  is  envisaged to  reenact the exemption in  favour o f 
fa re  c o n s u lta t io n s , but to  inc lude a p ro v is io n  o b lig in g  a i r  
c a r r ie rs  which e le c t to  p a r t ic ip a te  in  t a r i f f  c o n s u lta t io n s , to  
accept in te r l in in g  w ith  a l l  o th e r a ir l in e s  at the fa res d iscussed.
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T h is  o b lig a t io n  cou ld  l>e re f le c te d  in  a c o n d it io n  th a t p a r t ic ip a n ts
in  c o n s u lta tio n s  accept in te r l in in g  w ith  a l l  f in a n c ia l ly  sound
#
a ir l in e s  a t the fa re  app lied  by each p a r t ic ip a n t  fo llo w in g  the 
c o n s u lta t io n s .
Th is  c o n d it io n  would in  e f fe c t  lead to  the c re a tio n  o f  (m ostly 
un ifo rm ) g e n e ra lly  in te rU n a b le  fa re s , next to  which the re  would 
e x is t  (o fte n  c a r r ie r - s p e c if ic )  fa res which would not n e ce ssa rily  be 
in te r l in a b le .  I t  should be noted th a t some c a r r ie r - s p e c if ic  fa res 
can neverthe less be made su b je c t to  a du ty to  in te r l in e ,  fo r  
ins tance  where a re fu s a l to  in te r l in e  a t those fa res by a dominant 
a i r l i n e  would have the e f fe c t  o f p reven ting  new en tran ts  to  operate 
s u c c e s s fu lly . Such o b lig a t io n s  may be imposed on a case-by-case 
bas is  and f a l l  o u ts ide  the scope o f the group exemption.
In  a d d it io n , experience has shown th a t re p o rt in g  du ties  by a ir l in e s  
are not always w e ll understood o r respected. While fo r  the 
in d u s try -w id e  t a r i f f  co n su lta tio n s  these appear to  fu n c tio n  
s a t i s f a c t o r i l y , c o n s u lta tio n s  in  a more lim ite d  framework sometimes 
g ive  r is e  to  c r i t ic is m .  The Commission would make re p o rtin g  du ties  
more s p e c if ic  and would a c t to  ensure complete compliance by 
a i r  1in e s .
7. The exemption o f s lo t  a llo c a t io n  and a irp o r t  scheduling shoirld- as 
soon as p oss ib le  be extended to  cover domestic a i r  tra n s p o rt and 
a i r  tra n s p o rt to  th i r d  c o u n tr ie s . This w i l l  re q u ire  progress on the 
Commission’ s proposals on the a p p lic a tio n  o f the com petition  ru les  
to  those aspects o f a i r  tra n s p o rt (COM (89) 417 f in a l ) .
D i f f i c u l t ie s  caused by s lo t  a llo c a t io n  and a irp o r t  scheduling are 
p r im a r i ly  the re s u lt  o f  congestion a t a iro o r ts .  I f  congestion 
problems are reduced, the problems - e s p e c ia lly  fo r  new en tran ts  - 
encountered when app ly ing  the e x is t in g  systems o f s lo t a llo c a t io n  
and scheduling should be eased. On the o the r hand, i f  congestion 
problems do not seem l ik e ly  to  improve, more fa r-reach ing  s o lu tio n s  
to s lo t  problems may need to  be considered in order to g ive  new 
e n tra n ts  a chance to operate econom ica lly.
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/As fa r  as the co n d itio n s  o f th is  exem ptioa are concerned, the
Commission intends to  provide fo r  increased  transparency o f
procedures and to reduce the d i f f i c u l t i e s  o f  new en tran ts  a t
congested a irp o r ts .  A t the present stage a cons ide rab le  number o f 
o p tion s  are under rev iew , and i t  should be noted th a t a d d it io n a l 
in fo rm a tio n  may re s u lt  from ,d iscuss ions on the Code o f  Conduct
which .is  c u r re n t ly  being prepared. The fo llo w in g  elements are a t 
p resent being considered fo r  in tro d u c tio n  in  the group exemption o r 
in  the Code o f Conduct.
G rea te r transparency could be achieved by re q u ir in g  the s lo t  
c o o rd in a to r to  p rov ide  more in fo rm a tio n  about the present 
s i tu a t io n ,  fo r  instance  to  in d ic a te  c le a r ly  and re g u la r ly  which 
s lo ts  are a v a ila b le  fo r  a llo c a t io n  and which s lo ts  are n o t, and to  
whom they are a llo c a te d . In  a d d it io n , i t  is  contemplated to  make 
s lo t  co o rd in a to rs  more accountable by re q u ir in g  them to  g ive  
reasons fo r  th e ir  d e c is io ns , to  d is c lo s e  these reasons to  
a p p lic a n ts , and to  make th e i^  dec is ions  s u b je c t to  ju d ic ia l  rev iew .
I t  may a lso  be ap p rop ria te  to  re in fo rc e  the duty o f coo rd ina to rs  
not to  d is c r im in a te  between a ir l in e s .
I t  is  a more complex m atte r to  e s ta b lis h  co n d itio n s  which would 
improve co n d itio n s  fo r  access to  s lo ts  fo r  new en tran ts  a t 
congested a irp o r ts  o r in  respect o f peak tim es. The most ra d ic a l 
o p tio n , a u c tio n in g  o f s lo ts ,  does n o t appear to  be approp ria te  
s ince  a llo c a t io n  o f s lo ts  by a market mechanism could g ive  r is e  to  
d is to r t io n s ,  e s p e c ia lly  i f  the re la te d  t r a f f i c  r ig h ts  are a llo ca te d  
by o the r mechanisms. Another method cou ld  be to  a irp o r ts  l im i t  
e x is t in g  "g ra n d fa th e r"  r ig h ts  in  favour o f the es tab lished  
a ir l in e s .  Several means could be considered to  introduce such 
l im i ta t io n ,  in c lu d in g :
g rand fa the r r ig h ts  might be l im ite d  in  time. i . e .  a s lo t 
would have to be surrendered a f te r  X years o f use;
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/- g ra n d fa th e r r ig h ts  n ig h t be l in i t e d  to  a s p e c if ic  se rv ice ,
i . e .  the b e n e f ic ia ry  would have to  reapp ly  fo r  a s lo t  i f  i t  
wanted to  use i t  fo r  a d if fe r e n t  d e s tin a t io n ;
g ra n d fa th e r r ig h ts  n ig h t be lin k e d  to  the use o f  a 
p a r t ic u la r  a i r c r a f t  type, o r nay be used fo r  la rg e r bu t not 
fo r  sm a lle r a i r c r a f t ;  o r . v
the s lo t  c o o rd in a to r n ig h t re q u ire  th a t a l l  b e n e f ic ia r ie s  o f 
s lo ts  su rrender Y % o f th e ir  s lo ts  d u ring  any hour i f  there  
are not Z % o f "ungrandfa thered" s lo ts  a v a ila b le  du ring  th a t 
p e rio d , o r i f  they were requested to  do so by a new e n tra n t 
having less  than a c e r ta in  number o f  s lo ts ,  o r  i f  the re  is  a 
b e n e f ic ia ry  h o ld in g  over a c e r ta in  p ro p o rtio n  o f s lo ts  d u rin g  
th a t p e r io d .
Any measures to  l im i t  g ra nd fa the r r ig h ts  may be lin ke d  to  o th e r 
measures to  encourage the more e f f ic ie n t  use o f  a ir p o r t  f a c i l i t i e s ,  
e .g . in  the co n te x t o f  the Commission’ s proposal on a ir p o r t  
charging p r in c ip le s .
R egu la tion  No. 2672/88
8. The b lock exemption in  respect o f computer re se rva tio n  systems 
would not be su b je c t to  changes o f substance. However, in  o rd e r to 
p rov ide  fo r  more u n ifo rm  a p p lic a tio n  o f Community law a number o f 
p ro v is io n s  cou ld  be a lig n e d  on the corresponding ru le s  o f C ouncil 
R egu la tion  No. 2299/89 on a code o f conduct fo r  computerized 
re se rva tio n  systems o r re fe r  to  these ru le s .
Regulation No. 2673/88
9. Many in te re s te d  p a r t ie s  have emphasized the need to  introduce more 
com p e tition  in  the f ie ld  o f ground h a n d lin g . I t  would be p o ss ib le  
to increase the cho ice ' fo r  a ir p o r t  users by making the exemption in 
favour o f-  ground hand ling  agreements dependent on e ith e r  the 
p o s s ib i l i t y  to s e lf-h a n d le  <in d iv id u a lly  o r together w ith  o th e r
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/a irp o r t  users) o r on the existence o f a t le a s t two independent 
p ro v id e rs  o f h and ling  serv ices (which should not be re s t r ic te d  in  
th e ir  m arketing freedom in  respect o f any p o ss ib le  re c ip ie n t o f  
ground hand ling  se rv ice s  a t the a irp o r t  a t which they provide these 
s e rv ic e s ) . The exemption would on ly  operate  in  respect o f those 
se rv ices  fo r  which e ith e r  o f these co n d itio n s  is  met.
**•
C onclusion
18. The present document attempts to  g ive  a number o f o r ie n ta t io n s  
which cou ld  u s e fu lly  be fo llow ed fo r  the next group exemptions. I t  
does no t p u rp o rt to  be exhaustive  o r f in a l ,  and the Commission 
would expect to  re ce ive  va luab le  suggestions by in te re s te d  p a r t ie s  
on sub je c ts  not y e t covered by th is  document. A p re lim in a ry  
d iscuss ion  o f th is  document w ith  Member S ta tes ' re p re se n ta tive s  
cou ld  not rep lace  an extended debate in  the framework o f  the 
A dv isory  Committee on the basis o f a f u l l y  considered te x t ,  bu t a 
d iscuss ion  a t the present time may p rov ide  u se fu l guidance on 
op tions  not to be developed fu r th e r  when d ra f t in g  the proposa ls.
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As promised, I have been reflecting on the various 
amendments to the air transport group exemption 
Regulations set out in your report, and on the most 
helpful discussion ve had in Strasbourg.
In particular, I undertook to examine whether it might be 
possible to consult Parliament formally on the group 
exemptions themselves. On consideration, and for reasons 
which extend beyond this particular proposal, I am not in
a position to suggest such an approach to my colleagues.
Nevertheless, I do understand the depth of feeling of the 
Transport Committee on this issue, and I am therefore 
willing to propose that the Commission accept amendment 
43, that is the continuation of the existing conditions 
contained in the Council's enabling Regulation.
Naturally, I regret that this one enabling Regulation 
alone contains restrictive conditions, a fact which does 
affect the Commission's ability to adapt the group 
exemption to changing circumstances, and which will 
fetter its ability to take full account of the results of 
the widespread consultation process which will take place 
once the enabling Regulation is adopted.
However, it is important that this proposal makes 
progress, and both to ensure that, and as a feature of 
cooperation towards Parliament, I can accept the re­
insertion of the conditions in the enabling Regulation.
Hr. Visser, HEP 
European Parliament 
Rue Belliard
B r u ss e l s
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9I have already demonstrated the Commission's willingness 
to be open with regard to its intentions for the group 
exemption, and in that spirit I intend to keep Parliament 
informed and will take account of any views expressed.
In the light of the above, and of our discussion in 
Strasbourg, I believe that amendments 44 and 46 fall, and 
the date in amendment 45 is amended to 1 July 1990.
I look forward to explaining this to the Committee on 
Monday 23 April. I hope that we may now move forward 
quickly to secure approval of the air transport package. 
Further delay would disappoint the air transport 
industry and its consumers who are rightly expecting 
progress from the Community institutionj
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/Appendix IV. 3 
Example of a Questionnaire and Three Drafting 
Versions on the Common Rules for the 
Slot-Allocation Proposal at EC
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QUESTi QNNAlRE SLOT ALLOCATION
M e e t i n g  w i t h  e x p e r t s / c o o r d i n a t o r s  -  2 0 , 2 . 199Q
1. An EEC code o f  conduct  s ho u l d  be based on the f o l l o w i n g  p r i n c i p l e s . -
t he  s l o t  a l l o c a t i o n  p r o ce d u r e  should be t r a n s p a r e n t  and n o n -  
d l ^ s c r I m l n a t o r y
f l e x i b i l i t y  shou l d  be e ns ur ed ,  I n c l u d i n g  t he  p o s s i b i l i t y  f o r  
new e n t r a n t s  to e n t e r  t he  market
s l o t  a l l o c a t i o n  shou l d  not  be usee as a t oo l  in t he  c o m p e t i o n  
To what  e x t e n t  a r e  t hese  p r i n c i p l e s  r e f l e c t e d  In t h e  c u r r e n t  s l o t  
a l l o c a t i o n  p r ocedur e?
2.  Which o f  the f o l l o w i n g  p r i n c i p l e s  can be a p p l i e d
b i g  over  smaI I 
passenger  over  f r e i g h t  
schedu l ed  over  non - s ch e du I ed  
s I I ent  o ve r  no Isy
-  commercia l  over  non-commercI  al
-  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  over  aomest i c / Communi ty  
s t o p p i n g  over  n o n - s t o p
f r e q u e n c y  Capping 
s e c t o r  I z a t I o n
-  , t r a f f i c  d i s t r i b u t i o n ?
3.  What a r e  the a d v a n t a g e s / d i s a d v a n t a g e s  of  auct  I on I n g / 1  r ad I ng of  
s l o t s  ?
4.  What a r e  the a d v a n t a g e s / d i s a d v a n t a g e s  of  peak hour p r i c i n g  ?
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/5 .  What measures can be t ak en  to s t i m u l a t e  t he  use o f  a l t e r n a t i v e  
modes o f  t r a n s p o r t  ?
6 .  What measures can be t ak en  t o  avo i d  b l o c k i n g  o f  s l o t s ?
7 .  What measures have been t a k e n  to I ncr ease  the  number o f  a v a i l a b l e  
s l o t s ?  What I m p r o v e m e n t s / t e c h n i c a l  devel opments  can be e x p ec t ed ?
8.  Is t he  e x i s t i n g  I n f o r m a t i o n  technol ogy  an answer t o  meet the  
p r i n c i p l e s  s e t  out  In q u e s t i o n  1?
9 .  What measures have been t a k e n  to s t i m u l a t e  t he  use o f  a l t e r n a t i v e  
a i r p o r t s  and a l t e r n a t i v e  modes of  t r a n s p o r t ?
10.  What i mprovements a r e  p o s s i b l e  In the IATA s c h e d u l i n g  procedure- .
p u b l i c a t i o n  of  a swap l i s t
p r o h i b i t  t he  acc ep t an c e  of  s l o t s  f o r  o u t s i d e  t he  r e q u e s t e d  
t i me o n l y  f o r  exchange reasons
p r o h i b i t  t he  r e s e r v a t i o n  of  s l o t s / e a r l y  announcement  of
unused s l o t s
c o m p o s i t i o n  o f  Sc h ed u l i n g  Procedures Commi t te  
c o m p l a i n t  p r o ce d u r e  ?
11.  What improvements have been taken to s t i m u l a t e  t he  use of
a l t e r n a t i v e  a i r p o r t s  and a l t e r n a t i v e  modes o f  t r a n s p o r t ?
12.  How can new e n t r a n t s  be accommodated w i t h o u t  s e r i o u s l y  a f f e c t i n g  
t he  g r a n d f a t h e r  r i g h t s ?
13.  What r o l e  s houl d  be e nv i s a g e d  f or  a i r p o r t  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  in the 
s l o t  a l l o c a t i o n  pr ocedur e?
14.  A d v a n t a g e s / d i s a d v a n t a g e s  to i nv o l ve  consumer o r g a n i s a t i o n s  in :ne
s l o t  a l l o c a t i o n  p r o ce ss .
15 .  A d v a n t a g e s / d i s a d v a n t a g e s  o f  an EEC code of  conduct  f o r  s l o t
a l l o c a t i o n .  Are t h e r e  any suggest i ons?
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V I l / C / 1  -  379/90
D1S.CULS.SJon passr SLOT ALLOCATION
i n t  r o d u c t I o n
The a i r  t r a n s p o r t  s ys t em In Europe has expanded the l a s t  f i v e  year?  
c o n s i d e r a b l y  ( ±  Q% I n c r e a s e  o f  passenger  k i l o m e t e r s ) .  T h i s  deve l opmen- 
has not  a l ways  been accompani ed by a c ompa r a b l e  I nc r ease  o f  t he  a l l  
t r a n s p o r t  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e . C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  bot h  the a i r  t r a f f i c  c o n t r o l  
syst ems and t he  a i r p o r t  c a p a c i t y  have in many i n s t a n c e s  now r eached  th<° 
l i m i t s  o f  t h e i r  a b s o r b i n g  c a p a c i t y .
M a n y  i n i t i a t i v e s  n a v e  b e e n  t a k e n  t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  e x i s t i n g  c a o a c i t y .  T h e  
ATC p r o b l e m s  a r e  h i g h  o n  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  a g e n d a ,  a i r p o r s  a r e  i n v e s t i n g  
h e a v i l y  t o  e n l a r g e  t h e i r  t e r m i n a l  b u i l d i n g s  a n d  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  g a t e s .  
H a n d l i n g  c a p a c i t y  i s  b e i n g  i n c r e a s e d  a n d  e f f o r t s  h a v e  b e e n  ma d e  t o  
f a s t e n  p a s s e n g e r  t e r m i n a l  t h r o u g h p u t .
On e  o f  t h e  m o s t  d i f f i c u l t  p r o b l e m s ,  h o w e v e r ,  i s  t h e  i a c k  o f  r u n w a y  
c a p a c i t y  a t  s ome  o f  E u r o p e ' s  m a i n  h u b  a i r p o r t s .
E n v i r o n m e n t a l  a n d  p o l i t i c a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,  l e g a i  a n d  p r o c e d u r a l
d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  s a f e t y  a s p e c t s  a n d  t h e  v e r y  l o n g  l e a d  t i m e  f o r
c o n s r u c t i o n  w o r k s  ma k e  i t  v e r y  d i f f i c u l t  t o  e n l a r g e  r u n w a y  c a p a c i t y  i n  
the  f o r e s e e a b l e  f u t u r e .
Some a i r p o r t s  p r e s e n t l y  o n i y  f a c e  c o n g e s t i o n  p r o b l e m s  c u r i n g  seme p e a k  
h o u r s  o f  t h e  c a y ,  o t h e r s ,  ; i k e  H e a t h r o w ,  G a t w i c k ,  “ r a n c ' u r :  a n d
D u s s e l d o r f ,  a r e  c o m p l e t e l y  f u l l .
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The consequence Is t ha t  a i r l i n e s  ar e  compet i ng  f o r  t he  scarce  s l o t s  a t  
t he  -onger ^d a i r p o r t s ' :  The a i r l i n e  I n d u s t r y  has r e a c t e d  by s e t t i n g  up 
a ma ch i ne r y  t o  c o o r d i n a t e  demand and d i s t r i b u t e  s l o t s  among a p p l i c a n t  
c a r r i e r s .  These  IATA s c h e d u l i n g  p r o c e d u r e s  c o n s t i t u t e  a v o l u n t a r y  
■ystem o f  t r a f f i c  d i s t r i b u t i o n .
The IATA schedul  I no procedur es  Cl )
The IATA p r o c e d u r e s  p r o v i d e  f o r  b i - a n n u a l  C o n f e r e n c e s ,  which a r e  open - 
f o r  a t t e n d a n c e  f o r  a l l  c a r r i e r s  ( s c h e d u I e d - c h a r t e r , p a s s e n g e r - f r e i g h t ,
IATA-non I ATA) .
On t he  b a s i s  v i  p r i o r i t y  r u l e s  the a i r p o r t  s I o t - c o o r d I n a t o r  c o o r d i n a t e s
t h e  s c h e d u l e s  o f  a i r l i n e s  a n d  d e c i d e s  o n  c o n f l i c t i n g  s l o t  a p p l i c a t i o n s .
T h e  S c h e d u l i n g  P r o c e d u r e s  C o m m i t t e e  i s  t h e  s t e e r i n g  c r o u p  f o r  t h e  
C o n f e r e n c e s ,  i t  e s t a b l i s h e s  t h e  r u l e s  o f  c o o r d i n a t i o n ,  i t  r e v i e w s  t h e  
c a p a c i t y  l i m i t a t i o n s  a n d  a s s i s t s  i n  e s t a b l i s h i n g  t h e m  a n d  p r o v i c e s  f o r  
a ' e v i e w  o r  m e d i a t i o n  i n  c a s e  p r o b l e m s  s h o u l d  a r i s e .
T h e  a i r p o r t  c o o r d i n a t o r s  p l a y  a k e y  r o l e  i n  t h e  t o t a l  p r o c e s s ,  n o t  o n l y  
d u r i n g  t h e  C o n f e r e n c e s ,  b u t  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  y e a r .  T h e y  d e c i d e  o n  t h e  
a c t u a l  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  s l o t s  a n d  t h e y  m o n i t o r  t h e  w h o l e  p r o c e s s  o f  
s c n e c u i m g  a n d  u s e  o f  s l o t s  a l l o c a t e d .  T ne a i r p o r t  c o o r o i r a t o " s  a r e  
u s u a l l y  e m p l o y e e s  o f  t h e  n a t i o n a l  a i r l i n e .
( 1 )  I ATA s c h e d u l i n g  p r o c e d u r e s  g u i d e ,  s e v e n t h  e d i t i o n :  r e o r u a r y  15 9 0 .
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The p r i o r i t i e s  In t he  a l l o c a t i o n  of  s l o t s  a dv i s e d  by IATA a r e  based on 
t he  f o l l o w i n g  f a c t o r s :
H i s t o r i c a l  p r ecedence  -  a s l o t  t ha t  has been o p e r a t e d  by an a i r l i n e  
should e n t i t l e  t ha t  a i r l i n e  to c l a i m  the same s l o t  In the  n ex t
e q u i v a l e n t  season
E f f e c t i v e  p e r i o d  o f  movement  -  the s chedul e  e f f e c t i v e  f o r  a longer
p e r i o d  o f  o p e r a t i o n  In t he  same season shoul d  have p r i o r i t y
E m e r g e n c i e s
-  D a y l i g h t  sav i ng t  i me.
T h e  ATA s c h e d u l i n g  p r o c e d u r e s  f u r t h e r  r e f i n e  t h e s e  b a s i c  r u l e s .
C o n s u i t a t  I o n s
T n e  C o m m i s s i o n  n a s  u n c e r t a < e n  a r e v  e *  o f  t n e  p r e s e n t  s > s t e m  o f  s i o t
a l i c c a t i o n  o n  t h e  o a s i s  o f  t h e  f  o  I <o w i n g  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s :
1.  R u n wa y  c o n g e s t i o n  i s  a p r o o l e m  t h a t  w i l l  n o t  b e  s o l v e d  o n  t h e  s h o r t
t e r m .  T h e r e f o r e  e f f o r t s  t o  i n c r e a s e  a . r p c r t  c a p a c i t y  h a v e  t o  be
a c c o m p a n i e d  o y  an o b j e c t , » e  a n c  n o n - c . s c r : m i n a t o r y  s e t  o f  " u i e s  f o r
t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  s l o t s .
2 .  The  e c o n o m i c  v a l u e  o f  s l o t s  w i l l  i n c r e a s e .  C o n s e q u e n t l y  t h e
p r e s s u r e  p u t  o n  c o o r d i n a t o r s  t o  t a < e  : n t o  a c c o u n t  o o ; : t  i c a I
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  w i l l  a l s o  i n c r e a s e .  L e g a l l y  b i n d i n g  r u l e s  ma y  h e l p  
them to keep a n e u t r a l  p o s i t i o n .
3 .  One o f  t he  a l m s  t o  l i b e r a l i z e  a i r  t r a n s p o r t  i n  E u r o p e  I s
■ n c r e a s e  c o m p e t i t i o n  a n d  t o  l o w e r  t h e  c a r r i e r s  f o r  n e w e n t r a n t s  o n  
a s p e c i f i c  r o u t e .  S i o t  a l l o c a t i o n  r u l e s  s n o u l d  r e f l e c t  t h e  n e e d  f o r  
f l e x i b i l i t y  a n d  p r o v i d e  f o r  a c c e s s  t o  r o u t e s  f o r  n e w  e n t r a n t s .
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/4. Transparency and non-d I scr im I na t ion  has to  be ensured. Only I f  
a i r l i n e s  can monitor  the work o f  the c o o r d in a to r s ,  negat ive  
d ec is io ns  concern ing t h e i r  s lo t  a p p l i c a t io n s  are accep tab le .
5.  S lo t  a l l o c a t i o n  should not be used as a tool  fo r  c o m p e t i t i o n .
On t he  b a s i s  o f  a q u e s t i o n n a i r e ,  c o n s u l t a t i o n s  have t aken  p l a c e  w i t h
( a )  t he  s l o t  c o o r d i n a t o r s
( b )  ICAA ( a i r p o r t s )
( c )  ACE ( i n d e p e n d a n t  a i r l i n e s )
( d )  EBAA ( b u s i n e s s  a v i a t i o n )
( e )  I A T A  a n d  AEA
( f )  ERA ( r e g i o n a l  c a r r i e r s )  a n d
( g )  FATUREC ( u s e r s )  and
( h )  w i t h  t he  US a u t h o r i t i e s  and a i r l i n e  i n d u s t r y .
T h e  b r i e f  r e s u l t s  o f  t h e s e  c o n s u l t a t i o n s  w e r e  as  f o l l o w s :
( a )  T h e  c o o r d i n a t o r s  o f  t h e  c o n g e s t e d  a i r p o r t s  s t r e s s e d  t h e  p o i n t  t h a t  
t h e  p r e s e n t  s y s t e m  g i v e s  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  f l e x i b i l i t y  r e s u l t i n g  i n  t h e  
o p t i m a l  u s e  o f  a v a i l a c e  s l o t s .  C o o r d i n a t o r s  m u s t  be  k n o w l e d g e a b l e  
a i r l i n e  p e o p l e  t o  d o  a p r o p e r  , c c . T h e r e  m i g h t  be  a r e a s o n  t o  g i v e  
c o o r d i n a t o r s  a m o r e  f o r m a l  n e u t r a l  an d  i n d e p e n d a n t  p o s i t i o n ,  
a l t h o u g h  t h e r e  h a v e  n e v e r  b e e n  c o m p l a i n t s  o n  t h i s  p o i n t .  T h e r e  a r e  
w a y s  a n d  m e a n s  t o  c r e a t e  mo r e  s l o t s  a t  t h e  c o n g e s t e d  a i r p o r t s .  S l o t
a l l o c a t i o n  i s  a g l o b a l  i s s u e ,  n o t  j u s t  E u r o p e ,  t h e r e f o r e  I ATA i s  a
g o o d  f o r u m .
( b )  The a i r p o r t s  have b a s i c a l l y  on l y  s t r e s s e d  t he  p o i n t  t h a t  t hey
s h o u l d  b e  I n v o l v e d  i n  t h e  s l o t  a l l o c a t i o n  p r o c e s s .  T h e y  h a v e  n o t  
c r i t i c i z e d  t h e  I ATA s y s t e m ,  " h e  C o m m i s s i o n  p r o p o s a l  o n  a . ' p o r t  
c o n s u l t a t i o n s  m e e t s  t h e i r  w i s h e s .
( c )  The I ndep e n d an t  a i r l i n e s  of  ACE have a l s o  I n d i c a t e d  t h a t  the
p r e s e n t  IATA system i s  an e f f i c i e n t  way o f  deal  I n g  w i t h  t h e  
d i f f i c u l t  s u b j e c t  o f  s l o t  a l l o c a t i o n .  The equal  t r e a t m e n t  o f  
c h a r t e r  and sch ed u l e d  s e r v i c e s  was c on s i d e r e d  an I m p o r t a n t  a s p e c t .
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On t he  q u e s t i o n  o f  g r a n d f a t h e r  r i g h t s  and new e n t r a n t s  i t  was 
a c c e p t e d  t h a t  the,  p r e s e n t  system makes I t  d i f f i c u l t ,  but  not
I m p o s s i b l e  t o  get  s l o t s .
( d )  Bu s i n e s s  a v i a t i o n  is a d i f f e r e n t  mar ke t  segment  because these
compani es do not  p a r t i c i p a t e  in the s l o t  a l l o c a t i o n  p r o c e s s ,  out  
t r y  to ge t  the n e c e s s a r y  s l o t s  when needed on an a d - h o c  o a s i s .  
F l e x i b i l i t y  Is the  key word f or  t h i s  t ype  o f  a v i a t i o n ,  g e n e r a l l y
t he  IATA system works w e l l ,  a l t h o u g h  a i r p o r t s  c o u l d  p l a y  a more 
impor t a n t  r o l e .
( e )  IATA ad AEA were s t r o n g  s u p p o r t e r s  o f  the  p r e s e n t  s ys t em.  , : was
s t r e s s e d  t h a t  the  r u l e s  deve l op  g r a d u a l l y  and w i l l  be deve l oped
f u r t h e r .  The ' a c t  t h a t  the system is c r e a t e d  and c a r r i e d  out  by the  
i n d u s t r y  i t s e l f  has i ead to acept ance  of  the r u l e s ,  e v e r  by tnose
wno f ac e  r e f u s a l  o f  a s l o t .  Community r u l e s  woul d  c r e a t e  a massi ve
amount o f  comp I a i n t  s and cour t p r o c e d u r e s .  i aTa  i s  w i l i n g  to 
c o o p e r a t e  w i t h  the Commission and d e v e l o p  r u l e s  :o b e t t e r  
accommodate new e n t r a n t s .
Commission oa r ; i c i Da *. : on n the 5PC was we: cornea.
( f )  ERA r e p e a t e d  the arguments  used by the  o t h e r  o r g a n i s a t i o n s .  A
Commi ssi on r e g u l a t i o n  is unnecessar y  and may d i s t u r b  the system.
New e n t r a n t s ,  member o f  ERA, have been a b l e  t o  o b t a i n  s l o t s  at  the  
v e r y  c o n g e s t e d  a i r p o r t s .
( g )  FATUREC s t r e s s e d  t h r e e  p o i n t s :  s l o t  
f u r t h e r  I n c r e a s e  in c o m p e t i t i o n  
p o s i t i o n s  o f  n a t i o n a l  c a r r i e r s  
s t r e n g t h e n e d  cy the s i o t  a l i o c a t . o n  
access  to congest ed  a i r p o r t s .
( h )  The US a u t h o r i t i e s  have shown a keen i n t e r e s t  in t he  devel opments
in Eur ope .  They c l a i m  p r e f e r e n t i a l  t r e a t m e n t  f o r  US c a r r i e r s ,
s i m i l a r  t o  t he  advant aged t r e a t m e n t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s e r v i c e s  have in 
t he  US. The US a i r l i n e  I n d u s t r y  a c c e p t s  t he  IATA p r o c e d u r e  and they  
p a r t l - c i p a t e  a c t i v e l y  in the devel opment  o f  t he  r u l e s .
a l l o c a t i o n  s h o u l d  not  p r e se n t  a 
In Eur ope ;  e x i s t i n g  dominant  
a t  a i r p o r t s  s ho u l d  not be 
r u i e s ;  new e n t r a n t s  s r c u . a  ~ave
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/The g e n e r a l  v i ew o f  the o r g a n i s a t i o n s  c o n s u l t e d  is t h a t  t h e  e x i s t i n g  
IATA r u l e s  g o v e r n i n g  the  s l o t  a l l o c a t i o n  p r ocess  work out
s a t  I s f a c t o r  I I y . A l t hough some mi nor  m o d i f i c a t i o n s  can be e n v i s a g e d  the  
b a s i s  o f  t he  s chedul e  c o o r d i n a t i o n  shoul d  not  be changed.
Pr obl em a r eas
i n d i v i d u a l  a i r l i n e s  and a i r p o r t s  have,  in some i n s t a n c e s ,  t aken  a vi ew  
d i f f e r e n t  f rom the o r g a n i s a t i o n s  and they have p o i n t e d  a t  s ome 
d i f f i c u l t i e s  of  the l AT -  r u l e s .
A c a r r i e r  h o l d i n g  a s l o t  can use the s l o t  f o r  d i f f e r e n t  o p e r a t i o n s .
I t  can s w i t c h ,  for  exampl e ,  i t s  o p e r a t i o n  f rom one c o u n t r y  to
a n o t h e r  thus a d d ; ' ' ;  c a p a c i t y  in a s p e c i f i c  market  - r s r e a s  the
compet i ng  c a r r i e r  n t ha t  mar ke t  cannot  r e c i p r o c a t e  b e c a u s e  i t  is
d e n i e d  access to t ha t  a i r p o r t  due to a lack o f  s l o t s .
Not o n l y  is i t  o o s s i o i e  f o r  c a r r i e r s  h o l d i n g  s l o t s  to s w i t c h  
d e s t i n a t i o n s ,  they  can a l s o  s w i t c h  f rom a c h a r t e r  o p e r a t i o n  i n t o  a 
s c h e d u l e d  o p e r a t i o n .  Al so  In t hese  cases  the  schedu l e d  c a r r i e r  f rom 
t he  o t h e r  P a r t y  cannot  match t hese  schedu l ed  o p e r a t i o n s  because I t  
i s den i ed a c c e s s .
: t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  * c r  new e n t r a n t s  t o  e n t e r  t h e  p r o f i t a p  e r o u t e s  t o
and f rom the congested a i r p o r t s .  The emphasi s In the I a T a  p r o c e d u r e
on g r a n d f a t h e r  r i g h t s  g i v e s  the system a t endency  to become 
i n f l e x i b l e  and d i s cour a ge  new I n i t i a t i v e s .  P r e s e n t l y ,  even at  the  
h i g h l y  congest ed a i r p o r t s ,  a number o f  s l o t s  become a v a i l a b l e  
d u r i n g  the  y e a r .  S l o t s  a r e  b e i ng  g i v e n  up  o r  ar e  not  - s e d .  These  
s l o t s  a r e  not  a u t o m a t i c a l l y  a l l o c a t e d  among new e n t r a n t s .
C o nc e r n i n g  t r a n s p a r e n c y  and n e u t r a l i t y  some a i r l i n e s  have i n d i c a t e d  
to the Commission that  c o o r d i n a t o r s  do not  a l ways  ma<e a v a i l a b l e  
a l l  t he  r e l e v a n t  i n f o r m a t i o n  t o  the  c a r r i e r s  I n v o l v e d .  I t  i s ,  l r  
f a c t ,  somet imes d i f f i c u l t  t o  know I f  the IATA r u l e s  a r e  be i ng  
a p p l i e d .  Onl y  In few cases t he  c o o r d i n a t o r s  o f f e r  a l t e r n a t i v e  s l o t s
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or a swap l i s t .  The p o s i t i o n  of  the c o o r d i n a t o r  has been q u e s t i o n n e d .  
I t  Is w i d e l y  r e c o g n i z e d  t h a t  the c o o r d i n a t o r  s h o u l d  have a v as t  
e x p e r i e n c e  In t he  a i r l i n e  I n d u s t r y ,  but  the forma I r e l a t i o n  between the  
c o o r d i n a t o r  and h i s  e mpl oyer ,  the a i r l i n e ,  c ou l d  be changed so t ha t  h i s  
n e u t r a l i t y  is a l s o  f o r m a l l y  r e c o g n i z e d .
On the b a s i s  o f  a l l  tne i n f o r m a t i o n  o b t a i n e d ,  t he  Commission s ugge s t s  
t o  put  f o r w a r d  p r o p o sa l s  on s l o t  a l l o c a t i o n .  These  p r o p o s a l s  w i l l  not  
f u n d a m e n t a l l y  change the p r e s e n t  IATA system o f  s l o t  a l l o c a t i o n .  The 
m e r i t s  o f  t h a t  system are w i d e l y  r e c o g n i z e d ,  a l s o  by t he  Commission.  
Ther e  a r e ,  however ,  some e l e m e n t s  wnicn m i g n t  oe  f u r t h e r  i m p r o v e d .
The Commission w i l l  as< IATA for  an ODserver  s t a t u s  in the S . P . C . .  so 
t h a t  i t  can p a r t i c i p a t e  more a c t i v e l y  in the s c h e c u l i n g  p r o c e d u r e s  and 
in the  f u r t h e r  devel opment  o f  the r u l e s .
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SCOPE
/
ELEMENTS FOR INCLUSION IN A CODE OF CONDUCT
S l o t  a l l o c a t i o n  and s c h e d u l i n g  c o o r d i n a t i o n  I n v o l v i n g  a i r  s e r v i c e s  to
Communi ty a i r p o r t s  w i t h  a v i ew to e n s u r i n g  n e u t r a l  p r o c e d u r e s ,  
t r a n s p a r e n c y ,  c o n t i n u i t y  and p o s s i b i l i t i e s  for  new e n t r a n t s .
Ctef ln ,i Uons
SLOT ALLOCATION wo u . d cover  both the quest  ion -of whether  an a i r l i n e  can 
get  an i n i t i a l  s l o t  at  an a i r p o r t s  and the q u e s t i o n  o f  be i ng a l l o c a t e d  
a f i n a l  s l o t  a t  a s p e c i f i c  t i me.
SCHEDULE COORDINATION would mean the c o o r d i n a t i o n  o f  f l i g h t  programmes
i n v o l v i n g  a m u l t i t u d e  of  a i r p o r t s ;  a p r o ce ss  whi ch would r e s u l t  in the  
f i n a l  s l o t  a I I oca t ; o n .
NEW ENTRANT c o u l d  mean an a i r  c a r r i e r  which has no presence  at  the  
a i r p o r t s  ( o r  ess than X s l o t s )  -  or -  an a i r  c a r r i e r  which has no 
p r e s e nc e  on a r o u t e  .and has ess than X s l o t s ) .
T r a n s p a r e n c y
O b l i g a t i o n  on a i r  c a r r i e r s  to submi t  p e r t i n e n t  i n f o r m a t i o n  f or  example:  
r e q u e s t e d  s c h e d u l e s  ' o r  the f o l l o w i n g  season t o  the a u t h o r i t i e s  a n d / o r  
a i r p o r t  c o o r d i n a t o r .  Submi ssi on to be made a c e r t a i n  t ime b e f o r e  t he  
r e l e v a n t  s c h e d u l i n g  c o o r d i n a t i o n  c o n f e r e n c e .
The i n f o r m a t i o n  snoui d  c o n t a i n  c e r t a i n  I n f o r m a t i o n  f or  example:  type of  
a i r c r a f t ,  programme and r e quest ed  t i m i n g  o f  f l i g h t s ,  e t c . .
T h i s  I n f o r m a t i o n  s h a l l  be made a v a i l a b l e  to a l l  a i r  c a r r i e r s ,  whi ch  
have s u b m i t t e d  a s l o t  request  and to a i r p o r t  a u t h o r i t i e s .  At
c o o r d i n a t e d  a i r p o r t  3 trs s s r o u : a  be  t h e  . " e s D o n s . b ;  t .• o f t h e  
c o o r d  1 r . a t o r  .
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At  c o o r d i n a t e d  a i r p o r t s  t he  c o o r d i n a t o r  s n a i l  a l s o  i n f o r m  the a i r  
c a r r i e r s  o f  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  t o  meet  t h e i r  r e q u e s t s  or  o f  any  
a l t e r n a t i v e s  w i t h i n  a r e a s o n a b l e  t l m e s p a n .
R u l e s  g o v e r n i n g  s l o t  a l l o c a t i o n  and s c h e d u l e  c o o r d i n a t i o n  s h o u l d  be 
pub I I s h e d .
S l o t  pool
A minimum o f  X X o f  s l o t s  s h o u l d  be r e l e a s e d  e v e r y  [ s e a s o n ]  [ y e a r ]  and 
p l a c e d  In a common p o o l .
T h e s e  s l o t s  s h o u l d  be r e d i s t r i b u t e d  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  f o l l o w i n g
p r i o r i t i e s :
1.  New e n t r a n t s  ( f r o m  a w a i t i n g  l i s t )
2 .  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  s e r v i c e s  t o  t h e  Communi ty  and i n t r a - C o m m u n i t y  
s e r v i c e s  in d i r e c t  c o m p e t i t i o n .
Undue b l o c k i n g  o f  s l o t s  s h o u l d  have con s eq u e nc e  ‘ o '  o r i o r i : /  r a t i n g .
S l o t s  wh i c h  a r e  not  used o r  whi cn a r e  r e l e a s e d  must go i n t o  t he  s i o t  
p o o l .  T r a n s f e r  o f  s l o t s  f r om one a i r  c a r r i e r  t o  a n o t h e r  s h o u l d  not  be  
a l l o w e d ,  exchange  ( s w a p p i n g )  a t  t he  same a i r p o r t  s h o u l d  be a l l o w e d .
C o n f l i c t i n g  s l o t  r e q u e s t s
Where  s l o t  r e q u e s t s  c a n n o t  be accommodated In t he  n or ma l  way a t  
s c h e d u l i n g  c o o r d i n a t i o n  c o n f e r e n c e s  p r i o r i t i e s  o f  c h o i c e  may be 
e s t a b l i s h e d  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t he  f o l l o w i n g  c r i t e r i a :
1 .  P u b l i c  s e r v i c e  i n t e r e s t s .  In t h i s  c o n t e x t  a Member S t a t e  may f o r  
e x a m p l e  r e s e r v e  X % o f  s l o t s  f o r  r e g i o n a l  s e r v i c e s .
2 .  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  c o n c e r n s .
3 .  C a p a c i t y  u t i l i s a t i o n  c on c e r n s  ‘ o r  examp:e  z ;  n a y  o f  ‘ ' e q u e n c y  
c a p p i n g  per  r o u t e  u n l e s s  a c e r t a i n  s i z e  a i r c r a f t  i s  o p e r a t e d .
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/Where c o n f l i c t s  c a n n o t  be r e s o l v e d  IATA (SPC)  a r b i t r a t i o n  s h o u l d  be 
used I f  a i r  c a r r i e r s  a g r e e .  I f  no t  a n o t h e r  s p e e d y  a r b i t r a t i o n  
p o s s i b i l i t y  must  be p r o v i d e d .
Grand.fal.her rights
S h o u l d  be c o n f i r m e d  w i t h  f o l l o w i n g  r e s e r v a t i o n s :
S l o t s  may be f r e e l y  changed f rom one s e r v i c e  t o  a n o t h e r  e x c e p t  In
c a s e s  where  a s i g n i f i c a n t  u n s a t i s f i e d  demand f o r  s l o t s  e x i s t s
( w a i t i n g  l i s t )  f o r  a s e r v i c e  t o  t h e  a i r p o r t  [ on  t h e  same r o u t e j
[on a s i m i l a r  r o u t e  f rom the Member S t a t e  t o  w h i c h  a new s e r v i c e  or  
i n c r e a s e  in f r e q u e n c y  was i n t e n d e d ]  [ w i t h i n  X h o u r s  f r o m the
r e q u e s t e d  t i m e ] .
Change o f  use  o f  s l o t  f rom one t y p e  o f  s e r v i c e  t o  a n o t h e r  s h o u l d  be
a l i o w e d  w i t h o u t  r e s t r i c t i o n  to t he  same Member S t a t e .
C£Qr_^i,Pi2.I.:.an
An a i r p o r t  s h o u l d  be c o o r d i n a t e : :  when :
a c e r t a i n  u t i l i s a t i o n  is r eached;
2 .  a c e r t a i n  number  o f  a i r  c a r r i e r s  demand I t ;
3 .  when t he  SPC demand I t .
The c o c r o i n a t o r  s n a i l  be a p p o i n t e d  by t he  Member S t a t e  c o n c e r n e d .  The
c o s t s  s h a l l  be b o r n e  by t h a t  Menoer S t a t e .
S c h e d u l i nq c o o r d i n a t i o n
i a T a  s c . n e c u l i n g  c o o r d i n a t o r ,  c o n f e r e n c e s  s h o u l d  o e  c c n f  - n e e  a s  t n e
r i g h t  f o r u m  p r o v i d e d  g r o u p  e x e m p t i o n  r u l e s  a r e  r e s p e c t e c .
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/Ai rpor t  capaci ty
The maximum number o f  s l o t s  s h a l l  be e s t a b l i s h e d  by Member S t a t e s  a f t e r  
c o n s u l t a t i o n  o f  t h e  SPC,  t he  a i r p o r t  a u t h o r i t i e s  and any  o t h e r  p a r t y  
t h a t  may be d i r e c t l y  i n v o l v e d  In t h e  o p e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  a i r p o r t .
Reoor t
R e p o r t * o n  a p p l i c a t i o n  o p f  code o f  conduct  s h o u l d  be f o r e s e e n  t o g e t h e r  
w i t h  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  r e v i s i o n .
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D i s c u s s i o n  p ap e r  S l o t  A l l o c a t i o n  I I
A r t i c l e  i Scope o f  t he  r e g u l a t i o n
T h i s  r e g u l a t i o n  s h a l l  a p p l y  t o  t he  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  s l o t s  and t r a f f i c
d i s t r i p u t i o n  a t  Communi ty  a i r p o r t s .
Q u e s t i o n  and r e ma r k s  f o r  
con.su ! t a t  ion = GRC
T h i s  a r t i c l e  w i l l  be m o d i f i e d  
u l t i m a t e l y  a c c o r d i n g  to t h e  
f i n a l  c o n t e n t  o f  t he  p r o p o s a l .
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A r t i c l e  2 De f in i t i o ns
For  t h e  p u r p o s e  o f  th. I s  R e g u l a t i o n :
( a )  " S l o t "  means t he  o p e r a t i o n a l  a u t h o r i t y  t o  conduct  one l a n d i n g  o r  
t a k e  o f f  o p e r a t i o n  a t  a s p e c i f i c  t i m e  o f  a c o o r d i n a t e d  a i r p o r t .
( b )  " S l o t  a l l o c a t i o n "  means the g r a n t i n g  o f  a s l o t  [by  a s l o t  
c o o r d i n a t o r ]  t o  an a i r l i n e .
( c )  " S c h e d u l e  c o o r d i n a t i o n "  means the c o o r d i n a t i o n  o f  f l i g h t  programmes  
b e t we e n  a i r l i  n e s .
t a ;  "New e n t r a n t "  means an a i r  c a r r i e r  not  h o l d i n g  more t ha n  f o u r  s l o t s  
on a s p e c i f i c  day a :  a c o o r d i n a t e d  a i r p o r t ,  but  navi .ng r e q u e s t e d  
s l o t s  f o r  t h a t  day d u r i n g  t he  p r e v i o u s  cor  r e s p o n d i n g  s e a s o n .
T h i s  A r t i c l e  a t  p r e s e n t  o n l y  
c o n t a . n s  ce f . n i t : c.ns f o r  <ey  
t e r m s .  A d d i t i o n a l  d e f i n i t i o n s  
w i l l  be added as n e c e s s a r y .  
Sh o u l d  new e n t r a n t  oe s p e c i f i e d  
f o r  t he  a i r p o r t  as sucn or  per  
r o u t e ?
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Art  i c I e  3 General  ru les  
/
1.  A i r  c a r r i e r s  whi ch  have o b t a i n e d  a r o u t e  l i c e n c e  f rom t he  Home 
S t a t e  and t h e  S t a t e  o f  D e s t i n a t i o n  s h a l l  w i t h i n  t he  t e r ms  o f  t he  
l i c e n c e  and s u b j e c t  t o  A r t i c l e  4 . 8  be f r e e  t o  s c h e d u l e  t h e l .  
s e r v i c e s  a t  t h e  a i r p o r t  c o n c e r n e d .
2.  An a i r  c a r r i e r  s h a l l  as r e q u i r e d  by t he  S t a t e s  c o n c e r n e d  f i l e  i t s  
f l i g h t  programme f o r  a p p r o v a l .
3 .  A i r  c a r r i e r s  s h a l l  be p e r m i t t e d  t o  meet  and c o o r d i n a t e  s c h e d u l e ^  
p r o v i d e d  t h a t  t h e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  is  open t o  a l l  a i r  c a r r i e r s  h a v i n g  
a r i g h t  t o  o p e r a t e  to the a i r p o r t  b e i n g  t he  s u b j e c t  o f  c o o r d i n a t i o n  
and p r o v i d e d  t he  C o m p e t i t i o n  r u l e s  o f  t he  " r e a t y  a r e  r e s p e c t e a .
4 .  At  an a i r p o r t  where  c o n g e s t i o n  p r o b l e m s  a r e  e x p e r i e n c e d  t he  Member  
S t a t e  c o n c e r n e d  s h a l l  c o n s i d e r  s e t t i n g  up a s c h e d u l i n g  c o m m i t t e e .  
P a r t i c i p a t i o n  in the  s c h e d u l i n g  c o m m i t t e e  s h a l l  a t  l e a s t  i n c l u d e  
a l l  a i r  c a r r i e r s  hav i ng  p r e s e n t e d  a f l i g h t  programme,  t h e  a i r p o r t  
c o n c e r n e d  and [ o t h e r  p a r t i e s ] .  The c o s t s  o f  t he  s c h e d u l i n g  
c o m m i t t e e  shaI  I be cover ed pv the a i r p o r t  c o n c e r n e d .
CPC
Sh o u l d  c e r t a i n  r u l e s  o f
p r o c e d u r e  oe s p e c i f i e d ?
S h c u i c  " o t h e r  p a r t i e s "  oe
s p e c i f  i ea?
5.  F l i g h t  programmes s h a l l  be communi ca t ed  to t he  s c h e d u l i n g  c o m m i t t e e  
b e f o r e  a p p r o v a l  by the S t a t e s  c o n c e r n e d .
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Art 1cle 4 . A i rpor t  Coordination
> x
1.  A Member S t a t e  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  an a i r p o r t  e x p e r i e n c i n g  s e r i o u s  
c o n g e s t i o n  p r o b l e m s  s h a l l  c o n s i d e r  d e s i g n a t i n g  I t  as a c o o r d i n a t e d  
a i r p o r t  f o r  t h e  p e r i o d s  where  demand e x c e e d s  t h e  number  o f  s l o t s  
a v a i I a b I e .
2 .  An a i r p o r t  f o r  w h i c h  no s l o t s  a r e  a v a i l a b l e  d u r i n g  a ( 4 )  hour
p e r i o d  f o r  t he  wor kdays  o f  a week d u r i n g  ( 2 )  months  o f  a season  
s h a l l  be d e s i g n a t e d  as a c o o r d i n a t e d  a i r p o r t .
3 .  B e f o r e  t a k i n g  such a s t e p  a t hor ough  c a p a c i t y  a n a l y s i s  s h a l l  be 
c a r r i e d  ou t  a t  t he  a i r p o r t  w i t n  the p u r p o s e  o f  d e t e r m i n i n g  
p o s s i b i l i t i e s  t o  i n c r e a s e  the  c a p a c i t y  in t he  s h o r t  t e r m  t h r o u g h  
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e  o r  o p e r a t i o n a l  changes .
4.  The n a t i o n a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  s h a l l  p u c i i s n  a r e p o r t  o f  t ne  s t u a y  g i v i n g  
f u l l  i n f o r m a t i o n  on t he  c a p a c i t i e s  o f  t he  c r i t i c a l  s u b - s y s t e m s ,  
means o f  e x p a n d i n g  the c a p a c i t i e s  o f  l i m i t i n g  s u b - s y s t e m s  and t he  
t i me  f rame and c o s t s  e n v i s a g e d ,  a l t e r n a t i v e  s o l u t i o n s  and any o t h e r  
r e l e v a n t  i n f o r m a t i o n .
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the  n a t i o n a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  o f  t h a t  a i r p o r t  a f t e r  c o n s u l t a t i o n s  on t he  
r e p o r t  o f  t h e  s t u d y  w i t h  t he  a i r  c a r r i e r s  u s i n g  t he  a i r p o r t
r e p e a t e d l y  a n d / o r  t h e i r  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  o r g a n i s a t i o n s ,  t he  a i r p o r t  
a u t h o r i t i e s  and r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  o r g a n i s a t i o n s  o f  p a s s e n g e r s  u s i n g  
t he  a i r p o r t ,  wh e r e  such o r g a n i s a t i o n s  e x i s t .
S.  The n a t i o n a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  s h a l l  a p p o i n t  a f t e r  c o n s u l t a t i o n s  w i t h  t he  
. a i r  c a r r i e r s  u s i n g  t he  a i r p o r t  r e p e a . t e d l y  and t he  a i r p o r t
a u t h o r i t i e s ,  an a i r p o r t  c o o r d i n a t o r  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  t he  
c o o r d i n a t i o n  p r o c e s s  and f o r  t he  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  s l o t s .  The a i r p o r t  
c on c e r n e d  s h a l l  p r o v i d e  the  c o o r d i n a t o r  w i t h  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  
t e c h n i c a l  e q u i p me n t  and o f f i c e  f a c i l i t i e s .
~ . The c o o r d i n a t o r  s h a l l  oe r e s p o n s i b l e  f or  t he  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  s l o t s  at  
t ne  a i r p o r t  oy e n d e a v o u r i n g  to accommodate as c l o s e l y  as p o s s i b l e
t he  f l i g h t  programme,  p r e s e n t e d  by t he  a i r  c a r r i e r s  b e f o r e  and
d u r i n g  t h e  season w h i l e  r e s p e c t i n g  t he  l i m i t s  o f  t he  d e c l a r e d  
capac i t y .
3 .  At a c o o r d i n a t e d  a i r p o r t  p r i o r i t y  o f  o p e r a t i o n  s h a l l  oe g i v e n  t o  
a i r  c a r r i e r s  whi ch  have r e c e i v e d  a s l o t  a l l o c a t i o n  f rom t he  
c o o r d i n a t o r  w i t h o u t ,  h o w e v e r ,  e x c l u d i n g  t he  o p e r a t i o n  i f  t he  
c o n d i t i o n s  so a l l o w  at  t he  t i me in q u e s t i o n .
QRC
Sha I I  t he  t a s k s  o f  t he
c o o r d i n a t o r  be s e t  o u t  more In
d e t a  i I ?
441
$Art i c le  5 Ai rpor t  capaci ty
The na t i on a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  s h a l l ,  for  c oor d i na t ion  purposes,  dec lare  
twice y e a r l y ,  a f t e r  c onsu l t a t i ons  wi th the a i r  c a r r i e r s  using the 
a i r p o r t  r e p ea t e d l y ,  IATA, and the a i r p o r t  a u t h o r i t i e s ,  the c apac i ty  at  
the coordinated a i r p o r t s .
442
A r t i c l e  6 In fo rm al-ion
1.  A i r l i n e s  r e q u e s t i n g  s l o t s  at  a c o o r d i n a t e d  a i r p o r t  s h a l l  submit  to
the a i r p o r t  c o o r d i n a t o r  and -  on r e q u e s t  -  to the n a t i o n a l  
a u t h o r i t i e s  c on c e r n e d ,  a l l  I n f o r m a t i o n  r e q u e s t e d  by the a i r p o r t
c o o r d i n a t o r  and r e l e v a n t  f or  the s l o t  c o o r d i n a t i o n  at  l east  . . .  
days in advance o f  [ t h e  schedul e  c o o r d i n a t i o n  c on f e r e n c e ]  [ t h e  
s e a s o n ] ,  in the f or mat  s p e c i f i e d  by t he  a i r p o r t  c o o r d i n a t o r .
2.  The a i r p o r t  c o o r d i n a t o r  s h a l l  make a v a i l a b l e  on request  to a l l
a i r l i n e s  r e q u e s t i n g  s l o t s  at  a c o o r d i n a t e d  a i r p o r t  and to the
a i r p o r t  a u t h o r i t i e s  concer ned the i n f o r m a t i o n  a v a i l a b l e  to him 
r e l e v a n t  f o r  the c o o r d i n a t i o n  of  s c h e d u l e s  so as to enabl e  the  
a i r l i n e s  and the a i r p o r t  a u t h o r i t i e s  to a n a l y s e  in d e t a i l  a l l o c a t e d  
s l o t s ,  r e m a i n i n g  s l o t s  a v a i l a o l e  and p o s s i b i l i t i e s  to meet s l o t  
r e q u e s t s .
S h a l l  t h i s  be s p e l l e d  out  In
m o r e  d e t a i l  or  is p a r a g r a p h  4 
s u f f  i c i e n t ?
3.  I f  a s l o t  cannot  be a l l o c a t e d  w i t h i n  30 m i n u t e s  b e f o r e  or a f t e r  the
r e q u e s t e d  t i me  the s l o t  c o o r d i n a t o r  s h a l l  i n f or m the r e q u e s t i n g  
a i r l i n e  o f  the r easons  t h e r e f o r e .
4.  The Commission s h a l l  e s t a b l i s h ,  a f t e r  c o n s u l t a t i o n s  wi t h  IATA and 
w i t h  the a i r p o r t  c o o r d i n a t c r s , minimum r e q u i r e m e n t s  for  the  
aut omated systems to be used by the a i r p o r t  c o o r d i n a t o r s .
Ar  i
<L .
3.
ic i e 7 Scnedul e  c o o r d i n a t i o n  
/
A i r p o r t  c o o r d i n a t o r s  s h a l l  p a r t i c i p a t e  in the a p p r o p r i a t e  s ch ed u l e
c o o r d i n a t i o n  c o n f e r e n c e s  and s h a l l  endeavour  to accommodate w i t h i n  
t he  p r ocedur es  e s t a b l i s h e d  f or  t nese  m e e t i n g s ,  the a i r l i n e s  
r e q u e s t i n g  s l o t s  a t  t h e i r  a i r p o r t .
The r u l e s  of  p r i o r i t y  for  the a l l o c a t i o n  of  s l o t s  s h a l l  be 
e s t a b l i s h e d  by t he  a i r l i n e s  and a i r p o r t s  among t hemsel ves  and s h a l l  
e n t e r  I n t o  f o r c e  a f t e r  approval  by the  Commission.  The Commission  
s h a l l  g r a nt  i t s  appr ova l  w i t h i n  21 days a f t e r  r e c e i p t  o f  the
p r i o r i t y  r u l e s  e s t a b l i s h e d  by the a i r l i n e s .  Appr ova l  can be
w i t h h e l d  I f  t he  Commission c o n s i d e r s  t he  r u l e s  [ a n t l - c o m p e t l t l v e
o r ]  not  In accor dance  w i t h  p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t .
QRC
S h a l l  the a i r p o r t ' s  r o l e  be 
s p e c i f i e d ?
The a i r p o r t  c o o r d i n a t o r  s ha l l  a l l o c a t e  s l o t s  in accor dance  w i t h  the  
r u l e s  of  p r i o r i t y  e s t a b l i s h e c  in the a p p r o p r i a t e  m u l t i l a t e r a l  
o r g a n i s a t i o n s .  Any d e v i a t i o n  from the g e n e r a l  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t he s e  
p r i o r i t y  r u l e s  s h a l l  be submi t t ed  f or  a ppr ov a l  to the Commission.
The s l o t  c o o r d i n a t o r  s h a l l  endeavour  to accommodate ad hoc s l o t
r e q u e s t s .  To t h i s  e n d  t h e  s l o t s  a v a i l a b l e  i n  t h e  p o o l  o u t  n o t  y e t  
r  e d  i s t  r  i b u t e c  c a n  oe  u s e d .  Mo c o m m e r c i a l  c a t e g o r y  o f  s e r i e s  may  oe  
e x c I u d e d .
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A r t i c l e  8 S 10 /t poo I
1. At a c o o r d i n a t e d ,  a i r p o r t  newly c r e a t e d  s l o t s ,  unused s l o t s  and 
s l o t s  which have been g i v e n  up by a c a r r i e r  b e f o r e  or  by the  end o f  
t he  season,  s h a l l  be p l a c e d  In a common p o o l .
A minimum of  50% of  t hese  s l o t s  s h a l l  be r e d i s t r i b u t e d ,  in the  
i n i t i a l  c o o r d i n a t i o n  f or  a season and a f t e r  the s l o t s  have been 
c o o r d i n a t e d  In accor dance  w i t h  h I s  t or  I c I  a I p r e c e d e n c e ,  t o  new 
- e n t r a n t s  to a maximum of  two s l o t s  per c a r r i e r  per  4 - h o u r  p e r i o d .
2.  Any s l o t  not  u t i l i z e d  65 p e r ce nt  of  the t ime over  a two-mont hs  
p e r i o d  s h a l l  be p l a ce d  in the common p o o l .
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A r t i c l e  9 Sp'ec i a I new e n t r a n t  s t a t u s
1.  in the case that^ a new e n t r a n t  i n t ends  to commence a s e r v i c e  on a 
r o u t e  where o n l y  two a i r  c a r r i e r s  a r e  o p e r a t i n g  and can d emon s t r a t e  
t h a t  i t  has not  been abl e  to get  the necessar y  s l o t s  d u r i n g  the  
p r e v i o u s  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  season by the normal  s l o t  a l l o c a t i o n  r u l e s  
or  by the  p r o c e d u r e  of  A r t i c l e  8 . 1 ,  such an a i r  c a r r i e r  w i l l  
r e c e i v e  s p e c i a l  new e n t r a n t  s t a t u s  and s h a l l  I f  I t s  r e q u e s t  cannot  
be accommodated be p l a c e d  on a w a i t i n g  l i s t  Py the c o o r d i n a t o r .
2.  The s l o t  c o o r d i n a t o r  s h a l l  ensure t h a t  a i r  c a r r i e r s  w i t h  s p e c i a l  
new e n t r a n t  s t a t u s  s h a l l  r e c e i v e  as f a r  as p o s s i b l e  t he  nec e s s a r y  
s l o t s  to i n t r o d u c e  s e r v i c e s  on t ha t  p a r t i c u l a r  r o u t e  t o  a maximum 
o f  the number o f  s e r v i c e s  o p e r a t e d  at t h a t  moment by any one 
c a r r i e r  but  not  more than two s l o t s  per 4 - hour  p e r i o d ,  [ I f  need be 
by 1 i mi t  i ng p r o p o r t i o n a l l y  the number of  s l o t s  o f  t he  o t h e r  a i r  
c a r r i e r s  h o l d i n g  more than e i g h t  s l o t s  per day at  t h a t  a i r p o r t ] .
QRC
S p e c i f i c  comments on t h i s  
a r t i c l e  Is s o u g h t .  S p e c i a l
a t t e n t i o n  s houl d  be g i v e n  as t o  
whether  new e n t r a n t  s t a t u *  
shoul d be g i v e n  f or  i n d i v i d u a l  
r o u t e s  ( t h i s  approach Is 
c ompa t i b l e  w i t h  t r a f f i c
d i s t r i b u t i o n  r u l e s )  or  per
a i r p o r t  ( see a r t i c l e  2 . d . ) .
A r t i c l e  1 0  C h a n g e  o f  u s e  o f  s l o t s
1. The c o o r d i n a t o r  s h a l l  p e r mi t  s l o t s  to be f r e e l y  exchanged by an a i r  
c a r r i e r  f rom one r o u t e ,  or type of  s e r v i c e ,  to a no t h e r  except  in 
t he  f o I  l owi ng c a s e s :
a .  s l o t s  a l l o c a t e d  In accor dance  w i t h  the p r o ce d u r e  o f  A r t i c l e  9;
b.  s l o t s  to be used for  the e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of  a new s e r v i c e  or t he  
i n c r e a s e  o f  f r equency  on an e x i s t i n g  s e r v i c e  between a
congest ed  a i r p o r t  and ano t h er  Member S t a t e  f or  such t i me  as an 
a i r  c a r r i e r  l i c e n c e d  by ano t h er  Member S a t t e  is not  p e r m i t t e d ,  
on the b a s i s  of  i n s u f f i c i e n t  a i r p o r t  c a p a c i t y  to e s t a b l i s h  a 
new s e r v i c e  or  t o  i nc r ea se  f r e q u e n c i e s  on an e x i s t i n g  s e r v i c e
t o  the a i r p o r t  in q u e s t i o n ,  u n l e s s  agreement  e x i s t s  between t he
MemDer S t a t e s  concerned.
2.  At  the r e q ue s t  o f  any Member S t a t e ,  The Commission s h a l l  examine  
t he  a p p l i c a t i o n  of  par agr aph 1. in any p a r t i c u l a r  case and w i t h i n  
one month de c i d e  whether  the l i m i t a t i o n  in change o f  use o f  s l o t s  
a r e  we I I a p p l i e d .
3 .  The Commission,  a f t e r  t h o r o u g h  e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  s i t u a t i o n ,  may
impose any c o n d i t i o n s  to ensure  the a p p l i c a t i o n  of  p a r agr a ph  1. I t
s h a l l  communi cate i t s  d e c i s i o n  to the Counc i l  w i t h i n  a t i me l i m i t
!o f one nont  h .
4.  Co un c i l  p r o c e d u r e .
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/A r t i c l e  n  R e c i p r o c i t y
T h e  o b l i g a t i o n s  o f  a n  a i r p o r t  c o o r d i n a t o r  u n d e r  A r t i c l e s  - 8 . 1  a n d  9
s h a l l  not  a pp l y  in r e s p e c t  o f  an a i r  c a r r i e r  o f  a t h i r d  c o u n t r y  to the
e x t e n t  t ha t  Communi ty a i r  c a r r i e r s  a r e  not  a c c or de d  e q u i v a l e n t
t r e a t m e n t  in t h a t  c o u n t r y  to t h a t  p r o v i de d  under  t h i s  R e g u l a t i o n .
QRC
S h a l l  t h i s  a r t i c l e  be g i v e n  a
wi der  cover age?
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/A r t  I c  I e  1 ¥  R e v i s i o n
The Counci l  shaI  I d e c i d e  on the r e v i s i o n  o f  t h i s  R e g u l a t i o n  by 
31 December 1992 ,  on the b a s i s  of  a Commission p r oposa l  t o  be s u b m i t t e d  
by 31 March 1992 accompani ed by a r e p o r t  on the a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h i s  
ReguI  a t  i o n .
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/Br uxe l l e e ,  1 6 . 1 1 . 10 00 ,
WORKING PAPER 6 P3 / 90  b i s  LVH/ec
C-150 i/ie o
draft
C o u n c l I  R f c a u l a t I o n  on  
CQfTYTv?n r u l Q S  f o r  t h e  a I l o c a l  I o n
of  s l o t s  at  .CpramnltY a i r p o r t s  
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,
Havi ng r egar d  to the T r e a t y  e s t a b l i s h i n g  the European Economic 
Communi ty and In p a r t i c u l a r  A r t i c l e  04 ( 2 ) t he r eof ,
Hav i ng r egard to tho p r o p o sa l  i r o n  the Commission,
H a v i n g  r e g a r d  l o  t h e  o p i n i o n  o f  t h e  E u r o p e a n  P a r i  l a m e n t ,
H a v i n g  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  o p i n i o n  o f  t h e  E c o n o m i c  and S o c i a l  C o m m i t t e e ,
Whereas t hore  is an I n c r e a s i n g  number of congested a l r p o r t e  In the 
CommunI ty j
Wh&re&s tho a l l o c a t i o n  o f  s l o t s  at  congeatod a i r p o r t s  should be b&sod 
on n e u t r a l ,  t r a n s p a r e n t  and non-d I ecr iminatory r u l es ;
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Whereas t,ho deplslon to coordinate an airport Bhould be taken by the
Member s t a t e  r e s p o n s i b l e  for  t ha t  a i r p o r t  on the ba s i s  of  o b j e o t i v e
\ v
or I t e r  l a;
Whereas the n e u t r a l i t y  of  the a i r p o r t  coor d i na t or  shoul d be beyond any 
doubt  and t h e r e f o r e  the Member St a te  responsi bl e  for  the coord i nated  
a i r p o r t  shoul d  a p p o i n t  t he  c o o r d i n a t o r ;
Whereas t r a n s p a r e n c y  of  I n f o r mat i on  Is an e o o o n t l a l  element  for  
e n s u r i n g  an o b j e c t i v e  pr ocedur e  for s l o t  a l l o c a t i o n ;
Whorcas the p r i n c i p l e s  go ve r n i n g  the proeent  system of  s l o t  a l l o c a t i o n s *
cou l d  be the b a s i s  o f  t he  CM'roct lvo p ov l d l ng  t h i s  system e v o l v e s  in 
harmony w i t h  t he  e v o l u t i o n  or  the new t r anspor t  devel opment *  (n the EC,
W/iersas the f u t u r o  e v o l u t i o n  should a l l ow for  the ont r ance  of new 
c a r r I e r s  I n t o  the m a r k e t .
Whereas the p r e s e n t  sys t em,  g i v i n g  p r e f e r ence  to g r a n d f a t h e r  r i g h t s  
does not  a l ways f a c i l i t a t e  new e n t r a n t s ,
Whereas the o b j e c t i v e  t o  lower b a r r i e r s  for  c o m p e t i t i o n  and ent ry  In
the market  r e q u i r e s  s t r o n g  support  for  c a r r i e r s  who I nt end to s t a r t  
o p e r a t i o n s  on I n t r a - C o m m u n i t y  routes w i t h  l i mi t e d  c o m p e t i t i o n ;
Whereas ; t 19 n e c e s s a r y  to r e q u i r e  Member States  or t h e i r  appointees to
ensur e  t ha t  a l i m i t e d  r.umbor of  s i o t s  are a v a i l a b l e  f or  such opor a t l one
even whore an a i r p o r t  Is he l d  to be congested.
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Wherea9 I t  U  Al so necessar y  to avo i d  s i t u a t i o n s  whereby one Community 
a i r  c a r r i e r  con I n t r oduc e  one s e r v i c e  or  Increase f requency on an 
ex lot  In g s e r v i c e  and o t h e r  Community a i r  c a r r i e r s  cannot ’r o c l p r o ca t o  
these I n i t i a t i v e s  because o f  a lacK of  a v a i l a b l e  s l o t s .  Wheroas t h i s
coul d  mean t ha t  the de me r i t s  of  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  could bo unevenly sproad 
and c o m p e t i t i o n  coul d be I mpal rodi
Whereas In those cases,  a i r  c a r r i e r s  which have boon grantod new s l o t s ,  
'must .use those s l o t s  for  tho purpose for  which they wero r equest ed over
v * . i  .
a p e r i o d  <jf t ime cons i der ed  to be s u f f i c i e n t .
Whereas I t  Is not  a p p r o p r i a t e  to ' o b l i g e  an a i r p o r t  coor d I na tor  ano a 
Member S t a t e  to a l l o c a t e  s l o t s  w i t h  p r e f e r e n c e  to new e n t r a n t s  In 
r e 6pe c t  of  an a i r  c a r r i e r s  of a t h i r d  c ount r y  which coos not o f f e r
e q u i v a l e n t  t r e a t m e n t  t o  t h a t  p r o v i d e d  u n d e r  t h i s  c o d e ;
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION;
Ar t 1 c l » 1 t Scope of  the r e g u l a t i o n .
T h i s  r e g u l a t i o n  s h a l l  a p p l y  to the a l l o c a t i o n  of s l ots  fit Community 
a l rppr t o .
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Ar  1 1 c I  a  2 i D e f i n i t i o n s
For the purpose o f  t h i s  R e g u l a t i o n  i
( a )  ' S l o t "  means the schedul ed  t ime of  a r r i v a l  and depar t ur e  a v a i l a b l e  
or  a l l o c a t e d  t o  an a i r c r a f t  movement on a s p e c i f i c  date at an 
a I r p o r  t .
( b )  "S’cw e n t r a n t "  means
I .  an a i r  c a r r i e r  not  h o l d i n g  more than three s l o t s  on any day at
« c o o r d i n a t e d  a i r p o r t  and r e q u e s t i n g  f ur t uor  s l o t s  for  ser v i ces  
on i n t r a - C c mm u n I t y  r ou t es  on t ha t  day.
I I .  An a i r  c a r r i e r  not  h o l d i n g  more than 26X of. s l o t s  on a day at a
c o o r d i n a t e d  a i r p o r t  and r e q u e s t i n g  f u r t h e r  s l o t s  dur ing t ha t  
day to commence a t h i r d  or f o u r t h  freedom oervice on an ' Vl nt ra -
Community r o u t e  on which, at  most two ot her  a i r  c a r r i V r s  are
^ e x e r c i s i n g  t h i r d  or f o u r t h  f reedom t r a f f l o  r i g h t s  be tv/e en the  
a i r p o r t s  concerned dur i ng  t ha t  day.
( c )  '.’c ongest ed  a i r p o r t "  means an a i r p o r t  where the capac i t y  does not
r o o t  the demand or f o r e c a s t  demand f or  more than one hour on any 
d a y .
( d )  " S c h e d u l i n g  p e r i o d "  means e i t h e r  the summer or wi n t e r  soascn as
used In the  schedul es  of  a i r  c a r r i e r s .
4 5 3
(o) "Community A i r  Carrier* means tho air carriers doflned In Article
2 ( e )  of  Counc i l  R e g u l a t i o n  (EEC) N*2343 / 90  of  24 Jul y  1990.
\  t
A r t i c l e  3 : Goner a l  ru l oe
1 )  A i r  c a r r i e r s  w i t h  a v a l i d  r o u t e  l i c e n c e  s n a i l  be  f r e e  t o  s c h e d u l e
and o p e r a t e  t h e i r  s e r v i c e s  to and from Community a i r p o r t s  which are
not  . c o o r d i n a t e d  In accordance wi t h  a r t i c l e  < of t h i s  R eg u l a t i on .
2)  A i r  c a r r i e r s  s h a l l  communicate t h e i r  f ( Ight  ' programs to n a t i o n a l
a u t h o r i t i e s  In accordance wi t h  n a t i o n a l  r u l e s  and r e g u l a t i o n s .
3 )  a.  In case I t  to decided to set up a schedul i ng commit tee,
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  In t h i s  commit tee sha l l  at  l east  be open to the 
a i r  c a r r l o r s  us i ng  the f c i r por t ( o )  r e p e a t e d l y ,  the a i r p o r t  
a u t h o r i t i e s  concerned and r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of the a i r  t r a f f i c  
cont  r o I .
b,  Tho minimum taoks r e q u i r e d  of  the schedul i ng  commit tee shat I 
bo i
•f
to cons i der  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  to Increase the capac i t y  
det e r mi n ed  In accordance wi t h  A r t i c l e  5
to suggest  Improvements to t r a f f l o  cond i t i ons  p r e v a i l i n g  at 
the a I r p o r t  In quest  Ion
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to moni t or  the use of  a l l o c a t e d  s l o t s ,
> v
A r t i c l e  4 : Condi t i ons for  A i r p o r t  Coordinat ion
1) A Mombor S U t o  r oupono l b l o  for  a congoulod al t  por t  s h a l l  conulcJur
to d e s i g n a t e  I t  as c o o r d i n a t e d  for the per i ods  t ha t  congest i on  
p r o b ! ens o c c u r .
2) When the B l r p o r t  c onges t i on  r e s u l t s  In o p e r a t i o n a l  de l ays  to’ the 
a i r l i n e s  p u b l i s h e d  o p e r a t i n g  schedules of  moro than one hour on any 
day,  the Member S t a t e  r e s p o n s i b l e  for  that  a i r p o r t  s h a l l  des i gna t e  
t ha t  a i r p o r t  as c o o r d i n a t e d .
3 ) The d e c i s i o n  to de s l g n a t o  an a l r o o r t  as coord i nated s n a i l  be taken
by the Member S t a t e  r e s p o n s i b l e  for that  a i r p o r t  a f t e r
c o n s u l t a t i o n s  w i t h  the a i r  c a r r i e r s  using the a i r p o r t  r e p e a t e d l y  
# •
a nd / o r  t h o l r  r e p r e s e n t s !  Ive o r g a n i s a t i o n s ,  the a i r p o r t  a u t h o r i t i e s  
and r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  o r g a n i s a t i o n s  of  passengers usi ng the a i r p o r t ,  
whore such o r g a n i s a t i o n s  e x i s t .  The a n a l y s i s  ment ioned in
p a r a g r a p h  4 s h a l l  be  t h o r o u g h l y  d i s c u s s e d  w i t h  t h e s e  p a r t i e s .
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4 )  When tho d e c i s i o n  to d e s i g n a t e  an a i r p o r t  as coordi nated la taken,  
a thorough c a p a c i t y  a n a l y s i s  s h a l l  be c a r r i e d  out at  the a i r p o r t  
w i t h  tho purpose of  d e t e r m i n i n g  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  to Increase tho 
c a p a c i t y  In the s hor t  t o r n  thr ough I n f r a s t r u c t u r e  or  oper a t i ona l  
changes,  and to d e t e r mi n e  the t lmo frame envisaged to resoi vo the 
pr ob l ems.  The a n a l y s i s  s h a l l  bo updated p e r i o d i c a l l y  and sha l l  bo 
mace a v a i l a b l e  to I n t e r e s t e d  p a r t i e s .
5 )  T h i s  r e g u l a t i o n  s h a l l  ho t  a f f e c t  a Member S t a t e ' s  r i g h t  to r egu l a t e  
w i t h o u t  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  on grounds of  n a t i o n a l i t y ,  the d i s t r i b u t i o n '  
o f  t r a f f i c  between tho a i r p o r t s  w i t h i n  an a i r p o r t  system,
A r t i c l e  3 5 a i r p o r t  c a p a c i t y
At  a c o o r d i n a t e d  a i r p o r t  the a i r p o r t  a u t h o r i t y  In cooper at i on  wi t h  M r  
t r a f f i c  c o n t r o l ,  and whore a p p l i c a b l e  subj ec t  to the approval  of  the 
n a t i o n a l  a u t h o r i t i e s ,  s h a l l  d e t e r mi ne  the a i r p o r t  c a p a c i t y  t wi ce ,  
y e a r l y  a f t e r  c o n s u l t a t i o n  w i t h  customs and Immigrat ion a u t h o r i t i e s  and 
t h e  a i r l i n e s  usi ng the a i r p o r t  and/ or  t h e i r  r e p r e s e n t a t I v e  a ss oc i a t i ons  
f o l l o w i n g  i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y  e s t a b l i s h e d  methods.
T h i s  I n f o r m a t i o n  s h a l l  be p r o v i d e d  to the a i r p o r t  c o o r d i n a t o r  in good 
t i me  b e f o r e  c o o r d i n a t i o n  t akes p l a c e .
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i
A p t  l c J a  Q t Tho co o rd in a tor
1) Tho n a t i o n a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  Bhal l  Bppol nt ,  upon tho advice of  tho a i r
c a r r i e r s  us i ng  the a i r p o r t  r e p e a t e d l y  and/ or  t ho l r  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  
o r g a n i s a t i o n s  and of  the a i r p o r t  a u t h o r i t i e s  an a i r p o r t
coord I n a t o r .
2)  The c o o r d i n a t o r  s h a l l  bo r e s p o n s i b l e  for the a l l o c a t i o n  of  s l o t s  at
•tho c o o r d i n a t e d  a l r p o r t ( s )  and s h a l l  act In accordance w i t h  t h l *
R e g u l a t i o n  In a n e u t r a l ,  n o n - d l s c r I m l n a t o r y  and t r anspar en t  way.
3)  The c o o r d i n a t o r  s h a l l  p a r t i c i p a t e  In such I n t e r n a t i o n a l  schedul i ng
c on f e r en ce s  o f  a i r  c a r r i e r s  as are per mi t t e d  by Community law.
4) The c o o r d i n a t o r  s h a l l  at  any t ime havo a v a i l a b l e  the f o l l o w i n g
l .morjpat  Ion f or  r e v i e w by a l l  I n t e r e s t e d  p a r t i e s .
a) H i s t o r i c a l  s l o t s  by a i r l i n e  chr onogJca l l y  for a l l  a i r  c a r r i e r s  
at  the a I r p o r t ,
b) Reguosted s l o t s  ( I n i t i a l  submissions)  by a i r  c a r r i e r s  and 
c h r o n o g l e a l ! y  for  a l l  a i r  c a r r i e r s ,
c)  A l l  a l l o c a t e d  and o u t s t a n d i n g  » lot  reouosts I f  by a i r l i n e  and
for  a I i  c a r r I  er s ,
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d) pomalnlng available slots,
e) Full details on the crltorla being used In the allocation.
G) Sub j e c t  to a r t  Ic 10 s 8 and G the coor d i na t or  s h a l l  per mi t  s l o t s  to
be f r e e l y  exchanged botween a i r  c a r r i e r s  or  by an a i r  c a r r i e r  from 
one r o u t e ,  or t ype  of  s e r v i c e  to anothor .
6f, 1.1 c ! 2._7. j  Pr ocess  of  c o o r d i n a t i o n
1)  A'lr c a r r l o r s  r e q u e s t i n g  s l o t s  at a c oor d i na t ed  a i r p o r t  shal l
submi t  to the a i r p o r t  c o o r d i n a t o r  a l l  I n f o r mat i on  r equest ed by the
a I r p o r  t c o o r  d I lor .
2)  a.  Tho a i r p o r t  c oo r d i n a t o r  s ha l l  g i ve  a pr e f or ence  t o  commercial
c l r  s e r v i c e s  In a s i t u a t i o n  where a l l  s l o t  request s  cannot  be 
Accomodated to the s a t i s f a c t i o n  to the a i r  c a r r i e r s  concernoo. '
b.  Any s l o t  not  u t i l i s e d  more than 66X of the a l l o c a t e d  p er i od  can
be w i t h d r a w n  and pl aced in the ° s I o t  pool r e f e r r e d  to In
A r t i c l e  8 for ' r e a l l o c a t i o n ,  .unless m i t i g a t i n g  reasons can ne 
found ( g r ound i ng  of  an a i r c r a f t  type,  c l osur e  of an a i r p o r t  or 
a I r space)
c,  An a i r p o r t  c o o r d i n a t o r  sna i l  . a 190 t&v.e Into account  tho
a d d i t i o n a l  p r i o r i t y  r u l e s  I_n the annex.
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3) i f  a requested slot cannot bo accomodated tho airport coordinator 
shall Inform the requesting airline of the reaeons therefore and 
3ha)| Indicate the nearest alternative slot.
4) The airport coordinator shall endeavour to accommodate ad hoc elot 
requests. To this end the slots available In the pool referred to 
in Article 9 but not yet allocated can be used. No commercial 
category of service may bo excluded.
5)  The Commission s h a l l  e s t a b l i s h ,  a f t e r  c o n s u l t a t i o n s  wi t h  a i r  
c a r r i e r s ,  a i r p o r t  c o o r d I n a t o r s , and’ a I rpor te minimum requi rements  
for  the automated systems to be used by the a i r p o r t  c o o r d l n a t o r s .
A r t l c J e  8 t S l o t  pool
“I ) At a c o o r d i n a t e d  a i r p o r t  newly created s l e t s u n u s e d  s l o t s  ar.d 
s l o t s  which have been glvon up by. a c a r r i e r  dur ing or by th6 end of  
the season,  s h a l l  be p l aced In a common pool ,
2)  S l o t  ^ I  l o c a t e d  to an a i r  c a r r i e r  but not used s(fy \ I be placed sr. 
the common pool  and cannot  be reclaimed In the f o l l o w i n g  schedul i ng  
porlod.
3)  S l o t s  p l a c e d  In tho common pool sha l l  do roei  l ocated among 
a p p l l c o n t  . c a r r l o i ' 8 .  COX of  these 3 lota shal l  be a l l o c a t e d  to new 
e n t r a n t s ' ,  wl th p r i o r i t y  In tho order  of a p p l i c a t i o n .
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4)  When r e q u e s t s  f o r  s l o t s  by new e n t r a n t s  as def ined in A r t i c l e  2 b
I I  cannot  be aocomodated by the normal process or by the procedure  
of  p a r a g r a p h  3,  the ' Member  S t a t o  ^ s p o n s i b l e  for the a i r p o r t  shal l  
{make a v a i l a b l e  . the necessar y  e l o t s ,  For t h i s  purpose the Member 
Stf t to s h a l l  In the f i r s t  I nstance In a non dl scr Im I n a t o r y  way
r e c l a i m  s l o t s  usod by a i r  c a r r i e r s  to the extent  t ha t  these
c a r r i e r s  o p e r a t e  s e r v i c e s  w i t h  a i r c r a f t  of  le&a than 2C0 seats  and 
use more t han  6 s l o t s  on the day In quest i on,
5)  The r.ew e n t r a n t s  r e f e r r e d  to In paragraph 4 are e n t i t l e d  to cs many
s l o t s  as a r e  needed In o r d er  to r e c l p r o c a t o  the new s e r v i c e  or the
I n c r e a s e  o f  f r e q u e n c i e s  on the e x i s t i n g  serv i ce  of  tho o t her  a i r
c a r r i e r  to a m a x i m u m  of  6 s l o t s  on any given day.
6 )  Whon t he  s l o t s ,  made a v a i l a b l e  In accordance wi th par agraphs {2)
and ' A) of  t h i s  a r t i c l e ,  are not used or are given up w i t h i n  t
p e r i o d  of  2 y e a r s ,  they s h a l l  be returned to t h e i r  o r i g i n a l
Tio.l o e r , wnere t h i s  r u l e  cannot  be appl i ed  or whore the o r i g i n a l
hol der  does not  wish to use the s l o t ,  I t  shal l  co p l aced In the
re l o t  pool  ment i oned In A r t i c l e  9.
7 )  At the r e q u e s t  of  any Mombor St o t o  or on i t s  own i m t i e t l v o ,  tho
. Commi ss i on  s h a l l  examine tho a p p l i c a t i o n  of this a r t i c l e  In any
p a r t i c u l a r  case ana w i t h i n  two months decide whether  I t  Is
c o r r e c t l y  a p p l l o d .  The Commission sha l l  communicate i t s  d e c i s i o n
to the Counc i l  ana to the Member S t a t o s .
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8)  Any Member S t a t e  may r e f e r  the Commies i on's  dec i s i on  to the Counci l
w i t h i n  a t ime l i m i t  of  one month.  The Counc i l ,  a c t i n g  by a
q u a l i f i e d  m a j o r i t y ,  may take a d i f f e r e n t  dec i s i on  w i t h i n  a per i od  
o f  one month.
A r t i c l e  9 : S p e c i a l  c I r c u n s U n c e »
1) Member S t a t e s  s h a l l  ensuro the a l l o c a t i o n  of e l o t s  to a Community
a i r  c a r r i e r  t ha t  cannot  r o c l p r o c a t e  a new ser v i ce  or an I ncrease of
f r e q u e n c i e s  on an e x i s t i n g  s e r v i ce  by another Community c a r r i e r  of  
the Member S t a t e s  due to a i r p o r t  congest i on ,  p r ov i de d  t ha t  the 
f i r s t  c a r r i e r  can demonst r ate  that  I t  has not been ab l e  to get  the 
necessar y  s l o t s  on the r equest ed d a y ( s )  dur ing tho p r e v i o u s  season 
by the normal  s l o t  a l l o c a t i o n  r u l e s  or by the procedure of  A r t i c l e
9 .
2)  The a i r l i n e s  r o f e r e d  to In paragraph I are e n t i t l e d  to a9 many 
s l o t s  as are nesd9d In o r der  to r e c i p r o c a t e  the new s e r v i c e  or the 
I n c r ea se  of  f r eq u e nc i e s  on the e x i s t i n g  s e r v i c e  of  the other  
Conxnun 11 y car r I e r .
3)  The s l o t s  r e f e r e d  to In paragraph 2 of t h i s  a r t i c l e  cannot be 
f r e e l y  exchanged by the a i r  c a r r i e r  r e c e i v i n g  them ' r c n  one route  
or type of  s o r v l c a  to another  for a per i od  of z years .
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A) Member S t a t e s  s h a l l  make the necessary t r a n s p a r e n t ,  and non-  
dl  s c r I m l n h t o r y  arrangemonts to ensure t ha t  the s l o t s  requi red to 
meet the p r o v i s i o n s  of t h i s  a r t l c l o  s h a l l  be a v a i l a b l e  for  
a l l o c a t i o n  to the r e l ev a n t  a i r l i n e s  at the begi nni ng of the 
s c h e d u l i n g  p e r i o d ,  I f  need be by l i m i t i n g  p r o p o r t I o n a  I Iy the number 
of  s l o t s  of  t he  a i r  c a r r l a r  i I n tendi ng to I n t r oduce  a new serv i ce  
or to I ncr oase  f r equoncl es  cn an e x i s t i n g  s e r v i c e ,
5)  When the s l o t s ,  made a v a i l a b l e  In accordance wi t h  paragraph ( 4 )  of
t h i s  . . a r t i c l e ,  are not used or are given up w i t h i n  a per iod of 2 
y e a r s ,  they s h a l l  be r e t ur ned  to t h e i r  o r i g i n a l  h o l d e r ,  Where t h i s  
r u f o  cannot  be a p p l i e d  or where tho o r i g i n a l  hol der  dees not wish 
to use the s l o t ,  I t  s ha l l  be placed In the s l o t  pool mentioned In 
Ar t I o I o 9 ,
6 )  At t he  request  of any Member St a te  or on I t s  own i n i t i a t i v e ,  the 
Comm I so I on s h a l l  ox am I no the a p p l i c a t i o n  of  paragraph I  and c of  
t h i s  a r t i c l e  In any p a r t i c u l a r  case and w i t h i n  two months decide  
whet her  these pa i agr aphs  arc c o r r e c t l y  a p p l i e d .
7 )  The Commission s ha l l  ccmmun' cete i t s  d e c i s i o n  to the Counci l  and to 
the Member S t a t e s .  Any Member St a t e  may r e f e r  the Commission'? 
d e c i s i o n  to the Counci l  w i t h i n  a 11 mo l i m i t  of  one month.  The
C o u n c i l ,  a c t i n g  by a qua i l  flocJ m a j o r i t y ,  may take 2 d i f f e r e n t  
d o c  Is ion w i t h i n  a per loci of one month.
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A L lis lf l- l f l  : Reciproci ty
T h e  o b 1 1 g d 1 1 o n s  o f  a n  a i r p o r t  c o o r d i n a t o r  a n d  a Me m b e r  S t & t o  u n d e r
A r t i c l e s  7,  8 and 9 s h a l l  not apply In respect  of an a i r  c a r r i e r  of a
t h i r d  c ou n t r y  to the e x t e n t  that  Community a i r  c a r r i e r s  are not
accorded e q u i v a l e n t  t r e a t m e n t  in that  count ry  to that  p r o v i d e d  under
th Is r e g u l a t I o n .
ATl.lCJflJ.1
1) The Commission s h a l l  present  a r e p o r t '  to the Counci l  on the
o p e r a t i o n  of  t h i s  Rogui a t l on  w i t h i n  two years a r t o r  his
Imp Iementa 11 o n .
2)  Membor S t a t e s  and the Commission sha l l  c o - o p e r a t e  in the
a p p l i c a t i o n  of  t h i s  Re g u l a t i on ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  as r egar d  the
c o l l e c t i o n  of  the I n f o r mat i o n  for the r epor t  ment ioned In
p a r a r g r a p h  1 of  t h i s  a r t i c l e .
ALUfila 12
The Councl  l sha I I rev  lew the o p e r a t I o n  of  t h i s  Regutat  ion b e f o r e  i Jul y  
T994 on the b a s i s  of  the r e p o r t  f urni shed by the Commission.
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A r t i c le 12
1)  Tho Member S t M o s  s h a l l ,  a f t e r  c o n s u l t a t i o n  of  tho Comm I i t  I on ta *a 
tho necessar y  stups to amend t ho l r  laws and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  
p r o v i s i o n s  to b r i n g  them I nt o  conf or mi t y  w i t h  t h i s  R e g u l a t i o n  not  
l a t e r  than 1 January  1992.
2)  The Member S t a t e s  s h a l l  communicate to the Commission a l l  lows end 
a t f m l n l s t r a t I v o  p r o v i s i o n s  made In f u r t h e r a n c e  of  t h i s  K e g u l a t i o n .
T h i s  R e g u l a t i o n  is asresscd to the Member S t a t e s .
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AN H E X
V I l - C - l / 5 2 3 - A n n e x  16 , 11 , 1990
I V H / e c / m g t
pr [oj l l  t l a s I n A l l o c a t i o n  of  A i r p o r t  S l a t ^ C 1)
. 1.  The o v e r a l l  alms of  any Coor d i na t or  in admi ni s t e r  Ing the
a l l o c a t i o n  o f  l i m i t e d  a i r p o r t  s l o t s  s h o u l d  a l w a y s  be »
a) to r e s o l v e  probloms a r i s i n g  from c o n f l i c t i n g  requi rements  
In such a way as to avoid any n e c e s s i t y  for government  
I n t e r v e n t i o n  \
b )  t o  mak e  s u r e  t h a t  a l l  a i r l i n e s  h a v e  e q u i t a b l e  o p p o r t u n i t y
t o  s a t i s f y  t h e i r  s c h e d u l o  r e q u i r e m e n t s  w i t h i n  t h e
c o n s t r a i n t s  t h a t  e x i s t  ;
c )  t o  s e e k  a g r e e r . i o n t  o n  s c h e d u l e  a d j u s t m e n t s  w h e r e  n e c e s s a r y
so  t h a t  t h e  a i r l i n e s  c o n c e r n e d  s u f f e r  t h e  l e a s t  p o s s i b l e
e c o n o m i c  p e n a l t y  ;
d)  to mi n i mi ce  I nconveni ence to the t r a v e l l i n g  p u b l i c  and 
t r a d i n g  Community ;
e)  to a r r ange  for  r e g u l a r  r ev i ew of the app l i ed  l i m i t s  so as 
to ensure t ha t  a l l  I c vo l s  are J u s t i f i e d .
2.  A v i a t i o n  Is composed of  sev er a l  sogments wi t h  d i f f e r e n t  and
o f t e n  c o n f l i c t i n g  i n t e r e s t s  and  n e e d s .  T h e s e  may be b r o a d l y
c I a a s 1 f l e d  as :
a )  schedul ed p u b l i c  s e r v i c e s  ;
b)  programmed c h a r t e r  s or v i c es  ;
c)  I r r e g u l a r  commercial  s e r v i c e s  ;
d) genera  I a v 1st ion i
e)  m i l i t a r y  op e ; a t  I o n s .
( 1 )  Schedul i ng  procedure  guide -  e i g h t  e d i t i o n  -  July 1990
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In the event of conflict existing between the Interests of any
or ol ' l  o f  these d i f f e r e n t  c a t e g o r i e s ,  p r i o r i t y  should be given  
to ( a ) ,  ( b )  and ( c )  above,  and c o n s i d e r a t i o n  should be given to 
a p p o r t i o n i n g  any remai ni ng l i m i t e d  f a c i l i t y  In an appr opr i a t e  
r a t i o ,  the mannor to be decldecj  by the r e sp o n s i b l e  a u t h o r i t y  
o f t o r  c o n u u l t o t l o n  wi th r o p r o u o n l a i I v o u  of  tho cntogor iou  
c o n c e r n e d .
3.  The e o l a t i o n  of  problems I n v o l v i n g  c o n f l i c t i n g  demands for
s l o t s  shoul d  be reached through d i s cus s i ons  In an atmosphere of  
mutual  c o o p e r a t ' o n  and g o o d w i l l .
A r b i t r a r y  doc l s l ons  and the r i g i d  a p p l i c a t i o n  of r u l e s  should
be a v o l c e c ,  and reasoned c b j e c t ' v e  s o l u t i o n s  sought .
»
4.  The pr lmo o b j e c t i v e  behind the a l l o c a t i o n  of  s p o c l f l c  s l o t s
Should be to ensure that  the economic p e n a l t i e s  a r i s i n g  from 
any nec e s s a r y  r eschedul i ng should be kept  to at minimum In terms 
of  the a i r  I inee as a whole.
5.  A g a i n s t  the background of  the f o r e g o i n g ,  the f o l l o w i n g  f a c t o r s
shoul d  bo u t i l i s e d  by the C o o r d i n a t o r  as a moans of devel opi ng  
an i n i t i a l  s l o t  a l l o c a t i o n  p l a n  for  problem areas b9fore
Schedul e  C o o r d i n a t i o n  Conf erences .
A , H 1 s t n r i c * 1 ^ r e c * d **.n c ^
H i s t o r i c a l  precedence a p p l i e s  on l y  to s e r v i c e s  ment ioned in 
p ar ag r a ph  2 . a) and b ) .  A s l o t  that  has been oper&tea by 
an a i r l i n e  as c l ea r ed  by the Coor di na t or  should e n t i t l e
t ha t  a i r l i n e  to c l a i m the same s l o t  In the next  e qu i v a l e n t  
season ( e . g .  Summer to Summer season)  and Is l i m i t e d  to the 
e q u i v a l e n t  pe r i od  and deys of  o p e r a t i o n .
4 6 6
ETTflctlYft Period aLMcommam
When two or moro a l r l l M o o  coinpolo for tho oamo u l o t ,  tho 
schedul e  e f f e c t i v e  for  a longer per i od of  o p e r a t i o n  In the 
same season should hevo p r i o r i t y .
Erne Lfi£H £±03
In the s hor t  term,  schodule d i s l o c a t i o n  caused by 
d i s t u r b a n c e s  beyond a i r l i n e  con t r o l  should be d e a l t  w i t h  a& 
I f  they were ad hoc v a r i a t i o n s .  Long- term emergencies  
shoul d  n o r ma l l y  Invoke a reschedul i ng  process,  The f u t u r o  
t r e a t m e n t  of  s l o t s  c l o a r o d ,  but  not oper s t ed  because of  the 
emergency,  shoul d be discussed and agreed In advance 
between the Co o r d i n a t o r  and the B l r l l n o .
Day! J.cht Saying riafi
To Improvo f l e x i b i l i t y  for per i ods at the begi nni ng and 6nd 
c f  I AT A s c h e d u l i n g  seasons In which t here  are d i f f e r e n c e s  
In the d q t e 9 f or  I n t r o d u c t i o n  and wi t hdrawal  of d a y l i g h t  
sav mg t Imo
( a )  schedul es f o r  per i ods  of up to 7 days should not  be 
a d j u s t e d  ;
( b )  scnodui&s for  p e r i ods  of a to 35 cays should be g i ven a 
hi gher  p r i o r i t y  than requests  for  new s l o t s ,
QiHfiL
Any c i r cumst ances  not  covered by Paragraph C should r e q u i r e  
n e g o t i a t i o n  for  a n6w s l o t ,  However,  I f  the schedul e  
change r e s u l t s  from t
( o)  l a r g e r  a l r o r a f t
•b> adjustments to block times In order to make them more 
real 1stlc
( c )  t h e ' . n e e d  o f  an a i r l i n e  to e s t a b l i s h  a year  round 
oper a t  Ion
I t  shoul d have p r i o r i t y  over t o t a l l y  new demands for  the 
same s l o t .
6 .  Those s i t u a t i o n s  which cannot  be resol ved by a p p l i c a t i o n  of  the 
pr i mar y  c r i t e r i a ,  set  out  above,  should bo c o n s i d e r e d  f u r t h e r  
in the c o n t e x t  o f  the  l eve l  of  economic pena l t y  i m p l i c i t  ' in t ht  
necessary  degree  of  schodule change.  Assessment . o f  the 
economic Impact r e q u i r e s  c o n s i d e r a t i o n ,  of  the f o l l o w i n g  
f a c t o r s  t ■
A. SI to and type o f  market  -  c on s i d er a t i o n  shoul d be g i ven  to
tho need f o r  a mi x t ur e  of long-haul  and s h o r t - h a u l  
o p e r a t i o n s  at  ~ 3 j o r  a i r p o r t s  In order  to s a t i s f y  p u o i i c  
r e q u 1rcmonts , Domsst 1 c / r e g I o n a  1 / long-hauI  mar ke t s  are 
p a r t  of  a t o t a l  p a t t e r n  and the s i ze and type of  markets  
must ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  be consi der ed.
S3. C o m p e t i t i o n  -  c o n s i d e r a t  Ion should always be g i v en  to
a t t e m p t i n g  t o  ensure that  due account Is t aken of  
c o m p e t i t i v e  r e q u i r e me n t s  in the a l l o c a t i o n  of a v a l l a b l o  
s l o t s .
C. Cur fews -  In the event  of  a curfew at one a i r p o r t  c r e a t i n g  
a s l o t  probl em e l se wher o ,  p r i o r i t y  should be g i v e n  to tne 
a i r l i n e  whose schedul e  le const r a i ned  by tho c u r f e w ,
D. Requi rement s  c f  the t r a v e l l i n g  pub l i c  and o t h e r  usars -
c o n s i d e r a t i o n  shoul d always be given to m i n i m i s i n g  p u b l i c  
I nconven i ence  ( e . g .  avoi d i ng excessi ve a i r p o r t  t r a n s i t  
t i me ,  l os i ng  c on n e c t i o n s  e t c . )
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£ • ; Frequency  of  o p e r a t i o n  -  higher  f requency shoul d no t ,  per 
ee,  Imply h i g h e r  p r i o r i t y  -  the p r i n c i p l e  of  opt i mi s i ng
economic b e n e f i t  should be the main c o n s i d e r a t i o n .
p.  F l e x i b i l i t y  -  to achi eve optimum u t i l i s a t i o n  of  the 
a v a i l a b l e  c a p a c i t y ,  Coor di nat ors  should a pp l y  a c e r t a i n  
dofii 'oo of  f l e x i b i l i t y  when a l l o c a t i n g  s l o t s .  A i r l i n e s  co 
not a l ways o p o r a t e  e x a c t l y  to the t i mi ngs  publ ished In 
s c h e d u l e s .  Weat her ,  winds,  v a r i a t i o n s  In f l i g h t  t imes,
ATC or  t e c h n i c a l  problems are some of  the reasons for  such 
d e v i a t i o n s .  Coord I na t or s  should take account  of  t h i s  by :
I .  a p p l y i n g  runway r e s t r i c t i o n s  In 11 mo I n t e r v a l s  of at
I e e s.t 10 m i n u t e s  i '
I I .  measur i ng h o u r l y  movement ra tes  at  not  less than 
30 minutes I n t e r v a l s  ( e . g .  1200-1259 r  1 2 3 - 1 3 2 9 )  ;
I I I .  u t l n g  ove r book i ng  p r o f i l e s  based on paat  e xper i enc e .
S l o t s  may be r e que s t e d  by an a i r l i n e  for f l i g h t s  for  which i t  
dees not  yet  ho l d  a l l  the r equi r ed  t r a f f i c  r i g h t s .  I f  
a v a i l a b l e ,  the s l o t s  should be a l l o c a t e d  by the Coor di nat or  In 
a ccor dance  w i t h  the g u i d e l i n e s  In paras 1 to 3.  I f  an a i r l i n e  
h o l d i n g  such p r o v i s i o n a l  s l o t s  does not r e c e i v e  the requi red  
t r a f f i c  r i g h t s  thon the s l o t s  should be r e l e a s e d  to the
C o o r d i n a t o r  I mme d i a t e l y .
I f  a s l o t  request  cannot  be met ,  the Coor d i na t or  shoul d o f f e r  
the c l o s e s t  e a r l i e r  and i a t o r  a v a i l a b l e  t i mi n g s  for  that
e p o c i f l c  f l i g h t  a n d , I f  r equest ed,  provido I n f o r m a t i o n  cn other  
s e r v i c e s  w i t h i n  those t i mi n g s ,  so that  a i r l i n e s  noodlng s l o t s  
can c o n t a c t  o t he r  a i r l i n e s  concerned.
9.  I I  e ho u l d  c o n s t a n t l y  bo borne In mind that  w h i l s t  t r a f f l o
growt h c o n t i n u e s  t o  o u t s t r i p  the r a t e  of expansion of
f a c i l i t i e s ,  the r e s o l u t i o n  of  congest i on  problems can be
a c h i e v e d  o n l y  thr ough di scussi ons in an atmosphere of  mutual  
c o o p o r a t l o n  ond g o o d w i l l .  In the event  of an e f f e c t i v e  
r e d u c t i o n  or  I n c r e a s e  In a v a i l a b l e  c a p a c i t y  over an e qu i v a l en t  
p r e v i o u s  season,  a s o l u t i o n  ehould be sought c o l l e c t i v e l y  from 
a l l  i n v o l v e d  a i r l i n e s ,  t ak i ng i nto account  the guidance a l r eady  
g I ven.
10.  Where a s l o t  probl em cannot be resol ved by the means r o f e r r e d  
to a b o v e ,  tho C o o r d i n a t o r  should c a l l  a mooting of a l l  i nvol ved  
a i r l i n e s  w i t h  a v i ew to f i n d i n g  k m u t u a l l y  accept ab l e  s o l u t i o n .
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Appendix VIII. 1
Commission Proposal Setting Up a Joint Committee 
in Civil Aviation (JCCA)
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COMMISSION DECISION 
of 30 July 1990 
setting up a Joint Committee on Civil Aviation
(90/449/EEC)
TH E C O M M ISSIO N  O F T H E  E U R O PE A N  C O M M U N ITIE S,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic C om m unity ,
Whereas the Heads of State or of Government stated in 
the ir declaration of 21 October 1972 that the first aim of 
economic expansion should be to enable disparities in 
liv ing  conditions to be reduced and that this aim should 
express itself in better quality of life and higher standard 
o f l iv in g ;
Whereas, in this connection, they considered it indispen­
sable that both employers and employees should be 
increasingly involved in the economic and social deci­
sions of the C om m unity  ;
Whereas, amongst the p rio rity  actions contained in the 
C om m unity ’s ‘social action programme’ the Commission 
has recommended that dialogue and cooperation between 
employers and employees be promoted at C om m unity  
le v e l;
Whereas the C ouncil in its resolution of 21 January 1974 
concerning a social action programme (') named increased 
involvement of management and labour in the economic 
and social decisions of the C om m unity  as one of the prio ­
rity  measures to be taken ;
Whereas the European Parliament in its resolution of 
13 June 1972(2) stated that the participation of 
employers and employees in the form ulation o f a 
Com m unity  social policy should be achieved during the 
first stage of economic and monetary un ion ;
W'hereas the ifconom ic and Social Com m ittee in its 
op in ion  of 24 November 1971 expressed a s im ilar view ;
W'hereas the Council stressed in its conclusions of 
22 June 1984 concerning a C om m unity  m edium -term  
social action programme ( ’), that the European social 
dialogue must be strengthened and its procedures adapted 
•n order to involve the social partners more effectively in 
the economic and social decisions of the C om m unity  ;
W'hereas A rtic le  118b of the Treatv states that the 
Commission shall endeavour to develop the dialogue 
between management and labour at European level which
; >| \ v  C i ! 2 2. It*“ 4. d !
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could, i f  the two sides consider it  desirable, lead to rela­
tions based on agreem ent;
Whereas fu ll recognition should be given to the p rio rity  
objectives for the a ir transport industry to achieve the 
levels of cost efficiency and productiv ity performances 
required to ensure its economic viability , not on ly w ith in  
the context o f EC liberalization measures but also in the 
worldwide com petitive environm ent of international air 
transport;
Whereas fu ll recognition should be given to the 
com plexity of the c iv il air transport sector and to the acti­
vities necessary to deliver an economic and com petitive 
product which are beyond the direct control of the opera­
tors ;
Whereas it is necessary to take account of the social 
im plications of economical policies in  the field of c iv il 
aviation ;
Whereas a Jo in t Com m ittee attached to the Commission 
is an appropriate forum  at the C om m unity  level for the 
socio-economic interest involved to address the economic 
and com petitive objectives o f c iv il aviation as well as the 
improvement of liv in g  and w ork ing conditions,
HAS D E C ID E D  AS FO LLO W S :
A rtic le  1
A Jo in t Committee on C iv il A vaition hereinafter referred 
to as ‘the Com m ittee’ is hereby established.
A rtic le  2
The Committee shall assist the Commission in the 
form ulation and im plem entation o f Com m unity po licy 
aimed a t :
—  strengthening tn ;  economic and competitive position 
of the C om m unity ’s c iv il aviation both w tth in  the 
C om m unity and in the wider international context.
—  therebv im proving liv ing  and working conditions in 
the c iv il aviation sector w ith in  the context of the rele­
vant articles of the Treaty.
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V Article J
1. In order to attain the objectives laid Jown in  A rtic le
2, the Committee s h a ll:
(a) issue opinions and submit reports to the Commission 
either at the latter’s request or on its own in itia tive  ;
and
(b) in respect of matters fa lling w ith in  the competence of 
the airlines, airports’ organizations and employees’ 
associations listed in A rtic le 4 (3):
—  promote dialogue and cooperation,
—  arrange fo r studies to be carried out,
—  participate in discussions and seminars.
2. The Committee shall ensure that all interested
parties are informed of its activites.
3. Upon requesting an opin ion or report from  the
C '-nm ittee  under the terms of paragraph 1 (a); the 
L .im ission may fix  a tim e lim it  w ith in  w h ich the
op in ion  or report shall be given.
A rtic le  4
1. The Committee shall consist of 50 members,
nationals o f the Member States.
2. Seats shall be allocated as follows :
(a) 27 to the representatives of airlines and airports’ orga­
nizations ;
(b) 27 to the representatives of the employees’ associa­
tions.
3. The members of the Committee shall be appointed 
by the Commission as follows :
(a) 48 on proposals from the follow ing employers and 
employees’ organizations of airlines and airports :
vt) A irlines and airports associations:
—  Association of European A irlines (A E A ): 13 
members,
—  European Regional A irlines Organization 
(ERA): three members,
—  European Com m unities Independent A irlines 
Association (A C E ): three members,
—  A ir  Chartered Carrier Association (A C C A ): two 
members,
—  International C iv il A irports Association —  
Europe ( IC A A ): three members.
(2) Employees’ associations :
—  Committee of Transport W orkers’ U n ion of 
the European Com m unity : 24 members.
(b) Six, directly by the Commission, after consultation of 
the bodies mentioned in (a), from the representative 
organizations of airlines and airports organizations' and
employees,associations. I f  appropriate, these m ight be 
from bodies other than those m entioned in  (2).
A rtic le  5
1. An alternate shall be appointed for each member of 
the Com m ittee under the same conditions as laid down 
in  A rtic le  4 (3).
2. W ithou t prejudice to A rtic le  9, an alternate shall not 
attend meetings of the Com m ittee or a working group 
provided for in A rtic le  9, or participate in its work, unless 
the member for whom he is the alternate is prevented 
from doing so.
A rtic le  6
1. Com m ittee members and the ir alternates shall hold 
office for a term of four years ; appointments shall be 
renewable.
2. Members and the ir alternates whose term of office 
has expired shall remain in  office un til they have been 
replaced or the ir term of office has been renewed.
3. A  member’s or alternate’s term of office shall cease 
before the expiry o f the period of four years upon his 
resignation or death or if  the organization or association 
which nominated h im  requests his replacement. The 
vacancy thereby caused shall be filled  in the manner pres­
cribed in A rtic le  4 (3) by a person appointed for the 
remainder o f the term of office.
4. There shall be no payment for duties performed.
A rtic le  7
1. The Com m ittee shall, by a two-thirds m ajority of 
members present, and a single m ajority in each group, 
elect from among its members a chairman and vice- 
chairman who shall hold office fo r a term of two years. 
The chairman and vice-chairman shall be chosen alterna­
tely from  amongst the two groups of organizarijns and 
associations listed in A rtic le  4 (3).
2. (a) The chairm an or vice-chairman whose term of
office has expired shall remain in office u n til he
has been replaced.
(b) Should the chairman or vice-chairman cease to
hold office before expiry o f his term, he shad be
replaced for the remainder o f the term by a person 
appointed in the manner prescribed in paragraph 1 
upon a proposal from the group to which his orga­
nization or association belongs.
A rtic le  8
The Com m ittee shall create a Bureau consisting of the 
chairman and vice-chairman together w ith  four additional 
representatives of each of the two groups listed in Artic le 
4 (3) (a) to plan and coordinate its work, each group selec­
ting  its own additional representatives.
473
/N o L 230/24 Official Journal of the European C om m unities 24. 8. 90
Article
The Committee or its Bureau m a y :
(a) set up working groups to facilitate its work. I t  may 
authorize a member to delegate another representative 
of his organization or association, who shall be named, 
to take his place in a working g ro u p ; such delegate 
shall enjoy the same rights at meetings o f the working 
group as the member he replaces;
(b) ask the Commission to appoint experts to assist it  in  
specific tasks.
Each group of members specified in A rtic le  4 (3) may be 
accompanied by one or more experts, who are specially 
qualified in any particular subject on the agenda. The 
expert shall be present on ly for the discussion of the 
particular subject for w h ich his attendance is required.
Article 10
The Committee shall be convened by its Secretariat at the 
request o f the Commission after consultation of the 
chairman and vice-chairman. The Com m ittee may also 
meet at the in itia tive of the bureau, in  agreement w ith  the 
Commission and convened by its secretariat The agenda 
for its meetings w ill contain items for which the 
Commission requests an op in ion of the Com m ittee and 
items decided by unanimous agreement o f the Bureau.
Meetings of the Bureau shall be convened by the secret­
ariat after consultation of the chairman and the vice- 
chairman.
A rtic le  11
1. No opin ion of the Com m ittee shall be valid unless 
two-thirds of the members are present
2. The Committee shall subm it its opin ions or reports 
to the Commission. I f  an op in ion or report is not unani­
mous, the Com m ittee shall submit to the Commission 
the dissenting views delivered.
A rtic le  12
1. The Commission shall provide a secretariat for the 
Committee, the Bureau and the w ork ing groups.
2. The Commission shall ensure the attendance at all 
meetings of the Committee, the Bureau and working 
groups of representatives of appropriate seniority from the 
relevant departments.
|
3. A representative of the Secretariat of each of the 
organizations or associations listed in Article 4 (3) (a) may 
attend the meetings of the Committee as observer.
I1
4. The Commission, in agreement with the Bureau, 
may ask other organizations than those mentioned in 
Article 4 (3) to participate as observers in the Committee’s 
work.
5. The organizations and associations mentioned in 
A rtic le  4 (3) can indicate at m axim um  2 observers from  
European countries other than the Member States of the 
European Comm unities.
Article 13
I f  the Commission has inform ed the Com m ittee that an 
op in ion requested relates to a matter of a confidentia l 
nature, members o f the Com m ittee shall be bound, 
w ithou t prejudice to the provisions o f A rtic le  214 o f the 
EEC Treaty, not to disclose any in fo rm ation acquired at 
the meetings of the Committee, the working groups of 
the Bureau.
Article 14
A fter hearing the Com m ittee’s views, the Com m ission 
may review this statute in the ligh t o f experience.
This Decision shall take effect on 1 August 1990.
Done at Brussels, 30 Ju ly  1990.
For the Commission 
Vasso PAPANDREOU 
M em ber o f the Commission
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LIST OF INTERVIEWEES
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This list contains the names of European Community officials and members of 
the European Parliament, as well as of representatives of individual member- 
states and of international organizations, of individual airlines and airline 
organizations, trade unions, pilot associations, consumer and other interest 
groups. All of them provided useful information on a wide range of issues 
concerning the EC air-transport politics and policy-making, as well as on 
specific issues in the areas of their concern. Special reference is made to 
most of them in certain parts of this study, but there are also a few who are 
mentioned only here, since their contribution to our better understanding and 
explanation of EC air-transport politics and policy-making was of a more 
general kind. Some of our anonymous sources are mentioned below, but 
others are not.
Alexopoulos, Nicolas, Greek, principal administrator of the Transport Section 
of Economic and Social Committee of the EC (ECOSOC), (interview, 7 Nov. 
1990).
Ambrose, A., Mike, Briton, director general of European Regional Airlines 
Association (ERA) (interview, 30 May 1991).
Anastasopoulos, George, Greek MEP, president of the Committee of 
Transport and Tourism of the EP (interview, 19 Jan. 1989).
Argyris, Nicholas, Briton, Head of the division iii for Transport and Tourist 
industries of directorate D of DG IV for Competition (interview, 7 Dec. 1990).
Barbin, S., Air Transport expert officer of ECAC, ex-French CAA employee 
responsible for multilateral affairs, interview, 23 Nov. 1990).
Brown, John, Irishman, Transport Counsellor of the Permanent 
Representation of the Republic of Ireland (interview, 16 Nov. 1990).
Burlough, R. N., Briton, principal administrator of division iii for social aspects 
of transport of directorate C of DG VII for Transport (interviews, 9 Nov. 1990 
and 6 Dec. 1990).
Castro, Yose Osorio, Transport Counsellor of the Permanent Representation 
of Portugal to the EC (interview, 16 Nov. 1990).
Chene, Claude, Frenchman, Transport advisor of the Commissioner Karel Van 
Miert of DG VII for Transport (interview, 5 Dec. 1990).
Cremoni (Di) Tosti, Carlo, Italian, principal administrator of division i for air 
transport of directorate C of DG VII for Transport (interview, 5 Nov. 1990).
Cockroft, David, Briton, secretary general of International Transport Workers' 
Federation (ITF) (interview, 19 June 1991).
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Cotterill, M., R., head of economic policy division of UK CAA (interview, 31 
May 1991).
Crampton, Stephen, Secretary of Consumers in the EC Group in UK (CECG) 
(interview, 28 May 1991).
De Bastos, Marinho J., Portuguese, principal administrator of air transport of 
directorate C of Transport Policy of DG D of the Council Secretariat for 
Research, Energy, Transport, Environment, and Consumer Protection 
(interview, 8 Nov. 1990).
De Borger, R., Transport Counsellor of the Permanent Representation of 
Belgium to the EC (interview, 5 Nov. 1990).
Denton, Nicholas, Transport and Tourism Counsellor of the Permanent 
Representation of UK to the EC (interview, 12 Nov. 1990).
Deslandes, Christian, secretary general of the French Union General 
Federation of Transport and Equipment Workers (FGTE) (interview, 21 Nov.
1990).
Devellenes, Yves, Frenchman, principal administrator of air transport in 
Division iii for Transport and Tourism of directorate D of DG IV for Competition 
(interview, 29 Nov. 1990).
Enderle, Yves, president of the Belgian Airlines Cockpit Crew Association 
(ABPNL), (interview, 7 Dec. 1990).
Finstfein, Helena, administrative employee of the British Airlines’ Pilots 
Association (BALPA) (interview, 5 June 1991).
Frohnmeyer, Albrecht, German, head of division ii for transport infrastructure 
of directorate C of DG VII for Transport (interview, 22 Oct. 1990).
Gjertsen, Trygve, Norwegian, general manager of SAS to Belgium and 
Luxembourg (interview, 29 Nov. 1990).
Gomez, Gerard, safety advisor of the French Union National Syndicate of 
Commercial Aviation Personnel (SNPNC) (interview, 23 Nov. 1990).
Grenier, Corina, research executive of the French Consumer Association of 
the Air Transport Users (AFUTA), (interview, 23 Nov. 1990).
Gosselin, Alfred, Belgian, secretary general of the International Federation of 
Trade Unions of Transport Workers/World Confederation of Labour (FIOST- 
WCL) (interview, 14 Nov. 1990).
Hasselt, (Van) Ludolf, Belgian, administrator of division i for air transport of 
directorate C of the DG VII for Transport, (interview, 8 Nov. 1990).
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Hennon, Joe, Irishman, air-transport rapporteur of the division iii of directorate 
D of DG IV for Competition (interview, 30 Oct. 1990).
Holubowicz, P. R., Belgian, director general of the European Community’s 
Independent Airline Association (ACE) and member of the Joint Committe of 
Civil Aviation (JCCA) (interview, 15 Nov. 1990).
Houtte, Ben Van, Dutchman, administrator of division iii for Transport and 
Tourism of Directorate D of D O  IV for Competition (interview, 9 Nov. 1990).
Hudson, Edward, Briton, secretary general of the European Civil Aviation 
Conference (ECAC), (interview, 20 Nov. 1990).
Johannes, Hartmut, German, hearing officer of DG IV for Competition 
(interview, 23 Oct. 1990).
Howard, Stuart, ex-researcher of civil air-transport group of Transport and 
General Workers' Union (TGWU) and curently head of ITF's civil aviation 
section (interviews, 3 June 1991 and 4 April 1993).
Iddon, Clive, Briton, Secretary of Committee Transport of the Workers' Unions 
Committee in the EC (CTWV) (interview, 30 Oct. 1990).
Jeandrain, Pierre, Belgian, general manager of the Intelligence Service for Air 
Transport in the EC (AEROPA), (interview, 27 Nov. 1990).
Jullien, Danielle, international affairs officer of the French union National 
Syndicate of Commercial Aviation Personnel (SNPNC), and member of the 
Joint Committee of Civil Aviation (JCCA), (interview, 23 Nov. 1990).
Kanganis, Marina, Frenchwoman, secretary general and head of multilateral 
affairs of the French ex-independent airline UTA, (interview, 22 Nov. 1990).
Keramianakis, Manolis, head of the division for the aeropolitical affairs to the 
EC for the Greek CAA (interview, 22 April 1989).
Kontou, Nancy, Greek, air-transport rapporteur to the division iii of the 
directorate D of DG IV for Competition, interview, 26 Oct. 1990).
Korkodilas, Andreas, director of commercial planning of the Greek national 
airline Olympic Airways (OA) (interview, 18 Jan. 1991).
Koutsogiannos, George, president of the Federation of Civil Aviation 
Associations of Olympic Airways (OSPA), (interview, 18 Jan. 1991).
Laprevote, Paul, administrator and member of the board of the French 
national airline Air France for the union of FGTE-CFDT, member of the high 
consultative Commission of the French Civil Aviation, and member of the Joint 
Committee of Civil Aviation (JCCA) (interview, 22 Nov. 1990).
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Lothe Dalstoe, Andreas, Norwegian, Transport Counsellor of the Permanent 
Representation of Norway to the EC, (interview, 13 Nov. 1990).
Meheust, Jean Paul, president of the French Union National Syndicate of 
Commercial Aviation Personnel (SNPNC), (interview, 23 Nov. 1990).
Miart, Jacques, Frenchman, air-transport rapporteur of the division iii of the 
directorate D of DG IV for Competition, (interview, 23 Oct. 1990).
Middleton, Terry, Briton, executive administrator of the International 
Federation of Air Line Pilots' Association (IFALPA), (interview, 13 June 1991).
Mosca, Laura, Belgian, economic advisor of the European Bureau of 
Consumers Unions (BEUC), (interview, 7 Dec. 1990).
Mota, Cardoso, Portuguese, principal administrator of division iii for Transport 
and Tourism of directorate D of DG IV for Competition, (interview, 13 Nov.
1990).
Noordt (Der), Van A., Transport Counsellor of the Permanent Representation 
of Netherlands to the EC (interview, 12 Nov. 1990).
Obe MacFarlane, Frank J., Irishman, chief executive of the European 
Business Aviation Association (EBAA) (interview, 29 Nov. 1990).
Olmo (Del) Carlos Ibarz, Transport Counsellor of the Permanent 
Representation of Spain to the EC, (interview, 31 Oct. 1990).
Paganelli, Erifili, Greek, lower grade officer of the division i for air transport of 
directorate C of DG VII for Transport, (interview, 7 Nov. 1990).
Parr, John, Briton, director general of the Air-Transport Users Committee 
(ATUC) and ex-Director of air transport and shipping division of the directorate 
C of Transport Policy of DG D for Research, Energy, Transport, Environment 
and Consumer Protection of the Council Secretariat, (interview, 4 June 1991).
Pisters, Marel, German, deputy secretary general of the Association of 
European Airlines (AEA) and responsible for the social aspects interview, (12 
Nov. 1990).
Prentice, Derek, assistant director of Consumers' Association Limited, and 
member of the Consumers in the EC Group in UK (CECG) (interview, 31 May
1991).
Radice, Graziella, Italian, air-transport rapporteur of the division iii of the 
directorate D of DG IV for Competition, (interview, 26 Oct. 1990).
Remmer, Niels, Transport Counsellor of the Permanent Representation of 
Denmark to the EC, (interview, 9 Nov. 1990).
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Rokofillos, John, member of the Greek Pilot Association (EHPA), (interview, 17 
July 1990).
Ryde, George, Briton, national secretary of the Transport and General 
Workers'Union (TGWU), civil air-transport group, (interview, 5 June 1991).
Sabourin, Jacques, general director of the French Consumer Association of 
the Air Transport Users-AFUTA (interview, 23 Nov. 1990).
Seebohm, Eckard, Belgian, administrator of division i for air transport of 
directorate C of DG VII for Transport, (interview, 6 Nov. 1990).
Sorensen, Frederick, Dane, head of division i for air transport of directorate C 
of DG VII for Transport (Interview, 12 Nov 1990).
Stahle, Bo, Norwegean, vice president of SAS for EC and government 
relations in Belgium, (interview, 4 Dec. 1990).
Stamoulis, John, Greek MEP, member of the Committee Transport and 
Tourism of the EP, (interview, 7 Dec. 1990).
Stasinopoulos, Dimitrios, Greek, principal administrator of DG VII for Transport 
in the Administrative Unit attached to the Director General of DG Vll-Liaison 
Relations with other EC Institutions (interview, 28 Oct. 1990).
Stoquart, M., Deputy Transport Counsellor of the Permanent Representation 
of Belgium to the EC, (interview, 5 Nov. 1990).
Tack, Freddy, national secretary of the Belgian union FGTB-CGSP of 
telecommunication and aviation workers, (interview, 14 Nov. 1990).
Tsimbiropoulou, Roxani, senior superintendent of aeropolitical affairs for EC of 
the Greek national airline Olympic Airways (OA) (interview, 24 Jan. 1991).
Tsimas, Kostas, Greek MEP, (interview, 17 Oct. 1990).
Valladon, Rene, secretary general of the French Federation of FO (Force 
Ouvriers) of the Equipment of Transports and Services (FETS), (interview, 22 
Nov. 1990).
Vanderlinden, M., advisor of the air-transport division of the Belgian CAA, 
(interview, 24 Oct. 1990).
Veenstra, Kees, Belgian, general manager of aeropolitical affairs of the 
Association of European Airlines (AEA), (interview, 29 Oct. 1990).
Vincent, Daniel, Frenchman, director of directorate C for air transport, 
transport infrastructure, social and ecological aspects of transport, of DG VII 
for Transport (interview, 6 Dec. 1990).
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Webb, Steven, assistant manager of commercial and government affairs for 
EC of the UK national airline British Airways (BA) (interview, 4 June 1991).
Weber, Paul, Briton, administrative assistant of division i for air transport of 
directorate C of DG VII for Transport, (interview, 5 Dec. 1990).
Yuksel, Selfik, Turk, general manager of commercial affairs of Association of 
European Airlines (AEA) (interview, 31 Oct. 1990).
The bulk of the interviews, especially with EC officials, held in 
connection with this thesis fell into the period between 1 October and 15 
December 1990.
The 75 personal interviews were conducted without a  specific 
framework, in both formal and off-the-record discussions. Some interviewees 
were selected by myself, others I was referred to in the course of our 
conversations.
All information given was recorded and transcribed by the author, and is 
available for purposes of verification. The lengths of the interviews varied 
between 20 minutes and several hours.
I approached the majority of my interviewees by letter, introducing my 
self and asking for an appointment. Individuals were selected because they 
were members of the personnel of DG IV (Competition) and DG VII 
(Transport). One interviewee was an official in the Secretarial of the Council of 
Ministers. I also interviewed nine permanent Transport Counselors of the 
member-states, three Euro MPs who were members of the Transport and 
Tourism Committee of the European Parliament, and one member of the 
Economic and Social Committee of th e  EC (ECOSOC). Finally I interviewed 
representatives of EC, European, and international umbrella organizations and 
interest groups, as well as people from individual member-states, airlines, 
trade unions and pilot associations.
If I spoke with more people from one position or interest group than
another, this was because they were more readily available, quite apart from
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being of the greatest interest to me.
Generally speaking, the response from the EC officials was rather 
guarded, less so with respect to DG VII than DG IV. I was able to see the 
transport director of DG VII and even the directorate’s transport advisor to the 
Commissioner. Access to DG IV in each majority was restricted to lower- 
ranking personnel. N. Argyris, the head of Transport and Tourism division of 
DG IV, needed the most patience and even pressure before I could reach him. 
Other higher officials in DG IV refused to see me altogether. Jonathan Faull, 
air-transport advisor and cabinet-staff member of Commissioner Sir Leon 
Brittan, angrily broke into a conversation I was having with his secretary who 
was telling me yet again that he was unavailable and could not be reached. He 
informed m e that the EC is not a  charitable organization and that he  had better 
things to do than help researchers. He then hung up. I never saw him. Ruth 
Frommer also, head of the air transport social division in DG VII, consistently 
refused to see me, and when I went to her office to see her without 
appointment, she threw me out. In general, all EC officials seemed afraid to 
talk about their Commissioners, or to criticize anyone at the top of the 
hierarchy.
The nationalities and functions of my interviewees are set out to the 
Table below which is arranged in order of the number of interviews given.
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NATIONALITIES AND FUNCTIONS OF INTERVIEWEES
Fu n c t io n s Belgium D enm ark G er m a n y G r e e c e Fra n c e ITALY IRELAND LUXEMBOURG 
AND/OR OTHER 
COUNTRIES
N eth e r la n d s . Po ltu g a l S pain UK Total
1) TRADE UNIONS 2 1 6 4 13
2) AIRLINES 2 1 2 1 1 31 2 12
3) DG VII OFFICIALS 2 1 1 2 22 1 2 11
4) DG IV OFFICIALS 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 9
5) TRANSPORT 
COUJNCELLORS
2 1 1 13 1 1 1 1 9
6) CONSUMERS 1 2 3 6
7) MEMBER-STATES 1 1 14 25 5
8) PILOTS 1 1 2 4
9) EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
MPs
3 3
10)COUNSIL OF TRANSPORT 
SECRETERlAT
1 1
11) ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
COMMITTEE
1 1
12) PLATFORM 
ORGANIZATIONS
1 1
TOTAL 112 2 3 12 14 2 3 4 2 3 1 17 75
1 1ncludes individuals representing the Scandinavian airline SAS from Norway and Sweden, and a Turk representing Association of European Airlines AEA.
2 Including the member of the staff of cabinet and transport advisor of the Commissioner of DG VII (transport) Karel Van Miert.
3 Transport Counsellor of Norway.
4 Serving in Ihe European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC).
5 One serving in the European Civil Aviatioh Conference (ECAC).
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